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iSUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Introduction - Over the last decade or so the question of the place
of alternative automotive powerplants in the future of the American passen-
ger car has been a controversial one. The air pollution and energy prob-
lems have become social issues in which changes in automotive engine
technology must inevitably play an important role. However, the industry's
alternative powerplant R & D programs have been small compared to its
massive investments in R & D and in plant and equipment for modifying
the internal combustion engine (ICE), the associated driveline, and the
bodies and frames of their new vehicles. The apparent reluctance of the
industry's "Big Three" to deal "seriously" with the alternative power-
plants has led to calls for massive Federally-supported R & D programs de-
signed to produce "production prototypes" on a crash basis, much as the
Apollo program accomplished a national goal through such R & D. The industry
position has traditionally been that they provide what the automobile customer
wants; that the future of automotive technology should be determined by
those who know it best, i.e., itself; and that any government funding in
the area would therefore be invested in technologies either already being
given suitable consideration in industry or whose expected outcome would not
justify the expenditure.
This is the issue we have examined. Put succinctly: Should the Federal
Government support the development of alternative automotive powerplants?
We specifically address programs whose purpose it is to advance the
technology with the ultimate goal that the new power systems would be in-
corporated into substantial numbers of new passenger cars. We have
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approached this issue by assuming that the Big Three behave in a manner
which reflects their and their managements' self-interests, which are in
various ways different from the interests of society as a whole, and that
government interventions in the automobile market should be aimed at at-
taining a more socially optimal behavior of the automotive sector. This
would be accomplished by arranging a better alignment of the Big Three's
self-interests with those of society, by influencing other firms in the
automotive market, or through direct government activity. We have specifi-
cally examined how the government might perform this function by supporting
R & D on alternative powerplants. Three specific technologies are analyzed
in detail as representative of the three general classes of alternative
power systems: the Stirling engine, from among the advanced heat
engines; the diesel engine, from among those engines not too dissimiliar
from the ICE; and the electric vehicle, which would have operating features
and societal impacts substantially different from those of any of the heat
engines.
R & D support is the only government policy tool we explicitly examine;
we take the view of the R & D planner by assuming that other government
interventions in this market, such as changes in the Clean Air Act or fuel
economy improvement programs, are uncertain over the time-frame of interest --
the 1980's and 1990's -- and independent of alternative powerplant develop-
ments. This assumption is realistic because the performance standards
actually implemented in such regulatory programs must be tied to the
"available technology", and, due to the time scales involved in major
technological changes, the "available" powerplant technology is and will
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continue to be the ICE over this timeframe. These regulatory programs
therefore have been, and will likely to continue to be, conducted in-
dependently of alternative powerplant developments. We do address the
impacts these programs have on alternative powerplant development.
The Process of Automotive TD&P - Our analysis begins with a brief
examination of the present market for passenger cars, including the supply
side (principally the Big Three -- General Motors, Ford and Chrysler), the
demand side, and the present government interventions. We are interested
in how major technological changes, such as the development and introduction
of a new powerplant, have been handled in the past and how they are likely
to be handled in the future. A simple descriptive model for this process
of "technology development and production" (TD&P) is developed; the model
consists of sequential stages of development or productive activity, and
intervening decisions to advance, continue or terminate an evolving system
among the stages.
Several conclusions emerge from this examination of the present market.
First,the barriers to entry in the automotive industry, and the Big Three's
demonstrated willingness and ability tD respond to technological threats
from other automobile manufacturing firms, imply that they will continue
to control the domestic market. It follows that they do make major techno-
logical product changes when external technological threats must be
averted, and also, though less certainly when significant technological
opportunities arise. Second, major technological change in this industry is
very risky business. This is due in part to the replacement nature of
the demand for automobiles; i.e., that most new cars are sold as replace-
ments for old ones and therefore the decision to buy a new car is one that
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usually can be easily postponed. In part it is also due to the high
level of performance and cost optimization achieved in the continuous
evolution of the automobile, whose principal subsystems are mostly im-
proved versions of those used continuously for nearly half a century.
These features result in a demand for automobiles which is highly variable
and unpredictable, both over time and in its response to various techno-
logical attributes, and a manufacturing process which is highly capital
intensive and thus relatively inflexible. Any major technological change
must therefore be preceded by a lengthy and expensive R & D process, and
major investments in plant and automated mass production equipment, before
being introduced into the marketplace; thus the risky nature of major in-
novations. Third, there are steps the manufacturers can take to reduce
the possible dollar loss associated with the failure of a major technologi-
cal product innovation, principally associated with the failure of a major
technological proudct innovation, principally associated with designing
the innovation for a high degree of "integrability". This and other
measures taken to hold down the total initial investment in the innovation,
both in the Big Three and in associated support industries (especially
fuel supply), provide an "introduction barrier"t , which an innovation must
overcome before its advantages can be fully realized by consumers. Fourth,
the history of government involvement in the automobile industry has further
added to the uncertainties involved in major changes, as perceived by the
industry. Finally, the necessarily lengthy stages of TD&P, plus the
subsequent turnover of the in-use fleet, mean that on the order of fifteen
to twenty years would elapse from commencement of an intensive R & D
program on a major technological innovation until the resulting significant
change in the average attributes of the nation's automobile fleet.
v-The Federal R & D Decision - Our analysis of the Federal R & D
decision begins by sorting out the various reasons why the government
might want to do R & D on alternative automotive powerplants. R & D for
the objective of advancing the state-of-the-art should be justified, as
discussed above, by some divergence between the self-interest of the Big 
Three and the nation at large. Such a disparity can be reasonably well
demonstrated in this case, due principally to: (1) generally recognized
features of the economics of R & D investment which apply to all technolo-
gies, but which are uniquely significant in this industry due to the vast
economic impact of the production and operation of its product, (2) the
disparity between the value of automotive fuels and their market price,
caused principally by a national goal for security from dependence on foreign
supplies not reflected in the market price and government price controls
which hold the market price of automotive fuel well below its value to the
nation, and (3) the Clean Air Act, which forces the industry to focus its
R & D resources on technology available in the very near-term, thus rein-
forcing its natural predilection toward small and evolutionary changes,
and which adds risk to long-term investments due to uncertainties in the
standards of the regulated air pollutants, the possibility and unpredicta-
ble level of standards for presently unregulated air pollutants, and possi-
ble government responses to the availability of new technology. While
this social-private disparity means that the government should be "sympathetic"
toward proposals for government support of alternative powerplant R & D,
it provides little in the way of guidance for project election or program
design.
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A crucial feature of government-supported automotive R & D is that it
is attempting to influence the technology of a consumer product; this is
in notable contrast to most previous government-supported technology
development for which the Federal Government itself was the purchaser.
Thus any technology supported by the government must be ultimately "commer-
cialized", i.e., it must meet the test of the marketplace (including what-
ever government interventions are extant at that time). Two implications
of the commercialization requirement are of great importance. First, any
government-supported technology must not only be socially beneficial (in
order to merit government support) but it must be privately advantageous
as well (or it will fail the market test). Given the important discrep-
ancies between the social and private interests in the automotive market
as cited above, this implies important limits on the ability of government
support of R & D alone to correct social-private disparties. Second, it
implies that Big Three involvement in automotive R & D is very important
during the last stages of R & D because (i) only the Big Three have the
experience and capability to perform the key element of final development;
i.e. initial cost reduction through product design and process development;
similar considerations apply to other key elements such as "integrability"
and pleasability", and (ii) Big Three involvement, through financial
contribution, is desirable because it insures that industry's evaluation
is that the ultimate product may well be marketable, and provides the
necessary incentives for incorporating and emphasizing the key market features
which could be the crucial determinant of the system's success.
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A number of important features of the government's automotive R & D
decision severely limit the applicability of quantitative evaluation
techniques to project selection. First, the choice is dominated by
massive uncertainties which make the net benefits of the interesting
alternative powerplants uncertain over a range at least equal to their
most likely level. These uncertainties include: the future price of
fuel, future consumer tastes, future emissions standards, and the extent
of the technological evolution of the ICE. Second, it is not clear how
to evaluate what industry might do toward supporting alternative power-
plant R & D in the absence of Federal support. Third, some of the rele-
vant national objectives are unclear, such as the nation's willingness to
pay for reduced petroleum imports or reduced air pollutant emissions.
Finally, small improvements in automotive technology, such as a several-
percent savings in fuel consumption costs, result in massive future bene-
fits, with a present value easily in the billions of dollars; making many
projects with even very low probabilities of success apparently beneficial
on the net.
In the face of these considerations what can be said about a rational
role for the government in supporting alternative automotive powerplant
R & D? First, the goal for such programs should be reduced social life-
cycle cost of automobile operation, while meeting long-term emissions
standards, and treating other non-pecuniary attributes on a case-by-case
basis. An important feature of such a goal is that it explicitly treats
the value of "energy conservation" by incorporating an appropriate social
value of automotive fuel.
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Second, individual projects should be evaluated by a crude cost-benefit
analysis, which would include: an examination of the state of the techno-
logy, present programs and the key technological or other barriers which
explain the level of industry interest; an evaluation of target attribute
levels and the probability of meeting them (or the incremental probability
associated with government expenditures if an industry program is already
underway); an evaluation of the likelihood of commercialization; and,
finally, estimates of the usual social costs and benefits. The relative
emphasis among these analyses will be quite idiosyncratic to the particular
technology in question.
Finally, the design of government programs must be carefully tailored
to the particular technology, its status in industry, and the reasons for
that status, at any given time. These provide the government with a guide
as to where its R & D efforts must be focused. Given the great uncertain-
ties involved, it is clear that any government program must be carefully
reevaluated on a periodic basis -- in both social and private terms. The
R & D program itself will reduce the technological uncertainties; whether
or not the remaining uncertainties, such as emissions regulations, will be
resolved with time is unclear. However, it is clear that any government
program must be carefully aligned with the industry process of TD&P; most
importantly it would be desirable to have direct cost-sharing programs in
the final stages of R & D (as discussed above). While it will be impossible
to tell just what level of R & D investment the industry would undertake in
any given instance without government support, the features of the auto-
mobile market which would tend to cause the industry to underinvest in
alternative powerplants R & D (discussed above) make it likely that a
"toughly" negotiated cost-sharing agreement would be somewhere close to equit-
able.
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The Baseline ICE - One of the critical uncertainties in evaluating the
potential benefits of the alternative powerplants is the extent to which
the baseline technology will change. The key attributes of the ICE, its 
fuel consumption and cost, are therefore evaluated as a function of time
and the emission standards imposed upon it. That is, we have projected the
likely progress of the extensive industry programs in this area. With no
change in emission standards, the minimum expected engine economy improve-
ment by 1985 is about 15%, relative to the 1975 engine; gains much larger
are possible. The imposition of more stringent emissions standards could
result in losses of up to about 25%, relative to the 1985 engine at present
standards. The principal uncertainty is that associated with the change due
to emission standards, and it adds substantially to the uncertainty in the
benefits of any alternative powerplant. The 1985 ICE could cost up to about
$150 more than the present ICE, due both to efficiency and emissions improve-
ments, but this is probably smaller than the impact of efficiency changes
on vehicle life-cycle costs.
The Stirling Engine - A case study on potential government support of
R & D on the Stirling engine illustrates virtually every feature of the
general problem as described above. The Stirling engine is representative
of a major class of alternative powerplants. These are advanced heat en-
gines which are substantially different from the ICE, offer low emissions,
relative insensitivity to fuel properties and, possibly, high vehicle fuel
economy; but would require a major development effort before their actual
attributes and economic competitiveness with the ICE can be determined.
The modern automotive Rankine cycle and gas turbine engines are the other
important (although distinctive) members of the class.
xPrototype Stirling engines on dynamometers have clearly demonstrated
low emissions and high fuel economy relative to the present ICE. Stirling-
powered vehicles have the potential to equal every other important attri-
bute of ICE-powered vehicles; the principal uncertainty is the engine's
initial cost, which will likely lie in a range from the cost of the
present ICE to about twice that. Maintenance costs are also uncertain.
At the present time a total professional manpower of about 230 and an
annual expenditure of $5-10 million are being committed to development
of the engine; the programs are taking place almost entirely in Europe.
A crude social cost-benefit analysis for government investment in the
Stirling system demonstrates substantial likely net benefits. A simple total
operating cost model developed for Stirling-powered vehicles illustrates
the impact of the critical uncertainties on the key development target --
the engine's initial cost -- and the potential benefits which might be ob-
tained from its commercialization. At the engine costs in the range of in-
terest, the uncertainty in the system's total social operating advantage is
as large as its likely level -- several tenths of a cent per mile. Similarly
the maximum allowable premium of engine cost over the ICE (for positive
total operating benefits), is uncertain over a range as large as its
likely level -- up to 50% or so. However, technical and commercial success
of the system could provide social benefits with a present value of billions
of dollars. The technology is neither "embryonic" nor "mature", and
present and likely future private development programs are in the range
where incremental R & D funding probably substantially improves the proba-
bility of technical success. We conclude that government investment on
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the order of $100 to 200 million, over 5 to 10 years, is likely to be
a very good gamble.
The ways in which the government might involve itself in advancing
the Stirling system in the process of automotive TD&P deserve close analy-
sis. No major introduction barriers are likely for the Stirling system
except that many early Stirling users would probably run their vehicles on
gasoline, at a sacrifice in potential operating benefits. Some early
owners might be able to use diesel fuel, but the emissions issue on such
heavier fuels remains open. The criteria used by industry in their decision
to introduce the Stirling system would focus on initial system cost (al-
though of course many other criteria are involved); an analysis of the
social-private disparities previously discussed indicates clearly how a
socially beneficial system might be too expensive to be considered privately
advantageous. The implications for government-supported R & D are unfor-
tunately clear: unless the government intervenes to further change the
marketplace incentives, technologically-successful government-supported
development of a socially-beneficial Stirling engine may well terminate
without commercialization.
Because the Stirling engine is in the stage of R & D where initial cost
is the crucial attribute under development, the R & D activity should be
centered in the automotive industry. A cost-sharing agreement with one
of the Big Three would be most desirable, because a financial commitment
by one of them would give it a stake in a positive outcome, an outcome
which they are in fact best equipped and motivated to produce.
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The Ford Motor Company is presently involved in completing the initial
development of a Stirling engine, including vehicle testing of an early
demonstration engine, jointly with N.V. Philips of Holland. Ford plans
to request that the U.S. Government enter into a cost-sharing agreement
with it for the completion of the development program. As discussed above,
this is the type of program which the government should seek in this area.
Crucial issues will be the total program level and how the costs should
be split. Control of the patents for newly developed technology would
be of lesser importance in this case since the system is in the late
stages of development. It is difficult for us to offer specific guidance
on these questions; obviously a complicated negotiation procedure would
be involved. All we can say is that the government should be "sympathetic"
but "tough". Crucial technical judgments will have to be made on the
significance of various individual subprojects and their importance to
the project's overall success. However, we support the concept of the
shared-cost program with Ford on the Stirling engine, with both the govern-
ment and Ford bearing a substantial fraction of the $100-200 million likely
to be involved. As discussed above, such a program is probably a very
good gamble for the U.S. Government to take.
The Diesel Engine - In contrast to the Stirling engine, the diesel is
a relatively well developed technology which has been used for automotive
propulsion, including passenger cars, for many years. It is representa-
tive of a class of alternative powerplants which are heat engines not too
dissimilar from the ICE. Other engines in the same class are the Wankel
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spark-ignition enigne and the various types of stratified charge engine.
They are all in production for the passenger car application (though not
in the United States), and would allow the use of manufacturing techno-
logies and equipment very similar to those in use today. The diesel and
some stratified charge engines potentially offer a vehicle fuel economy
advantage over the ICE, but little or no advantage in air pollutant emis-
sions.
Lightweight, high-speed diesel engines have been designed for and
produced in the European and Japanese automotive markets for many years.
The diesel is also used in high mileage taxis and urban delivery vans in
these markets. A small number of European-made diesel-powered passenger
cars are imported onto the United States. In larger engine sizes, the
diesel is produced by several American manufacturers and extensively used
in buses and heavy trucks.
At a given power level, the diesel is considerably heavier, bulkier
and more expensive than the ICE. Its emissions of hydrocarbons and&
carbon monoxide are inherently low and do not require the initial and
operating expenses for their reduction to the statutory levels that would
be required of the ICE; but its emission of oxides of nitrogen cannot
be reduced to the present statutory levels (0.4 g/mile) with known or
forseeable technology, in contrast to the ICE. It also emits larger
quantities of currently unregulated pollutants -- especially particulates,
sulfur oxides, and odor. The diesel engine is inherently much more ef-
ficient than the ICE, but the extent to which this is translated into a
higher vehicle fuel economy depends strongly on the acceleration to which
the diesel-powered vehicle is designed, as does the initial cost premium
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for the diesel vehicle. The diesel could use a less expensive fuel than
the ICE (at least initially), and has lower maintenance costs, and gener-
ally matches the ICE on most other attributes. Turbocharging may affect
the weight penalty, but this is presently unclear. Some advanced con-
cepts are under consideration, but, other than the potential use of
ceramics, they do not appear to offer major changes in the attributes of
the diesel relative to the ICE.
A number of factors significantly influence the desirability, and
the likelihood, of the introduction of a domestically-produced diesel
vehicle. The economics of the diesel vehicle relative to the baseline
ICE depend strongly on its relative acceleration. If the engine is de-
signed with a displacement equal to that of the ICE it would replace in
a vehicle, as would likely be the case when it is first introduced, the
diesel vehicle's acceleration would be significantly poorer. The engine's
initial cost would be 10 to 50% higher than the ICE's, but this would al-
most surely be more than balanced by decreased maintenance and fuel costs
(including a 3-4¢/gal fuel price advantage corrected for equal energy
content, and at least a 30% relative fuel economy improvement). At
higher levels of performance, the fuel economy advantage is less, the
initial cost penalty is greater, and it is unclear whether the total
operating economics are advantageous. Because of the lower specific power
of the diesel, the total "cost" of vehicle performance is much greater for
the diesel than the ICE, so that even in the long run (after any introduc-
tion barriers are overcome), diesel vehicles will generally be designed
for lower acceleration. While these technological uncertainties are not
unimportant, they can be, and are being, resolved by the industry at modest
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cost. This situation must be contrasted with the case of the advanced
heat engines such as Stirling.
Of greater importance, since their resolution is much more difficult
and in fact unlikely, are the other uncertainties. First, there is the
emissions issue. In contrast to the Stirling case, the schedule of
future emissions standards has a direct impact on the economics of the
diesel and whether it can even be legally sold in passenger cars, as well
as indirect impacts due to its effect on the ICE. The most prominent un-
certainty is in the date when (if ever) the NO standard will be reduced
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below the effective limit for diesel technology; at present this occurs in
model year 1978. Adding significantly to this uncertainty are questions
associated with the diesel's unregulated air pollutant emissions, which
would presumably become regulated should the engine be marketed in signifi-
cant quantities. Another important uncertainty is the market appeal of
the diesel vehicle which would likely be introduced. To minimize the capi-
tal investment at introduction, it would likely have an engine with a dis-
placement roughly equal to the ICE it replaces, have a higher initial cost
but substantially lower operating costs, and be significantly poorer in
acceleration. Finally, fuel cost (in the long run) is unclear, as the
widespread use of the diesel in passenger cars would require changes in
petroleum refinery output mix, and the cost advantage of diesel fuel over
gasoline would likely diminish.
Based on these considerations the government's role in advancing diesel
technology can be addressed. Because the diesel is a relatively mature
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technology, for which development incentives have long existed, it is
unlikely that Federal support of R & D on the diesel would significantly
change its attributes over the next five to ten years, The principal
issues presently inhibiting diesel engine development and production for
passenger cars center on areas other than uncertainty in diesel techno-
logy. First, there is the issue of consumer acceptance of the set of
attributes the diesel provides. As with the Stirling, this is affected
by the government fuel pricing policies. For the most part, however, it
is the type of uncertainty which the industry is used to handling. Second,
and of a different nature, is the emissions issue, which is controlled by
the government. There does not now exist a solid basis for any schedule
of NO emissions standards. This is of course vitally important to the ICE
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as well. The effort required to bring a higher level of rationality to
emissions regulation is modest compared to the costs of a standard which is
unjustifiably high or low, but there is little government effort presently
in this area; nor has there been since it was widely recognized over five
years ago. The situation with respect to the presently unregulated pollu-
tants is similar in that the uncertainties themselves are very expensive to
the nation over the long run, due to their inhibition of technological
innovation, as with the diesel.
Thus, we conclude it is unlikely that there are significant gains to
be realized through government support of diesel engine technology
development for passenger car application. But government research pro-
grams designed to place light-duty vehicle NO emission standards on a
x
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sounder basis, and examine thoroughly the potential impact of diesel
particulate, sulfate, odor (and other unregulated) emissions if diesels
were introduced in large numbers, would contribute significantly to the
industry's ability to assess the attractiveness of the diesel relative
to the ICE. Uncertainties in these areas currently inhibit diesel engine
development and introduction.
The Electric Vehicle - The electric vehicle raises a substantially
different set of issues than the heat engines. Widespread use of electric
vehicles would make major changes in the character (rather than just the
degree) of the environment impact and energy consumption of the passenger
car fleet. Furthermorethe vehicle itself would be significantly different
from heat-engine-powered vehicles on a highly valued attribute -- its range
(between battery charges). The range of electric vehicles is inherently
limited and depends significantly on factors not generally considered by
present vehicle drivers when planning trips. Because the electric vehicle
is likely to become the passenger car technology which is generally pre-
ferred only in the (hopefully avoidable) case of significant liquid fuel
shortages, government support of R & D on electric vehicles can be thought
of as insurance, in contrast to the more usual investment in heat engine
R & D.
Analysis of electric vehicle technology is complex, and depends in
detail on the battery. The power and energy available from batteries are
strongly dependent on a number of factors, and in particular must be
traded off against each other, both in design and usage. This makes the
range of electric vehicles, for a given battery technology, very dependent
on how and under what circumstances they are driven. The range of electric
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vehicles is therefore elusive, and many paper analyses have been made
with erroneous or misleading results. Widely varying assessments of the
acceptability of electric vehicles using the various batteries now availa-
ble or under development have been published and widely quoted. Our
assessment is that only the advanced batteries, which will require sub-
stantial and successful development programs before they are widely
available at reasonable cost, would provide electric vehicles with a range
which would bring them into consideration as possible substitutes for other
than a miniscule fraction of the passenger car fleet. A number of such
R & D programs are now underway, some privately and some publicly funded.
The principal social value of the widespread use of electric vehicles
would be the reduction of the dependence of the passenger car fleet on
petroleum products. Thus, it would presumably lower the nation's depen-
dence on imported fuels, as electric power will likely be generated in-
creasingly using domestically available fuels. Other possible advantages
which are often discussed are improvements in the environmental impact
associated with the passenger car fleet and the provision of a market
for off-peak power. There are, however, important offsetting arguments:
the availability of other means for reducing the nation's dependence on
imports, the expected reductions in automotive emissions even with the
continuing use of the ICE or other heat engines, and the possible use of
advanced battery technology for load-levelling at the electric power-
plant site rather than in widely dispersed vehicles. Our judgment is
that it is not possible to reach any firm quantitative or even qualita-
tive judgment on the potential social value of the electric vehicle.
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However, since one can readily imagine circumstances, which might obtain
several decades from now, in which the nation might very much regret not
having accelerated the development of an acceptable electric vehicle
technology, and since the cost of battery R & D programs is extremely
modest compared to overall expenditures on personal transportation, we
conclude that the net value of such programs is positive.
The potential impact of the electric vehicle depends strongly on the
question of its acceptability to vehicle drivers as a replacement of
heat-engine-powered vehicles. There is substantial confusion as to both
the range such vehicles will provide and the range which users will
find acceptable. Unless these figures are in some proximity to each
other, the electric vehicle will neither be adopted by private choice
nor will governmental measures for its use be politically acceptable, An
electric vehicle's "range" can easily vary by a factor of three among com-
monly used technical definitions. Furthermore, none of these definitions
corresponds to what the electric vehicle user is likely to think of, namely
the range he can be confident he will get on a given day. The technical
definitions provide a standard set of conditions,but the vehicle user will
encounter non-standard conditions (congestion, cold days, hills, etc.)
where in his vehicle will not attain the technically defined range. The
range of a vehicle in actual service will deteriorate from the range
given for new batteries. The mere fact that he will often lose the freedom
to extend his trip, once it has begun, will be an unattractive feature.
Furthermore, we could find no statistical evidence indicating that second
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cars are used significantly differently from first cars (in contrast to
the often-made assumption that second cars are used for shorter trips).
In our judgment a nominal range, as determined on the SAE Metropolitan
Driving Cycle, of 100 to 200 miles is necessary for an electric vehicle
to be close to competitive with a small used conventional car.
This "almost competitive" range for passenger cars cannot be attained
by the available (or even plausible) lead/acid battery technology; might
be attained by the nickel/zinc batteries now under development and possi-
bly available within a few years; and can only be attained with any
assurance only with one of several advanced batteries now in relatively
early stages of development. Even if this range is attained, however,
lead/acid and nickel/zinc vehicles will be far more expensive to drive
than comparable ICE-powered vehicles.
Electric vehicles are significantly more attractive for usage in
urban fleet operatinns. This is because: (1) maximum required daily
ranges are reasonably short and highly predictable; (2) the fleet can
be managed so that vehicles with older batteries can be assigned to less
demanding routes; (3) battery exchange, maintenance and recharge opera-
tions can be centralized; (4) vehicle failure can be managed through
routine procedures; (5) higher total usage per year makes the raw
economics more attractive; (6) the vehicle can be tailored to meet particu-
lar fleet requirements; and (7) environmental gains are likely to be more
significant due to the high mileage and urban locations of these fleets.
Urban fleet operations are therefore the likely first candidates for signi-
ficant electric vehicle usage, and in fact near-term (principally nickel/zinc)
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technology may provide economical service in these fleets.
With these considerations in mind, we have reached a number of conclu-
sions concerning appropriate roles for the government in supporting elec-
tric vehicle technology. First, over the long run (25 years or more),
electric vehicles are an important, though not assured, prospect. Cre-
ation of an electric vehicle option would provide an insurance policy in
the event that liquid fuel supplies, including synthetics, prove extre-
mely expensive or limited. Second, a good case can be made for moderate
Federal encouragement of a small but growing electric vehicle industry, so
that development of the necessary intrastructure and non-battery techno-
logy would be undertaken. Third, there is little use in subsidizing passen-
ger car operations with current lead/acid battery technology; in fact,
such a program might inhibit future work in the electric vehicle area.
Limited subsidies to demonstrations in fleet operations are more plausi-
ble. What is needed in the area of demonstrations is not an immediate
action program, but a serious planning effort, looking at various possible
markets, types of programs, etc. Fourth, the near-term technologies, es-
pecially nicket/zinc battery, may prove economically viable in some appli-
cations, but two domestic and several foreign R & D efforts are underway,
and there seems little value to a government-funded R & D program. Ad-
vanced batteries which might allow the attainment of "almost competitive"
passenger cars deserve consideration for government support. Two efforts
are now receiving such support (the lithium/sulfur battery at ERDA's
Argonne National Laboratory and the sodium/sulfur battery under NSF and
ERDA support at Ford), some similar private (domestic) and foreign efforts
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are underway, but support of one or more promising domestic efforts seems
worthwhile. Sixth, and finally, substantial support of R & D on non-
battery electric vehicle technology does not appear warranted as the
battery is the crucial deficiency of present systems, and the improve-
ment of other features of the vehicle will naturally occur when battery
technology makes electric vehicles viable.
Closure - Alternative automotive powerplants potentially offer sub-
stantial benefits for American society in meeting the social goals of energy
conservation and low air pollution levels. However, in contrast to the
polar positions described in the Introduction above, the U.S. Government
should neither commence an Apollo-style crash program for the development
of production prototypes, nor should the Big Three be left to act on their
own. Rather, we recommend that the Federal Government support R & D on
some of the attractive alternative powerplants, but should always recognize
that, without substantial Big Three involvement, government-developed
automotive technology has little chance of making it into the marketplace.
Detailed analysis of the many important sub-issues, and of the individual
technologies, is difficult and uncertain, and calls for many judgements. But,
on the whole, carefully selected government investments in alternative
automotive powerplant R & D can be expected to pay off nicely in returns
to American society.
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PREFACE
This document is the second and last report resulting from a project
conducted by the M.I.T. Energy Laboratory and supported by the National
Science Foundation's Office of Energy R & D Policy. The first report,
"The Role for Federal R & D on Alternative Automotive Power Systems"
[1], was published in November, 1974, and contained the results of Phase I
1
of the program, which began in June, 1974. It examined the question:
Is it appropriate for the Federal Government to support research and
development (R & D) on alternative automotive powerplants? It was limited
in scope, focussing on the question of whether or not such government-
funded programs are appropriate, and did not evaluate in detail any of the
individual powerplants or the programmatic or organizational issues involved
in such a program. Past and current industry and government programs were
examined, the critical issues laid out, the various possible objectives
for Federal R & D examined, and the potential role of such a program as a
policy tool (among others) for meeting the relevant national goals
analyzed. The answer we then reported to this question was: "Yes, it is...
appropriate for the Federal Government to support R & D on alternative
automotive powerplants". This answer remains; no technolological break-
throughs, changes in relevant national policy or other factors, or basic
revisions in our own analysis have occurred which would cause us to change
that conclusion.
1Copies are available from the National Technical Information Service,
Springfield, Virginia 22161 (order no. PB-238 771/OWE, price: $6.25).
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In this, our Phase II report, we focus in detail on Federally-supported
R& D programs with the explicit objective of advancing the relevant techno-
logy. This is the most controversial of the possible objectives for
Federal R & D; it potentially involves an unprecedented major public
investment in the product technology of the nation's largest consumer
product industry. The study examines three of the proposed technologies in
detail (the Stirling, diesel and electric power systems) and broadens
the analysis into some of the technological and structural issues and
also into the stages of the technology introduction process not ordinarily
considered "R & D". While we do summarize (and broaden in Chapter 3)
some of the analysis of the Phase I report related to R & D for the
purpose of advancing the state-of-the-art, we repeat little of the back-
ground information contained in the Phase I report or the analysis of
R & D for the other objectives. Thus, while each of the two reports
stands alone, they should be considered companion volumes.
This report is very much the result of a team effort. Every chapter
received a detailed critical review, and often substantive inputs, from
team members other than its principal author. We all stand behind the
important conclusions of the report. However, we feel it appropriate
to identify the principal authors of the three case studies. They are:
Lawrence Linden for the Stirling engine, John Heywood for the diesel
engine, and Howard Margolis for the electric vehicle. Also
Michael K. Martin contributed to Chapter 3.
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We once again express our appreciation to the great many individuals,
in industry, government and academia, whose time and ideas were generously
contributed to this effort. In particular we acknowledge Dr. Leonard
Topper, formerly of the Office of Energy R & D Policy, National Science
Foundation, who initiated the program and has been actively (and
patiently) involved as contrast monitor.
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11. INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade the technology utilized in the passenger cars on
American roadways has been the source of widespread public concern. This
has resulted from the development of national goals, first for the reduc-
tion of the quantity of air pollutants in ambient air, and then for the
reduction of the national dependence on imported petroleum, which changes
in automotive technology must unquestionably play major roles n meeting.
In the air pollution area, the American automobile manufacturers have
significantly reduced the emissions from new vehicles principally by making
small, evolutionary, year-by-year changes in their engines and fuel systems
and introducing, in model year 1975, a minor technological innovation --
the exhaust catalyst. The fuel economy of domestically produced vehicles
is also being significantly improved, with major reductions in vehicle
weights (starting in model year 1977), new models (the Granada, Chevette,
etc.) -- but again only minor technological changes, principally in the
engine and drivetrain. This pattern is likely to continue over the next
decade at least.
There are, however, significantly different systems, in particular,
powerplants other than the carbureted spark-ignited Otto-cycle engine (or
"internal combustion engine," hereafter referred to as the "ICE") which
may offer the potential for significant and simultaneous improvements in
passenger car pollutant emissions and fuel consumption. The "Big Three"
American automobile manufacturers (the General Motors Corp., the Ford
Motor Co. and the Chrysler Corp.) have investigated these alternatives and
continue to conduct research and development (R & D) programs on them but,
2unless a significant new initiative is taken somewhere in industry or
government, it is not likely that any of them will reach the marketplace in
the foreseeable future. The Federal Gove:-ment's response to this situ-
ation has consisted, in part, of a relatively small R & D effort, prin-
cipally on two alternative powerplants. The Federal program's purpose has
been transitory and has never explicity included the direct advancement of
the state of the technology. The gap between the hopes and expectations
raised by the potential societal value of some of the alternative auto-
motive powerplants, and the actions of both industry and government have
been the source of continuing controversy, and the ultimate genesis of this
study.
This report addresses the question: Should the Federal Government
support the development of alternative automotive powerplants? We
specifically address the appropriateness of major new expenditures of
public funds for advancing alternative automotive powerplant technologies
with the explicit goal of significantly increasing the probability of their
incorporation into future American passenger cars. As discussed at length
elsewhere [1] (and briefly reviewed in Chapter 3), there are four objec-
tives for which Federally-supported automotive R & D might be conducted:
(1.) to advance the state-of-the-art; (2.) to support government procure-
ment programs; (3.) to develop data for regulatory decision, policy
formation, and public information; and (4.) provide "leverage" on private
sector activity. Here we focus on the first objective, which is easily the
most controversial, the most expensive, potentially the most significant,
and certainly the most difficult to analyze, of the four.
3By defining our central issue in this manner, we effectively exclude
from consideration other approachs to meeting the relevant national goals
for the automotive fleet, regulation in particular, from the set of
decision variables we analyze. Thus we will take the general structure of
the Clean Air Act as given, treat the schedule of emissions standards for
future vehicles and its evolution over time as uncertain, and attempt to
deal with our R & D question with this as a feature of the automotive
picture. Similarly we treat government intervention through fuel economy
regulations or incentives of some sort, beyond the present "voluntary"
fuel economy improvement program, as uncertain. 1 We will only consider the
impact that these regulatory activities (or other possibilities, such as
new car taxes based on fuel consumption) have on the planning and imple-
menting of possible government-supported programs. This is a reasonable
approach because the (unfortunate) practice is that regulatory goals
actually implemented have been set almost exclusively with the near-term
available technology" in mind. Because of the inherent time scales in-
volved in the development, marketing and conversion to an alternative
powerplant, the "available technology" (as previously defined ) has been
and will continue to be that of the ICE-powered systems. Thus our report
At this writing a conference committee has just reported to the floors
of the Houses of the Congress legislation containing mandatory average fuel
economy standards for vehicle manufacturers' new car fleets [2], but the
President has indicated that he may veto the legislation due to disagree-
ment with its extended continuation of crude oil price controls.
By the formal decisions of the Environmental Protection Agency's
Administrators and the associated court cases under the Clean Air Act.
4deals with the attempt to suboptimize, through R & D, a system with th.
other policy tools available to the Federal Government considered either
1
constant or uncertain. We hope this approach makes our report more useful
to the R & D planners and approvers, who are the most important of our
intended readers because, as implied in the above discussion, they have had
relatively little influence over the regulatory processes.
At this point we would like to make explicit our view of the most
useful and realistic approach a policy study of the sort we attempt here
can take in its analysis of the respective roles of government and industry
in American society. We accept the fact that the Big Three are economic
entities, whose managements follow a behavior pattern which is in their and
their firms' own self-interest (principally financial) as they see it,
within the legal constraints imposed by the government. In this respect
the Big Three's behavior is not different from that typically found in, or
generally expected of, major American manufacturing oligopolies (or other
firms), and there is little reason to suppose it would be so. In the
particular case of the automotive industry, there are reasons to believe
that there is in fact a significant gap between the Big Three's self-
interest and that of society as a whole, even within present and antic-
ipated legal constraints (such as the Clean Air Act); this source of gap
will be explored at some length in Chapter 3. Our goal is, first, to
understand how these firms operate within the legal, economic and techno-
logical environment they face (especially the key features of the process
In fact, we believe that a creatively designed regulatory or incentive
structure might eliminate much of the justification for Federally-supported
R & D, by inducing industry R & D, but such an approach does not seem to be
politically viable.
5of technological innovation in the industry), and then to determine how
that environment can best be modified so that their self-interest is more
closely aligned with that of society as a whole. In this report we examine
how the government might change that environment through the support of the
development of alternative automotive powerplants.
Since serious public debate on alternative automotive powerplants
began in 1967 with the publication of the "Morse Report" [3] and a set of
Senate hearings [4], the focus of most of the serious analysis has been the
relative technical merits of the alternative powerplants and the ICE;
analysis of the proper placement and structure of the interface between the
public and private efforts has been relatively neglected.1'2 This has been
a significant void: the issue is an important one in terms of the scale of
the potential costs and benefits involved, and the government's minimally
supported and ill-defined R & D effort has continued for six years without
ever achieving a convincing or widely accepted justification of purpose
(see Appendix A of [1]).
Within the last two years major advances have been made in the anal-
ysis of the technology with the development and application of techniques
for comparing the alternatives as part of optimized vehicle systems [7,8],
See Section 4.1 and the appendices of [1] for a historical review of
development of present industry and government programs and the accompany-
ing debate.
See Chapter 2 and Appendix B of [1] and also [5 & 61 for compilations
of the technological and programmatic history and status of the alternative
automotive powerplants.
6end for making consistent forecasts of technological advances [8].12
Lack of consideration of the entire vehicle as a system and inconsistent
technology forecasts have been two major flaws of previous alternative
powerplant comparisons. The recently released study by the Jet Propulsion
Laboratory (JPL) [8], includes by far the most detailed comparative ech-
nological analysis of the alternative powerplants and the most comprehensive
development of appropriate goals for R & D efforts that have been made to
date. However, in its attempt to select the best powerplant, even it
neglects (though not entirely) two important features of the problem;
namely the tremendous uncertainties associated with the technology fore-
casts and the impact of industry practices on the attributes of any alter-
native powerplant which might reach the marketplace.
The focus of this report is specifically not on the technologies per
se; we have performed no independent engineering analyses but rather have
relied on the available data on the technologies we xamined, as well as
comparisons and analyses such as JPL's. As we will make clear, we believe
that JPL's and others' similar results must be viewed in a perspective
sharply tempered by the realities of the uncertainties involved and the
likely industry behavior. We have explored these issues and the other key
ie JPL report calls for a 10-year, $1 billion R & D program to bring
ax alternative powerplant (the Stirling or gas turbine) to the marketplace;
buried in their conclusions and not supported by any significant analysis
or.details is the recommendation that the government should "ensure that
the program will be accomplished." [8; Vol. I p.86]
We acknowledge here a debt to the JPL report, whose publication
preceded that of this report; their much larger effort allowed them to
develop from basic sources many data for which we will reference them.
7features of this very rich problem in our analysis of what the Federal
Government should do (if anything) in advancing these technologies.
Our analysis of this issue is laid out in the following manner. First,
in Chapter 2, we step back from our focus on government R & D and look at
the automobile market as it exists today (specifically: without a major
government-supported R & D program). The key features of the automobile
manufacturers, automobile consumers, and the present government regulatory
intervention, are examined for their implications concerning major techno-
logical product changes. In particular the process of technological product
innovation in the Big Three is discussed and a simple model laid out for
use in the subsequent analysis, because it is the Big Three as we know them
today which will be the ultimate designers and producers of any alternative
powerplant which makes it to the marketplace.
Next, in Chapter 3, we address the general features of the Federal
R & D decision. First, the various possible objectives of government-
supported R & D on alternative powerplants are considered. Utilizing the
material developed in Chapter 2, we then focus on the issue of whether or
not there is a significant gap between the private and social costs and bene-
fits of long-range automotive powerplant R & D -- we consider the clear
existence of such a gap a necessary (but certainly not sufficient) condition
for government support of alternative powerplant development for the purpose
of advancing the state-of-the-art. The conditions under which a
socially-beneficial government-developed powerplant might be brought to
the marketplace (i.e. "commercialized") and the implications of this issue
for R & D project selection and program design are subsequently
8addressed (Chapter 2 again provides key background). Next we examine the
limitation imposed by a number of key uncertainties in the analysis of
the government's R & D decision. Finally, some general criteria for the
choice of technologies and program design are laid out.
In Chapter 4 one of the critical uncertainties -- the technological
evolution, over the next decade, of the"baseline" system, the ICE -- is
examined in detail.
Three case studies of government support of individual alternative
power systems are then presented. They are attempts to apply and demon-
strate the general features of the analysis of Chapter 3, viz. both to
utilize the analysis and to demonstrate its limitations. The alternative
power systems can be divided roughly into three categories; the three cases
were chosen to represent these categories.
In Chapter 5 the Stirling engine is examined in detail. It represents
the first class, the advanced heat engines; the other prominent members
of the class are the Rankine cycle and gas turbine engines. Each offers
potentially significant improvements over the ICE in either vehicle fuel
economy or pollutant emissions or both, but would require a substantial
development program beforeit couldbe mass-produced at reasonable cost in a
configuration demonstrating its potential advantages. Major changes in the
manufacturing processes and thus the equipment used by the automotive indus-
try would be required. These engines could not be in mass production in suit-
able configurations for at least a decade. The Stirling engine is addressed
as follows. First the status of the present (and likely future, near-term and
long-term) technology and R & D programs are reviewed (the details of the
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technology are relegated to Appendix A). After some discussion of the proper
method of comparing automotive powerplants, the social costs and benefits
of government-supported Stirling engine R & D are examined to determine the
likelihood that such investment has a positive expected net present value.
A simple model for the total operating costs of the Stirling engine, re-
lative to the contemporary (1985) ICE, is utilized. Finally, the issue of
commercialization and program design are addressed.
Next, in Chapter 6, a case study of the diesel engine is presented. It
is typical of those alternatives which, generally speaking, are not too
dissimilar from the ICE. The Wankel spark-ignition engine and the various
types of stratified charge engine can also be considered members of this
class. Some of these potentially offer a vehicle fuel economy advantage
over the ICE, but none offers obviously substantial improvements in air
pollutant emissions. They would not require the use of manufacturing proces-
ses significantly different from those used for the ICE; and they may be
considered as technology which either is available now, or could be in the
next few years. Our analysis of the diesel begins with a review of the
technology and present R & D programs, including an examination of present
diesel engine production and usage, and an assessment of the trade-off
between vehicle fuel economy and performance. The factors influencing
the process by which a domestically produced diesel-powered passenger car
would be introduced into the American marktplace are next addressed. Then
the appropriate roles for the U.S. Government in supporting R & D on the
diesel are discussed.
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The last class of alternative automotive power systems is that of
the electric vehicle; it has a number of properties which make it very
different from the various heat engines. The technology itself is very
different and would virtually require the establishment of a new battery
manufacturing industry. The attributes of electric vehicles are different
from those of vehicles powered by the heat engines, resulting in very
different environmental and energy impacts; and, due to the inherent range
limitation of electric vehicles, very different consumer acceptability
issues are raised. Our analysis begins again with a review of the techno-
logy and current R & D programs. The social value and issues of consumer
acceptability are next examined. Finally we look at the appropriate role
for government-supported R & D.
It would be desirable to develop a methodology for determining an
appropriate government role which would be general enough to apply to any
alternative powerplant. In fact, for reasons which will be made clear in
Chapter 3, this is not possible. We consider, therefore, that the case
studies we present in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 are at least as valuable as the
more generally applicable descriptive and analytical material in the earlier
Chapters.
A number of recent developments have significantly raised the level
of interest in the alternative automotive powerplant issue, The
recent dramatic increase in the price of petroleum products has caused
a reevaluation of all fuel-conserving technologies, including a number
of the alternative powerplants. The Energy Research and Develop-
ment Administration (ERDA) has now received an explicit charter
11
for alternative automotive powerplant R & D which its predecessor in this
area, the Environmental Protection Agency, never had, and is in the process
of completing its review in the place of alternative automotive powerplants
in its R & D portfolio. A bill has come out of conference to the floors of
the Houses of Congress containing a major new Federal initiative in automo-
tive R & D [2], and a bill specifically supporting an electric vehicle R & D
program has passed the House of Representatives. [9] The massive report by
JPL was released in August, 1975, containing a comprehensive technological
analysis of the alternative powerplants and the recommendation for a national
commitment to a major R & D program on the Stirling and gas turbine systems.
That report has been the focus of great interest and controversy within
both industry and government. Finally, the Executive Branch of the Federal
Government is involved in a comprehensive analysis of goals for the automobile
beyond 1980, the "300-Day Study", which includes an examination of the place
for alternative powerplants. Clearly it would be rash to predict that these
factors will force (or even allow) a resolution of the continuing question
of whether or not the major R & D programs are necessary to give an advanced
alternative a place in the forseeable future of our society will be under-
taken, either by industry or government. We hope, however, that our study
contributes constructively to an informed and realistic public debate.
12
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2. THE PROCESS OF MAJOR TECHNOLOGICAL PRODUCT CHANGE IN THE AUTOMOBILE
INDUSTRY
The "automobile industry" is a vast system of firms for manufacturing and
selling new automobiles, and producing and distributing the myriad of
supplies and services required for the nation's roughly 100 million
passenger cars. Broadly defined, it consists of about 600,000 separate
establishments, with a total employment of over 4 million peoplt who
receive about $20 billion in annual wages, and absorbs 13% of Americans'
1
personal consumption expenditures. The keystones of the industry are the
General Motors Corporation, the Ford Motor Company and the Chrysler
Corporation, the second, third and eleventh largest manufacturing concerns
(by sales) in the United States, respectively [11], collectively referred
to as the "Big Three". These three manufacturers presently produce well
over 90% of the automobiles made in the United States and about three-
quarters of the automobiles sold here. The technological features of the
product they decide to build determine the fortunes of little and large
firms in the automobile parts and service industry, have major impacts on
the demand for domestically supplied and imported minerals, determine a
major share of the demand for refined petroleum products (and thus are an
important factor in the aggregate demand for crude oil), are a key factor
in the highway death and injury toll, and have a major impact on the
quality of the urban air Americans breathe.
In this chapter we will examine the process by which changes are made
'The automotive-related portions of the petroleum industry are
included in these figures. [10, pp.52, 59]
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in the key technological features of this most important product, the
American automobile. We will focus on the decisions of the Big Three,
with lesser attention given to American Motors Corp. (AMC, the fourth
domestic assenger car manufacturer), the foreign manufacturers, the
component suppliers, dealers, repair shops, etc., for it is in the head-
quarters buildings of the Big Three in Detroit that the crucial product
decisions are made. We will be concerned only with major technological
product changes, whose impact is of the order of that of a change to a new
powerplant. We will not, in general, be concerned with product changes of
lesser impact, nor will we deal with process innovations (i.e., changes
in manufacturing technology), except insofar as they are a necessary or
ancillary factor in major product changes or shed light on the process by
which major changes are made. The forms of automotive product change
which receive the most attention are the "annual model change" (i.e. style
changes made almost annually to most models) and "new models" (i.e. cars
of new design, such as this year's Chevette), but because these generally
involve little in the way of new technology they are of little direct
concern here.
The general aim of this chapter will be to describe the crucial
features of the "ball game" in which the Federal government will be playing
if it is to engage in a substantial automotive R & D program. Subsequent
chapters of this report will utilize this background material in their
discussion of alternative powerplants. This chapter is laid out as follows.
In the first section we will discuss those features of the present market
for passenger cars, including the present government involvment, which have
important influences on the process of automotive technology development
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and production. In Section 2.2 we develop these influences and draw some
conclusions concerning the key features of the process of TD&P. Then, in
section 2.3, a simplified model of the process itself will be laid out
which divides it into stages of activity with intervening decision points.
Finally, in Section 2.4 we will close the chapter by drawing some pre-
liminary conclusions which look ahead to the discussion of government R & D
in the remainder of the report.
2.1 Present Market Structure and Government Involvement
The American passenger car market combines a set of features which
make it unique among the major American industrial markets. These
features are of crucial importance in determining just how the Big Three
select, develop and implement changes in their product. In this section
we will (rather quickly) examine these features. We will lean heavily on
the work of White [3], whose study, The Automobile Industry Since 1945, is
the most comprehensive economic treatment of the industry available.
For simplicity, we will generally refer to the "Big Three," as if
they acted identically and as a unit. While this is often true enough,
there are in fact important differences between the three firms. Probably
the most important is the difference in profitability and thus in ability
to support innovation. In recent years GM, Ford and Chrysler have main-
tained a profit per car sold in the ratio of about 4:2:1, respectively,
We will use the shorthand "TD&P" to refer to thd process of
"Technology Development and Production" in the industry, extending from
initial R & D through mass production.
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[12, p.266] and unit sales in roughly the same ratios. [10, p.1 0] Thus
Ford and Chrysler could be hard-pressed to finance innovations at the same
rate as GM, and Chrysler in particular has given the appearance, and in
fact admitted [13, p.1586], that in the last' couple of years it has not
been able to match the investments of GM and Ford either in R & D or in
new product development. There is, of course, a fourth domestic
passenger car manufacturer - the American Motors Corporation. While on
most scales AMC would be considered a large corporation (annual sales
approaching $2 billion), it does little R & D and is generally a follower
in the area of major technological product changes (although this has not
been as true in other forms of product innovation).
Four features of the automobile market have significant influence on
the TD&P process: on the supply side, (1.) the industry's manufacturing
processes are highly capital intensive and (2.) the industry is highly
concentrated; (3.) the demand for passenger cars is highly variable, both
in quantity (over time) and in its response to technological features;
and (4.) the present government regulatory structure adds uncertainty and
significantly affects the industry's planning horizon. These four
features interact strongly. In the following paragraphs each feature will
be defined and discussed separately. Their interactions will be addressed
and their separate and overall implications for major technological
product changes will be discussed in the next section. Many other inter-
esting features of this complex industry, which certainly have at least
some impact the process of technological change, will not be addressed
here (e.g. the relations between the Big Three, their dealers and the
automotive parts aftermarket; the internal corporate structure of the Big
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Three; the Big Three's overseas operations; etc.).
The basic structure of the supply side of-the market, i.e., the Big
Three and theit process and product technology, has been in a state of
steady evolution since the late 1920's. This period of relative stability
was preceded by several decades of dynamic technological and entrepreneur-
ial competition, during which the basic product in use today (i.e. vehicles
which are covered, use four wheels and an ICE, etc.) emerged techno-
logically, and the Big Three came out the winners on the business side.
As long as gasoline prices were relatively stable and affected only a
small fraction of operating costs, and pollution control was not an issue,
technological product change was undramatic but significant, and the
performance, fuel economy, handling, initial cost (relative to value
received), etc., of today's car are substantially superior to those of
fifty years ago, even if most of the major features are similar.
The massive expansion of the market and the lack of a requirement to
be able to make major technological product changes rapidly led to a
focus on cost reduction and thus a tremendous investment in automatic
2
machine tools as the preferred manufacturing technique. For example, a
modern engine manufacturing plant utilizes many such machines. The basic
inputs to the plant are the raw iron castings, from the foundry, of the
major engine components -- the block, cylinder head, pistons, etc. Each
1See Ford [14, p.2676] and Leeth [15] for some quantitative discussion
of these evolutionary advances.
2.
See Abernathy and Wayne for a discussion of this development in the
context of the market strategies of Ford and GM [16].
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component enters a "transfer line" in which it is automatically moved from
one machine to the next, with each machine performing one or more automated
operations (drilling, broaching, milling, etc.) until the completed
component is delivered to the engine assembly line. As many as 500
separate automatic operations may be performed as, for example, a newly
cast block with the right general dimensions is converted into a precisely
honed complex web of holes and spaces [17, p.C-3]. An engine plant
generally makes only one specific engine; modern plants have a production
capacity up to about 500,000 units per year. Economies of scale in engine
manufacture are estimated to be obtained by plant capacities up to about
half this size. 12, p.24] Most of the other key manufacturing and
assembly operations are highly automated (and thus capital intensive) as
well.
It is worth mentioning another form of capital which has been
accumulated by the automobile industry -- namely the wealth of knowledge
and experience accumulated in decades of dealing with the ICE. As recently
discussed by Gilpin [18, p.l-2] (among many others), such knowledge, much
of it implicit and unrecorded, is representative of a vital component of an
advanced nation's capital stock. Much of this part of the automotive
industry's capital stock would be very expensive to recreate in a
transition to an alternative powerplant; the R & D programs discussed below
would be the first steps of this replacement.
The second key feature of the supply side of the market is the fact of
its concentration. During the period of relative stability the number of
"independent" (i.e. non-Big Three) domestic manufacturers fell from 12 in
1929 (with a total market share of 17%) [19, p.141-2] to the single one
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remaining (AMC). With only three firms presently accounting for about 95%
of domestic production and 75Z of domestic sales, each must carefully
account for the reactions of the other two when making any significant
marketing decision. The high barriers to entry in the automotive manufac-
turing business [12, pp.54-771 make the Big Three secure from new domestic
competitors; and AMC and the imports, while capturing (at present) about
one-quarter of the market, barely attempt to compete directly with the Big
Three in what remains the largest selling segments of the market -- namely
cars in the intermediate and standard size classes.
In pricing the result of this concentration is relatively clear, as
the high profitability and price leadership of General Motors has been well
documented (e.g. by White [121). In general, the effect of industrial
concentration on technological change has been widely debated among
1
economists and little in the way of consensus has been reached. Similarly,
there exists substantial debate concerning the relative technological
progressiveness of product change in the automobile industry, with much
2
speculation or assertion that the industry has been overly slow.
[e.g. 12, 20, 21, 22, 19] It is impossible to resolve this issue because,
of course, there is little with which to directly contrast the in-place
technology. Here, however, we are not so much interested in the general
issue of progressiveness as in the effects of concentration on the process
See Scherer [23] for a comprehensive discussion of the arguments and
some tentative and very general conclusions.
2White concludes that "In manufacturing technology, the companies'
record of progressiveness seems fair to good," in contrast to the view of
many of their record in product technology. [12, p.256]
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of TD&P; this will be addressed in the next section.
The demand side of the automobile market also has great influence on
the process of automotive TD&P. Most significantly, the demand for ato-
mobiles is highly variable, both over time and between vehicle attributes.
The automobile is a consumer product and its purchase typically represents
the second largest made by an American family. Thus the three huge firms
must satisfy the various tastes and needs of millions of individual
customers; as auto industry spokesmen like to pose the contrast: "Auto-
mobiles may be made by the millions, but they are sold one at a time".
Furthermore, as a result of the high degree of optimization btained uring
the lengthy period of stable evolutionary development, automobile purchasers
have developed high expectations for their automobiles.
The temporal aspect of the demand is due to the fact that it is
almost entirely a replacement demand: in the last decade U.S. sales have
been in the range of 8 to 11 million automobiles annually, while the
domestic vehicle fleet has been growing at the rate of 2 to 4 million
annually. 24, p.10,71] The new car buyer, therefore, generally has the
alternative of keeping his present car longer rather than buying a new one.
Thus price increases (or quality decreases) which occur simultaneously
throughout the industry, or national economic disturbances, can result in
significant short-term decreases in industry-wide sales. This has been
painfully evident in the last two years as price increases in automobiles
and gasoline and reduced personal income sent the auto industry into its
1
Although the statistical evidence is ambiguous, it appears that the
short-run elasticity of new car demand with respect to price is considerably
higher than the long-run elasticity. [12, Chap. 7 and Table 7.2, and 25,
pp. 66-69].
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worst slump since World War II. It has been suggested that the degraded
driveability due to emission codtrols, the mandatory installation of
unwanted safety devices, and other negatively-perceived impacts of govern-
ment regulation, have made consumers less eager to part with their older
vehicles, also contributing to the present slump.
Consumer reaction to technological product change is hard to predict,
as witnessed by the two-year lifespan of fuel-injection and air suspension
in the American market in the late 1950's. And who could have predicted
the popularity of vinyl-covered roofs, for which 49% of new car buyers in
1973 paid roughly $100 each? [10, p.23] It is often stated that the auto-
mobile industry (among others) controls the demand for its product, prin-
cipally through advertising [e.g. 27, p.215], and no doubt this is to some
extent true. As seen here, however, substantial uncertainty in forecasting
consumer demand is the fact evident in the market today.
Along with the usual supply and demand forces in the automotive market-
place, today there is a third factor which has a key impact on the process
of automotive TD&P: the Federal Government. Of most direct relevance is
the possibility of egistlation mandating fuel economy standards.
A brief discussion of the history of the Clean Air Act and its
implementation indicates the type of government involvement the industry
must deal with in its TD&P process. The 1970 Amendments to the Clean Air
Act were adopted by an overwhelming majority in Congress, and stringent air
I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Air suspension was offered by Ford and GM (and AMC) in model years
1958 and 1959, achieving a total market penetration of 2.3 and 0.5% in those
two years, respectively. [26, p.33] Fuel injection was marketed by GI
(and AMC) in model years 1957 and 1958 and by Chrysler in model year 1958
(and presently appears to be in the process of making a comeback).
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pollutant emissions constraints were writtan into the law. Unfortunately,
the evidence to justify the particular levals chosen for emission
standards was weak: health studies were sparse, instrumentation was prim-
itive, the relative importance of automobiles and other sources not well
known, and the analysis of the dispersion and chemistry of air pollutants
in urban atmospheres only partially understood. By the same token, the
deadlines for achievement of the standards were set without precise
knowledge of which technological solutions were feasible or how long the
process to their implementation would take. Essentially the law set goals
and short deadlines not only to force implementation of new technology, but
also to force the development of the appropriate technology itself.
As it has turned out, the manufacturers have not been able to meet the
hydrocarbons (HC) and carbon monoxide (CO) standards originally set for
'1975 or the oxides of nitrogen (NOx) standard set for 1976. In 1973 the
x
manufacturers were granted the one-year extensions in the deadlines pro-
vided (conditionally) under the law; for each-pollutant, interim standards
were set which were more stringent than the former standards but consider-
ably more lenient than the full 1975-76 restrictions. By 1974, it seemed
clear that the original 1975 standards for HC and CO could not be met even
by the 1976 date to which they had been administratively postponed, and
Congress passed further amendments to the Act. The deadline for HC and CO
was postponed to 1977 and for NO to 1978, and the Environmental Protection
x
Agency (EPA) Administrator was given the discretion to grant, and has
subsequently granted, yet another one-year-extension for the HC and CO.
Throughout this period, however, the ultimate statutory standards (3.4
g/mile of CO, 0.41 g/mile of HC and 0.4 g/mile of NO ) have remained
x
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unchanged, even though the need for each has been seriously challenged.
In the case of NO standard the EPA itself has called for a change in the
x
standard because of errors in the measurement techniqueused to determine
ambient levels of the pollutant. To date, however, no change has been
approved by the Congress, although a large number of credible proposals
have been made and (at this writing) legislation is pending.
The crucial features of this type of regulatory program are: (1.)
mandatory standards which are not known either in the short-run (e.g. it is
expected that the present 1978 emissions standards will be revised) or in
the long-run (e.g. the NO standard), (2.) the short-run standards are set
x
to the limits of the "available technology", and (3.) every car produced
in a given model year must meet the same standard. Automotive safety and
damagability legislation and its implementation contains similar features.
It is becoming clear, after almost a decade of national automotive
regulation, that stable long-term regulatory standards may never come into
existence.
Beyond the present regulatory involvement, the Big Three have been under
considerable pressure to explain and justify various features of their
product technology, especially before Congressional Committees, with wide
attendant publicity and the implied or real threat of new government inter-
ventions in the automotive market.
The most obvious and important impact of such a regulatory program is
to add one more uncertainty to the technological requirements to be met
by relevant future technologies. On a more general basis, the Big hree
must account for the government's reactions to new technological develop-
ments just as they must now account for each others' and the public's
24
reactions.
2.2 Implications for the Process Of Automntivo TD&P
In the previous section we described the present structure of the
passenger car market, emphasizing those eatures which have an impact on
the process by which major technological product changes are made. In this
section we will address those impacts, taking into account the interactions
of the market features discussed above.
The high degree of capital intensity in the automobile industry, along
with its decades of exclusive production and continuous evolutionary devel-
opment of present product technology, make the industry naturally slow in
its ability to respond to new technology or to a new environment by making
major technological changes in its product. This is reflected in several
ways in the process of TD&P. First, it implies that a lengthy R & D
process will necessarily precede any marketing of a new or substantially
altered product. This is because the innovation must show a substantial
advantage relative to the in-use product, which has already attained a high
degree of optimization. Further, it must meet these technical demands at
the low costs attainable only under highly automated production. Thus a
successful R & D program must also include a major effort in optimizing the
new product for low cost mass production and in performing the associated
process engineering. Second, these lengthy R & D programs, plus the
initial tooling required to introduce an innovation to the marketplace,
make major technological innovations very expensive. Most of this invest-
ment must be made before the first mass produced units can be tested in the
25
market. Third, the large amount of tooling required for mass production
means that, once an innovation has proved uccessful in the marketplace,
capital and tooling availability may limit the rate of production build-up.
Finally, the major investments in the R & D and tooling imply the desirabil-
ity of a stable product demand to provide sufficient production for invest-
merit recovery and profit.
The impact of the concentration of automotive production in the Big
Three s less clear. Obviously each firm carefully watches the other two
in order not to be left out of a significant change. There has often been
a "bandwagon" pattern of behavior where any potentially attractive inno-
vation is brought out almost simultaneously by two or more of the Big
Three. Generally the initiator of a major innovation cannot even count on
the normal production lead-time of 3 to 4 years because the flow of infor-
mation between firms, through various means, makes it very difficult to
conceal the intense final stages of development, purchases of special
tooling, etc., which signal the impending introduction of the innovation.
Thus, for example, even in the case of the two unsuccessful innovations
mentioned above, fuel injection and air suspension, at least two of the Big
Three introduced them almost simultaneously. This behavior has not been
universal; for example neither Ford nor Chrysler followed GM's recent
procurement of tooling for the Wankel engine because their own evaluations
led to determinations that the Wankel would not be a success. This tend-
ency toward a commonality in the product technology has in the past often
been explicit -- the auto industry has had a history of extensive cross-
licensing of proprietary technology [12, pp.213-5], and it is unlikely that
this pattern of behavior will not apply in the future. Each case of a
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major technological innovation will, however, follow its own course.
Major technological changes in "mature," concentrated, industries whose
product changes have primarily ocurred through slow evolutionary process,
have often been accomplished through invasion by new firms (or firms from
other industries) more willing or able to exploit a new technology. [28]
This has been seen to some extent in the American automobile industry as
the Wankel and pre-chamber stratified charge engines have first been
marketed here by foreign firms, Toyo Kogyo and Honda, respectively, both
newcomers to the automobile industry (neither firm engaged in significant
automobile production before 1960 28]). Vigorous technical invest-
igations by the Big Three following these minor beachheads, indicating
their willingness and ability to successfully respond to technological
threats [1, Appendix B]. These examples serve, also, to indicate the role
of the imports as catalysts of technological change.
The variability of automobile demand leads the manufacturers to pay
great attention to "pleasability," i.e. those technologically unimportant
attributes to which the manufacturers pay so much attention -- like the
sound of a closing automobile door, the exact color coordination of
different materials in the vehicle interior, etc. Naturally this shows up
in the TD&P process; for example in both the disc brake and power steering
development programs major efforts were made to keep down irritating noises
- efforts very possibly as important to the ultimate success of the
programs as the basic technological attractiveness of the innovations.
Finally, and most importantly, the structure of the passenger car
market makes technological product change a very risky business. The
combination of the long lead time involved in bringing an innovation to
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the marketplace and the unpredictability of cnsumer and (where relevant)
government demands, mean that the probability of failure, or "pure risk",
cannot be reduced below some minimum, significant level. The tremendous
investments which must be made before success or failure is determined
mean that the "dollar risk" (investment zimes probability of failure)
involved in a major technological product change may be large enough to
have a perceptible impact on the firm's near-term accounting profits.
This feature has significant implications for the process of TD&P,
because the firms will attempt to reduce the dollar risk involved in an
innovation. We will develop this point at some length because it has not
been widely recognized. The impact of the high dollar risk on the
decision of whether or not to invest in an innovation is obviously
inhibitory. Once having decided to bring an innovation to the market, the
firm has substantial incentives to reduce the dollar risk by reducing both
the probability of failure and the initial investment in the innovation.
The steps taken to reduce the probability of failure are the usual ones,
especially field testing, usually in fleet vehicles, prototypes and early
production output.
More significantly, the Big Three strive to reduce the initial invest-
ment required for the innovation. This is typically accomplished in two
ways. First, they may initially produce the new or changed product at a
limited volume of production that may be well below the most economic
level (which is in turn likely to be well below the ultimate production
level if the innovation is successful). Thus the investment in tooling
.. .is held down, but the cost of the product is above (and possibly far above)
its cost at higher production volumes. Even at the early limited
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production levels, the firm may choose a poduction technique which is less
capital intensive than optimal, in order to hold down the fixed cost of
the innovation. In the case of the front wheel disc brake, for example,
Ford's introduction was made inmodel year 1965 as the new brakes were made
standard on the Lincoln and Thunderbird and optional on the Mustang. With
demand thus artifically limited, initial production involved the use of
expensive hand assembly of the caliper components. [29,30] Within three
years, as the performance features of the brake made it a popular item, a
new brake was designed which, among other things, received careful produc-
tion engineering for minimizing the total cost at high output.
The second technique for reducing the fixed cost of an innovation is
to design it so that it involves minimal disruption of other vehicle
systems, i.e. so that it has a high degree of "integrability. Again
there may be an important trade-off -- either compromising the performance
of the new product so that it fits the vehicle without significant vehicle
changes (but perhaps sacrificing some information on its long-run
potential demand), or investing in vehicle changes and increasing the
capital risked on the innovation. This trade-off will be discussed again
elsewhere in this report because it has major implications for the intro-
duction process which would be used for an alternative powerplant whose
1Thus the firm faces the dilemma of whether to price the innovation
at full cost, thus not getting a good indication of ultimate demand and
risking failure due to low demand, or it may price the innovation at the
estimated long-run cost and absorb the difference.
The modern automobile is a complex and highly integrated piece of
machinery, so that little changes made at one point may require simulta-
neous changes at many other points throughout the system. For example,
Peter Ware [31] lists the numerous changes which would result from a change
in wheel diameter.
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power density was significantly different rom that of the ICE, and thus had
a low degree of integrability.
These efforts to reduce the initial invesZ:ment, both in production
equipment and design effort, imply that substantial product development
will likely continue after a successful ntroduction. At first, the
advantages of the innovation may be compromised to minimize the dollar risk
while gaining information on demand. If successful, specialized tooling and
vehicle redesign are likely to follow when demand is relatively well-known
and the system is optimized with respect to cost and performance.
2.3 A Simple Model Of The Process Of Automotive TD&P
In this section we will focus the previous discussion of this
chapter into a model of the process of TD&P in the automotive industry.
It will incorporate and organize the features of the TD&P process previous-
ly discussed and provide a set of definitions for use in the subsequent
analyses of the report.
We have chosen to model the process of TD&P as four discrete "stages"
of activity with a "decision" made by the firm before each stage as to
whether or not to advance the innovation into it. Our discussion of the
model interleaves the usual six stages of R & D (Basic Research, Applied
Research, Exploratory Development, Advanced Development, Engineering
Development, and Product Improvement) with the three phases of the tech-
nology substitution process (development, market introduction and
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penetration, and vehicle substitution). wTe would like to follow a given
product change through the process, describing what sort of effort is made
during each stage of development and what the key criteria are in the
decisions. 2
The development of a simple model ic fraught with difficulties. First
oligopoly behavior in general remains an area of active research, even in
such relatively "simple" areas as pricing. Similarly, studies of tech-
nological innovation have not developed very many well defined behavioral
rules, even for the "simple" cases of perfect competition or monopoly.
Thus the academic fields are of limited help in our examination of techno-
logical innovations in an oligopoly. Furthermore, there is only a limited
amount of useful historical data on past automotive industry innovations.
The principle reason is one which is obvious from the discussion in the
previous section of this chapter: the development and market introduction
of an alternative powerplant would represent a technological product
change of greater magnitude than any since the pre-World War I days of the
industry. The industry has introduced "new" "models", risking (and
sometimes losing) sums of magnitude similar to that involved in a new
powerplant. These new models, however, have involved little new technology.
The only technological product innovation since World War I which approached
the significance of a new powerplant was the automatic transmission, which
These were discussed separately in Sections 1.4 and 3.4 of [1].
See Mullins [32] for a general discussion of the continuum of indus-
trial decisions from R & D to plant invenstment, a somewhat unique effort
to bring together the two generally separated fields of R & D management
and corporate finance.
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was first marketed in the late 1930's and reached substantial market
penetration and relative technological stability in the mid-1950's. While
the early developmental history of the automatic transmission [e.g. 33]
and the subsequent technological history e.g. 34] have been discussed in
the open literature, there is virtually nothing in the way of discussion of
the industry decision-making process. Our model will, however, utilize
the case study on the disc brake 35] and other sparse data available on
previous innovations. The relevance of even this limited historical
material is limited by the very nature of the issue at hand, viz. never
before has government involvement in the process of passenger car TD&P been
undertaken to the extent contemplated here.1
Our model will therefore be based on the available historical data,
some relevant work in previous studies of the alternative automotive power-
plants issue [8, 17, 36], information obtained in interviews with the Big
Three and other organizations involved with alternative powerplants, and
our knowledge of the industry's attitudes and practices. The model will
be no more than a crude schematic of a very complex, evolutionary process.
It will suffer from the usual defect of such models in that it will
probably not apply directly to any specific innovation, or even any
specific alternative powerplant. It will, however, capture and lay out the
principal features of the automotive TD&P process.
1
There was, of course, massive federal involvement in the development
of armament production capacity in the automotive industry in World War II,
but this was for the objective of meeting government procurement needs
rather than changing the private passenger car.
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..Figure 2.1 shows the stages of automotive product TD&P and the inter-
1
vening decisions which together compose our model. Each stage is designed
to advance the technology and provide the Inftnmation at the end of the
stage for an appropriate decision to be made concerning its future. A
successful product innovation procedes trcugh the process; during each
stage the firm invests in the relevant R & D, engineering, or plant and
equipment, so that at the end of stage the success criteria for the sub-
sequent decision are met. Defining failure is much more difficult and will
be addressed below. Tables 2.1 and 2.2 provide the ky features of the
four decisions and stages.
We are interested here in technological changes in the passenger car
pretty much as we know it today. Thus any innovation, even a new engine,
is almost surely a replacement for, or modification to, some system
already in production. The advantage of the innovation may be one of cost
alone, with no perceptible performance change. The TD&P process, as we have
described it, focusses on innovations which offer some technological
advantage at the same initial cost or, more likely, some premium (as will
be seen below, this is the type of innovation we are interested in).
In general we will focus on the process as it applies to development
by a single firm. This would be a tremendous simplification if it were
taken literally; each innovation follows its own course through the web of
industry connections. Much of the discussion will apply, therefore, to the
A note on terminology: In subsequent chapters we will often use the
term "commercialization." This refers essentially to the Introduction
Stage, i.e. those actions taken to bring the completed result of an R & D
program into the marketplace, The "commercialization criteria" are those
of the Introduction Decision discussed here.
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industry as a whole, including the Big Three and their component suppliers.
On a number of past innovations, for example, much of the initial develop-
ment work was performed by suppliers. When read as applying to the indus-
try as a whole, the stages become more diffuse as one firm may lead the
others by a year or two, or one of the Big Three may decide not to partic-
ipate in a given innovation.
The decision criteria listed in Table 2.1 are of course ambiguous;
they must of necessity be made more specific in a real instance, even if
the decision is highly judgemental. To the extent that they remain fixed
in time, then they may be considered mere "milestones," and the "decisions"
become relatively automatic as the technology progresses. In reality,
given the uncertainties of government and consumer behavior, the decisions
are real ones because the criteria are dynamic. On the other hand, major
technological changes of the nature of an alternative powerplant, which
require years of gestation in the TD&P process, must be tied to long-range
corporate strategy and thus somewhat insulated from yearly fluctuations.
Figure 2.1 indicates the position of Basic Research as one source of
ideas for innovation. In fact most innovations enter the process at the
Selection Decision from other, related markets or other firms. The disc
brake, for example, became widely used on aircraft in the mid-1940's,
racing cars in the mid-1950's, and European passenger cars in the early
1960's. It went through the Initial and Final Development stages in the
American industry for the extensive adaptation necessary for the American
market during the 1950's and early 1960's before being introduced by the
American Big Three in the mid-1960's.[35] The Wankel engine was already in
production in Europe when General Motors made a positive Selection Decision.
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As shown in the figure, an innovation may occasionally enter the system
at the Final Development Decision if it can be adapted readily from an
external source. As previously discussed, the process described here does
not do justice to the complexities of the innovation process or the
flexibility which may or may not be available to the manufacturers. As
discussed above, for example the Big Three will likely use various tech-
niques to reduce their initial investment while testing the market during
the Introduction Stage. This may change the TD&P process; for example the
costly process of production engineering, i.e. the detailed establishment
of the minimum cost design and manufacturing techniques may be partially
postponed until after introduction. On the other hand, in the case of an
innovation introduced under government mandate, such as low-damage bumpers
or catalytic converters, the entire Introduction and Mature Production
Stages may be drastically compressed and the innovation installed on all
(or virtually all) of the vehicles marketed in the model year of intro-
duction. This can be very costly as the ordinarily time-consuming
optimization process associated with normal industry practices is com-
pressed and introduction standards relaxed.
As indicated in Table 2.1, the nature of the risks involved at each
decision determine the type of decision-making procedure used by the Big
Three. The probability of failure, i.e. pure risk, is monotonically
reduced through the process, but becomes small only after a successful
introduction. In the earlier stages judgemental decision-making procedures
incorporating the variabilities of consumer and government behavior, the
importance of matching the offerings of the other firms in order to protect
tile firm's long-run market share, and (most importantly) the technological
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uncertainties, are used. This makes it inherently difficult to forecast
the firm's behavior. Only after a successful introduction do the
economics become similar, in terms of risk, to that of ongoing products
and thus more easily modeled (but by then government-supported R & D
obviously has little impact). The Introduction Decision, where consumer
response is not yet clear and the magnitude of the necessary investment is
very large, is where the firm faces the decision where the dollar risk,
i.e. potential impact on the firm's financial position, is greatest.
Up to this point we have discussed how a successful innovation
proceeds through the system, and we have discussed the uncertainties and
risks involved at each stage. The pure risk in any stage (as previously
defined) is associated with the probability of failure during the stage;
failure means not meeting the criteria for the positive decision at the
end of the stage. Thle element of time is ambiguous and difficult to model.
Obviously the Big Three, like other major firms, conduct periodic reviews
of their portfolio of projects in each stage of the TD&P process. The
continuing investment for each project must be assessed against the
managers' expectation for success within some time frame. A project may
drag on for years in the Initial Development Stage as incremental improve-
ments are made, expenditures kept low, but the success criteria not
achieved. Similarly, a project may fall back from the Final Development Stage
due to failure of cost reduction efforts or a change in criteria due to
(fcr example) changes in consumer tastes.
The timing and dollar investment in each stage for a successful
Innovation is highly variable, depending on the extent of technological
change (product or process) involved in the innovation, the strength of the
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incentive to make the change, and the actual manufacturing cost of the
item involved. Initial Development for a major innovation will certainly
never take less than several years unless the particular technology has
been previously applied in very similar situations and the incentives are
very strong. Final Development is likely to take several years, as this is
again about the minimum, and the relatively higher expenditure rates provide
an inherent incentive for a rapid completion (or a rapid determination of
failure). Similar considerations apply to the Introduction Stage. The
Mature Production Stage is typically more leisurely, and is often demand -
rather than supply-limited. While significant expenditures are involved,
they are capital investments with relatively low risk, so there is no
inherent financial pressure for a rapid production buildup. Typically this
stage has taken from 5 to 15 years in the past. The distinguishing feature
of the Mature Production Stage, however, is the optimization of the inno-
vation and its manufacturing processes. The ultimate extent of market
penetration of the innovation may or may not approach 100% of new vehicle
production; this will naturally depend on the desirability of the product
relative to its costs and how it meets the requirements of the diverse
segments of the market. By far the most dramatic innovation ever made by
the industry, in terms of timing, was the equipment of almost all produc-
tion vehicles with the cataiytic:-converters in model,:year 71975,. from a -
Final Development Stage effectively beginning in the late 1960's. This was
occurred (was essentially made mandatory) as a result of the intense
pressure of the Clean Air Act and the fact that the innovation was an add-
on device, requiring very little modification of the remainder of the
vehicle (i.e. it had a high degree of integrability).
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Figure 2.1 also includes the turnover of the in-use vehicle fleet as
the final stage of the overall innovation process (although not part of
TD&P). An innovation has a significant aggregate impact only after
enough of the new vehicles have been sold to replace a significant fraction
of the in-use fleet. This process is not within the control of the Big
Three, however; it is determined by the aggregate economics of the process
of vehicle population turnover. It adds another five years or so to the
total time from an initiation of the Initial Development stage for an
innovation to its incorporation into a significant fraction of the nation's
vehicle fleet. In the subsequent chapters of this report we will consider
government supported R & D on alternative powerplants for the ultimate
purpose of obtaining very large social benefits, from reduced aggregate air
pollutant emissions and reduced fuel consumption; the time for the turnover
of the in-use fleet is of obvious importance in these considerations.
2.4 Summary And Some Preliminary Conclusions
It is worthwhile at this point to review and highlight some of the
points developed in this chapter which will be most germane to the sub-
sequent discussion of government involvement in R & D on alternative auto-
uoLive powerplants. We are dealing with a major industry whose unique
characteristics must be carefully considered in any proposed government
;rogram to change its product technology.
First, the automotive industry exhibits many of the features
associated with "mature" industries; of most significance here is the
dominance of technological product change through slow evolution rather
than dramatic breakthroughs. Major technological changes in such
43
industries are often made by invasion of new firms (or firms from other
industries) willing to exploit a new technology. The barriers to entry in
this industry, the riskiness which is an inherent part of changes in its
products, and the ability of the Big Three to respond to external tech-
nological threats, make such an event exceeding unlikely in this case. We
are, therefore, left with dealing with the present Big Three.
We have emphasized that product change in the automotive industry is
a very risky business. The replacement nature of the demand for auto-
mobiles allows consumers considerable temporal leeway in their purchases,
and seventy years of continuous evolution have accustomed automobile
buyers to expect very attractive levels of all the important attributes of
their vehicles. A major product change poorly handled invites significant
loss of sales and several years of consequent economic disruption. The
skills which have been developed for dealing with this demand function lie
in the Big Three. Furthermore, the risks in technological change, as
perceived by the Big Three, have been increased by the government inter-
vention which has occured to date and, given the present tempo of debate in
both the Administration and the Congress, are not likely to be abated in the
foreseeable future.
We have developed a very simple model of the process of automotive
TD&P, consisting of a set of stages of activity and intervening decisions.
Most of the "R & D" takes place in the Initial and Final Development Stages.
Thle Introduction Stage, however, is the focal point of the entire process;
it must be anticipated by previous stages, and its success makes the Mature
Production Decision a relatively easy one. Its key characteristics of
significant probability of failure combined with large initial investment
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lead to a likely introduction strategy wherein the fixed cost of the
innovation will be kept as low as possible, consistent with an acceptable
probability of failure. Thus, the innovation is designed for a high degree
of "integrability" so that the amount of redesign required in the auto-
mobile body and the related components is held low. Furthermore, a manu-
facturing process using less than optimal (long-run minimum cost) capital
investment is likely to be used; the initial production will likely involve
variable costs higher than the long-run optimum, and thus total product
costs higher than the long-run minimum. These techniques allow the manu-
facturer to minimize his losses in the case of failure of the innovation to
meet the market test. Only after a successful Introduction Stage will the
vehicle redesign and increased investment in new process technology and
specialized tools result in the most efficient product and manufacturing
system combination. This has been the pattern in a number of past auto-
motive product innovations, and will be seen to have significant impli-
cations for the likely introduction process for an alternative powerplant.
Finally, the total time-to-impact of a technological change depends
on. the magnitude of the technological changes, the incentives to make the
change, etc., and includes the times for each stage from Initial Develop-
ment through Fleet Turnover. For a major technological change, such as
to an alternative powerplant, a decade, at least, and more likely two
decades, would be required.
At this point we have not yet addressed the question of the social
desirability of the conversion to an alternative powerplaLt. Assuming such
desirability, however, the challenge is to design a government strategy
to prod and guide these firms through what could be, if not carefully
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handled, a traumatic experience for them and, due to their national
economic significance, the nation as a whole.
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(Intentionally Blank)
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3. THE NATURE OF THE FEDERAL R & D DECISION
For the automobile industry, the decade of the 1970's is proving to be
a period of disruption and transition. Not only has the industry already
followed its most successful year ever (1973) with two of its worst years
since World War II but, more importantly, the industry's relations with the
Federal Government are in a state of flux. Major changes have been brought
about, or are in the offing, as a result of public concern about safety,
environmental pollution, and energy conservation. Many issues have been
settled, but other important policy decisions affecting the industry -- such
as precise emissions standards and future fuel prices -- remain unresolved.
So also is the issue of the degree to which the Federal Government should
participate in the process of technology development within the industry.
The question of government intervention in this aspect of industry operations
is difficult enough in itself - stirring, as it does, deep waters of con-
troversy over the proper role of government in the private market economy.
The fact that this discussion arises in the context of uncertainty on so
many related fronts only serves to complicate matters for those charged with
planning and carrying out Federal R & D programs.
Before outlining the structure of this chapter, two issues are worth
a brief discussion. First, it is important to keep in mind :he distinction
between government support of automotive R & D and government conduct of such
R & D. Government-supported R & D may be conducted either b government
organizations or by contractors, whereas government-conducted R & D is
virtually always government-supported. In this report we are principally
concerned with the issue of government support, i.e. the exper-giture of tax
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or other public revenues for-advancing automotive technology. This is what
we will generally mean when we refer to "Federal R & D". If the government
decides to support a given technology, then the question of where the R & D
should be conducted is addressed as part of the consideration of program
design. The nature of the organization conducting the R & D, e.g. its in-
centives structure, can be very important in determining the outcome of the
program, and therefore ay enter into the support decision, but we will treat
this as a secondary consideration.
Second, a brief note on the uniqueness of relations between the govern-
ment and the automotive industry provides some perspective on the subsequent
discussion. This study would never have been initiated had not the tradition
of little government funding of civilian automotive R & D been a long and deep -
one, supported by both government and industry. The most obvious contrast
is the opposite tradition of substantial support for civilian aircraft tech-
nology, a tradition strongly supported by both government, the airframe
manufacturers, and the airlines. Of course the bulk of government support
of aircraft R & D has been by the Defense Department in support of procure-
ment needs, and this has had significant spin-offs into civilian aircraft
technology. However, there has also been substantial direct support of civ-
ilian aircraft technology, principally by the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA, and its predecessor the National Adivsory Committee
for Aeronautics, NACA), but also by the Federal Aviation Adrinistration (FAA).
This has even included support of general aviation (small civilian aircraft)
technology. Recently NASA proposed a $670 million, 10-yea, R & D effort
aimed at reducing civil-air-transport fuel requirements b 40-50%. It was
received by a sympathetic Senate Committee on Aeronautical nd Space Sciences,
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strongly supported by the airline industry, and a NASA advisory board stated
that they were unanimous that "NASA struck a proper balance between govern-
ment and industry roles" in the program (although some concern had been ex-
pressed by the Office of Management and Budget on the latter issue). [37,
pp. 10-13] We will not analyze the reasons for the different traditions in
government-industry relations, they are complex and the market structures
are very different, but we only point out the tremendous impact the tradi-
tions have on the extent and nature of analyses required to support govern-
ment R & D in the two fields.
In this chapter we set the context for discussion of Federal R & D de-
cisions in the automotive area, and suggest some broad guidelines for anal-
ysis of Federal programs on alternative powerplants. Given the nature of
the ongoing debate, the discussion naturally begins with a review of the
various types of government programs devoted to automotive research, and to
their justification in the face of such a large and established industry.
The focus is on programs to prepare new technical options for automotive
propulsion, and attention is given to the various failures in the market
that create a need for publicly-financed investigations. Of course, even if
a new technology is developed, it still must win a place in the market, and
the discussion next turns to the issue of "commercialization" s it reflects
on Federal consideration of potential R & D programs. Then the critical
uncertainties and their impact on the usefulness of analytical R & D selec-
tion and planning techniques are explored. Finally, the insights drawn from
this review of the problem are pulled together in a brief outline of the
steps that one would go through in evaluating proposed Feceral activities
year-by-year.
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3.1 Alternative Directions for Federal Automotive R & D
There are several reasons why the Federal Government may become in-
volved in supporting R & D programs, and as discussed in the Preface, this
report is concerned with only a subset of these activities. To put the
discussion in context, therefore, it is useful to begin with a brief over-
view of the various objectives that may be set for Federal R & D programs.
Here we define four sets of objectivesl:
- to support procurement,
- to back up regulatory and policy decisions,
- to influence private industry activities, and
- to provide new options for commercial application.
In most circumstances, one or another of these objectives dominates program
design and administration, although many programs seek multiple objectives
and there are inevitable spillover effects, with contributions to objectives
that are not explicitly stated. At one time or another, each of these
objectives has been used to justify the government's automotive R & D pro-
grams. [1] In Section 2.3 a simple model of the automotive technology de-
velopment and production (TD&P) process is presented, along with the pre-
ceeding and subsequent stages (Basic Research and Fleet Turnover, re-
spectively) of the more extended process of changing the in-use fleet.
Corresponding to the different stages of this process -- frc- Basic Research
through Fleet Turnover- there are opportunities for government involvement.
1This taxonomy of objectives is discussed in greater detail in the
first report of this project. [1, Chapter 3]
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Some activities can be justified as appropriate areas for Federal interven-
tion while others cannot.
Table 3.1 summarizes the taxonomy of objectives and R & D activities
developed in this section. Across the top of the table are listed the four
principal objectives of programs in this area; down the left side are listed
the different types of R & D that are relevant to the automobile industry.
The table indicates which of the different objectives are compatible with
the various types of R & D activities, and summarizes several propositions
that have guided our work on this issue.1 Let us look' at each objective in
turn.
3.1.1 R & D To Support Government Procurement
Over the country's history, the major portion of publicly-sponsored
R & D has been a natural part of the government procurement process. Most
military and space R & D is usefully viewed in this way. The Department of
Defense may have a demand for a particular piece of equipment or a system
lOnce again, a more complete discussion of Federal activities -- in-
cluding assessments and impact studies, and performance and emissions
testing -- is included in the preliminary report. [1].
Regarding "Basic Research", the expansion of the frontiers of knowledge
is a sound objective of government programs and this type of research has
always been a justifiable activity in this regard. However, asic Research
is not the real issue in this study, for most research at the "basic" level
is sufficiently unfocused and removed from "available technclogy" as to be
of only partial relevance to specific applications to autrmotive propulsion
systems. (There are a few important exceptions such as fundamental work on
electrochemistry and related scientific work on storage batteries, the struc-
tural properties of ceramics, basic studies of NOx formation, etc., but even
these could not have any real impact for decades).
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to perform a certain function, yet the technology does not exist, or does
not exist in usable form. A necessary first step in procurement is to
finance the work required to solve engineering and technical problems, or
even to establish the scientific basis for the function to be performed.
In the automotive field, an example of this type of program is the work on
the stratified charge, gas turbine, and diesel engines supported by the
U.S. Army Tank-Automotive Command, for tanks, jeeps, etc.
Naturally, the spin-offs from this procurement-oriented research can
be significant. Often these by-products are offered in justification for
government expenditures, even when this spin-off potential does not deter-
mine the scale, composition, or longevity of the programs in question.
No one doubts that the Federal Government should be conducting programs
with the objective of meeting justifiable procurement needs. All the various
types of R & D activity may be involved in this process. However, this has
little direct relevance to Federal R & D on alternative automotive power-
plants, since government procurement needs for passenger cars and other
civilian-type light duty vehicles are very small relative to the total mar-
ket.
3.1.2 Research to Develop Data for Regulatory Decisions, Policy Formation,
and Public Information
A separate and distinct justification for Federal R & D is the devel-
opment of information to support government regulatory efforts. In taking
actions that directly influence private industries or individual persons,
key scientific and technical facts may be of critical importance. Without
them costly mistakes are possible. Sometimes the needed knowledge does not
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exist at all and the government must develop it.1 In the case of automotive
air pollution, for example, Federal agencies had to conduct research on the
health effects of pollutants, and on the appropriate driving cycles and
instrumentation for emissions testing. These data were needed as a basis
for setting regulatory constraints. By the same token, regulatory agencies
may need to develop knowledge about the feasibility of achievement of var-
ious levels of standards, or about the ramifications of expected industry
responses to particular constraints.2
In other situations, the technical knowledge may exist but may not be
in the public domain due to the proprietary interests of the industries
involved. Federally-sponsored research can develop the data and make it
publicly available. Or, research results may be available from industry
sources, but their credibility may be challenged because the companies are
parties to regulatory action. Without an independent R & D effort, respon-
sible government officials may have no sources of data other than the regu-
lated industry itself. Aside from the needs of policy analysis and regula-
1A good example of R & D with this objective is the recently completed
Climatic Impact Assessment Program (CIAP), supported by the U.S. Department
of Transportation. It was designed to provide information to support U.S.
policy and regulations on the performance and/or use of supersonic trans-
ports, by examining the potential impact of their emissions in the stratos-
phere and measures which might 1J taken to alleviate that impact. [38]
2One example of a situation where research of this type was lacking is
the case of the sulfate-catalyst problem. Having adopted regulations that
forced manufacturers to produce catalyst-equipped vehicles, the Federal
Government might well have nitiated a research program to investigate the
full range of possible consequences of such a technology.
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tory decision, the government may have reason for research programs to pro-
vide information to the public at large, often with consumer protection as
the overall objective.
Thus given the regulatory responsibility of the Federal Government, and
the continuing requirement for data to support policy decisions, there is
need for Federal investment in R & D on topics specifically related to these
functions. In meeting these responsibilities, all categories of R & D may
be called for, although Basic Research is likely to be relevant only under
very special conditions, and the latter stages of technology development are
less likely to be justified as a public expenditure, as suggested in the
table.
3.1.3 Research Intended to Influence Private Industry Efforts
The two objectives above relate to straightforward concerns of govern-
ment in its role as purchaser and regulator. This third objective, however,
is political in nature. It is a subtle and often unstated purpose of some
Federal R & D efforts. One instance where this objective becomes relevant
is in regulatory situations, where only the regulated industry itself has the
data to determine if particular contraints are reasonable, or if certain ad-
vanced technological solutions are feasible. Whether based on expert inter-
nal judgement or a general resistance to change, corporations may decide not
to expend funds to explore .ertin technical options, and there may be little
that government authorities can do directly to insure that new or radically
different technical options are fully evaluated.
Federal programs can have n ndirect influence in this circumstance
in that they may trigger a "defensive" R & D effort from industry. No com-
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pany wants to get caught without the technical knowledge to defend itself
against regulatory proposals based on Federal research results or news re-
leases portraying some dramatic success. This is true particularly where
the industry has argued that certain targets could not be achieved. And so
a possible goal of Federal R & D is an adjunct to the regulatory process -
to goad or threaten industry to undertake parallel R & D efforts on its own,
or to upgrade the priority attached to particular programs.
No doubt any substantial research activity in a new technical area will
spur interest and (perhaps) a parallel effort on the part of industries that
have a stake in the area in question. This is a natural aspect of the com-
petitive process and a normal component of industry-industry relations.
However, government R & D programs which explicitly or implicitly seek to
apply leverage to private sector efforts, while they may generate political
pressures, are not likely to have a great influence on the level and direc-
tion of industry programs on alternative automotive power systems. When such
influence is exerted, it is likely to be because of the inherent value of
the research results rather than the threat of a breakthrough which would
compromise the industry's position.
3.1.4 Research to Advance the State-of-the-Art and Open New Options for
Commercial Application
Finally, there is the objective that is the central focus of this
report -- that is, Federal sponsorship of R & D explicitly to advance the
state of scientific knowledge amid the practical arts of engineering applica-
tion, and thus to increase the number of technical options available for
future consideration by private industry. This is a traditional goal of
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R & D, and is an objective associated with many Federal expenditures in this
area. It is the objective of much of the work supported by such agencies
as the National Science Foundation, the National Institute of Health, the
Department of Agriculture, EPA, the aeronautics work of NASA and the FAA,
and it is often the stated goal even when other considerations are important
in program justification. Even where advancement of the state-of-the-art
knowledge is not a primary stated goal, most expenditures on R & D yield
some by-products or "spin-offs" of increased understanding and widened
technical opportunities. Most importantly for this discussion, this is now
the primary goal of the automotive programs that were brought into the
Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA). [39]
One of the key issues addressed here, of course, is the extent to which
Federal expenditure is justified in R & D on the product of an industry as
large and experienced as automobile manufacturing, and with so large an
existing in-house R & D capability. The answer to this question ultimately
must come with reference to specific technologies, but there also are some
general comments worth making.
3.2 The Justification for Federal Involvement in Developing New Options
For Commercial Application
As in most other areas of the private economy, the traditional pattern
in our society has been to leave to private industry the task of researching
and developing new product lLner for sale in commercial markets. So long
as markets function well, this pattern is rarely questioned, ad indeed the
great bulk of the R & D carr:ed out in the United States takes place quite
outside the direct concern of the Federal Government. However, problems
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arise when markets do not function properly -- when markets "fail", in the
economics jargon. In the most general terms, this "failure" occurs when the
social evaluation of the costs and benefits of a particular action are not
fully reflected in the private costs and benefits to which corporations
and individual consumers respond, i.e. there are "externalities" involved.
Where the incentives to private behavior are judged socially undesirable or
inadequate, intervention by the government, as the agent of society as a
whole, may be called for to correct the imbalance.
Direct involvement in R & D is only one of the many instruments avail-
able to government to accomplish such ends, however, and it is probably one
of the weaker measures as compared to regulation, taxation, and direct sub-
sidy programs. Indeed it can be argued that most of the problems discussed
in this report -- to which the Federal R & D program is directed -- could be
as well or better solved by appropriate sets of taxes and charges, which
would correct the private cost to correspond to the social.1 But though this
may be true in principle, it has little relevance in practice -- at least
for the immediate case at hand -- for there seems little chance these mea-
sures will be utilized. The emphasis in policy with regard to the automobile
seems to be on regulation of vehicle performance characteristics, and direct
involvement in the process of technical development and change. As a result
of these well-established patterns in U.S. policy, some level of Federal
R & D on alternative automotive powerplants has become a continuing if con-
troversial component of the Federal budget. Potentially this ork could
make a substantial contribution to the country's future welfare.
lExamples would include various combinations of emissions charges,
taxes on fuel consumption, etc
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It is relatively easy to find some sort of failure in most any market,
and there are good arguments (discussed below) as to why the private incen-
tives for the performance of R & D are always inadequate. There is a ten-
dency to cite them in passing and proceed to "justify" government invest-
ment in R & D, without examining the government's other, sometimes exten-
sive, interventions in a given market and their impact on the incentives
for R & D.1 In this section we therefore undertake an examination of the
possible disparities between the social and private incentives for R & D in
the automotive market, including the government interventions presently
extant. We will attempt to confine ourselves to those features of the mar-
ket which relate to R & D in alternative powerplants; e.g. we will not look
at other alternative issues such as safety, damagability, support of road
construction, etc.
3.2.1 Traditional Economic Arguments
One set of conditions that justifies government intervention in the pro-
cess of technology development occurs when various "failures" arise in the
performance of economic markets, even when those markets are perfectly com-
petitive.2 For example, certain types of technical developments may have the
character of a "public good" wer ° the knowledge, once developed, is not
lEads argues this point vry strongly, with the civilian aircraft indus-
try as a case study. [40]
2An excellent summary of ese arguments is provided by Hclloman, et.
al. [41]
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exploitable by any one firm. All competitors receive the benefits, and
there is insufficient advantage to any one competitor to expend the funds
to carry out the technical development. Much of basic research -- which is
devoted to the increase of human knowledge rather than the development of
specific technological procedures -- has this character, and it is for this
reason that a great deal of basic research is justifiably carried out with
some involvement of public funds. (It should be emphasized, of course, that
a great deal of basic research is supported by private corporations as well.)
At some level this argument holds for all markets and technologies, and
might be cited to support, for example, research on less expensive washing
machines. A unique feature of the automotive market, however, is its vast
economic size, so that very small changes in automotive technology make
very large differences in social welfare when used over the roughly one
trillion miles driven annually by the American passenger car fleet. Thus
the "public good" argument applies with particular quantitative strength in
the automotive case.
Another circumstance that may call for government intervention arises
when there are "externalities" of one type or another. An externality occurs
when an economic decision-maker - be he a supplier or consumer -- is not
faced with the full costs (or oz.3 not receive the full benefits) of the ac-
tions he takes. That is, market prices fail to reflect the full range of
impacts of a particular decisicn. A clear example is automotive air pollu-
tion, where the operating costs f an "uncontrolled" .vehicle did not reflect
the damage being done to otlers through tailpipe emissions; thus clearly
justifying some sort of governaimnt intervention. In such a situation the
imposition of regulatory performance standards (such as those of the Clean
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Air Act) may provide an incentive to manufacturers to carry out needed R &
D. On the other hand, regulatory constraints have turned out to be very
crude instruments from the standpoint of spurring technological development:
they have not proved to be efficient instruments for calling forth the de-
sirable level or mix of R & D on ways to reduce the externalities. Thus a
solid justification exists for the involvement of public bodies in research
to find ways to reduce the external affects; this will be addressed in more
detail below.
Another externality of automotive operation, though less obvious than
that involved with air pollutant emissions, is that the present high level
of consumption of gasoline (and all other petroleum products) exposes the
nation to blackmail by the Arab oil producers. That is, there is a value
to the reduction of petroleum imports that is higher than the avoided cost
of the petroleum itself. Thus the price of automotive fuel is too low by
(at least) a "security premium". One ramification is an underinvestment in
R & D on any fuel-conserving technology, such as the interesting alternative
powerplants.
Still another example of a market failure, though more controversial
than the ones above, is that which occurs when the relevant private decision-
maker has a degree of risk aversion which is significantly different from
that of the society at large. I essence, the government is capable of
spreading the risk of particular technological experiments over a very large
pool of alternative activity. A private corporation, on the other hand, may
be limited in its ability to iversify the risk of a large investment (say
in a new technology) even if the cGrporation's estimate of the expected value
of the investment is the same as that of the government.
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Now, of course, it is argued that a variety of financial measures
exist within our market system to allow a private corporation (or individ-
ual stockholders) to diversify risks of this kind, and therefore that the
risk aversion of the private corporation should be no different than that
of a public body. But once again these arguments depend on the efficient
working of financial markets, and to the extent these markets "fail" in one
way or another, the private and public perceptions of risk may be different.
This will happen, for example, when the formation of various types of risk
pools is retarded by various government restrictions on the market, such as
are imposed by the anti-trust laws.
Thus it might very well be the case that an expensive venture on the
part of Ford or General Motors may involve a degree of risk to the corpora-
tion which mitigates against its adoption, while at the same time the society
as a whole could well afford to bear the risk given its capacity to spread
risk over the body politic as a whole. In these circumstances there is a
justification for government involvement in carrying out such experiments.
In fact, on the basis of a 1969 consent decree between the automobile manu-
facturers and the U.S. Justice Department, the manufacturers are specifically
forbidden from collaborating on R & D related to air pollution control.
There is a trade-off here between the ability to form risk-bearing consortia
and the need to maintain competition that is beyond the scope of this dis-
cussion. The fact remains, however, that, with ventures of the size in-
volved in the development and introduction of an alternative powerplant, the
risk as perceived by a manufacturer and its management may well be much
larger than when calculated ';ocially.
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3.2.2 Problems of Market Structure
Another circumstance which also leads to a concern for government in-
volvement in technical development concerns the structure of the automobile
industry itself. All of the arguments in the previous subsection hold when
the market is made up of large numbers of sellers and buyers. As discussed
in Chapter 2, however, the supply of automobiles to the American market is
dominated by the "Big Three," with a fringe consisting of one "independent"
and a number of importers. In such a circumstance there are good reasons
to suspect that the full play of competitive forces is not brought to bear..
As discussed in Chapter 2, there are really two questions here: the large
scale necessary for the economic mass production of motor vehicles through
the extensive use of automatic machinery; and the small number of sellers
that has resulted from the development of firms probably beyond the size
required for these economies. The former may result in a more than optimal
degree of sluggishness to technological change. The latter may reduce the
degree of competition, but, on the other hand, the existence of such huge
industrial complexes and their associated financial power gives opportunities
for R & D that might not exist were the industry made up of much smaller units.
So therefore, on balance, it is not easy to argue whether more or less
R & D on new technical options takes place under current market structure or
some alternative. As discussed ._a Chapter 2, debate on this issue has been
hot and heavy, both within the academic community (on the general issue) and
among those involved in automotive issues. It is impossible to resolve this
issue as it bears on government support of alternative powerplant R & D.
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3.2.3 Unintended Impediments in Federal Regulation
As important as are the traditional economic arguments under competitive
markets or the special circumstances in oligopolistic markets, there is in
the automotive-case a host of imperfections that are introduced by govern-
ment regulation itself. Two areas of present government regulation are
significantly reducing the incentives for R & D on alternative automotive
powerplants.
Present Federal price controls hold the prices of automotive fuels well
below their marginal cost. The legal price of gasoline (and all other petro-
leum products) is based on an "average" cost of crude oil, where the average
includes imports and "new" and "released" domestic oil at prices determined by
the Oil Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) cartel, and "old" domestic at a much
lower price, presumably related to its old "cost". The problem is that the
production of domestic crude is relatively fixed, so that any gallon of
crude that is not consumed results (more or less) in a gallon of crude not
imported. But, because price controls hold the cost of automotive fuels
well below their cost based o the cost of imported crude (i.e. their mar-
ginal cost), the savings privately received in not consuming a gallon of
automotive fuel are substantially lower than the savings received by the
nation as a whole in not having to import the extra unit of expensive inter-
national crude oil. This will b discussed further in the following section,
but as long as petroleum price controls are continued, then (as in the case
of the "security premium" discussed above), all investment in fuel-conserving
technology will be undervalued in private decisions; specifically, this in-
cludes investment in R & D onI alternative automotive powerplants which con-
sume less fuel than the ICE.
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The other regulatory program in this category is the Clean Air Act,
which, in its structure, and its history and administration, biases invest-
ments in R & D on technology to control air pollution -- away from major
technological changes (such as alternative powerplants) and towards smaller,
"evolutionary" technological changes (such as those which have been imple-
mented to date and are being considered for the forseeable future (see Chap-
ter 4). The history and basic structure of the Clean Air Act and its imple-
mentation were summarized in Chapter 2, and will not be repeated here; rather
the impact of its key features on the incentives for alternative powerplant
R & D will be addressed.
First, there has been continuing short-term uncertainty in the emissions
standards. For example, as of this writing there is general agreement that
the presently legislated model year 1978 standards are "too stringent" and
will not remain on the books. Congress has been considering revisions to the
model year 1978 standards for over a year now, and neither of the relevant
Congressional committees has yet reported a bill to the floor of its respec-
tive House. The manufacturers will not know the 1978 emissions standards
until well less than two years before commencement of mass production. This
type of uncertainty forces the manufacturer to focus his best resources on
getting his new cars into production at the legislated levels with minimal
cost and disruption; that is, it shortens his time horizon.
Second, there is substantial uncertainty in the "long-run" emissions
standards, and it may be the case that there will never by any stable long-
term standards. For a while it appeared that the original 1976 standards
would be postponed until they ould be met, but even the EPA now agrees that
the original NOx standard is too stringent. No one knows what Congress will
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do. In terms of overall impact on investment in alternative powerplant R &
D, the effect of this long-term uncertainty is to increase the risk involved
in any such investment, and thus lower the investment level. It also biases
the choice of alternative powerplants toward those which can meet the most
stringent standards on the books, even though such standards may well be
changed.
Third, the Clean Air Act requires that (virtually) every car produced
in a given year meet the same standard. This raises a major difficulty. As
discussed in Chapter 2, a major technological product innovation such as an
alternative powerplant, could not possibly take place in a single year.
Some of the alternatives may meet the present long-term statutory (original
1976) standards, but the ICE may never be able to meet them with the "avail-
able technology", i.e. at reasonable cost penalty. Consider, then, a manu-
facturer who has successfully developed an alternative powerplant meeting
the statutory standards, at an appropriate cost penalty, in the case where
they had not yet been met by the ICE. The manufacturer could offer, ini-
tially, a few hundred thousand vehicles with his new engine, but consumers
would prefer the less expensive ICE-powered vehicle with the higher emissions.
The Act would have to be amended. It is reasonable to assume that some form
of equipment standard would be legislated along with a schedule for the
production build-up, in a highly political decision process. Thus a manu-
facturer, looking ahead to this possibility, sees great uncertainty and risk.
In fact, the annual change of emission standards was taken from the industry's
traditional annual model change. But this tradition has been based on a slow,
evolutionary, development of thie automobile, with many small year-to-year
changes (mostly in external stylLng) that can be introduced simultaneously
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across a full model line. The Clean Air Act therefore encourages exactly
the sort of evolutionary change that is the industry's natural bent.
Fourth, and finally, there is an inherent difficulty in dealing with
presently unregulated emissions. For example the diesel has special
emissions problems (e.g. particulates) that might create problems if the
engine were introduced in mass-scale passenger use. As yet the emissions
standards to be applied to these emissions have not been determined by Fed-
eral regulatory authorities, and so long as this uncertainty remains it is
not in the interest of any manufacturer to spend substantial sums of money
on the development or introduction of the diesel engine. Now it is possible
that regulatory constraints on diesel emissions ultimately will be set at a
level that allows the diesel to function as a passenger car engine. But in
the meantime the risks in the development of this engine are significantly
increased. Furthermore, it is very likely, due to the press of shorter-
term matters, EPA would not conduct the necessary impact studies and lengthy
regulation formulation and adoption procedures for setting a particulate
emissions standard until diesel use became widespread. Thus there may be a
fundamental dilemma which will have an inhibiting impact on diesel develop-
ment efforts.
In summary the Clean Air Act and its history and administration, as the
result of Congress' desire for haste in reducing air pollution levels, has
significantly biased the industry-away from major technological changes such
as some of the potential alternative powerplants, in the effort to reduce
automotive emissions. The principal source of this bias is the increased
risk it has added to such dev2lopments. These added risks have been im-
posed on the manufacturers by society but they are not risks as perceived by
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society. Again there is a significant disparity between the social and
private incentives to the development of alternative powerplants.
3.2.4 Some Conclusions Based on Analysis of Social/Private Disparities
In summary, it is very likely, for the reasons described above, that
the automotive industry will under-invest in alternative powerplant R & D,
relative to the level which would be socially desirable. This provides a
solid but very general justification for government support of alternative
powerplant R & D. However, what guidance does this provide us in our analy-
sis of project choice or program design in this area? Unfortunately, not
very much. Due to the nature of the disparities between the social and pri-
vate incentives, it is very difficult to look for R & D projects which would
be economically justifiable from a social basis but not a private one and
then confine government expenditures to them. Evaluation of risky R & D
projects is difficult enough (as will be discussed in Section 3.4 below);
here we would be evaluating (among other things), differences in risk.
We can draw the very general conclusion that the government is justi-
fied in supporting this type of work -- but we cannot apply this to specific
projects. All we can say is that the government should be sympathetic to
proposals in this area. But, n negotiating contracts with industry it
should be tough enough that the firm does invest what it considers an eco-
nomically justifiable amount, c that the government is not merely replacing
industry dollars with the taxpayers'. The boundary, however, will be very
difficult to determine.
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3.3 Commercialization of a New Powerplant
Whatever the purported social advantages of a new automotive propulsion
technology, and even assuming technical R & D goals can be met, there' re-
mains the question of the adoption of the new approach in commercial mar-
kets. In general, the government does not directly decide the technical de-
tails of automotive design (though it may regulate vehicle attributes), and
therefore there may be reasons why the manufacturers might not be interested
in carrying a new technology through the Final Development and Introduction
Stages, even though it might look attractive in a social benefit-cost calcu-
lation. This might happen for any of several reasons, and often they would
be the same reasons (argued above) why the manufacturer might not carry out
the R & D in the first place. Market prices might not reflect the presumed
social costs and benefits of particular inputs and outputs -- as happens
with pollutant emissions, or as would be the case if the fuel price failed
to reflect the true social cost of imported oil. The desire on the part of
the three major domestic manufacturers to maintain established patterns of
competition, market shares, and industrial structure may mitigate against
rapid change -- particularly if the financial risks are significant. Or,
there may be uncertainties or other effects in government regulations that
compound the risks for the corporations of a particular technical innovation.
In short, there may be a divergence between the social and private
economic calculations in the latter stages of the TD&P process even if a
socially beneficial alternative pc,werplant technology exists, perhaps as a
result of a Federal R & D effort. Moreover, this divergence need not origin-
ate oly in some conventional market "failure": it may be that the social
evaluation is inconsistent with observed consumer tastes. For example, it
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may.be argued that the average motorist's implicit discount rate is too high
(or his calculation horizon too short) and that he therefore makes an im-
proper tradeoff between initial cost and fuel economy.
But whatever the reason for the suspected public-private divergence,
this issue of commercial viability deserves careful attention in both the
selection and design of Federal R & D programs. To anticipate our principal
point: it is clear that a socially beneficial technology which does not
meet private market criteria (including government interventions extant) at
the time of the Introduction Decision, will only be introduced if a new
government intervention takes place at that time (such as an equipment stan-
dard or a direct subsidy to purchasers).
3.3.1 Two Complicating Issues
Unfortunately for the analyst and planner, however, all discussion of
the commercialization of new technologies is inevitable tangled in two unre-
solved issues of Federal policy:
1) To what extent is the Federal Government going to
intervene in the automobile market by additional
regulatory or fiscal schemes, and to what extent
is the automotive market going to be allowed to
operate on its own at existing market prices?
2) What trajectory of market fuel prices is the
government going to set over the decades to come,
considering the co:cern with import dependence,
the need to manage the long-term energy balance
of the countr, .-d related issues of social
equity and fiscal balance that are tied to the
fuel price decisions?
The answers to these questions will be worked out only over many years, and
they involve social and political issues far beyond the jurisdiction of the
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public agencies concerned with the development and demonstration of new
technical options. Nonetheless, judgements about the likely outcomes in
these areas have critical relevance to the discussion of appropriate and
efficient government technical programs.
Assuming for the sake of argument that the industry manufactures and
sells only what the public wants to buy, 1 the issue of government interven-
tion can be stated in terms of the degree to which consumer sovereignty is
to be rejected in this market. That is, to what extent are motorists going
to be allowed to buy what they individually want in the way of an automobile?
Naturally, in many cases where the consumer's decisions can injure
others -- through pollutant emissions, inadequate brakes, etc. -- regulations
already exist to prevent the sale of a vehicle without the appropriate de-
vices, even if the motorist prefers it. The exact standards may be contro-
versial, but the principle of government regulation in such cases is gener-
ally accepted. In a more limited set of circumstances, government regula-
tions have been adopted which imply rejection of the consumer's choice when
only his own convenience and safety are involved. Mandatory seat-belt-igni-
tion interlocks were an example of such a denial of the general principle of
consumer sovereignty, and the Congress' overturning of the National Highway
and Traffic Safety Administration's regulations in this area indicate that
such regulations are not readily tolerated by the public. There are, of
1At first glance this may seem to be mere tautology, but it can be ar-
gued that consumer "wants" are uot independent of industry advertising cam-
paigns and that, at any rate, te domestic industry s so dominated by three
firms that the consumer has lictle choice in the matter (an argument that is
dampened by the continuing a.va!.lability of a variety of imports), as dis-
cussed in Chapter 2.
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course, a host of less dramatic (and lasting) examples of government inter-
vention in consumer choice -- most often justified by the lack of information
on the consumer's part (if justified at all).
The issue at hand in this case is whether restrictions will be placed
on the fuel consumption characteristics of the vehicles available to be
purchased, or on the particular propulsion technology to be used. The im-
portance of this question can be seen by looking at the issue of alternative
powerplant commercialization first under the assumption that no new restric-
tions are to be placed on vehicle design or fuel performance.1 To be "com-
mercial", a new technology must satisfy something like the following defini-
tion:
Given: 1) the market prices of inputs to manufacturing
and maintenance, 2) the market price of fuel and 3) pre-
sent government interventions in the automotive market;
the technology must be available at a cost that allows
the manufacturer to make a normal rate of return (or
maintain his traditional market share) in its manufacture
and sale.
This definition, of course, implies that the technology must be preferable
or at least equal to alternative approaches for a substantial fraction of
the buying public. In the current circumstance, the relevant competition
is the ICE.
Thus the crucial challenge for any new automotive propulsion technology,
assuming the market is to be allowed to work without new restrictions, is to
provide manufacturers with an conomic rate of return at least equal to that
of the contemporary ICE. And since the distinguishing characteristic of most
of today's leading contenders is superior fuel economy (while meeting legis-
10r at least that any neu restrictions do not rule out one engine or
another.
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lated emissions standards), the challenge is to provide a fuel-economy/ini-
tial-cost combination that is more attractive than that provided by the ICE
(all other vehicle attributes held equal; i.e. drivability, maintenance
costs, etc.)
3.3.2 What Fuel Price?
Unhappily, this statement of the commercialization issue leads one
strsight into the second of the two Federal policy questions laid out above:
what is going to be the market price of fuel at which this tradeoff will be
calculated? The country faces a complex, continuing choice in setting dom-
estic fuel prices. On the one hand, there are two broad policy problems that
ultimately revolve around the U.S. domestic fuel price. First, a major
medium-term national objective (say, over the next 10 years) is to achieve
an acceptable degree of freedom from dependence on imports of foreign oil.
The most important single variable in determining oil imports is the domes-
tic oil price. Second, all the world's economies face the ultimate decline
in world oil production - an event that is generally predicted to begin
some time in the next 25 to 35 years. In this circumstance, the U.S. (along
with the rest of the world) faces a transition to other sources of energy --
all of which are far more expansive than conventional oil and gas in many
uses. One of the key policy variables that can be used to minimize the social
cost of this transition is the trajectory of the domestic price of energy
over the next 20 years. Both considerations argue for high oil prices now.
On the other hand, there is strong resistance to high oil prices on
grounds of income distribution, equity, and anti-inflation policy. As the
recent national debate over ol price decontrol shows, the political forces
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are very strong on both sides of the price issue. The outcome of the pro-
cess is impossible to predict with any accuracy, particularly considering
the uncertainty regarding the strength and the behavior of the international
oil cartel.1 Yet the outcome is of critical importance to any calculation
of the commercial viability of several of the proposed new propulsion tech-
nologies.
3.3.3 What Regulatory Policy?
Of course it is possible to make a radically different assumption about
the future level of government regulation of the automobile industry than
that made in the above definition of "commercial". One can hypothesize that,
were it developed, a more fuel-efficient propulsion system would be imposed
on the motorist by mandate regardless of the patterns of consumer demand.
There are examples on both sides of the ledger regarding this prospect. On
the one hand, legislation setting fuel economy targets now appears near a-
doption. [2] On the other hand, there are obvious changes to save energy
that have not been seriously suggested, no doubt because of an unwillingness
on the part of public officials to defy clearly revealed consumer preferen-
ces. For example, the U.S. could save many thousands of barrels of petroleum
per day by mandating standard transmissions (rather than automatic) and for-
bidding the air conditioning of vehicles. Similar gains would accompany
simple restrictions on horsApower and weight. These steps seem unlikely to
be taken, however.
1At this writing the Energy Plicy and Conservation Act, which would
extend crude oil price controls, -as come out of conference committee [2]
but may be vetoed by the President. Even if signed, however, it is not clear
that the ultimate decontrol o. oil prices contained therein would be per-
mitted to occur.
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The implication of this discussion for R & D planning seems clear:
Although it is possible that selective subsidy and enforcement schemes may
be used.to force the adoption of a technology that is otherwise less attrac-
tive than the ICE to the manufacturers or the public, it is unwise to base
R & D decisions on the assumption that such help will be available. To as-
sume otherwise is to invite two types of error in the planning and design
of R & D programs:
1) Bias in Technology Choice. It is possible to divert
funds to technical approaches that will not be attrac-
tive to the consumer, or perhaps to the manufacturer,
and to carry forward expensive "white elephants" which
may have positive benefit-cost ratios but which no one
wants (and the government is unwilling to impose) for
reasons of shortcomings in cost, or non-pecuniary
attributes such as performance or range. As a re-
sult, other approaches with greater promise for
actual market introduction may be slighted.
2) Misplacement of Priorities in R & D Program Design.
Program managers may lose sight of the fact that new
technologies must pass successfully through the
industry TD&P process described in Chapter 2 if they
are to achieve large-scale market use. As a result,
they may underestimate the importance of product cost
control in the Final Development process, and design
R & D programs that produce technical successes which
ultimately are doomed to failure commercially. That is,
without a continuing focus on the harsh discipline of
an ultimate market test, improper incentives may be
given to those carrying out the work.
These arguments have very important implications for Federal R & D planning:
1) that active industry interest in a technology (preferably evidenced by a
willingness to commit some funda to its development) should be considered a
decided plus in that technology's favor, and 2) that a year-by--year reassess-
ment is required not only of te technological progress of Federal R & D
programs, but of the proper assumptions that should be made about likely
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prices and apparent directions of government regulatory policy.
3.4 Planning R & D in the Alternative Automotive Powerplant Case
Given the foregoing arguments the dilemma is clear. Federal R & D is
well justified in theory and offers the possibility of making a significant
contribution to lower fuel costs, total vehicle operating costs and air
pollutant emissions over future decades. On the other hand, the character
of the automotive market makes it possible that substantial Federal expendi-
tures might contribute little to technology that actually sees the road.
The task of planning and analysis activities in such a circumstance is to
sort the good programs from the bad insofar as one can, and it is important
to enter the more detailed discussions to follow with a realistic impression
of what is, in fact, possible. The problem is dominated by uncertainties,
and no standard analytical method offers an easy, or even a very good, sol-
ution to the analysis problem.
3.4.1 Critical Uncertainties
In the previous discussion, many of the uncertainties that characterize
this problem were alluded to. They may be briefly summarized as follows:
* Technical uncertainty regarding the likely results of
R & D (ordinarily the crucial uncertainty in R & D
programs).
* Uncertainty about onsumer tastes: What vehicle
attributes will prove attractive to motorists ten
to twenty years in the future?
* Unresolved aspc'ts of Federal air pollution regulation --
especially the ultimate NOx standard.
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* Uncertainty about the degree to which additional
government regulation will be imposed on the auto-
mobile, perhaps mandatory fuel consumption standards,
or even design details.
* Uncertainty about the market fuel prices that will
prevail over the next two decades, and about the
likely social value of fuel conservation.
* Lack of specific guidance about the objectives of
social policy in the automotive area, and about the
tradeoffs among objectives (e.g. cost vs. emissions)
* Difficulty of assessing what industry efforts will be
in the absence of Federal involvement. (Does Federal
expenditure only substitute for activities industry
would soon carry out on its own?)
* Uncertainty about the likely industry response o a
socially viable new propulsion technology. (How
seriously is one to take the arguments about industry
resistance to switching away from the ICE due to
organizational inertia, desire to preserve existing
patterns of competition, etc.?)
None of these uncertainties is likely to be removed in the near future.
3.4.2 The Importance of Small Improvements
Another consideration that plays a role in studies of Federal expendi-
ture is the sheer size of the automotive market. As argued earlier, any
radically different propulsion system must win in competition with the ICE.
Suppose there is an alternative technology that offers a relatively small
gain over the baseline ICE technology, say in fuel economy. Further suppose
that the industry is not seriously considering this technology (so that one
could argue it will not be available if the Federal Government does not sup-
port R & D on it) and that thq technology has a reasonable chance of being
commercialized if government rograms are successful. Then it is almost
certain that an evaluation of te returns from Federal. expenditure on R & D
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will show a high benefit-cost ratio.
This point can be shown in a simple numerical example. Suppose the
Federal program has a chance of leading to a new engine that will beat the
ICE so that vehicles using the engine would have an advantage of one mile
per gallon over the period 1985 to 2005, and suppose that ICE technology
would (in the absence of the Federally-developed technology) be getting 25
miles per gallon over that period. It is reasonable to assume that during
each year of the period there will be at least one hundred million vehicles
on the road, each driving an average of at least 10,000 miles per year.
Finally, suppose that the new engine can achieve this modest improvement in
fuel economy with exactly the same emissions characteristics and initial cost
as the competitor or "baseline" ICE, and let the price of gasoline in real
1975 dollars be $1 per gallon over this 20-year period, so that the ICE
technology will involve a fuel cost of 4/mile. The results are the following.
The increase in one mile per gallon achieved by the new technology will
cut this cost by approximately 0.2C/mile -- a saving of $20 per year for the
average vehicle. Given 100 million vehicles, all of which are assumed to
shift to the new technology, this would involve a saving of $2 billion per
year in fuel, or $40 billion over the 20-year period. The present value in
1975 of such a saving at a discount rate of 10% is in the neighborhood of
$5 billion.
Thus, such a huge market creates a condition where benefit-cost calcu-
lations will justify Federal expenditure over and above industry efforts
even if the probability of technical success is relatively low, and even if
there is only a partial char.ce that technical success will lead to mass com-
mercialization. For example, if we suppose there is only a one-in-ten chance
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of technical success and a one-in-two chance of commercialization given tech-
nical success, this still leads to a present value of over $200 million in
benefits for a government program that would achieve the results postulated.
3.4.3 Insights from Other Analytic Methods
Of course R & D decisions are being made continously in both industry
and government, and in many cases some attempt is made to back up decisions
with rational analysis. Though few areas of Federal concern would involve
all the special circumstances outlined above, experience in other areas does
offer ideas about possible avenues of approach, and provide insight into the
problems of analysis in this area. Three approaches are worth a brief sum-
mary: economic return calculations, scoring models, and decision analysis
models.
Economic Return Models - For any given level of investment in an R & D
project, economic return models attempt to calculate an associated measure
of expected net benefit, usually stated in dollars. In a broad sense any
R & D investment decision is based on an economic return model -- the trading
of resources of one kind or at one time for something else inherently in-
volves at least implicit relative values of things, and dollars are as good
a common denominator as any other, Economic return models can be as compli-
cated or as simple as is necessary or desirable in a given instance and the
two other analytical techniques discussed below can be regarded as special-
ized economic return models which attempt to deal in-detail wit.h one or
another of the difficult features of an expected net benefit calculation.
Given a set of net benefit calculations, projects are ranked in order of
benefit-cost ratios. Under iacal circumstances all projects with benefit-
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cost ratios greater than one are funded; under capital rationing the cut-off
benefit-cost ratio may be higher.
A good economic return calculation requires a complete set of costs
and benefits of all the possible outcomes of a project, their distribution
over time, and the probabilities of their occurence. Simpler calculations
may use judgemental estimates of probabilities. A major problem in applying
such a model to the government R & D project selection considered here is in
devising a procedure for weighing up the relevant powerplant attributes and
combining them into a single measure of benefit. To the extent that such
benefit functions are available, and widely accepted as embodying the appro-
priate tradeoffs among social objectives, then this pe of calculation can
be an important component of an R & D planning procedure, even in a simple
form.
In fact, given all the uncertainties discussed in Subsection 3.4.1,
little more than crude economic return calculations will be possible. Fur-
thermore, given the massive size of the automotive market, as discussed in
Subsection 3.4.2, such calculations for alternative powerplants will very
likely give benefit-cost ratios greater than one.
Scoring Models - As the name implies, this approach involves the assign-
ment of an overall "score" to eaLh R & D project based upon judgements
about its likely contribution to each of a set of objectives that the R & D
program is trying to attain. In the automotive powerplant case, for example,
the set of desired attributes would be listed, and arelative freighting fac-
tor given to each. For example, efficiency might be given a weight of unity;
emissions, 0.5; initial cost, .38; multi-fuel capability, 0.76; etc. Obvious-
ly these weights would be equivalent to judgemental estimates of the relative
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social values of each attribute -- so the scoring model is an attempt to
deal with the difficulty of a lack of such prices by using explicit judge-
mental estimates.
Next, each powerplant would be judged on its potential attractiveness
in terms of each attribute. These scores would usually be obtained from
expert judgements, stated in a range of zero to one. Each score is multi-
plied by that attribute's weight, and a total score obtained by summing these
products for each powerplant. The total score might then be used for a rank-
ordering of the technologies as to their relative attractiveness for funding. 1
Obviously, there are a number of problems with this procedure. First,
a linear weighting of attribute subscores implies indifference between a
vehicle with high cost and low emissions and one with low cost and high emis-
sions. Though some of the non-linearity of these trade-off functions can be
incorporated implicitly in the judgemental subscores, the method tends to
gloss over the complex issue in practice and could, if not carefully applied,
assign a high score to a technology possessing one or more fatal flaws.
A second criticism concerns the realism of the approach, for there are
important factors that are not considered at all. The most obvious are the
three interrelated aspects of project uncertainty: 1) probability of fail-
ure (i.e. not meeting targeted R & D goals), 2) overall project cost, and 3)
expected time to projected completion. Project cost is especially difficult
to incorporate in a simple scoring model, but is obviously an important de-
cision variable. lThe probability of failure should influence the evaluation
of a project, as should the fact that the risk can be changed by altering
lln [42] the scoring metho i actually applied to a limited set of
automotive powerplants. See [45, 44] for other discussions and examples of
the technique.
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the funding level. Similarly, the time to project completion can be varied,
and is important in comparing competing alternatives.
A final problem with the scoring approach is that it provides no
justification for any specific level of funding on a given technology, or
even a guide as to whether funding is justified at all. It is difficult to
provide such budget justification, but this aspect of the evaluation must
be viewed as a highly desirable compenent of any project selection model
nonetheless. Most other models implicitly consider both costs and benefits
in the selection decision.
Decision Analysis Models - The first two methods discussed here gener-
ally either treat uncertainty in a very primitive manner or give it no ex-
plicit consideration whatsoever. Yet uncertainty is the heart of the issue
here, as noted above. Decision Analysis models recognize this role, and
concentrate on explicit handling of uncertainty and risk at each stage of
the R & D process.
A full application of the decision analysis approach would require that
the entire R & D process from initial funding through production and market
penetration be broken up into "decision points" and "chance events". These
are then displayed as nodes in a tree structure in such a way that all pos-
sible combinations of events are shown. Probabilities for each of the chance
events must be established a priori, though sensitivity analysis of the
highest value path will indicate a range into which each probability can fall
without altering the desired first decision. This technique identifies the
alternative with largest expected net benefit, and also gives the probability
distribution of outcomes so ~h.t tLe project risk can be evaluated.
Naturally, the analysis can be made very rich in detail: with the
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addition of more steps, more branches, and representations of multiple at-
tributes.
A review of present industry and government project selection methods
does not reveal heavy dependence on these formal models. Various surveys
of industry R & D project selection practices have reached a near-unanimous
conclusion on this score.1 For the early, risky stages of R & D which we
are discussing, there is little or no utilization of the complex selection
methodologies commonly proposed in the literature. Quantitative evaluation
of the ultimate payoff, if performed at all, is based upon simple economic
calculations, and is usually just one of a host of other factors which are
considered in the final decision.
The reasons for the lack of widespread use of complex analytic project
selection models are familiar. Executives complain that the models do not
take all the important factors into account, that they are inadequate in
their treatment of the multiple objectives for which a real organization
undertakes R & D, that they are unrealistic in their treatment of uncertain-
ty and often do not even take into account the increased probability of
success associated with an increased level of effort. Finally, many models
are condemned as being too complex to understand and trust fully, and as
requiring more data than are commonly available.
How then does an industry or government agency traditionally select
R & D projects in the Initial Development Stage? Essentially, it seems that
this decision is made based upon a number of qualitative factors and a few
1For example, see [45-49].
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estimated economic criteria; these are evaluated judgementally, often by
some form of project selection committee. Though studies have been done
which list many of the common selection criteria used,l there are no satis-
fying descriptions of exactly how an organiztion's decision-makers actually
evaluate the factors to arrive at a final decision. In the Final Develop-
ment Stage the situation is generally similar, but since the degree of un-
certainty is lower, quantitative models are used more often.2
3.4.4 What to Expect from Analysis of the R & D Decision
In summary, though the ingredients of the R & D decision are clear,
there is no standard easy or really useful method for putting them together
into an analysis for program planning and control. This is not to argue
that quantitative analysis is not needed or useful. Indeed, the ize and
importance of the Federal programs on energy R & D are sufficiently great
that some form of rational analysis seems essential. But whatever that anal-
ysis is, it will have to constructed from several of the various approaches
outlined above (and more), and even at its best it will have to be tempered
by expert judgement on issues that cannot be considered explicitly in the
analysis. Moreover, the ingredients of the analysis will change from case
to case, because the nature of the key problems of the various alternative
powerplants differs so greatly (.g. initial cost for the Stirling, cost and
emissions for the diesel, coqt ad range for the electric, etc.)
1See [45] for a description of this process.
2The model of automotive: fD&P discussed in Chapter 2 reflects these
considerations.
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Bearing these insights in mind, and keeping an eye on the special char-
acteristics of the automotive case, we may turn to discussion of methods
for developing information for decisions on the magnitude and composition
of Federal programs in the automotive powerplants area.
3.5 Steps in an Analysis of R & D Choice
3.5.1 Description and Measurement of R & D Objectives
The first step in devising a framework for R & D planning is the defi-
nition of research objectives and the following set is relevant for work
on automotive powerplant technology:
* environment, primarily air pollutant emissions;
* energy consumption, primarily vehicle fuel;
* safety;
* economy, primarily the first-cost of automobiles, and;
* vehicle performance and driveability.
These areas are interrelated and typically involve complex tradeoffs. Al-
though all five of these vehicle attributes are relevant to R & D project
choice, it is convenient to treat them differently for analytical purposes,
and to give more emphasis to some than to others. Clearly it is necessary
to simplify these objectives s that the resulting analytical framework is
as simple as possible. Let us look at each in turn.
Environment - Of the various attributes, the objectives for emissions
are the most clear. Congress has passed emission standards (.41/3.4/.40
g/mi of HC/CO/NO x) which presumLbly represent ultimate goals for vehicle
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emissions. What is less clear is the degree to which cost and fuel economy
objectives may be compromised to meet these emission goals. Historically,
the deadline for attainment of the standards has been extended because they
could not be met with "available technology" -- presumably with the implicit
assumption of "at reasonable cost". Currently, there is pressure to relax
emissions standards in order to gain increased fuel economy as well as some
debate on whether the original NOx standards were set correctly.
It is beyond the scope of this report to attempt to evaluate these
tradeoffs. As a practical matter, we expect emissions standards similar to
those now on the books to hold for the forseeable future, though the numbers
and deadlines may change somewhat. Furthermore, we expect that those stan-
dards will be met, at least by the ICE, within the time frame of the R & D
projects we are considering.
For purposes of a simplified analysis of R & D potential, therefore,
the environmental objective can be treated as a constraint: either a pro-
pulsion technology meets the legislated standard (or some expected modifica-
tion of it) or it does not. If a particular engine is far better than the
standards, then note needs to be made of that fact, and this consideration
included in the general judgemental information about a particular prospect.
The advantages of performance iwe]l within emissions standards does not seem
important enough (particularly cnsidering our ignorance about the marginal
benefits of further emissions reductions at these low levels) to justify a
complex effort to quantify the advantages to be attributed to an extra-clean
engine; a few simple quantitative estimates can be useful, however.
By the same token, it i reasonable to expect that any engine that does
not come close to meeting these "ultimate" emissions standards will probably
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not be brought to large-scale commercial use. If there are compelling rea-
sons to pursue a technology that offers no hope of meeting standards, the
fact of its environmental disability should, once again, be carried along as
part of the accompanying judgemental data. However, it is not worth the
effort of calculating the emissions-economy tradeoffs -- at least not for
the R & D choice at issue here.
Economy and Energy Consumption - Economy in vehicle manufacturing and
maintenance is a clear objective of Federal R & D policy. Apart from a gen-
eral concern with the efficient use of resources, Federal authorities must
worry about cost, else a propulsion system with other desirable attributes
turn out to be too expensive to capture a significant share of the passenger
car market. The relevant measure of these costs (leaving fuel consumption
aside for the moment) is the total "life-cycle cost" of a vehicle, including
the first cost and the discounted stream of maintenance, repair, and replace-
ment expenditures -- and of course fuel.
Fuel consumption is a complex matter, for not only is fuel expenditure
a part of life-cycle cost, broadly defined, but it is the object of a stated
Federal policy of energy conservation and reduction of oil imports. The
conventional way of handling the additional value that may be ascribed to
lowered fuel consumption is by computing a "shadow" or "accounting" cost of
motor fuel which purports to reflect the true social cost of its use. This
"social premium" would include the "security premium" as well as the differ-
ence between the market price and marginal cost under government regulations
extant. With the addition f a premium for social values not reflected in
current (or expected) market prices, the concern with overall capital and
maintenance cost and fuel expenditure can be lumped into a single life-cycle
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cost by using common interest rate and mileage assumptions.1
Safety, and Performance and Driveability - Safety is regulated under
Federal laws, and is little affected by powerplant choices. Therefore, it
does not play an important role in the choices studied here. If an impor-
tant issue does arise (such as a system posing special hazards) this fact
can be carried along in an analysis as accompanying judgemental information.
Of course, any system that is truly more dangerous than the general run of
vehicles will be ruled out under the current legislation and administrative
practice (as well as the usual consumer concerns, to the extent that consum-
ers are aware of the problem).
The attributes of performance and driveability present a more complex
problem. For propulsion systems that have similar operating characteristics,
it is reasonable to assume that market forces will dictate that for any
category of vehicle (e.g. general purpose vs. urban travel only) the per-
formance and driveability will be very similar. In this case, once again,
it is not worthwhile to calculate a complex expression for any small differ-
ences that remain.2
As noted earlier, difficulty arises with the electric vehicle, which
will have range limitations. Once again, however, for purposes of studying
R & D choice, there is not a compelling reason to try to develop a common
measure that takes this factor into account, along with life-cycle cost.
1Here, of course, implicit assumptions are being made. Motorists
trade off among vehicle types depending on their expected use patterns, and
thus the car with lower fuel economy, other things equal, can be expected
to travel fewer miles than ne with greater economy. For these rough cal-
culations to guide R & D decisions, these influences are small.
2This assumes that fueling cations are equally available for all
sources -- a condition that does not now hold for the diesel.
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The fact that this limitation exists is crucial information for determining
market potential. In presentations of the social benefits and costs, how-
ever, this factor is best introduced as a second attribute (to be quantified
as far as possible) to be entered into final R & D planning along with other
judgemental data.
Summary - There are several objectives of Federal programs to bring
about technical improvment in the automotive propulsion area, and although
it is possible in principle to construct detailed tradeoffs among the various
vehicle attributes in order to construct an overall measure of merit, it is
clear that the necessary data and social evaluations do not exist at the
present time. Therefore, any evaluation of alternative technical develop-
ments is of necessity going to have to be carried out in terms of a vector
of vehicle attributes, with primary emphasis put on the attribute of life-
cycle cost. Thus in subsequent discussion we focus on the following defini-
tion of the principal objective of the Federal R & D program:
Reduce life-cycle cost with inputs valued in social
terms (for the social analysis) or in market prices
(for the private market analysis), while meeting
legislatively established environmental standards.
It should be explicitly noted that in general market prices will suffice for
the social analysis except, obviisly, in the case of fuel.
Safety, low noise, reduced :range, and other attributes of alternative
powerplants can be treated as ide issues which are weighed judgementally
and considered on a case-by-case basis as appropriate. The same will be true
of environmental benefits in te case of technologies that offer special ad-
vantages as compared with tbh internal combustion engine, which is likely to
be the source of the definition of this environmental standard.
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Given such a statement of objectives, which hopefully is sufficiently
simple to allow actual calculations to be made, one can proceed to analysis
of individual programs.
3.5.2 Analysis of the Potential of Individual Technical Options
The next step in the analysis of a Federal R & D program is to evaluate
the likely benefits and costs of a given program. Several types of studies
may be called for to accomplish this.
The State of Technology: Barriers and Targets - The natural first step
in evaluating a potential R & D opportunity is to prepare data on the key
barriers that have prevented the technology from entering into mass passen-
ger car use in the past, and to establish reasonable targets for key vehicle
attributes in the future. For purposes of analysis, more than one target
may be chosen for a particular attribute. The study of R & D programs needs
to consider a range of possible outcomes, and usually there is no single
quantitative achievement which marks the boundary between failure and success.
Review of Existing Programs - What programs of research on the technol-
ogy have been carried out in the past both in government and in industry, and
what programs are underway currently? In reviewing a potential R & D invest-
ment it is important to understand as clearly as possible what s being done
now in industry in relation to the barriers identified earlier, and why it
is being done. Also, to the extent possible, it is useful to have informa-
tion on the targets for achievement that are seen as reasonable by researchers
who are engaged in active work on a particular technical option. Here, of
course, different attributes will be relevant for different technologies.
Historical data will be important as well, especially as it cncerns the rate
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of progress of the technology and the success or failure of previous R & D
efforts. If there have been high incentives to develop a particular tech-
nology (for some other use) in the past, then one must question how much
further progress can be made.
Evaluation of the Probability of Meeting Target Attributes with
Different R & D Programs - Naturally, one of the key uncertainties in any
R & D program is whether technical goals can be met, and in the consideration
of government intervention in R & D in this industry, this issue is raised
both for the Federal program itself (perhaps with companion industry efforts)
and for a world in which industry efforts proceed as they wiil without gov-
ernment intervention. It is important to look at both sides of this ques-
tion, for often the issue at hand is not government investment versus no
investment whatsoever, but a government program to supplement or expand the
existing level of effort on the basis that the probability of meeting tech-
nical targets is increased by raising the total level of resource input.
Often another component of such evaluations is to state the length of
time over which such probability estimates are presumed to hold. An invest-
ment program at one level may only have a one-in-ten chance of producing a
particular result by a particular time in the future; the same level of ex-
penditure carried over a longer period of time probably has sotcwhat larger
chances of ultimately succeeding. Or, with an input of two or three times
the presumed resources, the same probability of success might be estimated
for n earlier date. It is essentially the probability of technical success
(by a given date, say) as a function of expenditure rate tha: determines the
"maximum effective expenditure rate", i.e. the rate at whi h increases in
expenditure rate no longer produce significant increases in probability of
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success.
For the analyses conducted here, and very likely for most studies of
Federal R & D with regard to the automobile, estimates of the probability of
achieving the prescribed result should be stated in terms of some target
year, say 1985 or 1990. Periods much shorter than 10-15 years are usually
not reasonable for evaluating likely R & D results on major changes in tech-
nology. On the other hand much longer time horizons are less interesting
for evaluations of fossil fuel powered vehicles. For electric vehicles the
longer time horizons are of course relevant.
It is well known, however, that any judgemental estimates of probabili-
ties, such as those discussed here, are uncertain at best and potentially
misleading in their quantification (see 50] for a review of the subject).
Even the carefully pooled judgements of experts, as in the Delphi technique,
may not be very accurate -- there is of course simply no way to tell.
Price Forecasts - As discussed earlier, another key uncertainty affect-
ing evaluations of technologies with alternative attributes is that the rele-
vant prices of inputs to personal transportation are not known for the longer
term future. For analysis purposes two types of forecasts must be made: a
forecast of the market price that will exist over the next 20 to 25 years,
and a companion estimate of any social premium or shadow price that should
be used in the event the market price is assumed to fail to reflect the true
social cost of fuel resources.
Baseline Forecasts - Any alternative must be superior to the ICE; any
net benefits of an alternative must be calculated relative to continued use
of the ICE. It is therefore necessary to forecast the rel,:var;t attributes
of the ICE. In particular its efficiency is most important; ts cost is not
93
likely to change as significantly. Both are very dependent on future emis-
sions standards imposed by the government, standards which the R & D planner
must view as uncertain.
Net Benefit Calculations - Given a quantitative statement of possible
targets for alternative R & D programs, using the judgemental estimates of
the probability that various programs can succeed, and assuming the price
forecasts stressed above, the key step in any evaluation of a potential
technology is the calculation of the likely net benefits of expenditure on
the various stages of its development and introduction into the automobile
market. Presumably different levels of government expenditure, in addition
to existing industry efforts, will increase the probability that certain
technical targets will be met, and the meeting of different targets yields
a higher chance that the particular technology will actually penetrate some
significant segment of the market. Associated with this displacement of the
baseline internal combustion engine will be some set of net benefits to the
society.
The key issue at this point is whether, given reasonable technical judge-
ments about the likely results of R & D programs, the Federal expenditure
appears to offer substantial benefits for the cost involved. As suggested
above, one cannot expect a very accurate calculation at this stage. Such
an evaluation of the expected return to R & D investment can, at best, only
serve as a way to weed out the obviously weak candidates, and to clearly
mark those investments which are unlikely to prove economically or environ-
mentally advantageous.
Commercialization - Given that the rough calculations described above
yield a positive net benefit to government investments when evaluated at
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market prices, or at shadow prices as appropriate, the next question that
must be asked is whether there are special barriers to implementation of
the technology. The first place to look is in the benefit-cost calculation
itself: at what points were prices or other parameters used for the social
calculation which differed from values observed in the marketplace (such as
fuel prices) or from values implicit in industry or consumer behavior (such
as discount rate)? Each discrepancy represents a possible barrier to com-
mercialization. Next a careful review of industry arguments and choices is
obviously important. Why is the industry not pursuing the particular tech-
nology? Is it because of basic disagreements about the probabilities of
success? Is it due to some market failure of the types discussed earlier?
In particular, is the industry's lack of interest affected by some other as-
pect of Federal regulation? Or, is it simply a matter that the industry sees
no particular financial advantage in transition to a different powerplant?
The answers to these questions should help pinpoint barriers to imple-
mentation or commercialization of a new technology, whether these barriers
exist in the structure of consumer demand, in the clear interests of the
automobile manufacturers, or in some other structural apect of the automo-
tive market. In the early stages of R & D on some new technology, these
considerations might not weigh too heavily. But in the latter stages, as the
development approaches the various steps in final development, and the costs
of R & D necessarily rise significantly, these issues of ndustry resistance
or lack of interest -- and a clear understanding of why industry is not en-
thusiastic -- become critically important. Once again referrIng to the dis-
cussion earlier, it is always possible to assume that constumaer or industry
resistance will be overcome by direct government intervention in the Intro-
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duction Stage itself, but this does not seem to be a proper assumption to
make at the stage of R & D planning unless there are solid indications that
Federal policy is moving in that direction. Naturally, any conclusion on
this score would have to be reviewed year-to-year.
3.5.3 Program Design
The evaluation of problems of commercial adoption should give some key
guidance as to the type of R & D program that appears called for in a par-
ticular circumstance. Clearly, it is not helpful for government programs
to duplicate industry efforts except in very special circumstances. Simi-
larly, little is gained so far as the national interest is concerned if the
government expenditures simply replace resources that industry would have
committed had the government not undertaken particular programs, although
it will be very difficult to tell, in practice, whether or not this is oc-
curring. By the same token, evaluation of the nature of the barriers to
commercialization may point to advantageous ways of managing R & D programs.
For example, if industry has rejected a particular technical avenue because
of a judgement that it will not work, or that it cannot be made to perform
at reasonable cost, then little is gained by carrying R & D programs to the
point of demonstration of engines in large numbers of vehicles (an activity
in the Final Development Stage). Funds are better spent removing the key
barriers that form the basis of the industry judgement, and demonstrating
that earlier negative judgements were questionable (or finding that industry
was right).
If, on the other hand industry has shown considerable interest in a
technology (for example in the case of the diesel) but is retarded in its
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interest because of key environmental or regulatory issues, then to the ex-
tent that the technology appears to have promise the design of the Federal
program should focus on the key environmental barriers -- at least until un-
certainty about Federal regulation has been removed.
When an engine offers obvious fuel economy and environmental advantages
(as in the case of the Stirling, for example), but there is serious doubt
about the likely initial cost of the engine, then Federal programs (partic-
ularly as they approach the Final Development Stage) are unlikely to be con-
vincing to industry planners if the manufacturing firms themselves are not
to some degree involved in the R & D.
In summary, the overall objective of an R & D program carried out by
the Federal Government is to advance the state-of-the-art and to develop new
technical options which will be adopted by the automobile industry to the
overall advantage of the country. Any technical option must pass through
the Technology Development and Production process described in Chapter 2, and
this means that the design of Federal programs must take into account as
much as possible the reasons why the particular technology has not passed
through this procedure already. This is an obvious point, it would seem.
Unfortunately, it has been too often ignored in R & D planning, or too often
the desirable pattern of relationships between industry and government in
this area has not been possible for political reasons, or for rasons of
resistance on the part of key manufacturers.
Probably the best way of insuring that an R & D program is well coupled
into the industry TD&P process is by running the program ao a joint cost-
sharing with one of the Big Three. This is especially true where manufac-
turing cost is one of the objectives, which will always be tie if the pro-
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gram is in the Final Development Stage. In a cost-sharing program the in-
dustry has committed its own resources to success, so the incentive struc-
ture is there to develop a system which is commercially viable. Government
laboratories or companies deriving a profit directly from government R & D
(and not producing a commercial product) have an incentive structure which
will be difficult to align with the Big Three's TD&P process.
While we have tended to couch much of the preceeding disussion in terms
of a one-time investment, it is clear that an alternative powerplant R & D
program must be, to a great extent, a dynamic one. As the investment is
made, the technology will evolve; it will therefore become clearer whether
or not technical goals can be met. At the same time, those technical goals
will, hopefully, become clearer, although they might not. International and
domestic petroleum product prices, the emission standards imposed on the ICE,
the technological evolution of the ICE, and all the other factors which lie
behind these goals will continue to evolve. If at some point it becomes
clear that a given government-supported technology is very unlikely to attain
its (uncertain) goals -- the government must be prepared to stop the program.
3.5.4 Conclusion
There are sound reasons why the R & D programs of the American automo-
bile industry may not be carried out at a scale that is justified by the
great social interest in this technology. On the other hand, the industry
does have a large R & D apparatus and is under constant pressure both from
governmental regulation and external competition to stay on tp of possible
technical options. This means that the Federal program in this aea should
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seek those opportunities that are not being carried out at adequate scale
by industry but which show significant prospects of yielding technical ad-
vances which ultimately will be taken up and brought to final stages of de-
velopment by the industry. In addition, the design of the programs to carry
out such Federal research should be worked out in the light of the reasons
why industry has not put more funds into particular technologies, and in
consideration of the peculiarities of this industry as it goes about its
inherently slow process of technological product change.
The various points made above regarding the analysis of potential in-
vestments can be summarized in a set of questions that should be addressed
to each major expenditure program each time the activity comes up for review.
They are the following:
1) What are the technical barriers that have prevented the
technology from being adopted?
2) What are reasonable targets for technical developments
designed to improve the overall attributes of a
vehicle using this technology?
3) What existing R & D programs are there, and why are
they structured as they are?
4) If existing programs are supplemented by Federal
expenditure, what is the likelihood that the various
technical barriers can be overcome and targets met?
5) At what prices would one evaluate the outcome, hould
technical achievements be made?
6) Does the particular technology offer an opportunity
for Federal expenditure that appears to offer large
expected present value net social benefits?
7) What are the potential barriers to implementation of
the technology if it should prove to have the type of
benefits that recommend expenditure on it?
8) How should the R & D program be designed to overcome
the implementation barriers as well as the techi.ical ones?
99
In most cases, evaluations of this type of individual program are likely
to be fairly idiosyncratic, and it may not be possible to find comparisons
between programs on alternative technologies or programs on the same tech-
nology but at alternative scales. Nonetheless, such a series of questions
and analyses should help sort out the bad from the potentially good, and to
help allocate available funds where they will do the most good.
A final point needs to be made about the desirable portfolio of govern-
ment investments in technology of this kind. It is evident that the uncer-
tainties in the calculations suggested above are so great that no one tech-
nical avenue is likely to emerge from an overall program analysis as the dom-
inant prospect. The estimates of technical possibilities, prices, Federal
regulations, and industry responses, are simply too fuzzy to allow calcula-
tions to yield such a satisfying answer. Under these circumstances it is
only prudent for those concerned (be they the society as a whole, the R & D
planners in government, or industry officials) to carry forward a selection
or "portfolio" of alternatives until such point as it becomes more evident
where the preferred technical direction for the future lies. This means
that one should expect the evaluation suggested above to sort out prospects
that are unlikely to prove productive, and to identify a few areas of tech-
nical work that are obviously of great promise whatever the circumstance.
But between these two extremes there will be a range of prospects which look
rather favorable but are subject to great uncertainty as to their ultimate
payoff. One should expect the Federal R & D program to carry forward a rea-
sonable number of these in order to hedge against the failare of any one of
them to achieve its desired performance.
Thus, in light of all the uncertainties we have expounded upon over the
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preceding pages, government investment in alternative powerplant R & D must
be viewed as a gamble -- it can be expected to pay off, but we won't find
out unless we try it.
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4. THE ICE BASELINE
4.1 Background
We have already made the point that the alternative engines are com-
peting to take the place of a firmly entrenched technology -- the internal
combustion engine or "ICE". This engine, the reciprocating carbureted
gasoline-fueled spark-ignition engine, has been the dominant automobile
engine since the early 1900's. Hundreds of millions of these engines have
been produced and operated. Extensive production facilities now exist,
many of which are relatively new. Mass production methods and the required
machine tools have been developed to a high level of sophistication. An
enormous amount of experience relating to the design and manufacture of the
ICE has been accumulated within the automobile industry. An extensive
service industry -- with facilities, trained mechanics, tools and equipment
-- has been built up. It is paralleled by an extensive spare parts
industry and distribution system. Millions of automobile owners have gained
confidence in the ICE, and have developed high and continually increasing
expectations of engine performance and reliability. The industry has
built up an impressive record of steady improvements in engine design and
performance. Most importantly, in our context, the automotive industry has
evolved an operating structure with massive engineering resources focused
on the continued development and improvement of almost all aspects of its
ICE technology.
As discussed above, many factors now combine to make tha future of the
ICE less secure than it has appeared at any time since it came to dominate
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the automotive market beginning seventy years ago. The major uncertainties
concerning the future of ICE technology are:
* Whether the ICE can achieve sufficient control of hydrocarbons
(HC), carbon monoxide (CO), and oxides of nitrogen (NO ), toK
meet emissions requirement in the longer-term;
* Whether the catalyst technology which has been developed for HC
and CO control, and may be developed for NO control, will be
x
sufficiently durable and maintainable in actual use;
* How significant special problems associated with this catalyst
technology - e.g., sulfate emissions -- prove to be;
* Whether the engine fuel economy gains which have been achieved
in model years 1975 and 1976 will continue, especially if
emissions are further reduced.
*Whether adequate vehicle driveability (which has deteriorated
as vehicle emissions have been reduced) can be maintained if
emissions are further reduced.
One fundamental and difficult problem in evaluating alternative
engines is, therefore, the expected continuing development of the estab-
lished ICE technology.. The alternative engines are unlikely to be in mass
production before the early- to mid-1980's, and it is the production ICE
in this future timeframe, and not today's ICE, against which the alterna-
tive must be evaluated. Already intensive efforts are be:iLg mada to adapt
today's ICE to the perceived needs of the 1980's. This effort will be
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further stimulated by any large or successful R & D efforts on the
alternative engines. Also since the alternatives are likely to have higher
initial costs, the option of a more sophisticated (and thus more expensive)
ICE will be worth exploring if operating gains comparable to the potential
of the more promising alternatives can be realized.
Because the ICE has dominated the automobile engine market for so long,
there are tremendous development resources available for its further
improvement. Substantial efforts are now being made to both improve engine
efficiency, emission control technology and vehicle driveability, and re-
duce initial cost. Potential improvements in the following areas are being
sought:
* Better mixture preparation, and ignition system performance
to permit leaner engine operation to improve engine efficiency;
* More durable and effective catalytic converters -- oxidizing for
HC and CO, and three-way with air-fuel ratio feedback control for
HC, CO and NO -- to minimize the impact of stricter emission
x
standards on fuel economy.
* Computer control of engine operating variables -- spark advance,
EGR, air-fuel ratio -- as a function of engine speed, load and
temperature to optimize efficiency at any given emission level
and fuel octane rating.
* Cylinder head and cowbustion chamber redesign for optimum fuel
economy and engine enission control.
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On the time scale comparable to that required for developing and
introducing alternative engines -- 5 to 15 years -- reasonable progress
in most of these areas can be expected. However, the extent of this pro-
gress depends strongly on the emission standards in effect over the next
ten years or so, on the manner in which these emission standards are
eventually promulgated, and on whether the 0.4 g/mile NO standard remains
x
as the ultimate but perhaps postponable goal, or is removed as a long-term
requirement. The difficulties with the applicable emission standards are
compounded by uncertainties in fuel characteristics. Some of the promising
ICE development options could use leaded gasoline. This would allow an
increase in engine compression ratio due to the higher fuel octane rating
(the amount of the increase depending on the amount of lead added, which
may be constrained by concerns over lead as a health hazard), and thus an
increase in fuel economy. Or catalyst systems which require unleaded fuel
may continue to dominate; if so, pressures to increase the octane rating of
unleaded fuel are likely to develop. The degree to which increases in
octane rating of either leaded or unleaded fuel can be translated into fuel
economy improvements depends on the emission standards which have to be
met.
A somewhat different issue s the vehicle acceleration capability
deemed acceptable to the car-buying public. There has been an erosion of
vehicle performance of about 4 percent already over the past seven years
as a result of meeting emission control requirements, [51] It may be that
the public will respond to higher fuel costs by trading off vehicle perform-
ance for fuel economy improvement hrough the purchase of lower power
engine options. There is evid'tce of a modest shift in this irection
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already. [52] If this trend continues, then the sensitivity of the ICE
baseline to reductions in the ratio of engine power to vehicle weight
become important.
We will assume that vehicle performance requirements remain roughly
unchanged, and that only unleaded gasoline is available at an octane rating
close to today's value. We will estimate approximately the improvement in
fuel economy realizable in the 1975-1985 time frame from improvements in
the engine alone, at three different emission levels which cover the
spectrum of options now being considered:
(A) No change from 1975 standards (49 states)
(1.5 g/mile HC, 15 g/mile CO, 3.1 g/mile NO )
X
(B) Proposed 1982 EPA standards
(0.41 g/mile HC, 3.4 g/mile CO, 2 g/mile NO )
X
(C) Statutory 1978 standards
(0.41 g/mile HC, 3.4 g/mile CO, 0.4 g/mile NO )
X
Note that these estimates are judgemental, since the potential for improve-
ments is not well defined. Nonetheless, they indicate the magnitude of the
improvements which can be realistically expected from the ICE under differ-
ent sets of assumptions. And such estimates must be developed before any
meaningful evaluation of the alternative power systems can be made.
4.2 Potential ICE Fuel Econcey ains
Vehicle fuel economy gain;, for a given size car, are likely to be
realized through many differept design improvements. These include changes
in the vehicle's shape (i.f. aerodynamics), reduction in weight, improve-
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ments in tire construction, as well as changes in engine and transmission.
Clearly, vehicle body and tire design changes which improve fuel economy
will be applicable to vehicles with alternative engines as well as the ICE.
Also, transmission improvements will be realized by the alternatives, to
roughly the same degree they benefit the ICE (at least to within the order
of our crude calculations). We will therefore include in our baseline
engine definition only the basic engine assembly, the induction and
ignition systems, cooling system, auxiliaries and complete emission control
system. The transmission is not included. (It is worth noting that
improvements in the conventional automatic transmission should bring a 4
to 9 percent increase in vehicle fuel economy [53]; and a continuously
variable transmission with today's ICE might show a 17 to 30 percent
improvement. [53]) Note also that stratified charge spark ignition engines
are not included as baseline engine development options; we consider those
stratified charge engines with potential for significant fuel economy
improvement as sufficiently different from the ICE to be classed as alter-
native engines. Thus our improved ICE baseline does not include some of
the options evaluated as potential ICE improvements in the Rand study. [7]
The most promising ICE-emission control system combinations in terms
of potential for fuel economy iDrovements at different emission standard
levels are shown in Table 4.1. hese three systems have been examined for
their fuel economy improvement potential [54] in the 1975 to 1985 timeframe.
The changes in engine design and operation likely to result in improved
While this would not b trie for electric vehicles, the precise
performance of the baseline ngine is less important in that comparison.
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engine fuel economy, and the approximate magnitude of the improvements
relative to 1975 values which can be expected by 1985, are listed in Table
4.2. These estimated improvements assume no change in emission standards
from today's (1975) levels. Thus, by 1985, reasonable expectations for
improvements in vehicle fuel economy (mpg) due to improvements in engine
design and operation, for vehicle performance similar to today's, are in
the range of 14 to 27 percent, assuming emission standards remain at the
1975 49-state values of 1.5 g/mile HC, 15 g/mile CO, 3.1 g/mile NO .
x
At lower emission standards the engine fuel economy will be poorer,
and the potential for improvements with time will be less because not all
the changes assumed in generating Table 4.2 will be available to the degree
listed. An average of several estimates of the impact of stricter HC/C0
standards, and then stricter NOx standards, indicates that in the near-term
x
(pre-1980), imposing standards of 0.41 g/mile HC, 3.4 g/mile CO, and 2
g/mile, NO results in about a 10 percent fuel economy penalty relative to
x
1975 model year vehicles; imposing standards of 0.41 g/mile HC, 3.4 g/mile
CO and 0.4 g/mile NO would result in an 18 percent penalty relative to
x
1975 model year vehicles. [55] Presumably, with time, if these stricter
standards are imposed, these penalties would be somewhat reduced through
continuing engine optimization ad improvements in emission control tech-
nology. However, just as it is overly pessimistic to assume no gains in
ICE fuel economy at these lowe emission levels, it is overly optimistic to
expect all the engine design ands operating improvements that Lake up the
The 3-way catalyst system i not of course required at these emission
levels.
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Table 4.2
POTENTIAL FUEL ECONOMY GAINS BY 1985
Total Gain:
Conservative estimate
Optimistic estimate
Breakdown:
Increased compression ratio,
Leaner mixture or EGR and
reduced pumping work,
Combustion chamber and
cylinder head redesign,
Onboard computer,
Increased spark-retard,
Total
Percent Improvement in mpg 2'3
14 - 17
22 - 27
Percent of Total Gain
27
42
27
33
- 29
100
At 1.5 g/mile HC, 15 g/mfie CO and 3.1 g/mile NO
x
2Relative to 1975 model year engines
3Range in values for diffPret ICE concepts in Table 4.1
-
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increase listed in Table 4.2 to be capable of full implementation. For
example, it has been estimated that 1976 model year vehicles, due to
engine and transmission improvements alone, have on average shown a 9
percent increase in fuel economy. [52] (1976 models in the 49-states met
the same emission standards as 1975 models.) Only a part of this gain
relative to 1975 would be realizable at lower emission levels. We can,
however, say that the relative fuel economy of vehicles, at the three
emission levels we have examined, are approximately defined in terms of
technology available in 1975, and that the curves of fuel economy improve-
ments due to engine developments over time will diverge. Thus, in future
years the differences in fuel economy between vehicles at the three
emission levels examined are likely to increase with time.
The appropriate baseline against which to evaluate the alternative
engines should include only those improvements which one can confidently
expect to be realized. All other options, be they a better ICE or the
alternative engines, would thus be compared against an almost guaranteed
minimum. We take the conservative estimate in Table 4.2, a 15 percent gain
by 1985, to be this lower bound, if there were no change in emissions
requirements. Figure 4.1 shows this minimum expected gain as a solid line
over the period 1975 to 1985; the shaded area above, labeled A, represents
the range of potential improvemenAts above this minimum which might be
realized but cannot be guaranteed.
The solid lines in Figure .1 at the bottom of areas B and C indicate
our estimates of minimum fue1 economy at lower emission standards: 0.41
g/mile HC, 3.4 g/mile CO, 2 /mile NO ; and 0.41 g/mile HC, 3.4 g/mile CO
and 0.4 g/mile NOXI respectivevly. We have taken the fuel economy
ill
20
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penalties of 10 and 18 percent, relative to 1975 values, and then assumed
that the penalty relative to the no-change-in-standards case remains
constant with time. The shaded areas above each line again indicate our
estimates of the possible but in-no-sense guaranteed improvements above
these minimums. The two data points for 1976 show average 49-state vehicle
fuel economy change relative to 1975 model year (the California standards
of 0.9 g/mile HC, 9 g/mile CO and 2 g/mile NO are halfway between our
levels A and B). [52] The estimates are in reasonable agreement with the
data.
4.3 Initial Engine Cost
Since we will be making comparisons between the baseline and the
alternative engines on a total life-cycle cost basis, the impact on the
initial cost of the ICE, of the engine changes we have described, must be
assessed also. The baseline engine cost can be expected to increase due
to changes made to improve fuel economy, and will further increase if
emission standards are reduced below today's value.
Careful evaluations of the effect of the changes listed in Table 4.2
on initial engine cost are not available in the public domain. Our rough
estimate of their impact would be in the $50 to $100 range, at today's
emission standards. More accurate estimates of the effect of stricter
emission standards are available [8, 5]; these do include sore of the
potential improvements listed in Table 4.2, however. Values of the
initial engine cost increases estimates for an intermediate sized engine
in these studies are given in Table 4.3; they correspond to different
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Table 4.3
IMPACT OF STRICTER EMISSION STANDARDS ON ICE INITIAL COST
Change in Standards
(HC/CO/NO in g/mile)
X 
1.5/15/3.1 to 0.41/3.4/2
1.5/15/3.1 to 0.41/3.4/0.4
0.41/3.4/2 to 0.41/3.4/0.4
Initial Cost Increase
NAS1 JPL2
$65
$190
$125 $65
'Near-term, pre-1980 [56].
2Mature technology, mid-1980's [8].
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timeframes with near-term being pre-1980, and "mature" being mid-1980's.
The total initial engine cost penalty of both changes to improve fuel
economy and changes required to meet stricter emission standards could be
up to about $250, but by the mid-1980's is likely to be substantially less
than this figure.
An accurate estimate of this penalty is not required for our purposes
because the increase in initial engine cost due to stricter emission
standards is greater than the increase due to fuel economy improvements,
and the fuel economy losses resulting from stricter emission standards
have a much greater impact on total life-cycle cost than do either of
these initial cost increases. For example, a 20 percent fuel economy
decrease, at 55C/gallon fuel price and 20 mpg baseline fuel economy, at
7 percent discount rate increases total life-cycle costs by about $500
The increase in initial engine cost is likely to be less than one-third
this value.
However, we do need an approximate estimate of the initial cost of
the baseline engine in the mid-1980's. The JPL estimate of the mature ICE
initial cost will be used for this purpose. [8] Their figure of $1320 for
a 150 hp engine with a 3-way catalyst emission control system at standards
of 0.41/3.4/0.4 g/mile HC/CO/NO can be adjusted for a higher NO standard,
x x
and the exclusion of transmission and battery from the definition of the
engine to give an initial engine cost of about $900. We will use this
figure as the estimated cost of the mid-1980's baseline ICE in our sub-
sequent evaluations.
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4.4 Conclusions Regarding the Baseline
The important conclusions regarding the mid-1980's ICE, as a baseline
against which to evaluate the alternative engines, are the following:
1) With no change in emission standards, the minimum expected fuel
economy improvement by 1985, due to engine design changes alone,
is about 15 percent relative to the 1975 fuel economy levels. The
maximum potential gains are higher of order 27 percent, but we
cannot be certain these larger gains will be realized.
2) Changes in emission standards have a tremendous impact on these
estimated improvements: a reduction from today's standards to
0.41/3.4/2 g/mile HC/CO/NO , would result in vehicles with about
15 percent worse fuel economy by 1985; a reduction to 0.41/3.4/0.4
g/mile HC/CO/NO would result in vehicles with about 25 percent
x
worse fuel economy by 1985 (worse than the contemporary ICE at
today's standards).
3) Both changes in engine design to improve fuel economy and changes
to meet stricter emission standards will increase initial engine
cost. By the mid-1980's, these initial cost increases, while
significant (of order $150), are expected to be considerably
smaller than the changes in life-cycle costs that result from fuel
economy gains or losses.
4) The uncertainty in estimates of the fuel economy ot the 1985 ICE
is therefore very large; it could vary from 15 percent worse to
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about 27 percent better fuel economy than the 1975 ICE. The
largest part of this uncertainty results from uncertainty as to
the applicable emission standards; the uncertainty in the extent
of fuel economy improvements alone is of order +5 to 10 percent.
5) We conclude that alternative engines are more attractive relative
to the ICE at emission levels substantially below today's values
than they are at today's standards. Also, at emission levels
close to today's levels, advanced ICE technology offers fuel
economy gains comparable to those offered by the alternative
engines.
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5.- THE STIRLING ENGINE
5.1 Introduction
In Chapter 3 of this report we developed the thesis that the incentives
provided the automotive industry to develop and introduce major technologi-
cal changes in automotive power systems were inadequate relative to social
needs and that a government role in supporting R & D in this area might well
be justified. In this chapter we examine in detail a particular technology,
the Stirling engine, to determine the possible impact the government might
have in advancing this technology and how such impact might best be achieved.
Because it is impossible to quantify the complicated set of incentives and
disincentives faced by the industry, our judgement that they are generally
inadequate will provide an important backdrop to the judgements that will be
made in the remainder of this chapter.
The analysis will follow generally the formulation of the problem as
developed in Chapter 3. Here, however, we will be able to deal with specif-
ics in many areas which Chapter 3 left ambiguous. On the other hand, one
thing we will also be able to demonstrate clearly is the magnitude of the
uncertainties involved in many important areas.
The Stirling engine is representative of the category of alternative
powerplants which are "advanced" heat engines that are very different from
the ICE, which have the potential for high vehicle fuel economy and low air
pollutant emissions, but which require a substantial development effort be-
fore these attributes can be demonstrated in engines at competitive cost.
For the Stirling engine, the principal issues in need of analysis are: 1)
the present status of the technology and the R & D programs now underway,
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2) the potential social benefits which might be obtained from replacement of
the ICE by the Stirling and whether these are worth the likely government
costs, and 3) the barriers which have prevented, or might prevent in the
future, a socially beneficial Stirling engine from becoming a commercial
reality and how government-supported R & D might overcome these barriers.
These three issues are addressed in detail in the following three sections
of this chapter. The chapter closes with a summary and a set of conclusions.
A review of the status of Stirling engine technology is found in Appendix A
to the report.
This chapter considers the Stirling engine in isolation among the alter-
native powerplants, i.e. it compares it only to the ICE (as that engine will
evolve). We will conclude, however, that the Stirling engine is unique
enough and attractive enough that a government-supported development program
should be undertaken, independent of action taken concerning the other alter-
natives. No other alternative offers the following combination of charac-
teristics: 1) air pollutant emissions almost certain to meet the statutory
(original 1976) emission standards, 2) fuel economy substantially superior
to the present ICE, 3) ability to burn a broad-cut distillate fuel, 4) no
major integrability problems, and 5) a major American motor vehicle manufac-
turer requesting government funds for a cost-sharing agreement and develop-
ment program. While investments in one or more of the other alternatives
may.also be likely to be socially beneficial, and the government should prob-
ably support more than one, the Stirling system should be one of those sup-
ported. This summary evaluation can be arrived at only after the careful
documentation and analysis which is the remainder of this chapter.
119
5.2 Status of the Technology and Current R & D Programs
In this section we will first summarize very quickly the history and
present status of the Stirling engine, then discuss the likely attributes of
a Stirling-powered passenger car which could be developed and marketed before
the 1990's and, finally, discuss the merits of the Stirling engine a a com-
petitor to the diesel in the heavy duty prime mover application. We have
relegated to Appendix A a detailed discussion of the history and present
status of the engine and its crucial components, together with the techno-
logical details of the history and current status of the R & D programs which
have brought the technology to its present state. Our analysis depends on
a number of judgements which can only be made based on the detailed type of
knowledge presented in the appendix; it will therefore be necessary reading
for those who wish a fuller justification of the conclusions reached in this
and the next section and the chapter as a whole concerning the response of
the technology to an input of government support.
5.2.1 A Brief Description of the Modern Automotive Stirling Engine
The Stirling engine is characterized by the use of a continuous-flow
combustor from which heat is transferred to a gaseous working fluid in a
sealed mechanical system; the gaseous working fluid is compressed, heated,
expanded against a piston connected to an output shaft and cooled, in a
closed cyclic process.' The combustion system is external to the working
fluid, in contrast to the ICE, diesel or gas turbine, where the fuel and
air are combusted under pressure and expanded directly to produce work. The
use of a gaseous working fluid contrasts with the condensible material
1See [57-59] for detailed technical discussions of the Stirling cycle
engine.
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(usually water) used in a Rankine cycle system (also an external combustion
system) where condensation and evaporation play significant roles in the
thermodynamics of the cycle. ....
The two crucial features of the system which make it interesting as a
potential automotive powerplant are: 1) the fact that the theoretical
thermodynamic efficiency is limited only to the maximum obtainable by any
heat engine operating between the same maximum and minimum working fluid
temperatures (the "Carnot" efficiency); so that with modern heat-resistant
materials relatively high efficiencies can be obtained using a relatively
simple thermodynamic cycle (the "Stirling cycle"), and 2) the. continuous-
flow external burner which allows the combustion process to be controlled
much more precisely than in intermittent combustion systems, so that air
pollution emissions can be limited without degrading engine performance. The
continuous combustion also eliminates one of the major sources of noise and
vibration found in the ICE and diesel, namely the rapid pressure rise as-
sociated with the intermittent internal explosions, and makes the combustion
system efficiency relatively insensitive to the particular qualities of the
fuel (again in notable contrast to the ICE and diesel).
The modern Stirling engine is a complex device requiring many highly
sophisticated components for efficient, reliable operation. The Ford Motor
Company is now engaged in a program to develop a system suitable for the
passenger car application; a cutaway drawing of the engine now in vehicle
testing at Ford is shown in Figure 5.1. The "guts" of the engine are within
the sealed system for the cyclic processing of the pressurized gaseous working
fluid. Most modern systems use a set of cylinders with one or two pistons
in each for compressing and expanding the gas (hydrogen) and moving it
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through the heater and cooler. For each cylinder there is at least one re-
generator in which part of the working fluid's heat content must be stured
during each cycle. The passages within the working gas flow system nu.t Le
carefully designed to minimize the parasitic losses incurred in merely moving
the working gas around, and the regenerator must be carefully designed for
rapid absorption and release of heat with minimal contribution to the flow
losses. There are a number of different ways in which the pistons, regen-
erators, heaters, coolers and intervening passageways can be configured; the
systems now under consideration for automotive use are "double-acting" in
that a single piston in each cylinder serves both to take work out of the
system and to move the working fluid around.
Because the working gas is highly pressurized, critical features of
the system are the external hydrogen seals, i.e., the sealing mechanisms
at the points where power is transferred out by the motion of the piston
rod. Two types of seals are presently under consideration -- the roll-sock
seal invented by Philips, and the simpler but less effective sliding seal.
Although most components of the system can be made with relatively conven-
tional materials and technology, an unusually demanding situation occurs in
the heater head, which must contain the high pressure hydrogen while contin-
uously held at or above the maximum working gas cycle temperature. It is
therefore a significant cost reduction challenge, because in order for the
engine to attain its high efficiencies, peak cycle temperatures are used
which press the limits of materials technology, and thus expensive super-
alloys are required. A development of major significance would be the use
of ceramics to replace the superalloys in the heater head. This would allow
some increase in peak cycle temperature and thus efficiency; more importantlY
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it could effect a major cost reduction. However, while R & D programs are
currently underway on high temperature load-bearing ceramic components, the
development of techniques for manufacturing such components in quantity
would have to be considered a major technological advance.
The burner, in which fuel and air are mixed and combusted must be tare-
fully designed to limit the quantity of air pollutants formed. Preceding
the burner in the air-flow path is the air blower, which, due to the ex-
tremely low noise and vibration level of the engine proper, becomes an im-
portant noise source. The hot combustor product gases are directed along
the outside of the heater head, through which the bulk of their thermal
energy is transferred to the working fluid. An air preheater is used to in-
crease the overall system efficiency by transferring as much as possible of
the thermal energy remaining in the burner exhaust gases after they have
passed through the heater head to the stream of fresh air entering the bur-
ner. Rotating ceramic preheaters as well as stationary metal devices have
been demonstrated.
Three crucial and complex control systems are required to provide the
necessary engine response to the vehicle operator's demands. Power control
is accomplished either through some alteration to the geometry of the working
gas flow system or by actually changing the mass of working fluid in the
system. It must be sufficiently responsive for the engine to meet the
requirements of its duty cycle, and not excessive in cost. The fuel and
air control systems respond with the power control system so that the re-
quisite amount of heat is generated for a given power output, and they must
be coordinateZ together to meet the requirements of the burner.
Finally, a drive system is required to convert the reciprocating motion
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resulting from the pistons to the rotary motion required of the transmission
and drive shaft. Minimum weight and bulk are its key attributes. Either a
swashplate or conventional (ICE-type) crankshaft can be used (with crcss-
head pistons), depending on the configuration of the cylinders.
5.2.2 Review of the History and Present Status of R & D Programs1
As patented in 1816 by the Scottish minister Robert Stirling, the en-
gine used a coal- or wood-fueled fire to heat compressed air in a cylinder;
the air was then expanded against a piston and the resulting power used for,
among other things, pumping water from coal mines. Thousands of such "hot
air" engines were built during the nineteenth century, especially in appli-
cations where a higher degree of safety was required than was available from
the steam engine. However, the use of air at low pressure limited power out-
put and the steam engine went on to become the prime mover behind the indus-
trial revolution.
The modern development of Stirling cycle power systems has principally
been accomplished at the Philips Research Laboratories, Eindhoven, Nether-
lands, the main component of the research arm of N.V. Philips.2 Their pro-
gram began in 1938; it was initially intended to meet a demand for quiet
generation of electric power for radios at remote sites, but the invention
of the transistor virtually eliminated the demand. The automotive application
lMuch of the historical material presented here is taken from personal
interviews.
2Philips has published a number of historical reviews of the technolo-
gical and programmatic history of their efforts e.g. 60-62].
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is only one of a large number that Philips has explored in its continuing
efforts; estimates of Philips' total investment in Stirling technology range
up to $100 million. Discussion of some of the many important advances made
at Philips is contained in Appendix A.
As a corporation whose principal interest has been and remains in the
electronics area, Philips has constantly sought licensees in the engine man-
ufacturing business who would apply Philips' technology to the development
and production of practical systems. During the period 1958 to 1970 General
Motors was a licensee of Philips. The Allison and Electro-Motive Divisions
and the Research Laboratories all built experimental motors for a variety of
potential applications, including underwater systems for the U. S. Navy (the
low noise and vibration characteristics of the engine would make it advan-
tageous for torpedoes), engines or generators for the U. S. Army (again in-
audibility was important), and auxiliary powerplants for space satellites for
the U. S. Air Force (where it would be run indirectly from solar heat). In
all, a great deal of experience and expertise was accumulated -- involving
over 25,000 hours of operating experience [63] and an investment of $10-15
million. For various reasons, none of these efforts resulted in a signifi-
cant government procurement. Although in the late 1960's GM looked closely
at the emissions potential of the engine and built two highly experimental
vehicles using small Stirling engines (one a hybrid with an electric motor
and batteries, the other running off a heat store), GM concluded that the
engine did not have the potential to become a passenger car powerplant (in
contrast, for example, to its handling of the gas turbine). Nitrogen oxide
emissions, weight and bulk, cooling (i.e. radiator size), sealing, cost and
response time have been cited as the key problem areas.[64] Since 1970 GM's
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Stirling engine activity has been confined o maintaining cognizance of ex-
ternal developments.
Philips' second important licensee was KB United Stirling (Sweden) a:
& Co., a firm founded in 1968 for the sole purpose of developing and marketing
Stirling cycle engine technology. Its (equal) co-owners are Kockums Mekaniska
Verkstads AB, the sixth largest shipbuilder in the world, and Forenade
Fabriksverken (FFV), a defense manufacturer owned by the Swedish Government.
The company now employs about 90 people. The motivation for the formation
of United Stirling was a mutual interest in Kockums and FFV in quiet and
efficient engines for marine use, especially in submarines. United Stirling's
first order of business was to work out a technology licensing arrangement
with Philips. The initial plan was to develop as rapidly as possible an
engine based on the technology then most prominent at Philips, and to market
it for uses where the advantages of high efficiency, clean exhaust, and low
noise and vibration would outweigh the relatively high initial cost. It had
been hoped that the submarine, the city bus, or underground mining equipment
might provide such applications. The engine which resulted in 1971 turned
out to be too heavy and expensive for these markets, although it did have
low noise, vibrations and emissions, and a thermal efficiency between that
of an ICE and a diesel. With this experience, the company then decided to
orient its development work more specifically toward the prime mover field,
where the increasingly stringent emissions and noise controls would tend
(they hoped) to increase the attractiveness of the Stirling relative to the
diesel. A cylinder configuration of the conventional "V" type was adopted
along with crosshead pistons and a conventional crankshaft.
In 1968 the two large German firms M.A.N.and Motoren-Werke Mnnheim AG
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(MWM) decided to undertake a joint Stirling engine development program. Both
companies ranufacture a range of diesel engines. With a total technical em-
ployment in their Stirling program of about 30, this effort is less than
half the size of the other two. The group cooperates closely with Philips,
from whom they have purchased a license; less closely with United Stirling.
The M.A.N. - MWM Group was formed from the beginning with a long-range pro-
gram in mind. Managements' opinion was (and is) that the engine's emissions,
noise, fuel economy and fuel tolerance characteristics might in the long run
dominate over the engine's high cost, but that there was not much hope of a
successful product in the near term. Furthermore, they are interested in
developing a technology which would ultimately be applicable in some large
part of the broad range of markets for which they now make diesel engines.
The M.A.N. - W! Group therefore has not sought to build a prototype for a
specific application.
With the loss of General Motors as a licensee in 1970, Philips began an
active search for a replacement with comparable interest and capability in
the mass production and sales of passenger car engines. At about the same
time, Ford was conducting a major internal review of its alternative power-
plant programs, prompted largely by the rapid rise in importance of the air
pollution issue.1 Discussions were held, with special emphasis on the prob-
lems identified by G. A nine-month study was initiated, including emissions
testing on a burner and detailed examination of various packaging approaches.
Ford concluded that all of the major problems appeared amenable to solution,
although a major development program would be required. In July, 1972, Ford
and Philips signed an agreement for a seven-year joint engine development
1Ford has discussed the history of its Stirling engine program in two
public documents [57,65].
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program, iucluding a licensing arrangement. Ford subsequently signed a
licensing arangement with United Stirling, forming a three-way pool with
regular t.nial interchanges.
The first phase of the Ford-Philips program (corresponding roughly to
the latter efforts of the Initial Development Stage discussed in Chapter 2)
centers on the design and fabrication of a 170 hp Stirling "research demon-
stration" engine. It is comparable in its gross attributes to the 351 CID
ICE in a Ford Torino, an "intermediate" size car with a curb weight of about
4,200 lbs. Three of the engines have been built; two were to be installed
in vehicles for extensive field testing. Philips has had responsibility for
the design and fabrication of the engine proper; this program has come to
consume the bulk of Philips' Stirling engine effort. Ford, with a much
smaller present manpower commitment, has been responsible for those accessor-
ies which are standard automotive items, and the provision of packaging and
performance requirements to Philips. In October, 1975, the first Stirling-
powered Torino arrived in Dearborn and, at this writing, is undergoing test-
ing.
The technical goals of Phase I of the program are, in summary, to de-
velop an engine which would allow the Torino to: 1) meet the statutory
(original 1976) emissions standards, 2) provide a substantial improvement in
fuel economy, 3) maintain its performance, and 4) have all other non-pecuniary
attributes which would be acceptable to consumers, including noise, start-up
time, driveability, and maintenance (especially working gas recharge period).
System durability and reliability will be the focus of the vehicle testing
program. This is the first time a Stirling engine has been designed to meet
a specific set of vehicle requirements. A crucial feature of the Phase I
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program is that no manufacturing cost considerations have been explicitly
incorporated into the engine design.
It no.. appears that the program will meet all its primary objectives,
and that ord and Philips will proceed into the second half of the joint
program, Phase II, corresponding to the early efforts of the Final Develop-
ment Stage discussed in Chapter 2. However, the engine as it stands is a
device which could not be mass produced at a cost within even several times
that of present engines. During Phase I Ford has identified the key high
cost components of the present system. No significant efforts have yet been
made at developing lower cost items, however. Thus Phase II, presently
planned to cover roughly the years 1976 through 1979, will involve several
complete design iterations with fabrication of improved components and en-
gines, focusing on cost through minimizing the requirements for superalloys
and designing components amenable to mass production on modern high volume
transfer lines. Simultaneously, studies of the application of the engine to
vehicles of other sizes will be conducted. An important feature of Phase II
will be the active acquisition by Ford of all the relevant engine design
capability and "know-how", i.e. the technology, from Philips. The results
of continued developments by Philips, United Stirling, and future licensees
would of course be incorporated to the extent possible. Key engine and
engine-vehicle tradeoffs would be made during this period.
If Phase II is successful in developing an engine which has the potential
for being manufactured at the suitable cost, Ford estimates that a minimum
of two more years of development would be required, centered on production
engineering, at the end of which the final design, manufacturing techniques,
and thus cost figures, would be firm and the Final Development Stage would
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be completed. During this stage Ford would expect to be intimately ivolved
with potential suppliers for a number (of the critical components. Ford es-
timates the total cost of the Final Development Stage at $100-200 million
"to be shared [they hope] by Ford, ERDA, subcontractors and licensees". [66]
Again assuming continued success, in early 1982 or so a positive Intro-
duction Decision would be made and a four-year "Production Program" would be
undertaken, resulting in the introduction into the marketplace of Stirling-
powered vehicles in late 1985. Ford estimates the total cost of the Produc-
tion Program (or "Introduction Stage"), at $500 million to $1 billion, in-
cluding the first plant. Ford emphasizes that the 1985 date is a purposely
optimistic estimate, based on minimum reasonable estimates for the length of
the development stages, and requiring levels of funding which are larger than
Ford is willing to commit by itself.
Ford is actively seeking government support for its Stirling engine de-
velopment program. On July 9, 1975, a $550,000 contract was signed between
Ford and the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) for the
design of a 80-100 hp Stirling engine powerplant to power a subcompact (curb
weight 2500-3000 lbs.). This represents a contribution to the scalability
studies of Phase II of the Ford-Philips program. Ford would like to see
heavy government support of component and prototype engine developments in
the stages up through and including the Final Development Stage.
5.2.3 Attributes of the Automotive Stirling Engine for the 1980's
In this subsection the overall development status and attributes of the
engine as a system will be discussed. Two points should be noted at the out-
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set. First, it is really the attributes f he vehicle as a whole that are
of concern here, not those of the engine alone. Thus engine attributes must
be discussed very carefully, and can really La. evaluated only as part of a
full vehicle design. The most relevant example of this consideration is the
tradeoff between engine weight and efficiency. This section, however, will
deal principally with engines; discussion in the vehicle context will be
postponed to Section 5.3. Second, in this subsection we will minimize the
use of quantitative attribute values, because such numbers are very difficult
to develop in a meaningful way. Each requires a host of technical qualifica-
tions, and as stated above, are of limited usefulness outside of a vehicle
context. For example, the thermal efficiency of the Stirling engine depends
heavily on: coolant temperature, driving cycle (if any, often point values
are used), and very careful accounting of necessary accessory losses, among
other things, and, in any case is not meaningful outside of a vehicle con-
text due to the impact of engine weight on vehicle weight. Similarly, spe-
cific power is difficult to compare between engines due to problems of ac-
counting for accessory volume and weight. We will therefore primarily rely
in this discussion on qualitative comparisons with other systems. A major
difficulty in such comparisons (qualitative or quantitative), pervasive
throughout this report and explicitly addressed elsewhere, is just what sys-
tem to compare the Stirling engine to. In this subsection we will generally
compare the Stirling to the present ICE, and then use the discussion from
Chapter 4 to extend that to the future ICE.
In Appendix A we discuss at some length the status of the key components
of the Stirling system. An automotive engine is, however, more than a col-
lection of components -- it is a carefully integrated system whose gross
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attributes are :he result of a complicated set of tradeoffs which include
choices among competing component concepts and the design parameters cf the
components chosen. As discussed above, many hours of running time have been
accumulated on Stirling engines in laboratories in the United States and
Europe; most of these hours were focused on the performance and durability
testing of key components in laboratory engines not designed to be commer-
cially utilized. It is not a trivial matter, then, to discuss the attributes
of an optimized engine system based on known component performance character-
istics. This capability has now largely been attained (or nearly so) at
Philips through the use of computer simulations. Attribute levels given
here, however, are based on the results of engine test data and a consensus
of expert opinion.
As discussed above and in Appendix A, various component concepts have
accumulated different levels of experience behind them, and thus the amounts
of development effort required for incorporation into a practical engine
are very different. We will therefore characterize the technology here by
dividing it into a "First Generation System" (FGS) and "Advanced Systems".
The FS is defined as utilizing the component concepts of the Ford-Philips,
United Stirling and M.A.N. - MWM groups which have reached the development
status where questions of their performance have been largely resolved, al-
though issues of cost and (to a lesser extent) durability remain unresolved.
Thus the FGS utilizes a double-action configuration with either swashplate
or crankshaft drive, mean pressure (with a bypass) or pressure amplitude
(dead volume) control, and roll-sock or sliding external seals. Most sig-
nificantly, the FGS uses no ceramics in the heater head or any other load-
bearing component (although it may well utilize a ceramic core in its pre-
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heater). Advanced Systems might incorporate ceramic materials, especially
in the heater head, a heat pipe, a variable-angle swashplate, or new un-
cepts which have yet to be formulated. Table A.1 of Appendix A summarizes
the status of the key components.
The FGS is the only Stirling system with a chance to make it to the
marketplace before the late 1980's, because incorporation of any advanced
concepts would most likely significantly extend the development program
schedule. It is not at all certain that the FGS will make it to the market-
place; this obviously depends on the success (and thus the magnitude) of on-
going and future development programs. The Introduction Decision is based
on comparing a set of Stirling vehicle attributes with a set of marketplace
and government criteria; both are dynamic (aside from being uncertain). If
the FGS does not meet the standards relevant for the mid-80's, maybe an Ad-
vanced System will meet the more demanding criteria relevant for its later
potential introduction date; viz. structural ceramics may ultimately be
necessary for a commercially successful Stirling engine. In any case, since
any Advanced System will require a significant technological advance to make
it out of the Initial Development Stage, we focus here on the FGS for fore-
casting the attributes of a Stirling engine which, given an adequate R & D
program, could probably be brought to the marketplace before 1990.
The technological status of the FGS can be approximately characterized
in the following simplified way. It has demonstrated (simultaneously) ac-
ceptable levels of all the requisite powerplant attributes except initial
cost. These attribute levels are now reasonably well known (uncertainty in
the efficiency will be discussed below), but its initial cost (at a produc-
tion volume sufficient to utilize available economies of scale in manufac-
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turing) is relatively unknown, bounded roughly on the low side by the cost
of a simiLarly-sized ICE and on the high side by several times that. This
statement _~ bsed on the results of extensive dynamometer testing of FGS
components and complete engines by Philips and its licensees, on the results
to date of the Ford-Philips program, and the fact that it appears that the
vehicle testing of the Ford-Philips engines has indicated that it meets (or
exceeds) all the key requirements in the laboratory.
This characterization will prove to be very useful for purposes of our
economic analyses because it will allow us to deal with the economics in a
very simple way. We will treat initial cost as the key unknown in Stirling
technology, and thus the focus of the R & D effort, and we will examine the
impact of the other key uncertainties (such as government policies and fuel
prices) on the decision criterion for initial cost. This characterization
deviates from reality in two important respects. First, even in the simple
economic model we will use in Section 5.3, the decision criterion for the
engine will be a first-cost/efficiency attribute pair. This is because the
efficiency of Stirling engines may be increased somewhat during the R & D
process. However, this will be relatively independent of the engine cost
(as long as the peak cycle temperature is kept at the materials technology
limit, as is expected), so we will treat engine efficiency as an independent
uncertainty rather than as the focus of R & D. Second, the existence of
significant design tradeoffs between initial cost and air pollutant emissions,
maintenance costs, durability, or other key attributes would void this sim-
ple characterization. In fact, Stirling engine experts feel that none of
these tradeoffs are likely to be significant -- the major focus of future
R & D efforts will be the reduction of engine cost, and the other attributes
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will probably not suffer significantly in the process. The uncertainty re-
maining in FGS technology, because it has never been subjected to road test-
ing, is significant, especially as to maintenance and durability, so the
question of design tradeoffs against initial cost does, however, remain open.
Only one detailed estimate has been published for the initial cost of
the Stirling engine; it was by JPL. [8] They made consistent estimates for
the total costs of the ICE, at two emissions levels, and the Stirling sys-
tem (as well as for the other alternatives). Their total cost estimates in-
clude not only the direct manufacturing cost, but also the engine's propor-
tional share of the overhead and profit at the various stages between the
engine plant and the showroom; this is correct as an indication of the total
resources consumed in the engine as delivered to the customer. Their esti-
mate also includes all the relevant engine auxiliaries. Their "Otto-Engine
Equivalent" Stirling requires about 20% less rated horsepower than the ICE;
it costs 1.2 to 1.3 times as much, depending on the emissions levels of the
ICE. However, the horsepower advantage is very dependent on the specific
torque-speed curves of the projected Stirling and the particular ICE chosen,
and the "equivalence" criterion they used (a combination of 0-60 mph accel-
eration time and distance covered in 10 seconds from a standing start).
There are substantial uncertainties in the torque curve comparison and whe-
ther this equivalence criterion is the correct one. Another important cost
comparison, then, is at the same rated power; in this case their ratio of
costs is 1.6 to 1.7, depending on the ICE emissions and the Stirling cost
scaling procedure. Furthermore, the Stirling cost could be substantially
higher, as there is little experience in estimating mass production cost for
superalloy components. Our original citation of a Stirling cost from one to
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several times the cost of the ICE remains the crucial uncertainty of the
system; onE which only an R & D program will resolve.
Table 5.1 summarizes the attributes of the FGS. As stated above, ini-
tial cost aside, the engine has the potential for attaining an attribute set
at least s ood as that of the present ICE. We expect some changes in the
attributes of the ICE between now and the 1980's, most likely in emissions,
fuel economy and initial cost, as discussed in Chapter 4; the impact of
these changes on the economics of the future Stirling relative to the 1980's
ICE will be discussed below. The three areas where some further uncertainty
remains are maintenance requirements, start-up and safety (other than effi-
ciency). Each is an attribute for which consumers in general have high ex-
pectations due to their experience with modern ICE-powered vehicles. To the
extent that maintenance requirements impose no new non-pecuniary burdens on
the owner (such as having to take the vehicle in for servicing more often),
then maintenance becomes an operating cost which can be presumably incorpor-
ated with initial and fuel costs into the life-cycle cost considerations dis-
cussed below. The start-up and safety issues are much more difficult to
deal with. These attributes may turn out to be slightly inferior to, or at
least somewhat different from, those of ICE-powered vehicles. It is, there-
fore, not easy to predict consumer reaction to them, and makes the Introduc-
tion Decision a more difficult one for the manufacturer. This is especially
true of the hydrogen safety issue which may draw an irrational consumer re-
sponse. The low noise and vibrational energy output of the engine and its
possible maintenance advantages are similar features in the positive direc-
tion which may balance the safety and start-up problems out. At this time,
however, none of these features seems individually of crucial significance,
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Table 5.1
ATTRIBUTES OF THE FGS STIRLING ENGINE
Attribute Importance
Initial Cost
Emissions
Efficiency
Critical for
consumer acceptance.
Legal requirement,
although relevant
(future) levels unclear.
Key consumer and
legal requirement,
and of social value
Somewhere between one and
several times that of the ICE
at the same power; will be
the focus of future develop-
ment efforts.
Meets tightest proposed stan-
dards (original 1976) on gas-
oline, durability probably
no problem, emissions when
run on other fuels not known.
Between present CE and diesel
(either average over Federal
Driving Cycle or at peak),
25% over present ICE and
possibly more.
Key factor in cost,
vehicle design and
vehicle performance
Total system weight approxi-
mately equal to that of
present ICE.
Packagability
_(shape and volume)
Torque-speed
curve shape
Key in determining
whether major vehicle
modifications needed.
Determines transmission
requirements (and thus
influences vehicle cost).
No major problems. (Radiator
size and system length with
swashplate drive require
some vehicle modifications.)
Can utilize present
transmissions.
Consumer and socially
appreciated attribute;
will become legal require-
ment.
Substantially superior
to ICE; extremely quiet.
Status
Weight
Noise
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Table 5.1 (Cont'd)
Vibration
(smoothness)
Power response
and driveability
Maintenance require-
ments (and response
to abuse and neglect)
Starting charac-
teristics
Consumer requirement;
impacts on vehicle
design.
Key consumer requirement.
Key consumer requirement.
May be consumer re-
quirement.
Excellent, superior to ICE.
Satisfactory (will meet on-
sumer expectations).
Probably satisfactory,
although uncertain.
Hydrogen make-up requirement
a potential problem, oil
changes relatively rare.
Start-up certain but some
delay required before vehicle
operation (less than 20 sec.).
Consumer and possibly
legal requirement.
Probably no real problem;
studies underway.
Design versatility
(scalability)
Fuel versatility
Durability
Key in long-run
production cost.
Will allow use of less
expensive fuels.
Consumer requirement.
No apparent problems; studies
underway.
Emissions output and relevant
emissions regulations are un-
certain, early availability
of low-cost fuels unlikely.
Equal or possibly superior to
ICE.
Safety
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and they are highly uncertain on the "positive" side in that they will most
likely impruve as development efforts continue. The system's durability is
worth a final .omment. This will remain uncertain until substantial road-
testing in vehicles is completed. There are presently many complex systems
which are important to the engine, but these would presumably be maintained
or replaced, as long as the expensive principal components of the engine
proper are in functioning order (excluding consideration of other vehicle
components, such as the body). Because the engine proper must be well sealed,
and because the vibrational output of the engine is so low, it is expected
that the system's durability will, if significantly different from that of
the present ICE, be superior. 
While there are other technical uncertainties which are important, then,
the dominating uncertainty in the attributes of the FGS Stirling is its ini-
tial cost. Because the focus of development efforts to date has been on
achieving other attributes at whatever cost necessary, present systems use
quantities of expensive materials, manufacturing techniques and complex
components which would never be considered for a production engine. Major
efforts aimed at system cost reduction have not been undertaken. Further-
more, it is extremely difficult to forecast the degree of success which will
be attained by such forthcoming cost reduction programs. As the Phase I
portion of the Ford-Philips program draws to completion, Ford has identified
six components as potentially high cost items: the heater, preheater, inter-
cooler, fuel control, power control, and two-speed accessory drive. At this
time it appears that the initial cost of the FGS, if it were manufactured
in sufficient quantity to utilize the available economies of scale, would be
from one to several times that of a comparable ICE.
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That the fuel economy of a FGS Stirling-powered vehicle will be sub-
stantially superior to that of present CE-powered vehicles is not in oubt.
Ford fuel consumption data taken on dynamometer tests has shown a 47% iprove-
ment over the baseline 1975 Torino ICE-powered vehicles controlled to ali-
fornia 1975 emissions standards, on a driving cycle consisting of no ran-
sients, only a series of constant speeds. Based on these results, Ford nas
stated that the engine should easily be able to meet our 25% improvement
objective" [63] referring to fuel economy measured on Ford's "city-suburban"
cycle, which includes substantial transient operation (the Ford-Philips pro-
totype suffers relatively more during transients than the ICE). Vehicles
controlled to 1975-76 California standards suffer an average fuel economy
penalty of 7-10% relative to their 49-state counterparts [55,52], but there
is a wide variation in this difference among individual vehicles. Environ-
mental Protection Agency data lists the Ford Torino/Elite with the 351 CID
engine at 10 and 16 mpg on the Federal city and highway driving cycles,
respectively, at California standards, and 11 and 16 mpg at the 49-state
standards [67,68]; this difference cannot be considered statistically sig-
nificant, so the fuel economy advantage of the Ford-Philips prototype rela-
tive to 49-state 1975 vehicles is somewhat unclear. Ford has set a goal of
a 35% Stirling cycle fuel economy improvement (over the same cycle and base-
line) for their government-sponsored compact vehicle engine design, to be
attained with some projected advances in FGS technology beyond the Ford-
Philips prototype. The recent report by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL)
[8] has calculated that, without any major technical advances (i.e. using
the basic components of our FGS system), an optimized Stirling engine could
achieve approximately a 30% efficiency improvement relative to the Ford-
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Philips engine; this estimate is questioned by many others in the field.
Thus the efficiency advantage of the Stirling engine relative to the 175
49-state ICE is likely in the range of about 20% to 50%.
In the previous chapter we discussed the relation of the 1985 ICE to
the present ICE, indicating that an efficiency improvement of -5% to about
20% might be obtained relative to the present ICE.2 Thus the fuel economy
advantage of the FGS Stirling relative to the 1985 ICE lies roughly in the
range 0 to 55%. In the next chapter we address the impact of this uncer-
tainty on the maximum acceptable initial cost.
Finally, the multi-fuel capability of the engine is clear. Its valu-
ation, however, is very unclear, although certainly positive if considered
relative to operation on gasoline (as an option, it obviously has a minimum
value of zero; emissions with fuels heavier than gasoline could be a prob-
lem). This complicated issue will be addressed in Section 5.3 principally
in terms of its impact on the operating economics of the system.
In summary, then, the status of the Stirling engine system may be char-
acterized as follows: laboratory engines have demonstrated on dynamometers
the clear potential to attain all the attributes necessary for a marketable
system except initial cost; it meets the statutory emissions standards and
demonstrates a substantial improvement over the present ICE in fuel economy.
1The Ford-Philips engine is essentially JPL's "present" engine, the 30%
advantage is roughly that which their "mature"engine achieves over the "present".
2The full range was given in Chapter 4 as -15% to +27%, however the
upper limit is technically unlikely and the lower limit would require imposi-
tion of the 0.4 g/mile NOx standard at a fuel economy penalty which is
probably politically unacceptable.
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Initial cost is the principal uncertainty; uncertainties remaining to e
pinned down in vehicle testing and further development include maintenanice,
start-up, safety, durability, and efficiency.
The components comprising this system (our FGS) are individually at a
similar status. The system is, however, very complex and presently requires
expensive materials and manufacturing techniques for its fabrication. A
major development program which would focus on cost reduction while main-
taining the other attributes (the Final Development Stage) is necessary before
this technology could be developed to the point where a favorable Introduction
Decision could be made. There also exist advanced concepts for the Stirling
engine which might offer significant improvements in the engine attributes,
but it is very unlikely these could be incorporated into a system which could
be introduced in the marketplace before the 1990's.
5.2.4 The Heavy Duty Prime Mover Application
Up to this point we have discussed Stirling engine technology primarily
in terms of the passenger car application. As discussed in Chapter 1, this
is our principal focus; it is where the major social and private benefits
are to be found. For two reasons, however, the heavy duty prime mover appli-
cation is worth a brief discussion: first, there are potentially substantial
benefits there (even if they are substantially less than for passenger cars),
and.second, it could serve as an important stepping stone to the passenger
car application. In fact, two of the present Stirling engine research groups,
United Stirling and M.A.M. - MWM, are orienting their programs toward the
heavy duty prime mover application.
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As a parenthetical note it should be pointed out that there are many
applications for heat engines - from 1 hp lawn mower engines (ICE's) to 1000
MW (1.3 million hp) electric power generating stations (Rankine cycle sys-
tems). The emphasis in government-supported heat engine work (military and
space uses aside) naturally is focused on the application where the otal
usage,(and thus the potential aggregate benefits)are the greatest, even
though the Stirling system might yeld a greater benefit, per unit of usage,
in some other application. 1
Here we are addressing the "heavy duty" application, which essentially.
consists of those applications now dominated by large diesel engines: trans-
portation by trucks, buses, and ships, and electric power generation units
(for industrial plants or small communities). It appears that the maximum
thermal efficiency of the FGS will be 3 to 7 percentage points lower than
that of the present diesel (32-35% at peak as compared to 37-39%). Thus
(FGS) Stirling powered vehicles will be 5 to 20% higher in fuel consumption
than diesel-powered vehicles. This deficit would have to be made up by a
combination of lower initial cost (with appropriate consideration of engine
lifetime) and lower maintenance cost. The baseline in this case, the diesel
of the mid-1980's, is likely to (at least) maintain its present efficiency.
Its initial cost, already substantially higher than the ICE at the same power,
will likely be increased somewhat by noise control requirements (especially
in the case of long-haul trucking). The pressure for air pollutant emissions
1The possibility of special applications can never be eliminated. For
example, development of an automotive Rankine cycle engine has been supported
by ERDA; ERDA will probably be dropping its support, but the Bureau of ines
is picking the program up for a low-emissions source of power in coal mines.
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control on trucks and buses is not nearly as strong as it has been for thte
passenger car and is less likely to significantly degrade the economics of
either system.2 Experience has indicated that municipally operated tmsi:
systems will not willingly sacrifice any significant economies to obtain re-
duced emissions or noise, contrary to the hopes of some Stirling engine pro-
ponents, and long-haul truckers are even less likely to do so.
In the following section on the economics of the Stirling system we
will confine our analysis to the passenger car application. It is not clear
at this time, however, that the heavy-duty prime mover application is not a
more likely candidate for widespread application of Stirling technology,
and a serious study of the relevant economics should certainly be undertaken.
5.3 The Social Economics of Government Investment in the Stirling Engine
In this chapter we will, following the general guidelines discussed in
Chapter 3 above, attempt some rough calculations of the benefits which might
be expected to accrue to our society, should the government support a Stirling
engine R & D program. These expected benefits will then be compared with the
likely costs of such a program to see whether such an investment is justified.
Our most important conclusion will be that while the benefits could be sub-
stantial, they are very uncertain, first in terms of their magnitude in the
event the R & D is successful and the Stirling engine is subsequently com-
mercialized (or its commercializationis hastened) due to government invest-
ment, and second in the impact of government funds on the probability of R & D
lIt should be noted, however, that Congress is at this writing consider-
ing legislation in this area.
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success. Thus the actual calculations made here will be only of the grossest
sort, designed to illustrate the essential points of the discussion.
We will confine our economic analysis to the FGS Stirling system, for
a number of reasons. First, some features of Advanced Systems will undioubt-
edly continue to be examined with private funds and, if they come to ppear
sufficiently ready as well as sufficiently attractive, could always be ab-
sorbed into any FGS development program. Second, to delay the engine devel-
opment program as a whole in order to work on Advanced Systems would be to
extend the likely introduction date into the 1990's, passing up a decade of
potential benefits from the FGS. Third, a key feature of the Advanced Sys-
tems, namely the use of structural ceramics, is of a relatively "basic" na-
ture -- most importantly, research is needed to develop new techniques for
the processing of these materials. Such research would have broad implica-
tions for many areas of technology involving processes at high temperatures,
including other heat engines besides the Stirling. This work is clearly de-
serving of government support, but as discussed in Chapter 3, this type of
effort does not need to be justified by the type of economic analysis under-
taken here.
Our evaluation of the social economics of government investment in the
FGS Stirling will proceed as follows. First, in Subsections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2
the potential benefits of Stirling engine utilization will be examined. The
general nature of the proper comparison of vehicles powered by different
powerplants will be addressed, some total operating cost calculations made
for Stirling-powered vehicles, and the issue of how to aggregate and discount
the benefits obtained by many individuals at some distant date will be dis-
cussed and some simple calculations presented. In Subsection 5.3.3 the
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likely impact f government funds on the possibility of R & D success will
be discussed; specifically, the incremental increase in the probability of
technical succebs which might be assigned to the government investment will
be assessed. Finally, in Subsection 5.3.4 a set of conclusions will be
drawn about the relative costs and benefits of government investment in
Stirling engine R & D.
5.3.1 Preliminary Considerations
5.3.1.1 Comparing Future Automotive Powerplants
Within the last few years, numerous studies have attempted to evaluate
and compare the alternative automotive powerplants e.g. 5,7,8,69-71]. Until
recently the published evaluations have been mainly qualitative in nature,
at best using a scoring system to weigh the various powerplant attributes,
and have generally not recognized (or have ambiguously handled) the facts
that the powerplants (including the ICE) are now at very different stages of
development and must be compared consistently at future dates. In Chapter
3 above we suggested that reduced life-cycle costs of automobile usage, with
fuel appropriately priced, was the proper central goal for government-spon-
sored R & D. Here we will discuss the general features of how these costs
should be calculated and, in the process, shed some light on the general de-
ficiencies inherent in any practical calculation technique.
The proper comparison of automotive powerplants an only be made by
comparing vehicles designed to utilize those powerplants. In other words,
it is not really the attributes of the powerplant, er se, which are of in-
terest either to the consumer or society; it is the attributes of the
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vehicle.1 The attributes of the vehicle are related to those of the power-
plant in a complex way, which is subject to considerable design flexibility.
For example, the relatively larger vibrational energy output of the diesel
or ICE as compared to the Stirling can be compensated for, to provide simi-
lar vehicle comfort, by suspension system design, but at a weight and cost
premium.
This implies then, that in comparing vehicles having different power-
plants, it is crucial to decide the attribute levels to which the vehicles
in comparison will be designed. This is not a simple matter. A consumer
buys a car because the value of the ownership and operation are to him
greater than the cost he incurs, both initially and throughout the ownership
period. Therefore, the correct vehicle comparison would be to design vehi-
cles which maximize, for each different engine, the difference between (quan-
tified) value to the consumer and total life-cycle cost. The optimal vehi-
cles for the various powerplants might exhibit very different characteristics
due to the differing technological attributes of the engines. For example,
the optimal diesel-powered vehicle would most certainly have a lower accel-
eration than the optimal ICE-powered vehicle, because, due to the lower spe-
cific power of the diesel engine, the "cost" of acceleration is higher.
In any case, such an approach is immediately faced with the problem
that it is unclear just what consumer to design the vehicle for -- the mar-
lThis statement assumes that, all else held the same, people do not care
what the name of the engine under the hood of their vehicle is. This seems
a good assumption. However, some evidence to the contrary is provided by
the marketing behavior of the automobile manufacturers, such as the use of
the labels "Fuel Injection", "CVCC", etc. on some cars. Similarly, for
example, it is not hard to imagine a certain emotional appeal to owning a
gas turbine-powered car, due to the association with jet aircraft.
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ket for automobiles is marked by substantial diversity in consumer "tastes",
i.e., the values ascribed to the various vehicle attributes. One element of
this diversity hich has received much attention is the broad range of sizes
(and weights) of vehicles which find willing buyers. The wide range of al-
ternative features which are successfully marketed (even on vehicles of sim-
ilar size) has received somewhat less attention. The widespread purchase of
air conditioning, various forms of power-assisted equipment, vinyl roofs and
other decorative features, various engine sizes for a given vehicle size
(and thus various levels of vehicle acceleration), etc., indicate the extent
and diversity of vehicle attributes valued differently by substantial num-
bers of consumers. A further feature of the diversity of the automobile mar-
ket is the widely varying amounts of usage to which consumers subject their
vehicle; a recent survey indicated that 25% of vehicle users operate 1-year
old cars less than about 5400 miles in a year and 25% more than 17,500 miles
(ignoring fleet vehicles). [73] Clearly, these consumers will place a very
different relative emphasis on initial and operating costs. Of course, the
diverse manner in which these miles are driven are relevant in this consider-
ation as well ("urban" vs. "rural", for example).
It is clearly impossible (even if desirable) to treat the optimization
of the vehicles with different powerplants for this market in all its di-
versity without knowledge of consumer (and societal, if different) valuations
of vehicle attributes.1 A reasonable approximation is to segment the market
into a limited number of classes, each one uniform in the set of the most
1Although an attempt was made by Dewees to estimate the price consumers
were willing to pay, for example, for extra horsepower at a given vehicle
weight, using econometric techniques on price data for a wide variety of
vehicles. [72]
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important vehicle attributes, and to choose some appropriate annual mileage
(possibly arying with the age of the vehicle). With the assumption that
the value to the consumer is the same if these attributes are the same, the
problem of determining the optimum powerplant reduces from the choice of the
one which maximizes net vehicle value to the one which minimizes total vehi-
cle costs. his has been essentially the treatment utilized by the two most
recent evaluations of alternative powerplants, those by JPL and Rand [8 & 7,
respectively], where vehicle acceleration (which essentially determines en-
gine size), internal compartment size, tank mileage, and the choice of key
power-consuming accessories have been the features held constant within
(although different between) a number of vehicle size classes. In these
studies vehicles were synthesized, for each powerplant, to attain the speci-
fied attributes. In this technique, the "optimal" powerplant is then chosen
by. looking across the different size classes; the dominance of one or two
powerplants is hoped for, and in fact has been found. 1
A key result of the JPL and Rand studies was that they laid bare the
importance of engine specific power (by weight or, less importantly, volume)
in determining the relationship between engine efficiency and vehicle fuel
economy. All else held the same, a vehicle powered by a heavier engine will
have a poorer fuel economy than a vehicle with an equally efficient but
lighter engine. The difference in vehicle weights will be substantially
greater than the difference in engine weights due to the heavier vehicle
lIt should be noted, however, that if the vehicles within each size
class had been optimized for maximum net value, and if the alternative power-
plants have significantly differing scalabilities and the vehicles thus had
differing accelerations, then different powerplants might turn out to be
optimal for the various vehicle classes.
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frame needed to support the engine, the consequently higher installed engine
power requi.red to attain the same performance, the heavier drivetra±a needed
to transmit t higher power, larger gas tank and extra fuel needed to main-
tain tank mileage, etc. The most noticeable impact of this effect was that
the fuel conomy advantage of diesel-powered vehicles was found to be con-
siderably less than the relatively high thermal efficiency would imply with-
out due consideration given to the diesel's relatively low specific power.
Another important feature of the Rand and JPL analyses was that they
determined vehicle fuel economy over a specific driving cycle; very often
alternative powerplant comparisons have utilized point estimates of thermal
efficiency (usually the maximum), which do not account for the differing
variation of efficiency with engine loading. The vehicle synthesis approach
to powerplant comparisons also forces the analyst to address the question of
differing accessory requirements for the alternatives (larger starter motor
for the diesel, larger radiator for the Stirling, etc.); lack of a careful
accounting for accessory requirements has been a problem with previous analyses.
One difficulty with this vehicle synthesis approach is that it is likely
to be valid only over the long run, i.e. well after the first introduction
of an alternative powerplant, when the whole vehicle system has been optimized.
As discussed in Section 5.4, an alternative powerplant is likely to be intro-
duced in a vehicle frame close to that already optimized for the contemporary
ICE. Thus, while the approach is useful for estimating the long-run impact,
it may be less useful for examining the prospects of a favorable Introduction
Decision, which would likely be based on the less than optimal attributes of
a vehicle using a body designed for the ICE. Similar considerations apply to
the type of fuel it is assumed that the alternative powerplants will utilize.
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The JPL study, for example, assumed the immediate availability of a broad-cut
distillate fuel, at some price advantage, for those engines such as the
Stirling wJch could presumably use it. Like the optimized body, this desi-
rable feature of the future is only likely to be fully realized in the long
run, well after a successful introduction has been made.1
Another aspect of alternative powerplant comparisons is the need for
consistent technology forecasts. The concept of the ICE as a moving base-
line (as discussed in Chapter 4) is now becoming widely recognized, although
analyses still appear comparing future alternatives with today's ICE. When
advances in the technologies under comparison are likely to be independent,
then each must be separately forecast. Often, however, this is not the case
- in fact, studies of technological innovation have found that advances in
a new system tend to be aggressively incorporated into the threatened older
system as the economic interests associated with the older system strive to
protect it. [74] It is, therefore, very necessary that comparisons made at
future dates apply advances in technology consistently. Of direct relevance
here is the possible development of high temperature load-bearing components
made from ceramics. Most of the relevant development work in this area has
been focused on components for gas gurbine engines. However, as previously
stated, this technology would very likely apply to an advanced Stirling en-
gine and very possibly the ICE and diesel as well, though the impact is dif-
ferent in each case.
Finally, the emissions issue deserves further comment. Regulations for
exhaust emissions must be satisfied and we need a framework for evaluating
lIt might be possible to apply these vehicle synthesis tools to the
Introduction Decision, using appropriate constraints.
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the low emissions potential of the alternatives. This is especially compli-
cated becaitze (as previously discussed) there is short-term uncertainty as to
what the e.isslon standards will be; there is uncertainty in the longer-term
potential of the ICE for further emissions reductions, and for the ICE and
for some of the alternative engines, there are tradeoffs between emission
control and fuel economy (as well as initial and operating costs). It is
tempting to say that comparisons should be made at the same emissions levels.
But this ignores the fact that with the existence of a dominant technology,
the ICE, the applicable standards effectively represent what is achievable
at some reasonable control cost; that is, an implicit tradeoff between bene-
fits and costs is always present. The different engine technologies, since
they have different emissions-level versus cost functions, would presumably
achieve the appropriate benefit-cost trade-off at different emission stan-
dards. There is no easy way out of this dilemma. We have concluded that,
unless the structure of the Clean Air Act is changed, for alternative engines
to be attractive they must offer the potential for emissions at least as low
as those projected for the ICE over a comparable time frame. Furthermore,
because the marginal cost of low emissions levels for some of the alternatives
is much less than for the ICE, it may in fact be appropriate to compare them
at different emissions standards. Thus, as we will examine later, the Stir-
ling engine could well carry an additional social benefit relative to the
ICE, because it can be introduced at lower emissions levels.
5.3.1.2 A Simple Total Operating Cost Model for the Stirling System
In this subsection a simple calculation procedure is developed for com-
paring the "total operating costs" (defined here to include initial outlay
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minus scrap recovery as well as direct optrating costs) of the Stirling sys-
tem with the baseline ICE. We want to fccus on the tradeoff between the un-
certain, but prcbably high, initial cost f Lhie Stirling engine, and its su-
perior fuel economy; with the future fuel market prices, the type of fuel to
be used by the Stirling, and the properAis of the baseline ICE as the crucial
unknowns (ignoring other key uncertainties such as maintenance cost differ-
ences). The model can be used for making total operating cost calculations
as privately or socially perceived depending on the values of the input par-
ameters used. In this section (5.3) we will perform only social calculations,
for use in our cost-benefit analysis. In Section 5.4 we will use the same
equation to calculate privately perceived costs and the difference between
the two will be used there to explore the commercialization issue.
A number of recent investigations have used various calculation proce-
dures for evaluating the impact of vehicle changes on total vehicle costs.
[7,8,17,53,76] A series of critical choices have to be made, centering
around the issues of appropriately allocating the initial cost over the life-
time mileage of the vehicle, and treating the variation of average vehicle
mileage with vehicle age. Our interest here is to examine in gross terms
the initial-cost/fuel-economy tradeoff. Therefore, rather than developing
a detailed procedure for dealing with the temporal variation of capital and
operating charges, we simply use a non-rigorous but intuitively satisfactory
procedure which captures the key features of interest. It is most similar
to that used by Rand. [7]
We calculate the rough difference in average total cost per mile between
the Stirling and baseline vehicles, where the average is both temporal (through-
out the vehicle's life) and cross-sectional (over various users and vehicles).
154
Let:
T = Total annual average vehicl cost;
I = Initial vehicle purchase price,
A = Annualized fraction of capital cost;
V = Vehicle total operating cost other than fuel and capital
costs, i.e. maintenance, insurance, oil, etc., all
calculated on a per mile basis;
P= Price of fuel (detailed choice will be addressed below);
F Vehicle fuel consumption per mile;
M Average annual miles traveled;
C = Total average cost per mile; and
L = Number of years of vehicle life.
Then from the definitions above we calculate C as:
C = T/M = (IxA/M) + V + PxF . (1), (2)
We use a single average vehicle lifetime and average annual vehicle
mileage, and we assume them invariant over time (for our future comparisons)
and between vehicles (e.g. no durability differences). IXA will be calcula-
ted as the amount of a single payment made at the end of each of the L years
of the vehicle lifetime, whose present value equals the initial cost of the
vehicle minus its discounted salvage value; i.e.,
L
IX[1 (l+i)L] - (l+i)J ;Y~ IxAj=l
where:
i = Relevant interest rate; and
y = Fraction of initial value received for salvage at end of
vehicle life.
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Thus:
.x[(l+i)L - y]
A= (l+i)L- ' (4)
Implicit in this calculation is the incorporation of a net cost of capital
of interest rate i, with no distinction as to whether this is an opportunity
cost of the capital value of the vehicle or a debt financing charge. The
initial cost (I) is the total cost of the vehicle, carrying its proportion-
ate share of plant and corporate overhead, dealer costs, profits. and indus-
try R & D investment (i.e. approximately the purchase cost).
We now consider the difference in the total cost per mile (AC) between
the Stirling and baseline systems, using the subscripts S and B, respective-
ly, and the symbol A to be the cost of the baseline system over the Stirling
system (i.e. AC>O means positive Stirling benefits). As discussed above, we
are implicitly assuming that all non-pecuniary attributes are roughly bal-
anced and explicitly hold vehicle acceleration the same; then:
AC = (A/M)xAI + AV + A(PXF) . (5)
As discussed above, we should treat AI and A(PxF) on a total vehicle
basis (as well as AV). However, we now make a simplifying assumption based
on the known attributes of the Stirling system (as discussed in Section 5.2
above): that the total engine-related weight (i.e. including necessary en-
gine "accessories") for the Stirling system is the same as that of the base-
line for any given power level (i.e. weight-specific-power is the same). We
further assume that there is no significant difference in torque-apeed curves
(it is less clear that this is so). It then follows that the vehicle weights
are the same (ignoring the difference in fuel tankage requirements), because
engines of the same weight will provide the same acceleration. The two
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important consequences for our model are: first, that the only difference
in vehicle initial costs is the difference between engine costs at the same
rated power anU, second, the ratio of vehicle fuel economies is equal to the
ratio of engine efficiencies (over the relevant driving cycle). This simple
model ignores some features of the Stirling system which may in the long-run
prove advantageous. However, it provides us with a tremendous simplification
by eliminating the necessity for a complete vehicle synthesis and therefore
allowing us to deal with engine attributes directly. Furthermore, as will be
seen below, other uncertainties, not directly associated with the engine
technologies, are so large as to dominate the errors associated with the
simplifying assumption made. Thus we will use:
AI = -(R-l)xEB ; (6)
where
R = Ratio of Stirling to baseline engine cost; and
EB= Baseline engine cost.
We further assume, for simplicity and for lack of data, that the Stir-
ling and baseline engine operating costs (other than fuel) are the same.
This is however, an important assumption, as engine maintenance and repair
costs (differences in which would be the dominant contributor to AV) can be
as high as fuel costs, especially in the later years of a vehicle's life.
Finally, then, let:
n Ratio of Stirling to baseline fuel economy;
and thus
AC = -(AXEB/M)(R-1) + PBXFB(1-1/n) + FBXAP/n . (7)
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The consideration of the possible Stirling fuel price advantage as a diff-
erence in fel price, rather than a fractional decrease from gasoline, is
because the difference would be attributable to refining costs, whereas
movements in the price of both gasoline and some other Stirling fuel would
be expected to occur principally due to changes in the cost of crude oil.
Refining costs are, of course, additive to and independent of the cost of
the incoming crude.
Finally it is useful to define two specific points on the relation
given by equation (7). First, let us define R as the "break-even" ratio of
Stirling engine cost to ICE cost, i.e. the ratio where the Stirling benefits
are zero (AC = 0):
Ro = 1 + [AXEB/M][PBXFB(1-l/rl) + FBxAP/nl] . (8)
This may be considered a minimal R & D goal, i.e. the (relative) Stirling
cost must be less than Ro for the Stirling vehicle to achieve positive bene-
fits. Second, we would like an upper bound for the benefits to be obtained
from Stirling utilization [(AC)max]. Since it is generally conceded that
the Stirling engine is likely to be always more expensive than the ICE, we
will use the value of Stirling engine benefits at equal costs (R=1) for this
calculation:
(AC)max = PBXFB(1-1/n) + FBXAP/n . (9)
As a final note, we will be making our calculations for engine of the
future. We will use constant (roughly 1975) dollars, and real interest rates
(excluding the effect of inflation).
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5.3.2 The Potential Benefits of Stirling Vehicle Commercialization
Before proceeding a brief comment s useful to provide an overview of
the benefits analysis, especially in light of the "energy conservation" is-
sue. As discussed in Section 5.2, the Stirling engine will undoubtedly cost
more than the equivalent ICE, but it will probably be more efficient, giving
Stirling-powered vehicles more miles-per-gallon than their ICE-powered counter-
parts. The higher initial cost represents an increased consumption of real
resources -- expensive superalloys (requiring chromium, nickel, cobalt,
tungsten, etc.), increased quantities of tools and equipment to machine the
superalloys, increased labor, etc.1 -- which would be traded principally for
reduced petroleum consumption in vehicle operation. The principal potential
"benefits" of Stirling vehicle commercialization would be the surplus of the
value of the reduced petroleum consumption over the increased consumption of
these other resources in the vehicle's manufacture. This is why the Stirling
vehicle is of interest as part of our national goal for energy conservation.
The principal focus of this subsection will be the issue of how much increased
first cost we are willing to trade for the reduced fuel consumption, under
various conditions which might obtain in the future and for different prices
used in valuing petroleum from a social standpoint, and thus the likely mag-
nitude of the net benefits to be obtained.
5.3.2.1 Single Vehicle Analyses
We now apply the cost model developed in the previous subsection to
examine the potential total operating advantage of the FGS-Stirling-powered
1See [8] for detailed estimates.
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vehicle relative to the 1985 ICE. By using the FGS Stirling, which does not
employ structural ceramics or any other advanced concepts, we are using a
consistent technology forecast. Our calculations are designed to estimate
the social benefits; in Section 5.4 we will deal with the possible dispari-
ties between the social and private benefits and the implication of these
disparities. The parameters we use in our equations will reflect this; the
two where this raises obvious issues are the interest rate used in the capi-
tal amortization coefficient, and the price of the fuel used by the baseline
system (viz., gasoline).l We will use a social discount rate which may not
represent the cost of capital implicit in consumer vehicle purchase behavior,
and a fuel price which is higher, by an uncertain social premium, than the
market price. We will include the tax on fuel as part of its market price,
since automotive tax revenues are generally spent on road construction and
maintenance and thus represent a real part of the social cost of automobile
operation rather than a mere .transfer payment. For the other prices and
other parameters we will use observed values. Only one vehicle size will be
considered -- a medium-size vehicle weighing about 3500 lbs. -- and this will be
sufficient for our purposes, which are to indicate the rough magnitude of the
likely benefits, the social break-even initial cost, and the impact of the
key uncertainties.
As previously discussed we will calculate the total Stirling operating
advantage as a function of Stirling engine initial cost. We will make this
calculation for one "Base Case" (Case 1), and then for three other cases,
lSince the Stirling fuel price is the baseline fuel price minus a
refining advantage, we need only consider the baseline price in this respect.
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each of which examines the impact of a single critical unknown.1 The impact
of each unkniown is examined through the choice of a single plausible value
of the releaint parameter. Table 5.2 lists the parameter values used in the
calculations and Table 5.3 and Figure 5.2 show the results. The Base Case
represent a FGS Stirling vehicle with a fuel economy about the minimum
reasonably assured, relative to our projected minimally efficient 1985 ICE
at current emissions standards, both running on gasoline at today's market
prices. (This is not quite a worst case calculation for the Stirling as the
1985 ICE would likely be somewhat more efficient than the minimal projection
used here, as discussed in Chapter 4). In Case 2 the relative Stirling fuel
economy advantage is double that of Case 1. This roughly represents either
of two possibilities: 1) the realization of a higher Stirling engine effi-
ciency than that of the present prototype, closer to that of JPL's "mature"
Stirling (although the calculation does not account for the possible cost
savings due to decreased engine size and vehicle), or 2) the impact of tighter
emission controls, such as the current statutory long-term standards (although
the calculation does not account for the associated increase in baseline en-
gine cost). Case 3 shows the impact of a substantial (50%) increase in fuel
price, representing a large social premium, a significant increase in fuel
prices, or a combination of the two. Case 4 shows the impact of the use of
cheaper fuel than gasoline; the difference is roughly that between gasoline
and diesel fuel today, corrected for differing BTU content and taxes. Ac-
tually the Stirling could run on a less restrictive "broad-cut distillate",
(and probably would in the long-run if actually commercialized) which would
be slightly less expensive than today's diesel fuel. As previously discussed,
lCase 5 will be discussed in Section 5.4.
161
Table 5.2
PARAMETER VALUES USED IN STIRLING VEHICLE TOTAL OPERATING COST CALCULATIONS
I. Parameter Values Used in All Cases
Parameter Value Comment
M 10,000 miles Has been rising slowly over past decade.l [1C,p.44]
EB $900 Retail 150 hp ICE cost (see Chapter 4).
FB .04 gal./mi. 17 mpg (1975 3500 lb. avg. [52]), + 30% non-engine
[25 mi./gal.] improvement by 1985 [8,p.10-16], plus 15% m:ni-
mum expected baseline engine improvement (see
Chapter 4).
L 10 yrs. Roughly constant. [17,p.3-11]
Y .07 [7,17]
II. Parameter Values Used in Base Case
Parameter Value Comment
PB 55¢/gal. Approximate national average market price of un-
leaded gasoline including taxes. [77]
AP 0¢C/gal. Stirling operating on gasoline.
i 4%/yr. Social real discount rate (range 3-5%).
A .12 Calculated from i and y.
n 1.15 Minimum reasonable FGS Stirling efficiency im-
improvement factor over 1985 ICE. (inimal ex-
pected advantage for Ford-Philips prototype re
1975 Calif. Torino (30%), -5% guess for 49-state
Torino advantage over Calif., + 10% minimal FGS
gain above Ford-Philips prototype, -15% minimum
expected 1985 ICE gain over 1975).
III. Parameter Values Used in Cases 2-5
Parameter
Differing from
Case No. Base Case Value Comment
2 n 1.30 Arbitrary doubling of Stirling advantage
(could be due to better Stirling efficiency
and/or tighter ICE emissions standards).
3 P 83¢/gal. 50% increase in gas price (due to social
~B ~premium and/or market price increase).
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Table 5.2 (Cont'd)
III. Parameter Values Used in Cases 2-5 (Ccnc'd)
Parameter
Differing from
Case No. Base Case Value Comment
4 AP 4C/gal. Approximate price advantage of broad-cut
distillate or diesel fuel over gasoline.
[8,p.20--6]
5 i 15%/yr. Possible consumer discount rate.
(A) (.20)
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Table 5.3
SUMMARY OF STIRLING VEHICLE TOTAL OPERATING COST CALCULATION RESULTS
Parameter Changed
From Base
Break-even Relative
Engine Cost
[Ro]
1.26
n = 1.30 1.47
Maximum Benefit
(¢/mile)
[(AC)max)]
.29
.51
PB = 83¢/gal.
AP = 4/gal.
i = 15%/yr.
(A = .20)
Case
Base
2
3
4
5
1.40
1.40
.43
1.16
.43
.29
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the only publicly available detailed estfmare for the initial cost of the
Stirling engine, that of JPL [8] is in te range of 1.2 to 1.7 times that
of the equivalent ICE, so that there sects a reasonable chance that it does
in fact lie within the range of interest.
In summary, the results indicate that social benefits in the range of
several tenths of a cent per mile may result from Stirling engine operation,
if the R & D efforts are successful in bringing the engine's cost down to
within 20 to 40% above that of the ICE. The impact of the critical unknowns
is clear: at an initial cost in the range of interest, the uncertainty in
the level of social benefits is of the same order as its likely magnitude,
and similarly with the allowable extra cost of the Stirling above the ICE.
We will discuss below the aggregate value of savings of tenths of a
cent per vehicle mile, but is of interest here to compare this with the total
operating (social or private)cost of the baseline system. Including capital
charge, fuel costs, maintenance and parts, tires, oil, insurance, garaging,
parking and tolls, and taxes, the total operating cost of our 1985 baseline
system will be about 14¢/mile (±2¢/mile, estimated from [76]). Thus the
likely social savings due to Stirling engine commercialization is only a few
per cent of the total cost (social or private) of automobile ownership and
operation.
In the above calculations we neglected any explicit consideration of the
air pollutant emissions issue. As discussed in Chapter 3, this issue is very
difficult to treat. At the simplest level, the R & D planner can treat the
emissions issue as a simple constraint; since the Stirling system will very
likely meet the most stringent presently legislated standards, this constraint
is met. We can, however, proceed somewhat beyond this.
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The impact of future emissions standards entered the above calculations
only implicitly, in their impact on the relative fuel economies of ICE and
Stirling-powered vehicles. It is reasonable to assume that any Stirling
engine actually introduced would meet the present statutory (original 1976)
emissions standards because, as discussed in Section 5.2, this can be ac-
complished ith little increase in initial cost and no effect on fuel econ-
omy (at least when the engine is run on gasoline). Therefore if the Stirling
is introduced under circumstances where it replaces ICE's meeting less re-
strictive standards, a further social benefit accrues due to the operation of
Stirling-powered vehicles.
In the spirit of the preceding calculations, we can very crudely bound
the monetary value of these benefits. The National Academy of Sciences has
estimated the total annual cost (to society, due to health effects, etc.)
of automotive emissions as $2-10 billion for uncontrolled vehicles. [75]
Crudely averaging across the.three regulated automotive air pollutants, ve-
hicles at the 1975-76 standards emit about 75% less pollutants than uncon-
trolled vehicles. Making the (conservative) assumption that the costs are
directly proportional to emissions levels (there most likely are decreasing
marginal costs at lower levels), then the annual aggregate costs of the
emissions of a fleet of vehicles at present standards would be $0.5 to 2.5
billion. The almost complete elimination of these costs to society would be
benefits received if a fleet of ICE-powered vehicles at the present interim
standards were replaced by a fleet of Stirling-powered vehicles. These ag-
gregate benefits are difficult to deal with on an individual vehicle basis
because they vary strongly with the location of the vehicle; i.e. they occur
almost entirely in certain urban areas. About half of all vehicle miles are
167
driven in urban areas 79]; dividing the above aggregate benefits by one-
half of a crude estimate for the national annual mileage (see Subsection
5.3.3) one obtains a social benefit of 0.1i to 0.5¢/mile, associated only with
vehicles used in metropolitan areas. Even if the emissions of ICE-powered
vehicles are not lowered below present levels, the true value of this social
benefit is likely to be close to the lower end of the range indicated.
Two conclusions may be drawn from this extremely crude calculation.
First, social benefits due to the low emissions potential of the Stirling
may be of the same order as those previously calculated, but are likely to
be lower, due to continuing reductions in ICE emissions. Second, if the
Stirling system replaces an ICE at higher emissions levels, its social value
will be higher in urban areas than in rural.1 In fact, it is possible that
the system might yield positive net social benefits in urban areas but not
in rural (although this is unlikely given the magnitude of the benefits due
to emissions alone relative to the overall level of uncertainty).
We have attempted to value the low-emissions and multi-fuel capabilities
of the Stirling system in simple, quantitative terms. There is, however, a
somewhat different point of view which captures some of the subtleties missed
in our simplistic approach. Both of these Stirling engine features are op-
tions which, under circumstances which might prevail in the forseeable future,
might be valuable.
In the emissions case, the Stirling engine may make possible a viable
"two-car strategy", whereby low-emissions, but relatively expensive, passen-
ger cars are required to be used in downtown urban areas. If further reduc-
1This is obviously true of any air pollutant emissions control system --
including those on present ICE's.
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tions in emissions from the ICE prove overly expensive to be imposed nation-
wide the Stirling system might provide a superior low-emissions vehic:e at
an extra cost acceptable where the costs of air pollution are the greatest.
The market for vehicles in large downtown areas is certainly large eough
to support Stirling engine production utilizing the available economies of
scale in engine manufacture (i.e. much greater than hundreds of thousands
a year). Given the uncertainty in estimates of the'costs of ambient auto-
motive pollution and the costs of lowering the emissions of the ICE, the
availability of the Stirling engine would provide an option which, while
difficult to quantitatively evaluate at the present time, should be consi-
dered in the government R & D decision.
A similar argument can be made for the multi-fuel capability of the
system. Forecasting the continued availability, to say nothing of the
price, of automotive fuels over the next couple of decades, is a tenuous
art. The extensive discussion at the present time of the possible develop-
ment of synthetic fuel may make the availability of the system which is rel-
atively insensitive to fuel properties a very desirable option in future
planning. Again, this is difficult to evaluate quantitatively but should
be considered.
While the crude numbers we have generated are of interest in themselves,
one general conclusion stands out clearly: the break-even initial cost,
which can be regarded as the crucial R & D goal for future development pro-
grams, is highly uncertain at this time. It depends very strongly on two
issues which are presently the subject of intense political debate and are
relatively independent of R & D success: automotive fuel prices and air
pollutant emissions standards. Fuel prices are also relatively unpredictable
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to the extent that they depend on the international market price of crude
oil, presettly set by the OPEC cartel. It also depends on the type of fuels
available; although in the long-run a successful commercialization would
induce the availability of low-cost fuel. It depends on the relatively in-
dependert fuel economy advances made by the ICE (at a given emissions level).
It depends n the (weakly coupled) extent to which efficiency advances can
be made beyond the level of the present Ford-Philips prototype. Finally,
there may be differences in non-fuel operating costs and durability, which
we have ignored. Thus any R & D program is shooting at an unpredictable and
moving target.
5.3.2.2 The Aggregate Benefits of Stirling Engine Introduction
In this subsection, we very quickly address the potential aggregate
benefits of the introduction of Stirling-powered vehicles. Because the num-
bers tend to be very large over a range of possible assumptions, we do not
expend any effort in calculating more than extremely crude estimates. The
calculation is the present value, in 1975, of discounted future benefits,
in order to have an appropriate figure to compare with the possible govern-
ment expenditures on Stirling engine R & D. The calculation is made in con-
stant (1975) dollars, with a real social discount rate (not incorporating
the effects of inflation). The key variables in the calculation are: the
date by which the bulk of the vehicle fleet is converted to Stirling-powered
vehicles, the discount rate, the number of vehicle miles traveled.in future
years, and the benefits associated with each mile of travel in a Stirling-
powered vehicle as compared to one powered by an ICE.
The earliest possible date for introduction of the FGS Stirling is 1985.
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Since it i ulikely that, if the Stirling engine were superior in one pas-
senger class, it would not be superior in all, we assume a complete conver-
sion of all er-ine manufacturing facilities. Such a conversion would like-
ly take teu to fifteen years (ten is usually quoted as the fastest reason-
able, e.g. 8]). With an average vehicle lifetime of about ten years, the
bulk of the vehicle fleet could be Stirling-powered by about the year 2000.
We also use a less optimistic date of 2010.
The amount of private vehicle travel in the turn-of-the-century time
frame is the subject of varying forecasts; we assume that it will have grown
approximately 50% from the present, to about 1.5 trillion (.5x10 2) vehicle
miles, and we assume it constant. The potential benefits from a successful
Stirling engine program were discussed in the previous subsection. In 1985
they were estimated to be several tenths of a cent per mile. It is not
clear whether they would be expected to increase or decrease as a function
of time -- it would depend on the relative technological progress of the
Stirling and the ICE, as well as changes in other factors such as the price
of fuel. For our crude calculation we assume that ten years of benefits of
0.2'/mile are obtained. This would roughly reflect an average value over
ten years with a fading out of the benefits (or, as will be discussed fur-
thur in Subsection 5.3.4, it could reflect the fact that only 10 years of
benefits could be attributed to a government R & D program, viz., the Stir-
ling would have been introduced in ten years anyway without government R & D).
We have previously used a social discount rate of 4%/year, we also test a
more conservative 8%/year. The calculation, then, takes the form:
B =l-i ACxM 1 .1ix(l+i) + (10)
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where :
B-= Present value of future benefits ($);
AC= -enefits per mile ($/mile);
i = Social discount rate;
N:= Number of years from 1975 to fleet conversion;
M- Total annual vehicle miles (miles/yr.); and
L:= Number of years of benefits.
The results are shown in Table 5.4. They are hardly surprising. First,
they show the large impact on the choice of discount rate on the present
value of benefits received 25 to 35 years in the future. However, we see
that, under reasonable assumptions, benefits having a present value in the
billions of dollars are easy to demonstrate.
While in this report we have addressed the issue of energy conservation
as strictly a matter of economics, assuming fuel to be appropriately valued
in the calculations, it would be useful to look briefly at the aggregate
-impact of the Stirling engine on fuel consumption. The extent to which the
-monetary savings discussed here represent fuel savings, of course depends
aon the particular technical features of any Stirling vehicle commercialized.
Any such vehicle would necessarily involve a substantial reduction in aggre-
gate automotive fuel consumption, at least to make up for its higher initial
most. The aggregate annual benefits discussed here are consistent with a
fuel savings of from several hundred thousand to one million barrels per day.
3.3.3 Impact of Federal Funding on Stirling Engine Technology
In this subsection we examine the issue of the responsiveness of Stir-
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Table 5.4
PRESENT VALUE OF AGGREGATE STIRLING BENEFITS
Social Discount
Rate
_ i (yr. 1)
.04
.04
.08
.08
Years to Fleet
Conversion
N (yr.)
25
35
25
35
Present Value of
Aggregate Benefits
B (109$)
9.1
6.1
2.9
1.4
Other parameter values used are:
Stirling vehicle benefits AC = 0.2¢/mile,
Total annual vehicle miles M = 1.5 101 2mile/yr., and
Number of years of benefits L = 10 yr.
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ling technology to additional financial support; that is, we would like to
estimate e incremental increase in probability of Stirling engine commer-
cialization (d thus its associated benefits) due to a given increase in
U. S. Government support. We are implicitly assuming, for the moment, that
achieving the technical goals (essentially an initial cost providing posi-
tive social benefits, as previously discussed), would lead to commerciali-
zation; this issue will be discussed in Section 5.4. Stated in general
terms, we nw address the questions 1) "Would additional support significant-
ly enhance the probability of success (i.e. commercialization) or accelerate
the date of success (as compared to ongoing programs)?", and 2) "If so, how
much could be usefully spent in this way?"
Before stating the issues in a more formal manner, it is useful to dis-
cuss some more general considerations. First, we are dealing here with a
-technology which is neither "embryonic" nor "mature". As discussed in Sec-
tion 5.2 above, there have been significant Stirling engine technology de-
velopment programs underway since 1938. The total cumulative investment to
date is certainly in the tens of millions of dollars at least; present pro-
grams worldwide involve a total employment of about 230 professionals and an
expenditure rate of $5-10 million annually in three efforts. Complete en-
gines have accumulated many tens of thousands of dynamometer hours, and a
sophisticated design and synthesis capability has been developed. The tech-
nology remains a dynamic one; as discussed above and in Appendix A, signif-
icant advances have been made every few years or so. Furthermore, the in-
centives for Stirling engine development have significantly increased over
the last decade, as the attributes of low emissions and high efficiency have
become relatively more valuable. This is reflected in the fact that private-
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lyl funded development efforts have substantially increased during this
period and are likely to remain significant and probably even grow for the
next few years at least. Continued technical progress may therefore be ex-
pected, even without (U.S.) government funding.
On the other hand, the Stirling engine has not been commercialized in
this century.2 Thus the engine has never reached the stage where an appro-
priate organization has felt it to be superior technology for any signifi-
cant heat engine application. This is very important; as discussed in Chap-
ter 2 above, the potential benefits to be gained by evolutionary advances in
systems already in production are usually more apparent to their manufactur-
ers and less risky than investments in commercializing new technology. Thus
the R & D investments made in improving the performance and reducing the cost
of the ICE, diesel and gas turbine have certainly been several orders of
magnitude greater than those on the Stirling.
Because forecasting technological change is such a difficult and uncer-
tain business, these general considerations must weigh heavily in our udge-
ment on the susceptability of progress on the Stirling engine to increases
in funding provided by the U.S. Government. They leave us however, with a
very mixed picture.
We will now attempt to be more precise in our analysis. In the follow-
ing discussion we will utilize the division of Stirling technology into the
FGS and Advanced Systems described in Section 5.2, first addressing the FGS.
1Actually much of United Stirling's program and some of those at Philips
and M.A.N. - VIM have been supported by European governments, but we will use
"private" here to mean funded by bodies other than the U.S. Government.
2Except for a small number of cyrogenic heat pumps sold by Philips.
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There are many ways to pose the issue more precisely; here we will start
with a relatively simple one: we would like to know the present probability
of meetin a pecified set of R & D goals by a given date as a function of
the annual R & D expenditures. The R & D goals are chosen so that, if they
are atta.ned, the Stirling engine is presumed to be commercailized and social
benefits are obtained (the benefits of course are a function of the R & D
goals). By fixing the date and R & D goals, we have made the benefits of
success only implicitly dependent on the R & D investment, and the expected
benefits of the R & D investment are the beneftis of success times the sep-
arately calculated probability of success. Let us ignore the question of
changes in annual investment from year-to-year; as will be seen shortly
the analysis here will not be detailed enough to cope with that issue.1
Then, in accordance with the general approach of this chapter, we will crude-
ly subdivide the estimation of the function (defined above) into two parts
(more precise expositions of the two questions posed in the first paragraph
of this subsection): 1) estimating the general magnitude of the slope of
the curve at the present time, and 2) if the slope is satisfactorily high,
estimating how much the U.S. Government could usefully spend (before the
slope drops off to unacceptable levels).
It seems reasonable to argue that the curve looks something like that
shown in Figure 5.3. For expenditures less than B, we do not have the
1Other ways to pose the question would be to use expected benefits as
the dependent variable -- this would include the effect of R & D investment
on the probability of success, the benefits of success, and the date of suc-
cess (the latter through a present value calculation of the benefits), and/or
to use cumulative R & D investment as the independent variable, which would
make explicit the acceleration of success possible with additional funds
(ignoring other limiting factors).
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"critical mass" of professionals needed to provide adequate coverage of the
relevant disciplines, adequate facilities and support, etc. Thus, for ex-
ample, if we were at A and increased expenditures to B, we would gain very
little. y expenditure level C, however, we have significantly increased
-the prol)lbability of success. At this point no major features or problems
of the system are being neglected and no good ideas are being ignored for
lack of funds. Beyond C the curve flattens out as further expenditures go
toward important problems already receiving attention (with decreasing mar-
ginal impact), ideas with somewhat less merit are examined, parallel programs
at new groups are started up, etc. Eventually, some limiting probability
(Pmax), generally less than one (as it seems unlikely that an infinite ex-
penditure rate could guarantee success), is reached.
The magnitude of these probabilities is naturally a function of time,
even for the constant technical goals we have assumed. This is because tech-
nical success (e.g. a Stirling engine with a certain attribute set) is com-
-posed of the success of a time-ordered set of subsidiary goals [e.g. a Stir-
ling engine with a less demanding attribute set by (9XX-3) 1 ],and the prob-
:ability of success in 9XX, as seen N years before, is the probability of
-success in some appropriate subset of those events which have not occurred
by year (19XX-N). A crucial distinction must be made between the curve it-
self, and our knowledge of the curve. Not only does the curve move with
time but, probably more importantly, our ability to estimate the curve im-
proves as the technology becomes better understood.
Let us now consider the parameters of the present curve for the Stirling
1Notation: by (19XX-N) we mean the year which is N years before 19XX.
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engine. First, consider only the FGS, and the probability of attaining a
satisfactory expected initial cost at the end of the Final Development Stage
in 1981 or so corresponding roughly to the hoped-for Introduction Decision
of the present Ford program). In this case the magnitude of the Stirling
engine effort worldwide is the relevant expenditure rate.1 As discussed in
Section 5.2 and Appendix A, each major FGS subsystem option is being active-
ly developed by at least one of the ongoing efforts with the focus on sim-
plifying component designs, reducing the amount of expensive manufacturing
operations and costly materials necessary, etc., and thereby moving toward
a lower cost system. No important concepts which could contribute to the
FGS are going unexplored for lack of funds. Thus we are clearly well above
point B, probably around C. The total worldwide annual investment is in the
range of $5 to 10 million, supporting about 230 professionals. Adding fur-
ther to this effort would allow parallel efforts to be undertaken under new
programs, allow present efforts to be made more intensive,2 and provide for
important additional studies (such as the present ERDA scalability study at
Ford). By doubling the present effort to D, then, we would expect that the
probability of success might be brought significantly closer to Pmax from PC,
but the probability of success is unlikely to be doubled.
1This is an oversimplification because, as discussed in Section 5.2, the
major efforts have different goals. In this discussion we will crudely ag-
gregate the relevant expenditures of the different groups. Thus we will
also not make a distinction here among recipients of any additional funding,
e.g. whether a new effort is started or the Ford effort is supplemented, as
long as the expenditure is relevant to the R & D goals considered here.
2 A simple example -- by providing additional test engines Ford esti-
mates the cost of fabricating a fourth unit of the present Ford-Philips en-
gine at about $500,000.
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It is more difficult, however, to jdge just what those probabilities
are; in fact there is quite substantial isagreement within the technical
community. Much of this disagreement i due to the uncertainty in the tech-
nical goals and differences between priv'ate and social calculations. For
our purposes, the crucial technical goal is the attainment of an initial
cost which is lower than the social break-even cost (as roughly calculated
above) by some "premium" sufficient to obtain the substantial social bene-
fits possible. As discussed above reasonable values of the break-even cost
lie in the range of 40 to maybe 70% above the cost of the ICE. For the mo-
ment, let us look at the lower bound.
It may well be that evolutionary developments of the FGS will just not
be enough to attain an initial cost within 20-30% of that of the ICE, and
that, for example, substantial use of ceramics may be required in the heater
head to attain a competitive system. Thus Pmax may be well short of unity.
Estimating this sort of probability is a very difficult task. However, it
will be shown that finely tuned estimates are not necessary for our purposes.
We estimate PC to be greater than .1, Pmax to be at least twice that, and
PD closer to Pmax than P This is given some credence beyond our own judge-
ment by the results of the JPL study, which, as previously discussed, indi-
cates a likely cost premium of 20 to 70%. Given the crudeness of our esti-
mate of the necessary technical goals and the benefits of success, these es-
timates are sufficient. To the extent that the break-even initial cost is
higher than our lower bound, the relevant probabilities are increased. Thus
we estimate that a doubling of present worldwide expenditures by the U.S.
Government would raise the probability of technical success with FGS tech-
nology by at least 0.1. These expenditures would be of the order of $10-20
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million annually for the next year or two, probably doubling through 1981
as the later stages of Final Development are approached, totalling $100-200
million over six years. We note, however, tat the estimation of these prob-
abilities is extremely crude; in the nezt subsection we will attempt to get
around this difficulty by turning the question around and asking what incre-
mental probability would be required for benefit-cost ratio of unity.
Up to this point we have discussed the probability of meeting the spe-
cified technical goal by a given date as if the only alternative were not
meeting the goal at all. This is, of course, not the case -- government
funding may simply advance the date at which the technical goals are met.
A more detailed analysis would obviously be required to take this considera-
tion into account -- more detailed than justified by the large uncertainties
and judgemental estimates used. We only note that the length of time saved
by a doubling or tripling of funding is, if we are at all close in our es-
timates of the shape of the curve and the rough placement, likely to be of
the order of the number of years from present until the postulated goal, i.e.
5 years to a decade.
Application of the above treatment to Advanced Systems is inherently
more difficult as we are by definition attempting to look deeper into our
rather cloudy crystal ball, and it therefore will not be attempted here.
Advanced concepts are receiving only a fraction of the present expenditures,
but they may in fact hold the key to a Stirling engine program which is
successful in the longer run. Since they are in an early stage of develop-
ment, it is likely that they will be relatively responsive to increased
funding, and relatively modest additions to the current investment rate ap-
pear to be attractive in this regard. At a minimum it is important that
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advanced concepts be carefully analyzed o etermine their potential impact
on the engine's attributes, especially its initial cost. With the current
concentration on the FGS in present programs, this may not be taking place
to the appropriate extent. It can be expected that the FGS efforts will
suggest presently unknown advanced concepts, and these, of course, must be
considered as well. A special note should be made of potential developments
in the area of ceramic components. The development of the capability to
manufacture satisfactory high temperature oad-bearing components from cer-
amic materials would have wide implications for other heat engines besides
the Stirling and should be considered in that broader context.
5.3.4 Some Preliminary Conclusions Concerning the Costs and Benefits of
Government Support of Stirling Engine R & D
In the preceding subsections of Section 5.3, we have analyzed, and at-
tempted to estimate crudely, the social benefits which might be obtained
from widespread replacement of the ICE by the Stirling engine, and the like-
lihood of the R & D success which would make such an engine a reality. We
assume for this cost-benefit analysis that a socially beneficial engine
would be commercialized; we will address this issue in the following section.
We need hardly repeat here the uncertainties and complications such cal-
culations have involved and the crudeness of our simple estimates. As dis-
cussed in Chapter 3, cost-benefit analyses can be made to any degree of com-
plexity that the available data justifies. In this case we will fold all the
compounded probability distributions for the various outcomes into simple
point estimates. Our simple criterion is:
R = PxB/C ; (11)
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where
R= Benefit-cost ratio ;
B Benefits ($, present value;,
P = Probability of obtaining benefits; and
C Costs ($, present value).
With this simplest of criteria, any proposed project is accepted if R>l.
We have estimated that social benefits in the range of $2-9 billion could
be obtained by a U.S. Government investment of $100-200 million, with a prob-
ability of at least 0.1. With these numbers we obtain an R>1, possibly up
to 10. As discussed above in the relevant sections, these gross estimates
apply whether the fact of introduction of the Stirling system is assumed to
be attributed to the government, or whether it is assumed that the government
investment hastened the introduction by five to ten years.
The most uncertain of the estimates is the probability of technical
success. It is useful therefore to turn the criterion around, and estimate
the minimum probability which would be required to justify the estimated
government investment viz. C/B (i.e. assume R=1). The numbers here indicate
that the benefits, given success, are one to two orders of magnitude greater
than the costs. Thus a probability of technical success in the range of
.01-.1 is all that is necessary to provide a reasonable justification for
this government investment. A probability at least in this range seems very
likely. Looked at this way, investment in the FGS Stirling R & D is a very
good gamble for the U. S. Government.
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5.4 The U.S. Government in the Process f Automotive TD&P for the
Stirling Engine
In the previous section we examined thce economics of the Stirling en-
gine as perceived by our society as a wbhole. As discussed in Chapter 3,
however, there very likely are real discrepancies between such social cal-
culations and those of the real decision-makers -- the consumers and manu-
facturers of automobiles. The substantial benefits potentially available
to society from Stirling engine utilization will probably never be obtained
unless one or more of the Big Three decides it is in its own best interest
to carry the Stirling system through the TD&P process. Of course, the tech-
nology may not prove to be even socially beneficial -- only time and further
R & D will tell -- but there may be discrepancies between the private de-
cision-making and the social interest which would cause a socially beneficial
engine to be rejected at one of the decision points. The fact that only
one of the Big Three is presently conducting Stirling engine R & D (i.e.,
has made a positive Selection Decision) is a good indication that this is
in fact probably the case (it is also possible that analysts at GM and Chrys-
ler have different opinions concerning the potential for cost reduction than
ours and Ford's).
In this section we will explore some of these possible barriers to com-
mercialization. Since the subject of this report is government-supported
R & D, our discussion of possible government intervention in the marketplace
will be primarily concerned with R & D, but we will also comment on other
possibilities. First we will discuss the likely process by which a Stirling
engine would be introduced into the marketplace, addressing the potential
barriers inherent in the TD&P process discussed in Chapter 2. Then we will
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discuss several possible discrepancies between private and social economic
calculations which, even in the long run could keep a socially beneficial
engine from the marketplace. Third, we Xll address the general implications
of these discrepancies for government R D decisions. Finally, we will make
some specific comments on the potential relationship between the U.S. Govern-
ment and the Ford Motor Company concerning Stirling engine R & D.
5.4.1 The Stirling Engine in the Industry TD&P Process
In Chapter 2 we discussed the process by which the automotive industry
would likely make a major technolgoical change. Here we will apply some of
that discussion to the possible transition to the Stirling engine. We will
concentrate on the Introduction Decision and the Introduction Stage; these
are the focal points of the TD&P process -- the preceding development deci-
sions and stages are aimed at a successful introduction, the subsequent
stage is easily managed once a successful introduction has been made. As
we have discussed in Chapter 3, any government development program must care-
fully align itself with the industry's TD&P process. To not deal with this
process effectively would be to invite failure, in the form of a terminal
"demonstration" of a prototype vehicle which would never make it into the
Big Three's showrooms. As in Chapter 2 we will include here the government's
present intervention in the market; thus this subsection will provide a sort
of "baseline" against which the possible further government involvements,
discussed below, can be assessed.
If one of the Big Three were to make a positive Introduction Decision
with respect to the Stirling engine, it would imply an unmistakable corporate
185
commitment to success; the magnitude of the expenditures involved are such
that the rofits in subsequent years could be noticably affected by a failure
of the venture. Estimates of the cumulative prior development investment
are on the order of $100 million, the cost of the Introduction Stage itself,
including the first Stirling engine plant are on the order of $500 million.
Given this total change in the most important of automobile subsystems, the
probability of failure at introduction cannot be reduced below a significant
level. Thus, the magnitude of the possible dollar loss on a Stirling engine
introduction would at least be comparable to that risked on a major new ve-
hicle line, 1 but in a type of venture where the industry has less experience. 2
In general terms, Chapter 2 above discussed the criteria the industry
has used in the past for making technological changes in its products.
Roughly speaking, an innovation had to at least match every relevant attri-
bute (except cost) of the system it replaced. A cost increase would only
be tolerated as justified by the net gain in the other attributes. As dis-
cussed in Section 5.2 above, the FGS Stirling system has the potential to be
comparable or superior to the ICE in every non-pecuniary attribute except
possibly start-up time and "apparent" safety, and uncertainties remain in
maintenance requirements and durability. Its fuel economy will be substan-
1White [12, p.74] estimates that Ford invested $250 million (then current
dollars) in the Edsel in 1954-6, eventually losing about $100 million.
2An automobile industry spokesman recently gave the following assessment:
"The great majority of automotive vehicle owners and users really do not care
what kind of powerplant is used to accomplish these objectives. They are
interested in results, not means or processes. Unless, of course, their
powerplant requires more care, greater maintenance, costs more or is less
reliable. If any alternative powerplant, although in its early stages of use,
departed in any way from previous user experience or even expectation, nega-
tive customer response would be inediate and, from the standpoint of private
enterprise, retribution would be swift". [78]
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tially superior to the present ICE, but how it will compare with the contem-
porary ICE depends heavily on developments of the ICE. It will most certain-
ly have an initial cost higher than the contemporary ICE. At the time of
the Introduction Decision, the economics-of the manufacture (i.e. the initial
cost) and operation will be well known. The principal criterion for a posi-
tive Introduction Decision will be an initial cost (including, of course,
an appropriate (for the risk) return on R & D and other capital investment)
which consumers find attractive. The principal risks will be associated with
the consumers' evaluations of the system, and the government's potential re-
action to the availability of the engine.
The crucial feature of a Stirling introduction is that it would take
place in an environment which is still dominated by the ICE. While it is
possible that some modified form of the ICE (such as the stratified charge
or Wankel), or possibly the diesel, may penetrate to some fraction of the
new passenger car market by the mid-1980's, the infrastructure for supporting
the automotive fleet will be essentially the one in existence today. The
first year's Stirling engine production would likely amount to several hun-
dred thousand units; even if the system were very successful and more than
one of the Big Three were involved in a massive production conversion pro-
gram, it would still be several years at least before more than a few per-
cent of the in-use automotive fleet were Stirling-powered. The key compo-
nents of the infrastructure not in the control of the manufacturer, namely
the independent garages and the petroleum industry, would have little incen-
tive to make significant investments to provide materials or services unique
to Stirling-powered vehicles -- until either the number of such vehicles on
the road were significant, or they had some prior guarantee that such invest-
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ments would be profitable (i.e. that the Stirling system was likely to remain
in production). In general, then, it is likely that some of the long-term
advantages of the Stirling system would ot e available to (and some short-
term disadvantages would be present for) early purchasers of the system, due
both to lack of infrastructure and to dc.s'gn choices made by the manufactur-
ers. This may be very important because the long-run commercial success of
the system will very likely be determined by sales during the first few years
in the market.
The choice of fuels for Stirling vehicles may be one important example
of short-run sacrifices in the Introduction Stage. Stirling engines can
operate on less expensive fuels than gasoline, and a given vehicle designed
to operate on gasoline will probably be able to run on diesel or a light dis-
tillate fuel without any significant problems. As discussed in Section 5.3
above, this could be translated into a real advantage of about 0.1-0.2¢/mile
in operating cost. However,today diesel fuel is much less widely available
than gasoline so that, unless significant changes are made in the automotive
petroleum product distribution system before the Stirling introduction date,
. .
many, if not most, Stirling vehicles would be operated on gasoline. If, on
that basis, the Stirling system proved itself a success and the number of
Stirling vehicles on the road began to grow at a significant rate, then the
petroleum refiners and distributors would have the incentive to offer more
widely some less refined fuel at a lower price. At first, primarily the dis-
tribution system would be affected, as the actual consumption levels would be
relatively small due to the small size of the in-use Stirling fleet. Later,
significant changes in refinery output would be required and the fuel cost
structure would be affected. Speculation as to the national liquid fuel
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system in the 1990's is probably not useful ere. The crucial point is that
the commercial success of the system mig-Lt well be determined by systems
using only gasoline.1
As discussed in Chapter 2, the industry would attempt to minimize the
fixed cost of any innovation. In partJicular, the investment in related changes
to the vehicle body or other key subsystems (such as the transmission) would
be avoided to the extent possible. Thus, it is likely that the Stirling
engine would be offered in a vehicle body designed for the ICE. Development
of a special body for the Stirling vehicle would add considerably to the
aggregate investment risked on the Stirling system, probably without signif-
icantly decreasing the probability of failure due to the necessary compro-
mises. The Ford-Philips program has demonstrated the "packagability" of an
engine which matches the power of the system it replaced (i.e. that its spe-
cific power is not significantly worse). This is in notable contrast to a
number of the other alternatives which have significantly lower (e.g. the
diesel) or higher [e.g. the Wankel, or the gas turbine (at least as analyzed
by JPL)] power densities than the ICE. These engines would require signifi-
cant vehicle redesign or would be offered initially in less-than-optimal
configurations. No such compromise would likely be necessary in a Stirling
introduction. Other aspects of "integrability", such as vibrational energy
output and transmission requirements, make it likely to be suitable for con-
temporary vehicle bodies and most other key systems.
The provision of adequate service support would require a major invest-
lIt should be noted that the use of a fuel heavier than gasoline raises
issues of unregulated air pollutants (particulates, odor, sulfates) similar
to those now inhibiting the widespread introduction of the diesel.
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ment by the innovating firm. This would include the training of mechanics,
stockpiling of replacement parts, etc. at dealerships. The most important
feature of the effort might be an assurance o vehicle buyers of adequate
service over the vehicle lifetime, even in the event the system is withdrawn
from the market. This might require a lengthening of the usual warrantee
period, or possibly including some unique features in the warrantee agree-
ment. Again, however, if the introduction were successful there would prob-
ably be no problem, as the independent service facilities would soon compete
for the business. Requirements for emergency service, special lubricants,
etc., would also have to be considered by the firm introducing an alternative
powerplant.
There has been considerable discussion of the industry's ability to
finance the transition process -- the key issue being whether depreciation
plus retained earnings and any external financing would cover the new tooling
plus the capital loss of obsolete equipment. One analysis has concluded
that the industry in the aggregate could finance even an unrealistic and
expensive 4-year production conversion. [17] The Big Three have argued that
government-imposed vehicle changes have absorbed much of their financial
capacity for the next few years, and indicated large differences between
their abilities to finance more major changes.1 A successful introduction
however, would presumably provide reasonable incentives for further change.
An important feature of the Introduction Decision as it is likely to be
made is that, to the ordinary forecasting and business risks of the sort which
1See the comments by the Big Three in response to this question from
Senator Magnuson. [79, pp. 284ff] Chrysler especially might have difficul-
ties because its ability to obtain external financing is presently limited.
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industry has previously dealt with, a whole new set of risks have been added
by the involvement of the Federal Goverrm.ant in the automotive industry.
Nearly every year for the past eight year o so, industry officials have
had to justify their alternative powerplant programs to Congressional com-
mittees, in the face of hard questionins nd potential intervention. This
has naturally reflected a national desire for technological change in an in-
dustry whose products have a large impact on society. However, from the bus-
inessman's point of view, the government's reaction to technological develop-
ment is a hard-to-predict variable which must be incorporated into his de-
cisions.
A major government involvement in the Introduction Decision is already
to be found in the Clean Air Act. Without a change in the structure of the
Act, it is too blunt an instrument to directly cause a positive Introduction
Decision. This is because (as discussed in Chapter 3) there is virtually no
provision for the gradual phase-in of a system whose emissions are substan-
tially lower than those of the contemporary ICE. If the ICE has met a set of
standards which appear to be relatively stable, then the Stirling system would
be judged against the ICE at those standards; to the extent that the attri-
butes of ICE-powered vehicles have deteriorated due to the standards then a
positive Introduction Decision is more likely (as seen in the calculations
shown in Section 5.3). If, however, the technology for the ICE to meet strin-
gent standards, such as those readily attainable by the Stirling, were judged
"unavailable" and the other attributes of the Stirling were not sufficiently
relatively attractive, then a major structural change would be required in the
Clean Air Act to bring about lowered emissions through Stirling introduction.
Because of the relatively unattractive Stirling attributes (in this scenario),
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privately perceived, one or more techniques or changing the privately per-
ceived attributes would have to be utilizpd. It is possible that the govern-
ment would exert some sort of pressure to force an extraordinarily rapid con-
version to the alternative. Anticipatic of such a possibility certainly
cannot serve as encouragement to the mulufacturers in taking the major risk
of introducing an alternative powerplant.
While these issues are important, the dominant criterion in the industry
decisions involving the Stirling engine, however, is what it will cost rela-
tive to what consumers would be willing to pay for it. This, then, leads us
back to questions of the disparity between the socially and privately per-
ceived benefits of the engine.
5.4.2 Private Calculations of Stirling Vehicle Economics
In this subsection we will examine the possible economics of Stirling-
powered vehicles from the point of view of the car buyer and manufacturer.
Consumers' evaluations of the economics of the Stirling system are inherently
difficult to address because, as discussed in Chapter 2, the demand for new
cars is volatile and hard to predict, especially as it responds to technolo-
gical changes. This volatility makes analysis of the attractiveness of low
fuel consumption, the Stirling's principal advantage, extremely difficult.
The industry's widely publicized improvements in the fuel economy of model
year 1975 and 1976 vehicles and the billions of dollars they have stated they
are investing over the next few years in fuel-economy-motivated redesign are
dramatic. But given the type of demand discussed above the consumers' likely
response remains unclear. Analysts [e.g. 7,17,53 and ourselves below] have
used various models for computing the privately perceived tradeoff between
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operating cost and initial cost, based on various sorts of rational consumer
models, for operating cost savings whose Lotal is of the same order as the
cost of a vinyl roof. Even with such models t is unclear whether the new
car buyer, who typically keeps the car ojr only several years, is willing to
pay for a vehicle life's worth of savings or merely his several years' worth;
it depends on how the fuel consumption affects the resale value of the car.
To some extent these considerations reflect the dilemma, discussed in Chap-
ter 3, that small reductions in cost, such as those discussed here, aggregate
to major social impacts. They also reflect the fact that the American car
is bought in part on an emotional basis with its symbolic and aesthetic fea-
tures possibly more important to the owner than its detailed technical attri-
butes.
In spite of these concerns, we will here proceed to address quantita-
tively, by simple example as in Section 5.3, the impact of two possible areas
of social-private disparity on the consumer's evaluation of the total oper-
ating economics of a vehicle. Again we focus on initial cost as the crucial
variable; we will take Ro, the break-even initial cost (initially defined
socially in Subsection 5.3.2.1) to represent the maximum initial cost of a
Stirling engine which would be acceptable to the consumer. Presumably this
is closely related to the decision criteria in the industry TD&P process;
whether this is so will be discussed below. Actually, of course, tile Stir-
ling's entire attribute set would be considered in such decisions; even with-
in our simple vehicle total operating cost model the attribute pair (Ro,n)
determines whether there are net benefits (private or social). Our focus on
initial cost is used principally for illustrative purposes.
It is most likely that even a "rational" consumer uses a capital charge,
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or interest rate, which is higher than tat esirable for society as a whole.
For example, the real annual interest rates on new car loans ranged from
2.4 to 8.6% during the period 1971-4 [8, Tab' 20-7]. This might be consid-
ered the appropriate rate for a rational person; whereas, for a number of
reasons, real social discount rates are generally considered somewhat lower,
in the neighborhood of 3-5% annually. However, there has been considerable
speculation that a new automobile buyer simply does not place an appropriate
value on operating savings realized years after the initial purchase, prob-
ably by a subsequent owner, and thus implicitly uses a higher discount rate
than even the rational model would predict. There have been no good studies
of this question (such as an econometric study to determine the car buyer's
implicit discount rate), but the argument may have merit.
In Case 5 of our total operating cost calculations, shown in Table 5.3
and Figure 5.2,we show the results of such a possibility. Case 5 is identi-
cal with the Base Case except that a real annual discount rate of 15% was
used in the capital charge calculation, as compared with 4% in the Base Case.
The results are clear; under our simple assumptions the tolerable Stirling
engine premium over the ICE is reduced from 26% of the ICE cost to 16%. A
consumer calculating his costs this way, and an industry basing its deci-
sions on such consumer calculations, would require a substantially less ex-
pensive Stirling engine than would be socially beneficial for positive TD&P
decisions.
The impact of a positive social premium on fuel on consumer calculations
is similar. As discussed in Chapter 3, it is likely that fuel is not (and
will not be) priced at its real social value. For example, the value to the
nation of reduced imports, beyond the actual cost of the fuel saved, is not
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reflected in its market price. Similarly, as long as the market price of
motor fuel. is determined by some average ost of crude oil, including price-
controlled domestically produced crude c¢l, ather than the marginal cost
(which is the cost of imported crude) then there is a disparity between the
social and market values of motor fuels. (This may be considered an exter-
nality: the gasoline purchaser causes the import of expensive foreign crude,
raising the average price of refined products to all consumers of petroleum
products.) The impact of such a disparity can be seen in the difference be-
tween the Base Case and Case 3 in Table 5.3 and Figure 5.2, using a different
interpretation than was used in the discussion in Section 5.3. In Case 3 the
price of fuel was taken to be 50% higher than in the Base Case. If the mar-
ket price of gasoline were 55¢/gal. and the social premium 28¢/gal., (un-
doubtedly a high estimate), then the Base Case would represent a private
calculation and Case 3 a social calculation. Again the impact is clear: the
consumer would demand an initial cost of the Stirling engine no greater than
26% higher than that of the ICE, whereas social benefits would be obtained
with a Stirling costing no more than 40% more. Again a more stringent cri-
terion is placed on the outcome of the R & D process than would be socially
desirable.
The case of air pollutant emissions is the most obvious; if the Stirling
vehicle has lower emissions than the contemporary ICE, this would be a so-
cially valuable attribute (at least in urban areas) which consumers would
not consider in their vehicle choices.
The possible disparities between social calculations and those made in
industry are as difficult to evaluate as those of new car buyers, given the
lack of applicable economic theory on oligopoly behavior. In particular the
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automobile industry must deal with the impact of new technology on govern-
ment regulation (and vice versa); how they incorporate this into their de-
cision-making process is unclear. Clearly istortions in consumer economics,
such as those discussed above, are incorporated directly into industry de-
cisions, as the manufacturers obviously will not introduce a vehicle that
the public will not buy. Thus the crucial decision criterion, the Stirling's
initial cost, will have to be lower than the socially beneficial break-even
cost due to the factors discussed above.
It is likely that the actual decision criterion would be even lower than
the privately-calculated break-even cost. Clearly the new vehicle must offer
a private operating advantage relative to the ICE, and this advantage must
be large enough to make the firm confident that the vehicle will in fact
sell. Thus the manufacturer would calculate the private break-even initial
cost and then subtract off a risk factor. How large this risk factor would
have to be is unclear. (It should be noted that the risk involved in invest-
ment in the Stirling system would also have been separately considered in the
capital return the manufacturer would include in his initial cost calculation.)
It is worth briefly discussing a further implication of a social premium
on automotive fuels (there are of course, many other implications outside of
the realm of TD&P, such as on the extent of vehicle operation).1 If there is
a significant tradeoff between first cost and fuel economy, then the private
firm, optimizing an engine to minimize the total private cost of automotive
1Another feature of a positive social premium on energy (in other forms
as well as automotive fuels), is that the energy consumption involved in en-
gine manufacture becomes a socially relevant figure of merit along with life-
cycle cost. We will not address this issue, principally because, as is well
known, the operating energy consumption of a passenger car is far greater
than that of its manufacture, maintenance, and sales. [7,80]
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travel, will choose a design which has a lower initial cost and higher fuel
consumpticon than the socially optimum engine. This is shown clearly (although
crudely) in Figure 5.4, where the total fel c:onsumed in a year's driving
(10,000 miles) is plotted against engine initial cost. Let point a represent
the position of the ICE in 1985. Line ? s a line of constant total private
cost of driving 10,000 miles (i.e. the total annual cost on line P is equal
to that of using the 1985 ICE). Let curve T represent the Stirling engine
technology available for introduction in 1985. It represents the end of a
privately successful Final Development Stage, because, at its (private) op-
timum design point (), it matches the private total costs of the ICE (ex-
cept for the risk factor). It demonstrates a distinct initial cost-fuel
consumption tradeoff. Line S1 is a line of constant total social cost, with
that cost associated with the ICE (since it passes through ). The lower
slope of line S1 as compared to P is due to the assumed social premium on
automotive fuels. Line S2 indicates the lower social cost of the firm's
Stirling engine design (at point ) as compared to its ICE. However, the
socially optimum design point is at y, and, due to the social premium, the
potential social benefits associated with the difference between social cost
line S2 and S3 are not obtained. This simple exercise demonstrates the
subtle effects of improper fuel pricing.
5.4.3 Government Involvement in Advancing the Stirling Engine in the TD&P
Process
In this subsection we will proceed to discuss some details of the gov-
ernment's possible involvement in the process of automotive TD&P for the pur-
pose of advancing Stirling engine technology. We will address the uncertain-
I ip
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INITIAL ENGINE COST
Figure 5.4
IMPACT OF SOCIAL FUEL PREMIUM ON ENGINE DESIGN
(Line P is a line of constant private tot-
al operating cost. Lines S,S 2 and S3 are
lines of constant social operating cost
(with a social fuel premium). Curve T is
the available alternative powerplant tech-
nology. c is the relevant ICE design point;
6 is the privately optimal alternative eng-
ine design point; and is the socially op-
timal alternative engine design point.)
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ties inherent in any such program and possible mechanisms for dealing it-
the disparities between social and private calculations regarding the utility
of Stirling technology. First, the government's general review procedires
and decision criteria for an R & D program will be addressed. Next the type
of organization which should be used to conduct the R & D work is diccussed.
Then the inherent limitations of R & D support as a mechanism for aligning
social and private incentives is addressed, and the discussion is therefore
broadened for a brief set of comments on other ways in which the government
might want to intervene in the automotive market to promote major fuel-con-
serving technological changes such as the Stirling engine.
As discussed in Section 5.3 and previously in this section, the econom-
ics of the FGS Stirling system are highly uncertain. The government's R & D
programming system must be specifically designed for flexibility in order to
accommodate new information as it is developed. The uncertainties may be
broken into two categories: first, the technological uncertainties of the
Stirling engine itself, i.e. the system's initial cost (and, to a lesser ex-
tent, its fuel economy and other attributes); and second, all the other un-
certainties -- future domestic fuel prices (as determined both by world crude
oil prices and domestic fuel price policy), advances in ICE technology, and
future emissions standards. The technological uncertainties are primarily
concerned with the actual cost of the system; the others determine the deci-
sio.n criteria for that cost, both the social criterion and the private one.
The Stirling's technological uncertainties can be resolved by the investment
of funds in development of the engine. Some of the other uncertainties will
be resolved with time, some will not. Thus it seems clear that any Stirling
R & D program would have to be conducted under a carefully monitored periodic
r
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(presumably annual) review, with the economics of the system assessed .acl
period in light of new knowledge gainer in every area. As discussed n Chap-
ter 3 and above, the economics would have to be evaluated from both a social
and private standpoint. At some point it might become clear that the cost
of the Stirling could very probably not be reduced enough for the systm to
be even socially beneficial, given the state of the technology and the (then
estimated) social decision criterion (essentially the social break-even ini-
tial cost). Then the program would be terminated and the government would
have lost its bet. Similarly, it might become clear at some point that the
initial cost could be easily reduced to the point where it met the industry's
private criterion. At that point the industry would (by definition) proceed
without further government involvement. In this case substantial social ben-
efits would likely be obtained, because the industry's decision criterion is,
as previously discussed, likely to be significantly more stringent than the
social criterion.
Clearly the most difficult problem would occur if it appears that the
system will be socially beneficial, but will not meet the private criterion.
As we have discussed this could very well occur if the government fails to
take measures to align the social and private criteria, viz. change the
structure of the Clean Air Act, price fuel at its social value, or other
possibilities discussed below. In this case there is little point in pro-
ceeding with the program. Even if the government continued support through
production, no one (or at least very few people) would buy the vehicle.
How should the government-supported program be organized? At this point
the Stirling system is late in the Initial Development Stage. The competing
concepts for the various components are being sorted out; the emphasis world-
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wide is shifting to cost reduction through improved design. Since initial
cost is the crucial factor which will determine the ultimate success c¢r fail-
ure of the system, it is important that government-supported work be crried
out by organizations whose primary incentives are in this direction and which
have proven capability in this area. Such organizations are, of covursa, only
in the automotive industry, i.e. the Big Three and their component suppliers.
Furthermore it is very important that the work-performing organization
have a stake in making the system a commercial success. Thus a cost-sharing
arrangement would be the most desirable form of agreement. A cost-sharing
agreement with one of the Big Three would insure not only that cost was em-
phasized, but also that all those other factors -- pleasability, servicea-
bility, etc. which are so important to commercial success -- would be given
adequate attention. As long as one of the Big Three is investing its own
funds in the project, it is signalling its evaluation that the (private) In-
troduction Decision criteria have a reasonable likelihood of attainment.
As discussed above, attainment of the private criteria (which would include
government interventions actually extant) is necessary for success.
This discussion refers to work on the FGS Stirling only. Advanced Sys-
tems, on the other hand, could be well pursued by government laboratories
or by non-automotive firms interested primarily in R & D (rather than com-
mercialization) with direct grants. Of necessity such work would overlap
and. require close interface with FGS programs.
However, government support of R & D is very limited in its ability to
correct market failures more basic than underinvestment in R & D. Although
it might affect the Selection and Final Development Decisions, it will have
little impact on the Introduction Decision criteria where there may be sig-
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nificant social-private disparities. Even .f our society refuses to price
fuels at their social value, and maint.ins a Clean Air Act which discourages
major technological changes, there are other steps which can be taken. Snome
sort of automotive fuel economy standard, such as those recently disco'ssed
in Congress, would certainly have an impact on the Introduction Decision,
serving as a very crude proxy for the social premium on fuel. The impact
would, however, depend on just how the legislation were written and imple-
mented. Vehicle standards, tied to the "available technology", would be less
effective than a more flexible approach utilizing gradually tightening fleet
standards, allowing for the phase-in of new systems. As with the Clean Air
Act, such a mechanism could cause significant disruption of automotive sales
if the attributes of the system being gradually displaced were perceived by
consumers as superior to those of the Stirling. Such measures would obvious-
ly apply to the minor evolutionary changes, toward which the industry is
naturally inclined, as well as major innovations such as the Stirling engine.
The government may want to intervene in the automotive market with the
express purpose of commercializing Stirling technology. Given the large and
risky nature of a positive Stirling Introduction Decision, a logical govern-
ment role would be to reduce either the magnitude of the funds risked or the
probability of failure. The former could be accomplished by a direct subsidy
of the Introduction Stage. Of less impact, but less expensive for the govern-
ment, would be some sort of guaranteed (limited industry liability) loan or
other risk-bearing function by the government. To the extent that such mea-
sures are considered appropriate for the commercialization of other energy-
related technologies (such as the supply of synthetic fuels), they would be
appropriate for consideration in the commercialization of a petroleum-conser-
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ving technology such as a Stirling-powered automobile.
Such measures would reduce the finrm's possible dollar loss involved in
a Stirling introduction, and would be appropriate if it is the reticen,: of
the industry to make a major technological change that is considered the
relevant market failure which government is attempting to correct. f, how-
ever, it is a social premium on fuel that is the relevant problem, such mea-
sures would have limited impact, as they would not directly affect the auto-
mobile buyer's decisions and thus have little impact on the ultimate success
of commercialization. As discussed above, a positive social premium on fuel
causes an undervaluation of any fuel-conserving technology, which we are here
(of course) assuming the Stirling engine to be. The most straightforward
measure, then, is to align the private and social values of fuel. A less
direct approach to the general problem, but with a similar impact on the auto-
motive TD&P process, would be a direct subsidy to purchasers of Stirling-
powered vehicles. In this case, however, there is no reason why such a mea-
sure should not apply to other low-fuel-consumption vehicles. A tax/rebate
system for high/low fuel consumption vehicles would of course have similar
effects. Such a system might well be utilized in combination with a risk-
reduction measure such as those discussed above.
5.4.4 The Ford Proposal
In the previous subsection we emphasized that if R & D on the FGS Stir-
ling system is to be supported by the government, the best type of arrange-
ment would be a cost-sharing program with one of the Big Three. At this
time, this effectively means financing part of the Ford program. GM contin-
ues to maintain its position that the Federal Government should not support
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(and GM would not accept) R & D which is more closely related to an actomi-
bile than Basic or Applied Research, ard that the Stirling is extremely un-
likely to ever be cost-effective. Chrysler agrees with GM on the second -
sue, and has long maintained that the gas turbine is the engine of the future.
The policies of GM and Chrysler may be in the process of changing, especially
if government funds become more widely available. We will deal here, hw-
ever, with Ford's public proposals.
As discussed in Section 5.2, Ford is actively engaged in development of
a Stirling-powered vehicle. They have laid out an optimistic schedule for
Final Development and an Introduction Stage, with model year 1985 as the
introduction target date. They estimate a total cost from the present through
completion of Final Development (in 1981) of $100-200 million, and have stated
that they will not allocate this amount of money internally. They are in the
process of preparing proposals to the Energy Research and Development Admin-
istration for substantial support of their Final Development program. Ford
obviously has the proven competence for the manufacture and design of auto-
motive systems that will sell, and the incentives to get the Stirling system
to the marketplace. Their willingness to foot a substantial fraction of the
bill gives them a clear stake in a positive outcome. This is the type of
program the government should be looking for on the Stirling engine, and the
type of behavior by the Big Three that should be encouraged by the government.
It is an opportunity for our society that should not be passed up.
There is, however, an inherent difficulty in this type of cost-sharing
program, namely finding an equitable division of support between the govern-
ment and the company involved. To pose the question quite baldly: If Ford
is so interested in the Stirling, why don't they fund the program entirely
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on their own? Is their proposal merely a plan to get the taxpayers to fuid
a program they would fund themselves anyway? If the government accepts their
proposal, then obviously there will be no way to know the answer to teqe
questions. However, in Chapter 3 we discussed the various reasons why the
automotive industry's own self-interest will very likely lead it to nder-
invest in major technological innovations; we will not review that matezial
here. It is very plausible that Ford would not adequately (from a social
standpoint) fund a major new technology program which they view as extreme-
ly risky. If the government chooses not to fund Stirling engine development
at all (beyond the present $550,000 contract with Ford), the most probable
result will be (as Ford has said) that the Ford program will continue at a
relatively low level of funding, possibly attaining success at some date
well after 1985.
If the government invests in the Ford program and either Ford would have
funded it anyway or the program simply fails to produce a viable engine, the
worst that can happen is that the government has lost up to about $100 mil-
lion.1 On the other hand, as discussed in Section 5.3, society may well gain
benefits in the $billions. The probability of commercial success (given the
marketplace conditions and government interventions extant) would be higher
under this type of arrangement than any other, due to Ford's stake in a pos-
itive outcome. If the Ford program proved unsuccessful, it at least would
have accelerated a determination that.the FGS Stirling is not a viable alter-
native to the advanced ICE (or inferior to another alternative) and allow
both Ford's and the government's resources to be diverted either to advanced
lOf course the money would not really have been "lost" -- information
on Stirling technology would have been obtained.
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Stirling concepts or to other systems.
An alternative or supplement to finding Ford directly would be tc fund
automotive component suppliers or other firms for the development of spcif-
ic components to be supplied to Ford. This is the procedure used by he
ERDA program in its gas turbine development effort, which is centered at
Chrysler. There are other alternatives which we have not analyzed. At this
stage in the development of the FGS System, however, it is clear that the
automotive industry (i.e., not a government laboratory or a research-oriented
firm without a relevant product line) should be the center of the R & D ac-
tivity.
5.5 The Stirling Engine: Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter we have attempted to analyze the benefits from govern-
ment support of Stirling engine development efforts and how those benefits
might best be obtained.
First, we examined the status of Stirling engine technology and the ex-
tent and focus of present Stirling engine R & D efforts. The Stirling engine
is neither an infant nor a mature technology -- it has been the subject of
development efforts for several decades but has never been produced in sig-
nificant quantities. At the present time the Stirling technology can be di-
vided into two subsets: 1) a "First Generation System", consisting of com-
ponents each of which has been in dynamometer testing for several years, and
which has demonstrated a high likelihood of meeting all the necessary requi-
sites for a successful passenger car powerplant except initial cost, and 2)
"Advanced Systems", involving concepts with potential performance and/or cost
advantages over the FGS but which have not yet been shown to be technologically
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viable. The most important distinction is that the FGS uses no load-bearing
components made from ceramic materials, The key non-cost attributes of an
FGS Stirling-powered automobile are unlikely to change significantly a de-
velopment efforts proceed; the focus of the efforts will be to minimize its
cost, through engine optimization and component choice and design. .a, GS-
powered vehicle might, if the development process procedes well and is ade-
quately funded, be marketed in the mid-1980's.
The economics of the Stirling system were next examined, from a strictly
social viewpoint. The analysis was concerned principally with the FGS Stir-
ling; of the various Advanced Systems, structural ceramics stand out as
clearly deserving of R & D support, and the relatively basic nature of the
work precludes the utility of economic analysis. First a number of general
issues in the evaluation of alternative automotive powerplants were dis-
cussed and a very simple total operating cost model for the FGS Stirling
system developed. Then a very crude cost-benefit analysis was performed.
The benefits of Stirling engine commercialization, relative to continued use
of the ICE, are extremely uncertain. The principal technological uncertain-
ty is its initial cost, but its social value at any initial cost depends on
the price of fuel, the type of fuel used, and the technological features of
the contemporary ICE. The present value of the future benefits of displace-
ment of the ICE by the Stirling was shown to be very much larger than the
likely government investment in R & D, and we therefore concluded that such
an investment is a very good gamble for the government to take.
How, then, should the government proceed to determine whether the Stir-
ling can in fact be made socially beneficial, and, if it can, what roadblocks
might there be to block its commercialization? This was next addressed.
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First, the process by which the Stirling system would be introduced ito the
marketplace was examined; transitional roadblocks are apparently min-rilal ex-
cept that the fuel-insensitivity of the engine would not likely be utilized
to advantage at first. Then the disparities between social and private cal-
culations of the vehicle's economics were examined. The disparities miy be
significant; and thus the decision criteria in the TD&P process are likely
to be more stringent than socially desirable. Unless our society decides to
price fuel at its social value, or take other measures to encourage the adop-
tion of fuel-conserving technology, government support of R & D is shown to
be an inherently limited policy tool. Some desirable features of a govern-
ment-supported R & D program were then discussed. Finally the proposal by
the Ford Motor Company for a cost-sharing Stirling development program was
discussed. Ford has the proven competence and the incentives structure to
bring the Stirling system to the marketplace, and there are good reasons to
believe that Ford will not find it in its own self-interest to invest in the
system at the socially desirable level. We therefore conclude that the Ford
proposal is an opportunity that should not be passed up.
Several further issues deserve to be addressed to place this discussion
of the Stirling engine in a broader perspective. First, as discussed in Chap-
ter 3 of this report, the alternative automotive powerplant R & D program must
be viewed as a portfolio of programs, some of which will likely fail, i.e.
not reach commercialization, if for no other reason than the fact that, while
they achieved their technical goals, other systems turned out to be superior.
There is a tendency, especially in politically visible programs such as this,
to view individual programs in isolation and consider funds expended on sys-
tems not ultimately commercialized as having been a waste of government
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resources. Such a tendency must be resisted; in selecting a portfolio of
R & D programs it must be expected that they will not all succeed.
Second, we have neglected discussion of markets where the Stirling en-
gine might be successfully commercialized as a stepping stone to the passen-
ger car a&plication. In particular, the heavy duty prime mover market should
be carefully analyzed and the Federal program accomodated to it if appro-
priate.
Finally, it is hard to avoid comment on some of the features of recent-
ly proposed legislation related to Federal alternative powerplant R & D pro-
grams. First, it must be recognized that the transition to a major new auto-
motive powerplant would of necessity be a long, tedious and carefully orches-
trated program, as we hope has been made clear in the preceding discussion.
There is little point in mandating the crash development of demonstration
systems when no significant impact on the national goals of reduced auto-
motive fuel consumption and mbient air quality could result from a Stirling
engine commercialization until around the turn-of-the-century. Second, given
the magnitude of the present automotive manufacturing, servicing and fuel
supply system, it is of the utmost importance that care be taken to integrate
the R & D program with it. In particular this means that we must recognize
that the present institutional structure must be incorporated into the Fed-
eral R & D process. This has been emphasized in the discussion of the Stir-
ling system, but is generally missing in the legislation which has recently
been proposed.
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6. THE DIESEL ENGINE
6.1 Introduction
A number of the alternative engines -- the stratified charge engines,
the Wankel and the diesel -- are close in concept, design and stage of
development to the conventional spark-ignition engine. All these engines
are "internal combustion engines" (though we have followed popular usage
and used this term to denote the conventional automobile engine only).
They are all quite well developed engine technologies -- versions of these
engines are already in mass production in either Europe or Japan, or in
the Final Development Stage in the U.S. Most of the industry's standard
design practices, and much of its ICE experience, would be directly appli-
cable to these alternatives. These engines are (or would be) manufactured
and assembled on engine production lines very similar to those used to
produce the ICE today, and indeed do (or would) use a great many common
machine tools and existing engine components.
These engines thus present a different set of issues to the government
R & D planner than do the advanced heat engines (of which class we analyzed
the Stirling engine) because mass production experience is already avail-
able. We have chosen one example of the engines which are "close to the
ICE" -- the diesel -- for more detailed examination in this chapter. The
diesel is especially interesting because it is already in mass production
and use in automobiles (though on a modest scale relative to total'U.S.
auto production), and it does offer significantly improved vehicle fuel
economy. Many in government and elsewhere are enthusiastically promoting
the advantages of much greater use of diesel engines in automobiles in the
U.S. Yet there are special problems associated with its emissions and per-
formance characteristics, and the U.S automobile industry has in the past
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shown little interest in its development for introduction in passenger cars.
An apparent impasse exists. The issue, then, of whether the government
should embark on a substantial diesel engine R & D program, is an important
one in the current context where automobile energy conservation is a major
national concern.
In this chapter we address this issue in three stages, generally fol-
lowing the logical structure developed in Chapter 3. First we describe
the status of the diesel engine technology which is available for mass
production within roughly a five year time scale. A description is given
of production and R & D programs now underway. The attributes of a "mature"
diesel engine technology -- one available within this time frame -- are evalu-
ated relative to the ICE. Second, we examine the social benefits which
might be realized from replacement of the ICE by the diesel, and we discuss
the constraints which the industry's introduction process is likely to
place on the attributes of a diesel engine at the time mass production com-
mences. The major uncertainties or barriers which inhibit the automobile
industry from resolving either final development or introduction decisions
are thereby identified. Finally, the degree to which these uncertainties
or barriers could be overcome by government R & D programs is examined.
Our primary conclusion is that these uncertainties and barriers are not
in the attributes of the diesel engine technology itself. That technology
is well developed, and the characteristics of a diesel passenger car of
given acceleration capability could be (and are being) determined with
relatively modest effort by the automobile industry. The diesel engine ap-
pears to be an attractive alternative to the ICE at a lower vehicle per-
formance level than its ICE-equivalent vehicle. Gains in fuel economy, lower
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fuel price and lower maintenance costs (at this lower vehicle performance
level) are likely to more than offset the higher initial vehicle cost. The
major uncertainties are threefold. The ability of the diesel to meet future
NO emission standards is in doubt and there is concern that currently un-
regulated diesel emissions may be subject to strict control if large-scale
use appears likely. The size of the market for diesel cars with much re-
duced performance relative to equivalent ICE vehicles is unclear. And un-
certainties in.the ICE baseline continue to introduce uncertainties into
calculations of benefits of diesel engine use of the same order as the bene-
fits projected from such use. We will now develop these arguments in detail.
6.2 Status of the Technology and Current R & D Programs
6.2.1 A Review of Diesel Engine Technology
The diesel engine is no newcomer as an automotive powerplant. In
those parts of the world where fuel costs are higher, personal incomes are
lower, and fuel economy and engine durability have been much more important
than in the U.S., the diesel engine has penetrated into the light duty vehi-
cle market. Lightweight, high speed diesel engines have been developed
specifically for these conditions in Europe and Japan where automotive fuels
are much more expensive than in the U.S. The more economical diesel is used
in taxis, delivery vans, and other high mileage urban vehicles. While diesel
engine passenger cars are not currently produced in the U.S., Daimler-Benz
and now Peugeot market diesel and ICE-powered versions of their same basic
vehicles in this country. The number of diesel vehicles sold here is, how-
ever, small (a few thousand per year). In the larger engine size ranges
the diesel is produced by several manufacturers in the United States. The
diesel engine is generally used in the heavy truck and commercial bus market.
low
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It is also used extensively in many other areas for power generation or
propulsion.
The dieselengineis an "internal combustion engine" superficially quite
similar to the conventional automotive spark-ignition engine. The fundamen-
tal difference between the two engine types is in the method used to ignite
the fuel-air mixture inside the engine cylinder. From this fundamental
difference follow differences in the characteristics of the fuels, methods
used to prepare the fuel-air mixture, the details of engine design, and
engine operating characteristics. In the conventional gasoline-fueled spark-
ignition engine the fuel-air mixture is ignited by an electrical discharge
at the spark plug towards the end of the compression stroke, and a turbulent
flame propagates across the cylinder at a rate determined by cylinder head
and piston geometry and properties of the fuel-air mixture. This mixture
is prepared in the engine intake system with a carburetor (or in some
cases fuel injection in the intake port). In the diesel engine, the fuel-
air mixture ignites spontaneously close to the end of the compression process,
as the temperature and pressure of the mixture in the cylinder increase and
chemical reaction rates become sufficiently fast to initiate combustion.
Control of this process is achieved by requiring certain fuel characteris-
1
tics , and by producing within the engine cylinder a mixture which is ready
to burn at the appropriate time. Fuel injection directly into the engine
cylinder just before combustion commences, and suitable design of injector,
cylinder head and piston geometries, achieve the desired rate of fuel-air
mixing.
A cetane number is used to characterize the ignition quality of
diesel fuel. A certain minimum cetane number is required for acceptable
engine operation.
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This difference in method of ignition and of controlling the rate of
burning of fuel-air mixture leads to perhaps the most important design and
operating differences between these two engines. The diesel can operate at a
higher engine compression ratio than the spark-ignition engine because detona-
tion (or knock) is not a limiting factor. Also, power levels lower than the
maximum engine output are obtained in the diesel by reducing the fuel flow
while the air flow remains unthrottled. In contrast, in the spark-ignition
engine, both fuel and air are throttled together. The higher compression
ratio, and unthrottled air flow at part load, combine to give the diesel engine
its higher operating efficiency.
But with these advantages come the reasons for the higher initial cost
and heavier engine weight of the diesel. Higher compression ratios and rates
of pressure rise in the cylinder during combustion in the diesel generally
require heavier and more rugged engine components -- engine block, cylinder
head, crankshaft, brings, etc. The diesel fuel injection system is signi-
ficantly more expensive than the carburetor on the gasoline spark ignition
engine. Difficulties in starting the diesel when the engine is cold require
a heavier duty battery and starter. Furthermore, for a given engine displace-
ment, the maximum power obtainable from a diesel is less than from a spark-
ignition engine because objectionable exhaust smoke levels limit the mass of
fuel which can be burned in the diesel per unit mass of air to below normal
spark-ignition engine values. Thus, specific power (maximum power divided
by engine weight) for the diesel is lower, and initial engine cost for the
diesel is higher. This trade-off for the diesel -- higher efficiency achieved
at the expense of lower specific power and higher initial cost -- is an impor-
tant issue which will recur throughout this chapter.
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The emissions characteristics of the two engines are also different
(again due to the different combustion processes). The diesel's hydrocarbon
and CO emissions are lower than engine exhaust emissions from a typical
spark-ignition engine. N x emissions are about the same, but the diesel
cannot use a catalyst to achieve further N x reductions in the exhaust system.
Particulate and sulfur oxide emissions from the diesel are substantially
higher, but in automobiles these pollutants are not yet subject to regula-
tion. The degree of NOx emission control which the diesel-engine passenger
car can achieve, and the impact of diesel particulate emissions if diesels
significantly penetrate the market are important issues we will consider
further.
There are several distinct types of diesel engines. A major reason
for this is the effect of changes in cylinder size on the diesel combustion
process. As the size of the engine cylinder is decreased, the intake
port, cylinder head and piston geometries must be modified to maintain the
appropriate rate of mixing fuel and air necessary for good combustion and
thus engine performance. As a consequence, engine configurations change as
engine size (and application) change. Direct injection (DI) engines, where
the fuel is injected directly into the combustion chamber between the piston
and cylinder head, are used at the larger size and lower speed end of the
spectrum, where slower fuel-air mixing rates are acceptable. Indirect
injection (IDI), engines where the fuel is injected into a separate combus-
tion chamber which is connected to the main combustion chamber through a
nozzle, are used at the smaller size and higher speed end of the spectrum
where faster fuel-air mixing rates must be achieved. IDI engines are often
called prechamber or swirl chamber engines depending on the details of the
separate combustion chamber geometries. Also, for each type of engine, each
diesel engine manufacturing company has developed its own design practices,
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and a variety of engine geometries across the different engine manufacturers
results. There appears to be no unique optimum configuration for any
given application.
One potentially viable engine option for passanger car diesels, which
addresses the problem of low specific power, is turbocharging. The power
output of a diesel or spark-ignition engine of given displacement is limit-
ed by the maximum air flow through the engine. Given this maximum airflow,
the fuel flow is then fixed for the diesel by the fuel-air ratio at which
smoke becomes objectionable and for the gasoline engine by the available
oxygen in the air. A compressor can be used to increase the air density at
the engine intake; the airflow and consequently the fuel flow and engine
power, for a given displacement engine, are thereby increased. The compres-
sor can be driven by a turbine fitted to the engine exhaust. Thus engine
weight for a given vehicle performance may be reduced. However, engine
cost increases, and there is currently no consensus as to whether natural-
ly aspirated (nonturbocharged) or turbocharged diesel engines are the more
promising for passenger car applications.
In summary, the diesel engine choices for any given application are:
diesel engine type (DI or IDI), and turbocharged or naturally aspirated.
In addition, for each diesel engine type, manufacturers offer a range of
engines which differ substantially in the details of the design.
Presently available automotive (car and tuck) diesel engines can be
grouped roughly by diesel engine type, according to engine size, as follows:
1) Passenger car engines: naturally aspirated small high speed
engines with swirl chamber or prechamber configurations, with
maximum power in the 40 to 80 hp range at 3000 to 4000 rpm.
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2) Intermediate size engines: generally naturally-aspirated
and direct-injection medium-speed engines, with maximum
power in the 120 to 200 hp range at 2500 to 3000 rpm.
3) Large size engines: usually turbocharged direct-injection
low-speed engines, with maximum power above about 300 hp at
2800 rpm.
None of these engines are suitable to power U.S. passenger cars in the inter-
mediate and full size ranges -- the categories where the greatest potential
for national fuel conservation exists; see Table 6.1 which follows. Across
the entire spectrum of car sizes, diesel engines for U.S.-manufactured passen-
ger cars would be in the 80 to 200-plus hp range, depending on car size
(subcompact to large) and desired maximum acceleration characteristics. [8]
These would be indirect injection high speed engines, and perhaps would be
turbocharged. Suitable engines of this size range are not currently avail-
able in the U.S. As a consequence, there is considerable confusion as to the
likely performance and fuel economy characteristics of diesel engine vehicles
which might be developed for production. Also, thereis some disagreement
as to whether existing types of diesel engines are the optimum for this new
application.
6.2.2 Current Automotive Diesel Usage
U.S. fuel consumption by autos, trucks and buses, divided by vehicle
classes, puts current diesel engine usage and the potential for expansion of
diesel use in context. Table 6.1 shows the number of vehicles registered in
the U.S. in December 1973, broken down into vehicle weight categories. Fuel
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Table 6.1
FUEL USAGE BY VEHICLE TYPE [81]
Vehicle Type
Vehicles
registered
Dec. 31, '73
in millions
Distance
travelled
in CY 1973
billions of
miles
Percent
total
highway fuels
used in
each class
Diesel
as percent
of fuel
usage in 2
each class
Passenger cars
subcompact
compact
intermediate
full size
total
Trucks
I < 6000 lb.
II 6000-10,000
III 10,000-14,000
IV 14,000-16,000
V 16,000-19,500
VI 19,500-26,000
VII 26,000-33,000
VIII < 33,000
total
Buses
School
Commercial
28.5
17.3
18.3
37.7
203
152
203
458
101
8.3
7.0
16.3
38.8
1016
12.6
4.8
0.25
1.3
2.4
0.48
1.1
8.9
3.6
0.19
1.5
3.1
1.2
9.9
23
0.33
0.09
total
267
2.4
2.5
125
0
1
0
0
70.4
0
0
0
0
4
45
79
28.6
0.30
0.47
1288
30
0
75
100
On a volumentric basis. Note a gallon of gasoline is equivalent to 0.88
gallon diesel on an energy content basis.
2
Total fuel usage in millions of gallons (CY 1973); gasoline 100,636;
diesel 9,837.
8.9
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consumed -- gasoline and diesel -- is also shown. Passenger car fuel usage
(gasoline) is 70 percent of the total; truck fuel usage is 29 percent.
Diesel fuel is significant only in the heavy truck classes, and is 9 per-
cent of the total fuel consumed. The diesel has penetrated the automotive
market in applications where two key requirements are met. The first is
that vehicle operators are responsive to total life-cycle vehicle
cost calculations. The second is high mileage usage which places a pre-
mium on durability, and low maintenance and fuel costs. As a result of
increased petroleum prices, diesel engines are expected to increase their
share of the market at the heavy truck end, and in light truck, van and taxi-
cab categories. One European manufacturer expects to double diesel engine
production by 1980.
Another characteristic of the current diesel engine market important
to our discussion is its size and diversity. U.S. production of diesel
trucks is about 150,000 per year. [82] This includes many engine sizes from
several engine manufacturers. Thus, production volume for a given size and
manufacturer is one or more orders of magnitude smaller than is typical of
passenger car gasoline engines. The U.S. diesel engine industry has, in the
past, shown little interest in passenger car diesel engine applications. The
U.S. automobile industry has shown a similar lack of interest in this applica-
1tion, though two of the Big Three have considerable diesel engine experience
One of the European diesel vehicle manufacturers, Opel, is a GM subsidiary.
GM (through Opel and through Detroit Diesel), and Ford (in their European
division) have extensive experience with the diesel technology, ranking first
and second respectively, in world-widediesel engine production.
1Current automobile industry activities are discussed in the next section
of this chapter.
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While diesel engines of a size suitable for U.S. passenger cars
are not manufactured in this country, diesel light-duty vehicles are manu-
factured in Europe and Japan. Daimler-Benz (which produces the Mercedes-
Benz), and recently Peugeot, market diesel and gasoline ICE versions
of the same basic vehicles in the United States. The numbers sold here
are small (a few thousand per year). Nonetheless, these vehicles have
been extensively tested, and the performance and emissions characteristics
widely quoted, in attempts to evaluate the attractiveness of the diesel as
a passenger car engine. Passenger car diesel engine development in Europe
has a history going back several decades, and a long sequence of product
improvements have been made. As evidence of this continuing evolution of
improved light-duty engines, both Peugeot [83] and Daimler-Benz [84] re-
cently introduced new diesel engines in their passenger cars, with the
primary aim of improving vehicle acceleration.
Because of renewed interest over the past few years in the diesel
for passenger car applications, the operating characteristics of vehicles
currently available with diesel engines have been carefully measured and
documented. The Mercedes, Peugeot, Vauxhall, Opel and Nissan diesel cars
(naturally aspiratedindirect injection engines with either a swirl chamber
or prechamber) have been evaluated, and in many cases vehicle attributes
compared with those of the same vehicle with its conventional gasoline
ICE option. We have chosen to summarize the results of these studies in
Table 6.2 by listing, for the best diesel technology now available, the
ratios of diesel engine and gasoline engine attribute values, to make two
points.
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Table 6.2
PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS OF CURRENT DIESEL ENGINE
CARS RELATIVE TO GASOLINE ENGINE VERSION OF
SAME VEHICLE 1
Vehicle weight; diesel/gasoline
Engine displacement; diesel/gasoline
Engine max. power; diesel/gasoline
Vehicle max. speed; diesel/gasoline
0 - 60 mph acceleration time; diesel/gasoline
Vehicle fuel economy;
diesel/gasoline
2
Noise; diesel noise above gasoline
drive-by
idle
Emissions
HC diesel/HC gasoline
CO diesel/CO gasoline
NOx diesel/NO gasoline
1.0 - 1.07
1.04 - 1.3
0.56 - 0.9
0.8
1.4 - 1.6
1.19 - 1.34
2 dBA
8 dBA
3
- 0.1 - 13
0.1 - 1
0.5 - 1
1
These ratios are obtained from references [85]-[87] where Mercedes 240D and
300D, and Peugeot 504D were compared with their gasoline ICE equivalent
vehicles.
22 Fuel economy expressed on a miles per gasoline-equivalent gallon basis
(i.e. per unit fuel energy). Average of urban and highway EPA cycles.
3 Low value for diesel compared with non-catalyst gasoline vehicle. High value
compares diesel with gasoline vehicle with oxidation catalyst and optimum
emission controls
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The first point is that the gasoline and diesel versions are essen-
tially the same basic vehicle with different engines fitted under the
hood. The reason for this is to hold the costs of integrating the
diesel into the vehicle body to a minimum. Current diesel vehicle pro-
duction volumes are not large enough to justify major vehicle body
changes. Depending on the particular comparison made, these diesel engines
have displacements closely equal to the equivalent gasoline engine dis-
placements, and engine weights of order 100 lb. heavier. The dis-
placements are about the same so that the two engines share as many
1
common parts as possible. The diesel vehicle weight penalty, at about
the same engine displacement, is primarily in the engine, starter and
battery. At roughly equal engine displacements, the increase in diesel
engine weight can be accommodated in the existing vehicle body with
only minor body changes.
The second point follows from this. The maximum power of the diesel
engine option is considerably below that of the gasoline ICE option,
because present diesel engine technology has a significantly lower power-
to-displaced volume ratio (and power-to-weight ratio) than gasoline ICE
technology. Thus, given the requirement that engine displacements must
be roughly the same, the diesel engine version must inherently have
significantly poorer vehicleperformance characteristics than the gasoline
'The Mercedes 300D is the exception to this generalization. However,
it represents a further level of engineering development (undertaken to
improve diesel vehicle performance) beyond the equal displacement stage
described above.
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ICE version. If vehicle performance were to be the same, then a con-
siderably larger diesel displacement would be required, and because of
the resulting engine weight increase, much more substantial vehicle
body modifications would be necessary for the diesel version. This
places important constraints on the diesel engine introduction process
which we discuss further in Section 6.3.
The data in Table 6.2 supports this analysis. The table shows maxi-
mum engine power, and maximum vehicle speed significantly lower for the
diesel engine versions; 0-60 mph acceleration times are correspondingly
much longer. Furthermore, presumably these diesel engine vehicles are
designed for that part of the market which is especially concerned with
vehicle lifetime fuel costs. By using the same vehicle body as the gaso-
line engine version (which is manufactured in larger numbers) and by
using a more efficient basic engine at a lower power to vehicle weight
ratio and allowing a cheaper fuel to be used, the diesel engine version
has (in a rough sense) minimized the initial vehicle cost increase and
maximized the fuel cost savings. The degradation in vehicle performance
that results is apparently a price that purchasers of these vehicles
are willing to pay.
The emissions comparisons in Table 6.2 are not especially useful
for projecting future trends because the gasoline engine vehicles were
not equipped with catalytic converters nor with advanced emissions con-
trols. Nonetheless, the engine emissions of the diesel are roughly an
order of magnitude lower than emissions leaving the gasoline engine
exhaust port (i.e., prior to the catalytic converter for HC and CO), and
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between a factor of one to two lower for NOx. The emission control
potential of the two engines is not the same, however, as a result of
their different combustion characteristics. The emissions status of
the diesel as an alternative engine is discussed in Section 6.2.4.
6.2.3 Status of R & D Programs
Diesel engine R & D is being carried out by the diesel engine manu-
facturers, the automobile industry and various R & D organizations. The
interests of these three groups are quite different. The diesel engine
manufacturers have had to carry out the R & D necessary for their engines
to be able to meet (or be prepared to meet in the future) the applicable
emissions and noise standards for their product line (which are primarily
heavy duty engines). They also, of course, pursue activities in the
product improvement stage of development as they seek an improved competi-
tive position and expanding markets for their products.
The R & D activities of Ford and Chrysler on the diesel as a passenger
car engine have been exploratory in nature. The characteristics of
currently available diesel engines have been evaluated, existing diesel
engine vehicles have been tested, available diesel engines have been
installed in vehicles for evaluation, the emissions reduction potential
of the engine has been examined. These programs have apparently not
proceeded beyond these exploratory investigations because of the diesel's
current inability to meet the 0.4 g/mile NO standard, because of con-
x 
cern over possible future standards for currently unregulated emissions
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such as particulates, and because of uncertainties as to the market
for diesel automobiles which would have several different characteris-
tics from current U.S. gasoline engine vehicles.
In contrast, General Motors, in its Oldsmobile Division, has em-
barked on a passenger car diesel engine development program. The diesel
engine design is based on the V-8 350 CID gasoline engine with the goal
of using the same engine block and as many other components as possible.
The design is a prechamber engine with a 20:1 compression ratio. Ap-
parently, some firm tooling orders for the diesel have been released
and a supplier for the fuel injection equipment has been identified.
Sources predict that the Oldsmobile diesel could reach production in
mid-1977 or 1978. [88] Reports also say that the diesel will be sup-
plied to Chevrolet and GMC for use in light pickup trucks. However, GM
officials have repeatedly stated that the corporation would not put the
diesel into production until the government relaxed future NO emission
x
standards. It is believed that Chevrolet is also developing a smaller
diesel than Oldsmobile's, for one of its car lines.
Volkswagen has an active diesel engine development program. It is
apparently very close to a production decision. A version of the engine
has been demonstrated in VW Rabbit vehicles in the U.S. to EPA, DOT and
ERDA. VW has utilized its standard 1,475 cc engine with a diesel upper
end. The design is an indirect injection engine with a 23.5:1 com-
pression ratio giving 48 brake hp at 5000 rpm. The impact of the lower
diesel engine power has been reduced by use of a 4.22 ratio final drive.
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Apparently the high low-speed torque characteristics of the diesel give
good performance at low vehicle speeds in high gear. .[88] VW also be-
.lieves the diesel has a promising future in the light-duty truck area.
In discussions with VW engineers, we were given the impression that
the major question is "how many" diesel engines they will provide,
and not "whether" diesel introduction will occur. [89]
A recurring theme in industry statements concerning these automotive
diesel R & D efforts are the inhibiting effects of the 0.4 g/mile NO
x
standard, and potential particulate emissions problems for the diesel.
The U.S. government has funded a number of programs to evaluate
automobile diesels. One of these efforts is a development program;
ERDA has initiated a diesel engine program, currently at the $1 million/
year level, with the ultimate goal of demonstrating an advanced six
cylinder turbocharged 130 hp diesel engine concept in an automobile, which
meets the 0.4 g/mile NOx standard. The technology advances which will
be sought include lighter engine weight, variable compression ratio en-
gine design, cheaper fuel injection system and significantly lower NO
x
emissions than has been achieved to date. The first stage of the program
consists of extensive testing on an Opel engine, a single cylinder engine
test program, and a preliminary design study. This program has the inten-
tion of developing diesel engine technology substantially beyond today's
levels, and then demonstrating this potential in a passenger car.
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Outside of these development activities, a number of information
gathering and assessment studies have been completed, mainly supported
by government funds. There has been a high level of interest in, and
even advocacy for, the diesel within government circles, because of the
good fuel economy currently available diesel vehicles exhibit and the
inherently low CO and hydrocarbon emissions.
EPA has funded a number of studies to quantify the emissions char-
acteristics of present diesel engine passenger cars, as well as an over-
all light-duty diesel technology assessment. DOT has sponsored several
studies in which the fuel conservation aspects of the diesel in passenger
cars have been evaluated. We will review some of the results of these
studies in the next section.
6.2.4 Attributes of the Automotive Diesel
In this section we will review the attributes of current automobile
diesel engine technology, and assess the potential for substantial im-
provements in these attribute values. At the outset it is worth empha-
sizing the different status of the diesel and the Stirling engine
technologies. In Chapter 5, the Stirling engine, at the first generation
level, was characterized as at the end of the Initial Development Stage.
In contrast, the diesel engine is a highly developed technology, well
into the Mature Production Stage, for a large number of applications
including automobiles. There is extensive experience in Europe and Japan
with the manufacture, sale, and operation of light duty diesel engines
in passenger cars, taxis and light trucks. There is a long history of
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steady product improvements to increase the specific power of the diesel
relative to the ICE, improve the fuel economy of the engine and reduce
its initial cost. The diesel engine technology, for automobiles, is
already at a mature stage in its development.
What creates a problem in evaluating the diesel engine for the
U.S. auto market is not that diesel engine experience is unavailable,
but that vehicle performance data are not available for engine-vehicle
combinations roughly equivalent to U.S. intermediate and full-size cars.
Thus, one is led to the conclusion that if a major U.S. auto manufacturer
makes the decisions to first develop and then introduce an automotive
diesel for the U.S. market, the engine technology is likely to be primarily
a scaled-up version of the light-duty engine technology now available in
Europe, incorporating perhaps some modest improvements resulting from the
greater R & D resources the Big Three have in comparison to existing diesel
engine manufacturers. We will now review the attributes of that technology,
relative to the ICE, and return to the question of more "advanced" diesel
engine technology at the end of this section.
A number of recent studies have reviewed the characteristics of a
light-duty diesel engine as it might be used in a passenger car in the
near-term future (say prior to 1980). [7,8,42,53]. These assess-
ments all see the indirect injection engine, with either a prechamber
or a swirl chamber, as the best engine type for this application.
Table 6.3, based mainly on the Ricardo tudy [42] summarizes the -
attributes expected of a first generation diesel passenger car built for
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Table 6.3
ATTRIBUTES OF AVAILABLE-TECHNOLOGY DIESEL
Attribute Importance
Initial Cost
Emissions
Efficiency
Critical for consumer ac-
ceptance.
Legal requirements for
HC/CO/NOx, though future
levels unclear.
Key consumer and legal
requirement, and of social
value.
Somewhere between 1.5 and
2 times cost of equivalent-
hp gasoline ICE.
Meets strictest standards
proposed for HC/CO. NOx
limit 1-2 g/mile depend-
ing on vehicle and engine
size. Possible future
problems with particulate,
odor and perhaps other
currently unregulated emis-
sions.
Most efficient currently
available powerplant for
light-duty use. However,
either vehicle fuel economy
or acceleration must be
compromised due to low
specific power.
Key factor in cost, vehicle
design and vehicle perfor-
mance.
Greater weight would
require body modifications.
Packagability
(shape and
volume)
Torque-speed
curve shape
Key in determining whether
major vehicle modifications
needed.
Determines engine max.
power for given vehicle
performance, and trans-
mission requirements.
Greater in volume and
height than equivalent power
gasoline engine. Turbo-
charging reduces volume but
increases complexity.
Diesel and gasoline ICE
have similar torque charac-
teristics. If diesel runs
at lower speeds, heavier
transmission may be re-
quired.
Status
Weight
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Table 6.3 (Cont'd)
Consumer and socially ap-
preciated attribute, will
become legal requirement.
Drive-by noise levels
for diesel vehicle higher
than gasoline ICE vehi-
cle. Idle noise major
problem area requiring
attention in vehicle
design.
Vibration
(smoothness)
Power res-
ponse and
driveability
Maintenance
requirements
Response to
abuse and
neglect
Starting
characteris-
tics
Consumer requirement; im-
pacts on vehicle design.
Key consumer requirement.
Key consumer requirement.
Key consumer requirement.
May be important consumer
requirement.
Higher than gasoline ICE,
especially at idle. Will
require special engine
mountings.
Satisfactory. Cold engine
driveability as good as
hot engine driveability and
better than gasoline ICE.
Minor maintenance require-
ments similar to gasoline
ICE. Major overhaul required
less frequently. Likely cost
savings.
Probably satisfactory.
Inferior to gasoline ICE;
starting aid required. 15-30
second delay.
Consumer and possibly legal
requirement.
Safer than ICE since fuel
is less volatile than
gasoline.
Design
versatility
Fuel
versatility
Key in reducing long run pro-
duction cost.
May allow use of less
expensive fuels in short
term.
Equivalent to gasoline
engine.
Diesel fuel presently
cheaper than gasoline; but
diesel fuel availability
and cost are constrained
by cetane number require-
ment.
Noise
Safety
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the U.S. market, and identifies the critical technological problem areas.
The major advantage relative to the ICE is the higher engine efficiency,
which offers the promise of significant fuel economy improvements.
Secondary advantages are fel at ower prices (in the short term, at least)
and potentially lower maintenance costs. The major disadvantages are
the magnitude of the engine's emissions of both regulated and currently
unregulated pollutants, the engine weight and size, and noise character-
istics,as they impact on vehicle integration, and manufacturing cost.
Less critical areas, which nonetheless create uncertainty about marketing
the diesel as a passenger car engine on a large-scaleare the vehicle
owners' response to cold starting problems, noise, vibration, odor and
fuel availability. We will not discuss these problem areas in more detail.
Table 6.4 summarizes the emissions characteristics of current
diesel engine automobiles; the comments in the table relate the diesel's
emissions to either currently promulgated standards or to typical emis-
sion levels of gasoline engine cars using various types of fuel, either
with or without oxidation catalytic converters. Satisfactory control of
HC and CO emissions is an inherent part of the diesel combustion process,
but the inability of the diesel to meet the statutory 0.4 g/mile NOx
x
standard is generally acknowledged. The NO emissions of a diesel
x
passenger car depend on vehicle weight and engine power (as do HC and
CO emissions too, though less critically); though estimates of the low
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Table 6.4
EMISSIONS CHARACTERISTICS OF CURRENT DIESEL CARS 1
Regulated Pollutants
Pollutant
HC
CO
NOX
Level, g/mile
2
0.22 - 3.3
1-4
1 - 1.6
1 - 1.6
Commments
should meet strictest statutory standard (0.41)
should meet strictest statutory standard (3.4)
depends on vehicle size; approx 1.5 g/mile
limit for full size car; will not meet
statutory standard (0.4)
Currently Unregulated Pollutants
Particulates
Aldehydes
S02
Sulfates
NO2:NO ratio
Odor
0.3
0.5
0.3 - 0.6
0.1 - 0.2
0.1 - 0.3
2 times leaded gasoline engine car emissions;
10 times unleaded car
comparable to non-catalyst car; higher than
catalyst car
catalyst car 0.1 g/mile
comparable to or somewhat greater than catalyst
car
depends on load; much higher than gasoline car
potential marketing and public acceptance
problem
Sources [86,87,90]
Higher levels can be easily controlled.
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NO emissions potential of the diesel are speculative, values in the
x
1 - 2 g/mile range are often quoted. Additional potential emissions
1
problems for the diesel are particulates , sulfate and NO 2 emissions,
as well as odor. Particulates are primarily soot, and are of concern
due to their submicron size and absorptive surface capacity for other
reactive molecules. Sulfur oxides and sulfate emissions are comparable
to catalyst-equipped-ICE vehicle emissions because the sulfur content of
diesel fuel ( 0.5 percent) is an order-of-magnitude higher than in gaso-
line. The concentration of N2 (much more toxic than NO) in the diesel
exhaust is much higher than in ICE exhausts. Odor is regarded by many
in the diesel engine development business as the hardest emissions
problem to sort out and resolve. [89] These currently unregulated pollu-
tants, if emission levels for the diesel are found to be significantly
higher than for gasoline engine vehicles, might be subject to regulation
in the future; for example, sulfate emission levels are comparable to or
greater than emissions from catalyst equippped gasoline ICE vehicles,
and future regulation in this area is anticipated before 1980 model year.
It is important to note that exhaust treatment devices such as thermal
reactors and oxidation catalysts for HC and CO control, or reduction
1A particulate emissionstandard of 0.1 g/mile was suggested by me Dept.
of H.E.W. in February 1970, in an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
along with suggested standardsfor HC, CO and NOx emissions, all for Model
Year 1975. [91] It was aimed at controlling particulate emissions (primarily
lead) from ICE-powered vehicles using leaded gasoline. All these standards
were superseded by the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 and their implementation,
which has included standards on lead content in gasoline. No particulate
standard was ever promulgated. This 0.1 g/mile suggested standard is some-
times erroneously cited as a possible goal for diesel particulate emissions
(e.g., [69 , p. 146]) but in fact it is totally irrelevant since it related
to both a different health hazard and a different technology.
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catalysts for NO control, which have been and are being developed for
x
gasoline engines are not useful for diesels. Oxidation in catalysts or
manifold reactors is limited in effectiveness by the low exhaust gas
temperatures at part load (an inevitable result of the improved effici-
ency of the diesel). NOx reduction catalysts are not applicable to the
x
diesel because the exhaust always contains excess oxygen. Particulate,
smoke and NO controls have been developed by the heavy duty engine
x
manufacturers, as well as the European diesel passenger car manufacturers.
The concensus is that the indirect injection light-duty diesel engine has
been roughly optimized with respect to current U.S. requirements for HC,
NO and smoke emissions, and noise, and that significant improvements in
x
one of these areas causes deterioration in one or more of the others.
[89]-
Engine weight is another important problem area relative to the ICE.
In a comparison made on an equal displacement basis (equal cylinder
volume swept out by the pistons), the diesel including necessary auxi-
liaries is about 15 percent heavier than the gasoline engine. The increase
is due in part to heavier engine construction, in part to the heavier
engine auxiliaries -- starter motor, generator, battery -- required because
these auxiliaries' duty cycle is more arduous, and in part to the fuel
injection system. In addition, because exhaust smoke limits the amount
of fuel which can be fully utilized with the air inducted into the engine,
the diesel's power per unit displacement is less than of the gasoline
engine, and for equivalent performance a larger displacement (and thus
substantially heavier) engine is required. Development efforts to reduce
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the weight of an existing light duty diesel engines to make them more
attractive for automobile applications have shown that some weight re-
ductions are realizeable (e.g., [93]). But given the fact that Daimler-
Benz and Peugeot recently introduced new diesel engines in their cars in
large part to improve the vehicles' acceleration capabilities, and that
improved power to weight ratios contribute significantly towards this
goal, it is unlikely that substantial further improvements are to be
expected. On an equivalent-maximum-engine-power basis, one must expect
that a diesel engine (plus its auxiliaries) sized for a 3500 lb. inter-
mediate size car, with typical U.S. passenger car performance characteris-
tics, would be between 150 and 300 lb. heavier than an equivalent horse-
power gasoline ICE. [42]
It is unclear whether the use of a turbocharged diesel engine signifi-
cantly affects this weight penalty. Two alternative engine evaluations
assessed the turbocharged engine as superior to the naturally aspirated
engine in the passenger car application. [7,8] However, Ricardo (42]
completed a preliminary design of both types of an indirect injection
engine (a V-8 naturally aspirated 150 hp engine and a turbocharged in-line
6 150 hp engine) and found little difference in engine weight. The ques-
tion remains unresolved, but probably does not significantly affect the
relative attractiveness of the diesel.
The greater engine weight for equivalent power to the gasoline
engine, and the noise and vibration characteristics of the diesel, all
impact onthe engine-vehicle integration process. At issue is whether
substantial vehicle redesign would be required if the diesel engine were
manufactured and marketed in U.S. passenger cars. Choices made here
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strongly influence the costs and risks associated with the introduction
process. The less important of these factors are the noise and vibration
tion characteristics of the diesel engine. It has been the experience of
manufacturers of current production diesel passenger cars that several
years of engineering effort at the product improvement stage are required
to reduce noise and vibrational levels inside the vehicle to close to
gasoline engine vehicle standards. Thus, one would expect that,at intro-
duction,diesel cars would be noisier and suffer more from vibration than
the vehicles they might replace. The market implications of this are
unclear.
The most important trade-off in the engine-vehicle integration process
is between vehicle acceleration capabilities, and the fuel economy and
the initial cost of the diesel vehicle,relative to an equivalent gasoline
ICE vehicle. For roughly equal engine displacement, as is the situ-
ation with currently available diesel cars, vehicle acceleration is sub-
stantially inferior. As the diesel vehicles' acceleration is improved,
both the engine weight and the vehicle body weight increase; fuel economy
worsens due to both the increase in vehicle weight and due to increasing
ratio of engine maximum power to average power required for normal driving.
Vehicle initial cost increases. We will now establish the rough magnitude
of the trade-off between diesel vehicle fuel economy and acceleration,
relative to the baseline ICE vehicle.
Our goal is to calculate the ratio of the diesel vehicle fuel economy,
tothe fuel economy of an equivalent gasoline ICE vehicle (with both fuel
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economies expressed in miles per gasoline-equivalent gallon (i.e., miles
per unit energy content in the fuel). Our equivalent vehicle definition is
that internal compartment size, tank mileage, andsthe choice of key
power-consuming accessories have been held constant in the comparison.
But, in contrast to the Stirling engine assessment where vehicle accelera-
tion was held constant, we will here allow the displacement of the diesel
engine to increase from being roughly equivalent to the ICE1 (where the
diesel's acceleration is significantly inferior) to the point where the
2
diesel and ICE vehicles have equal acceleration . We would like to make
this comparison at an appropriate future date when reasonable numbers of
diesels might be entering the market. Volkswagen and General Motors con-
sider model year 1978 and 1979, respectively, as possible introduction
dates for the diesel engines they are developing. We will use model year
1980 as a suitable evaluation date.
It must be admitted that the data available to quantify this trade-
off are limited. We will use the JPL [8] evaluation of a "mature" diesel
to establish the equal acceleration end of the curve. The JPL diesel
technology -- a turbocharged indirect injection modifed swirl chamber
engine -- corresponds closely enough to what could be mass produced on
about this time scale. The JPL study provides values for fuel economy of
a range of diesel cars -- from subcompact to full size -- which have the
same 0-60 mph acceleration times as their gasoline-ICE equivalent-size
lIn today's diesels compared with their gasoline engine equivalents,
engine displacements are roughly equal and engine weights are slightly
higher.
2 _
This latter point corresponds to the "Otto-Engine Equivalent"
vehicle in the JPL comparison. (8]
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vehicle (which have performance equal to today's average values). We
have normalized these diesel fuel economy values (average EPA cycle
values expressed in miles per gasoline equivalent gallon to correct for
the higher heating value of diesel fuel) with the average 1975 model year
equivalent size gasoline engine vehicle fuel economy. The data point on
the left of Figure 6.1 includes all these car sizes; apparently the scaling
we are attempting is almost independent of car size. Equivalent assess-
ments are not available to evaluate the lower acceleration end of the
curve. We have used data from diesel passenger cars which have new or
upgraded engine designs -- the Mercedes-Benz 240D, 300D; Peugeot S40D;
and the VW Rabbit diesel prototype. Our rationale is that these vehicles
represent the best diesel engine technology available today and it is our
assessment that significant improvements for 1980 production are unlikely.
We have normalized each of the average measured EPA cycle fuel economies
of these vehicles (again miles per gasoline equivalent gallon) by the
average fuel economy of an equal weight 1975 model year gasoline engine
vehicle. We have normalized the actual diesel vehicle 0-60 mph acceleration
times by the average 0-60 mph acceleration times of 1975 equal weight
gasoline vehicles, as determined by JPL, to provide a relative perfor-
mance measure. The points are shown in Figure 6.1; a straight line of
slope -0.7 gives the trend. It can be argued that by 1980 these vehicles
may have improved engine efficiency and/or acceleration. Since these are
all new or updated engines, we believe these improvements would be modest1 ,
and they would increase the slope of the trade-off line.
1The JPL mature diesel technology is only marginally better than the
present diesel technology.[8]
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However, as discussed in Chapter 4, the ICE is a moving baseline.
There, in Figure 4.1,we presented estimates of the fuel economy of ICE
vehicles relative to a 1975 baseline at various emission levels. If we
exclude the estimates for the 0.4 g/mile NO standard, because the diesel
x
would not be certifiable at this NO level, the range in 1980 ICE fuel
X
economy is from -7 to +18 percent change from 1975. The band in Figure 6.1
shows the impact of this uncertainty in ICE baseline on relative diesel
vehicle fuel economy gain.
Two important conclusions can be drawn from Figure 6.1. First, that
the choice of relative acceleration for the diesel significantly affects
its relative fuel economy (going from roughly equal engine displacement
to equal vehicle performance halves the relative fuel economy advantage).
Second, the uncertainties in the ICE baseline fuel economy, which result
from uncertainties in applicable emissions standards and in the technologi-
cal gains which can be realized with the ICE, are of the same order as
the fuel economy gains the diesel may achieve.
We must now address the question of whether comparable uncertainties
exist in projecting the performance and efficiency of the diesel engine
technology. Our assessment is that comparable uncertainties do not
exist, for the following reasons.
The largest part of the ICE uncertainty, as it relates to the diesel,
comes from uncertainty as to the applicable emission standards for HC
1(1.5 to 0.41 g/mile) and NO (3.1 to about 2 g/milel). Since the diesel
x
meets the 0.41 and 2 g/mile HC and NOx standards without any fuel economy
penalty this uncertainty is not present. The second part of the ICE
1We have assumed the 0.4 g/mile NOx standard will not be implemented
on this time scale.
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uncertainty has to do with the magnitude of fuel economy gains obtainable
from certain engine design and operating changes. These changes primarily
relate to use of leaner mixtures, increased compression ratio, and improved
control of engine operating conditions to reduce the impact of emissions
and fuel octane constraints on engine efficiency (see Table 4.2). None
of these changes are relevant to.the diesel technology.
Thus, it is our conclusion that the diesel technology for the 1980
time frame is well defined and "mature" inthe sense that the potential
for significant improvements in attributes is not available. This does
not mean the diesel is unattractive as an alternative engine. But it
does mean that, even though diesel engines of the size and design required
for the U.S. passenger car market are not readily available for testing,
the characteristics -- fuel economy, acceleration, engine size and weight --
of engines and vehicles of appropriate size can be evaluated with relative
ease.
The final part of this trade-off is diesel engine cost relative to
the cost of an equivalent ICE. A number of factors contribute to the
higher initial cost of the diesel engine. The fuel injection equipment
is more costly than the ignition system and carburetor it replaces. The
increased weight, more complex geometry of the engineand greater use of
more expensive materials are also important factors. Due to the higher
compression ratio, closer manufacturing tolerances on some parts are
required. Some of the accessories must be heavier duty. A first cost
for the diesel of 1.5 to 2 times an equal maximum power gasoline ICE
is a rough estimate of the diesel's initial cost disadvantage. [42]
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This equal power point is between the two extremes encompassed in Figure
6.1. At equal engine displacement, the diesel maximum power is less. At
equal vehicle acceleration, the diesel power is greater because of its
greater engine and vehicle weight. Thus, the initial cost penalty of the
diesel relative to the ICE varies with relative acceleration. We will
address the magnitude of these initial cost penalties more fully in the
next section.
So far we have described the diesel engine technology which would
be available for production in the U.S. by about 1980. We must also
address the question of whether significant improvements in diesel engine
attributes are possible in a longer time frame through major advances in
the technology. One potential development is the use of ceramics for
parts of the cylinder head, cylinder liner, piston (or piston crown).
The goals in substituting ceramics for metal in these components are to
reduce engine weight and heat losses. While success in developing suitable
load-bearing ceramics would probably yield gains in these areas, almost
equal gains would be realized by the use of the same materials in the base-
line ICE so the relative position of the diesel would be essentially un-
changed. [8]
Two other advanced diesel concepts are currently being examined: the
variable compression ratio diesel and the ignition-assisted diesel.
Direct-injection variable-compression-ratio diesels have been developed
in larger than automobile sizes by the U.S. Army. High compression ratios
are used at light load for maximum economy; progressively lower ratios
are used as load increases to limit the maximum cylinder pressure. The
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primary gain is claimed to be a reduction in engine weight; the princi-
pal penalty is in engine complexity; and the cost implications are
unclear.
The second concept, a low compression ratio ignition assisted diesel
is potentially attractive because the high compression ratio of current
high speed diesels is used primarily for acceptable cold starting, and
the prevention of high speed light load misfire and blue smoke after a
cold start. A reduction in compression ratio does not affect efficiency,
and reduced peak cylinder pressures could give reductions in engine weight
and cost. One engine concept which would fall into this class is already
under development by the U.S. Army -- the Texaco Controlled Combustion
System fuel injected stratified charge engine. The performance characteris-
tics of the diesel and an ignition assisted low compression ratio diesel
(or one of the fuel injected stratified charge engines) are closely comparable
on an equal performance vehicle basis. 8] However, the ignition
assist aspect does release the diesel from its fuel cetane rating constraint
(a requirement for acceptable fuel ignition quality), a point which might
be of importance in the longer term and which we will examine below in
Section 6.3.3.
We conclude, therefore, that while some of these advances may have
modest implications on the initial cost penalty of the diesel, they appear
unlikely to significantly change the diesels'fuel economy relative to
the ICE.
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6.3 Factors Influencing the Diesel Introduction Process
Summarizing the discussion in the previous section, the diesel can
be characterized relative to the ICE as follows. The diesel engine has
higher initial cost. For roughly equivalent engine displacement, the
diesel vehicle has significantly lower performance; for equal vehicle
performance, the engine and vehicle weight are higher than for the ICE.
Between these extremes, there is a fuel economy advantage for the diesel,
but the fuel economy advantage decreases as the diesel vehicle's perfor-
mance increases to approach that of the ICE vehicle. There is also a
possible fuel price advantage if diesel fuel remains cheaper than gasoline.
The diesel emission levels in vehicles of similar weight are not signifi-
cantly lower than reasonable projections for ICE vehicles with oxidation
catalysts, but in the diesel low HC eissions are achieved without a fuel
economy penalty. Diesel engine NO emissions appear unlikely to be con-
x
trollable to levels approaching the 1978 0.4 g/mile standard. These are
questions about whether other emissions from the diesel might be subject
to regulation, if large scale production appeared likely, or occurred.
Maintenance costs for the diesel are likely to be significantly lower
than for equivalent emission controlled ICE's.
Furthermore, the diesel engine technology is highly developed --
existing light duty engines have evolved from previous engine designs as
a result of substantial efforts improve their performance characteristics
and marketability. Strong pressures to decrease the diesel's initial cost
penalty relative to the ICE, and improve its fuel economy to offset that
cost penalty, have always existed. The engine technology is "mature";
it is unlikely that significant improvements in its attributes, at least
in the short term, can be expected.
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In this section we attempt to evaluate the life-cycle costs of a
mature diesel vehicle relative to an ICE vehicle, and examine under what
conditions it would be most attractive. We then discuss the likely intro-
duction process for the diesel should one of the major manufacturers make
the decision to bring the engine into production. We will end this
section by summarizing the nature of the barriers which we believe are
currently holding back more extensive diesel development or introduction
within the automobile industry. These barriers are uncertainties in some
of the marketing aspects of diesel vehicles which will have different
characteristics to the ICE, and most importantly the current situation
with emission standards.
6.3.1 Total Operating Cost Estimates i
Life cycle cost calculations relative to the ICE for the diesel are
complicated by the substantial difference in specific power (maximum power
per unit engine weight) between the two engines. Because of this difference,
the choice of the relative acceleration capabilities of the two vehicles
has an important impact on these cost estimates. Also, for a given interior
compartment size the diesel vehicle will be heavier than its ICE equivalent
due to both the heavier engine and influence of the heavier engine on the
vehicle body -- a weight propagation effect exists. The fuels used by
the two types of engine are different, and currently have a cost differen-
tial which is significant. And maintenance costs are likely to be differ-
ent to an important degree. We will not attempt to construct a total
cost model similar to that developed for the Stirling engine in Chapter 5,
but we will now examine the impact of each ofthese points on total opera-
ting costs for the diesel relative to the ICE.
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A number of estimates of the initial cost of a diesel vehicle with
roughly the same acceleration as an equivalent size gasoline-ICE vehicle
have been made. [7,8,53] The variation in diesel vehicle initial cost
minus the ICE vehicle initial cost is so great -- from $260 [8] to
$1000 [7] for (about) a 4000 lb. vehicle -- that these estimates must be
used with caution. An important part of this difference in estimates
comes in the different engine weight estimates (the diesel engine weight
ranged from 140 lbs. to 240 lbs. heavier than the equivalent-performance
(ICE), and the magnitude of the weight propagation effect (vehicle weight
increases other than engine weight increases ranged from 50 to 300 lbs.).
We suspect that Rand [7] has overestimated the diesel vehicle body weight
penalty since existing diesel vehicles can tolerate engine weight increases
of the order of 100 lbs. without significant additional vehicle weight
penalties. Also, an additional vehicle weight penalty in the 50-100 lb.
range adds about $50-$150 to the initial vehicle cost, which is relatively
small compared with differences in engine costs. We will, therefore, neg-
lect the initial cost of increase due to vehicle body weight increase in
the rest of our discussion.
Ricardo's estimate of diesel engine cost is useful to us in
this context because it is expressed as a ratio to ICE cost. [42]
Also, since Richardo has extensive experience in both diesel and ICE de-
sign we expect their estimate to be reliable. They suggest that for equal
maximum engine power the diesel engine (engine, auxiliaries and battery) will
be 1.5 to 2 times the initial cost of the ICE baseline (about $900 for a 150
hp engine, see Chapter 4). But as we consider engines of different sizes
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which cover the relative vehicle acceleration range shown in Figure 6.1,
this initial engine cost ratio will decrease as diesel engine maximum
power falls below ICE engine power; and will increase as diesel maximum
engine power increases to provide equal vehicle performance.
If we assume that engine cost scales with engine weight, and use
JPL calculations of engine weight as a function of maximum horsepower [8].
we can scale this diesel engine initial cost factor across this relative
performance range. At equal engine displacement (and 60 percent relative
acceleration) the diesel engine initial cost would be between 1.1 and 1.5
times the ICE cost. At equal vehicle performance, the diesel engine
initial cost would be 1.6 to 2.1 times the ICE cost.
It is generally agreed that maintenance costs with the diesel vehicle
are likely to be lower than with the ICE, primarily because the fuel
injection system requires less attention than a conventional carburetor,
and there is no ignition system. Though consumption of oil is higher [42],
maintenance costs for 100,000 miles (supplied by Daimler-Benz) show a signi-
ficent diesel advantage -- $1,153 for the 240 diesel versus $2,590 for the
2.3Z gasoline vehicles. [871 But NAS estimates [56] indicate smaller
incremental lifetime maintenance costs for the diesel relative to the ICE
at equivalent emission levels, of order $100-$200. But even if lifetime
maintenance savings are only several hundred dollars, they still translate
to savings of order several tenths of a cent per mile and are therefore
significant in the overall cost evaluation (see Section 5.3.1.2).
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The next factor to consider is the diesel fuel price advantage.
Currently, diesel fuel has a cost advantage of 3-4 /gal. relative to
gasoline (and 0.88 gal. of diesel fuel are equivalent in energy content
to 1 gal. of gasoline). This translates to about 0.2 /mile operating
cost advantage for the diesel vehicle. This diesel fuel price advantage
reflects the lower production costs of the diesel fuel at current diesel
to gasoline production ratios. Presumably, this price advantage would
remain during the diesel engine introduction process, and as the diesel
engine portion of the market started to grow. But, if the diesel fuel to
gasoline ratio shifts substantially, then the fuel production cost advan-
tage of diesel decreases. Thus, if diesel vehicles ever came to share the
market roughly equally with gasoline engine vehicles, it is not clear the
fuel cost advantage would be fully or even partially retained. While this
is so far in the future and so speculative it may seem irrelevant, it does
influence calculations of the long-term potential of the diesel as an alter-
native engine. We examine further the implications of much greater use of
diesel fuel below.
From the results of the Stirling engine total operating cost ad-
vantage analysis presented in Figure 5.2, we can draw preliminary conclu-
sions regarding the attractiveness of the diesel in terms of total operating
costs. At the equal engine displacement end of the relative diesel accelera-
tion scale, the minimum estimated fuel economy gain relative to the average
ICE vehicle (of the same weight) is 30 percent. At equal fuel and mainten-
ance costs this improvement in efficiency would offset an intial engine
1
cost relative to the ICE of about 1.5. The expected range of engine initial
1The engine and vehicle weight of the diesel and the ICE would be
roughly the same, so Case 2 results shown in Figure 5.2 would be applicable.
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costs is 1.1 to 1.5. If a diesel fuel price advantage, and a diesel main-
tenance cost advantage are assumed in addition, a net benefit seems assured.
At the other end of the performance scale, equal vehicle acceleration, the
fuel economy advantage of the diesel may be as little as 4 percent (though
it may be as high as 30 percent); the initial engine cost ratio, diesel to
ICE, is between 1.6 and 2.1. Also, the costs of body modifications are
greatest at this end of the relative acceleration range. Thus, under
these conditions, the diesel is much less likely to show a total operating
cost advantage, and certainly such an advantage cannot now be assured. We,
therefore, conclude that relative attractiveness of the diesel, on a total
operating cost basis, is strongly dependent on the acceleration capability
of the diesel relative to average ICE equivalent vehicles. Thus, the at-
tractiveness of a diesel vehicle depends on a design choice which must
be based on an assessment of the market appeal of a vehicle with signifi-
cantly lower than normal performance.
Two factors could act to offset the above evaluation. One is the
effective discount rate vehicle purchasers apparently use, which is higher
than the 4 percent social discount rate used in generating Cases 1-4 in
Figure 5.2. The gains from the reduced fuel and maintenance costs of the
diesel might, in private calculations, only offset a much smaller initial
cost penalty (see Case 5 in Figure 5.2). The second factor of importance
is competition from a lower-than-average-powered ICE vehicle. ICE vehicles
are available now with a range of engine sizes. If a sizeable market
exists for a diesel vehicle with much reduced performance, than a com-
parable market may exist for ICE vehicles with much reduced performance.
The lower-performance ICE vehicle would have lower-than-average initial
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cost and higher-than-average fuel economy. It would not, however, realize
savings through reduced fuel price and maintenance costs. JPL quotes a
.
15-20 percent fuel consumption increase for a 40-60 percent horsepower
increase in ICE vehicles. Thus, a reduction to 0.6 of average accelera-
tion (the acceleration of the roughly equal displacement diesel which has
about 0.7 times the average ICE horsepower) would yield a 15-20 percent
improvement in fuel economy. This would have the minimum projected fuel
economy advantage of the diesel at this acceleration level.
We see that the relative total cost advantage of the diesel is
strongly dependent on design choices determined by estimates of market
implications of changes in vehicle attributes from the average values of
today's automobile.
6.3.2 Introduction Constraints
We will presume for the moment that the diesel engine has been
developed to the point where an automobile manufacturer sees it as an
attractive product option. The nature of the process by which major product
changes occur in the automobile industry is likely to constrain the type
of diesel vehicle which the industry would produce, especially at the time
of introduction. The analysis of the technology development and production
process in Chapter 2 indicates that the diesel would be offered as an
option to the conventional gasoline engine in an existing vehicle body,
to which only the minimum of modifications would be made. This approach
limits the funds risked in the diesel introduction process essentially to
the capital invested in the new diesel engine production line. Further,
1The engine development costs are considerably smaller than this.
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the capital investment in the diesel engine production line would also be
held to a minimum by using as many common or standard gasoline ICE parts,
and as much common production machinery as possible.
Apparently, this is the approach both Volkswagen and General Motors
have adopted in their diesel engine development programs. VW has utilized
its standard 1,475 cc gasoline ICE,and added a diesel cylinder head.
GM is expected to use the block and other engine components from its 350
CID gasoline engine. Thus, the diesel vehicle, at introduction, will have
an engine with roughly equal displacement to the gasoline ICE it replaces.
The engine will have a slightly higher weight, which can probably be
absorbed into the existing vehicle body in which it is being marketed with
relatively modest body changes. It will have significantly lower vehicle
acceleration than its ICE equivalent. However, the different diesel
speed-torque characteristics can be taken advantage of to minimize the
impact of lower engine power at more normal vehicle operating modes than
wide-open-throttle acceleration. It will not, nonetheless, provide per-
formance equal to the average ICE vehicle of equivalent size.
At this point, we want to stress that the manufacturers' incentives
as the Introduction Decision is approached are different from the incen-
tives of many in government and elsewhere who view the diesel engine as a
means of achieving substantial national fuel conservation. The manufacturer,
presumably, is solely concerned with whether the market is large enough for
him to recover his investment in engine development, introduction and mass
production costs. For the diesel, these costs and risks are only slightly
higher than those associated with a new gasoline ICE. (The situation
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for Stirling or gas turbine engines, for example, is very different indeed;
changes to these other alternative engines represent "revolutions" in
engine technology.) For the manufacturer, adequate return on his invest-
ment may be obtained with relatively modest market penetration.
If the introduction of the type of diesel vehicle described above
is successful, the engine-vehicle combination will most likely be further
optimized in the Mature Production Stage which follows introduction, as
described in Chapter 2. Here, through evolutionary changes in engine and
vehicle design, the attributes of the vehicle are modified to increase its
relative attractiveness in the market. Daimler-Benz has moved to larger
and more powerful diesel engines in its passenger cars in this stage of
development to reduce the performance gap between its diesel and gasoline
engine vehicles. While it seems likely that some movement in this direction
would occur if the diesel introduction process were perceived as successful,
it is not at all clear how far such efforts would go. Efforts to improve
the performance characteristics of the diesel engine vehicle to more
closely match its gasoline ICE equivalent would increase the initial cost
penalty of the diesel, and decrease its fuel economy advantage, and not
necessarily increase its market appeal. Thus, in our judgment the diesel
is inherently a lower powered alternative to the ICE, and should be evalu-
ated as such on a roughly equal engine displacement basis. One may speculate
as to longer term future product improvement trends, but on that time scale
one is doing little more than guessing.
6.3.3 Critical Uncertainties
In this section we will summarize the critical areas of uncertainty
which we believe are currently inhibiting diesel engine development efforts,
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and a resolution of any industry introduction decisions. First, however,
we will address the question: Are there significant uncertainties in the
performance, fuel economy and initial cost attributes of a diesel engine
vehicle, using engine technology available in the short term, and given
the constraints of the introduction process itself?
While it is not possible to find agreed-upon values for all these
attributes in the open literature, we have concluded that the characteris-
tics of the available technology are sufficiently well defined for this to
be primarily a problem in scaling. Diesel engines are not now readily
available with suitable displacement for testing in intermediate and full
size U.S. cars. However, we judge that the cost of the design and develop-
ment effort required to accurately characterize the attribute values of
a diesel engine for a particular vehicle are modest in comparison to that
required to characterize Stirling or gas turbine engine vehicles, and are
only slightly higher than the cost of an equivalent new ICE development
program. VW and GM are already well into such diesel design and develop-
ment programs.
We conclude, therefore, that the primary uncertainties regarding
diesel engine introduction are not in the vehicle's performance, fuel eco-
nomy or initial cost. Rather they are in the potential of the diesel
to meet the NOx emissions standards of the future, the questions associated
x
with currently unregulated emissions which might be subject to standards
in the future, in the assessment of the market potential of the "low
performance" diesel with its higher initial cost but lower:fuel consumption
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fuel price and maintenance costs, which in turn is made uncertain by
uncertainties in the attributes of the baseline ICE. We will now address
each of these areas of uncertainty in more detail.
Emissions
The current uncertainty over the 1978 NOx emission standard of 0.4
g/mile is a major factor in diesel engine introduction decisions. For
example, GM Chairman Murphy has indicated that the absence of congressional
action to resolve this issue and substantially delay or remove this require-
ment, would rule out the diesel as a mass production automobile engine for
the forseeable future. [94] The issue is complicated because many proposed
changes in NOx emissions standards are being suggested to, and considered by,
Congress, and it is not at all clear what degree of resolution of the issue
is required to make the introduction risk tolerable.
Roughly, three types of proposals have been suggested. One is the
rapid reduction in NOx standard to whatever level is selected as the
strictest standard written into the law. There is now serious discussion
of removing the 0.4 g/mile standard and replacing it with a higher one -- 1
g/mile is being proposed. There would undoubtedly have to be some delay in
either of these ultimate NOx standards because the gasoline ICE could not
meet these requirements without additional successful development. The
second type of proposal is a five-year moratorium, with NO x standards at
today's or slightly lower levels, with the longer-term future left vague
because it isn't worth attempting to resolve right now. The third type of
proposal attempts to lay out the standards for a fifteen-year time span -- EPA
has made one proposal which defers the 0.4 g/mile NOx standard to 1989. An
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additional complication is the apparent need for a stricter NO standard
x
in the Los Angeles basin than elsewhere, and the unknown degree to which
future emissions standards will reflect these regional needs.
How long an assured future schedule of NO -standards would be required
x
to make the uncertainty with respect to diesel NO emissions much less
x
important? (It is difficult to conceive of the issue being removed entirely.)
Generally, in engine mass production facilities of the scale used by the
automobile manufacturers, the investments in tooling and foundry equip-
ment are written off over about ten years. It may be unrealistic to expect
an assured emission standard climate over this time span. However, it
seems reasonable to conclude that a five-year moratorium, to say 1982, with
NO emissions above about 1.5 to 2 g/mile followed by several years with
x
NO emissions at least no lower than 1 g/mile would be required to suffici-
x
ently reduce the risk associated with initial introduction. Significant
market penetration, that is expansion of diesel engine production facilities
beyond the initial introduction phase, might require a longer term assured
emissions climate.
The problems associated with diesel emissions which are not now
subject to regulation are poorly documented, and the implications of exten-
sive diesel engine use have yet to be examined. Areas of concern, where
standards might be introduced if diesel introduction on a large-scale was
contemplated or occurred, are particulate emissions, odor, sulfate emissions,
and perhaps NO 2 and aldehyde emissions. The concern is that these
standards might be expensive or impossible to meet, and would therefore
significantly alter the market appeal and profitability of a diesel vehicle
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or even prevent its continued production. The magnitude of diesel engine
emissions of these pollutants are not well defined; the potential impact
of these emissions from large numbers of diesel on the urban air pollution
problem, has not been assessed. And, the control technologies in these
areas (in contrast to diesel engine NO emissions controls which have
x
been subject to extensive R & D) are not well developed.
Marketing Factors
We have described how the characteristics of the diesel make it
more attractive as a lower performance alternative to the ICE, and how the
fuel economy and initial engine cost compared to the ICE all vary with
the diesels' performance relative to average equivalent ICE vehicles. We
have also explained how the nature of the introduction process pushes the
diesel engine design to the low maximum-vehicle-acceleration end of the
performance spectrum, since the greater the commonality in engine compo-
nents and vehicle design with an equivalent existing ICE vehicle, the lower
the initial capital investment required. A major uncertainty then is the
market appeal of a diesel vehicle with these characteristics. The choice
of relative maximum-acceleration-level is critical since that determines
relative fuel economy and initial cost, and presumably market appeal.
The assessment of the attractiveness of the diesel compared with an
ICE-equivalent vehicle is greatly compounded by the uncertainties in the
ICE baseline. We have already indicated the magnitude of that uncertainty
in Figure 6.1. A further uncertainty for the manufacturer is the appro-
priate discount rate to use in evaluating how vehicle purchasers would trade
off increases in initial vehicle costs against reduced fuel consumption, most
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likely a reduced fuel price, and potential reduced maintenance costs over
the vehicle's lifetime.
While these uncertainties are formidable, there is almost nothing
the government R & D planner can do about them. They are inherently
questions which the automobile industry has to evaluate for itself, if
diesel engine development or introduction decisions are to be resolved.
Fuel Availability and Cost
Unlike the Stirling, gas turbine and some stratified charge engines,
which are multi-fuel engines, the diesel must use a fuel with a carefully
controlled ignition quality -- characterized by a cetane number. From
the marketing standpoint, two aspects of diesel fuel supply are important,
particularly at the time of introduction -- cost and the question of wide-
spread availability. We have already discussed the cost issue and con-
cluded that in the short term, today's diesel fuel price advantage would
probably be maintained.
In the long term, if widespread use of diesel passenger cars occurs,
the continuation of the diesel fuel price advantage would depend on the
availability of suitable amounts of diesel fuel without extensive refinery
modifications. Currently, diesel fuel used in transportation is about one-
tenth the total automotive fuel production. It has been argued that in-
creasing the proportion of diesel fuel and decreasing that of gasoline
would decrease energy losses in the refinery. Studies have been done to
examine the implications of increasing the proportion of the diesel fuel
fraction of the transportation sector petroleum demand, while continuing
to supply the appropriate petroleum products to other sectors of the market
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in quantities proportional to today's useage. There is some disagreement
as to the maximum fraction of the transportation sector's fuel which can
be diesel, at the optimum refinery operating conditions. One study claims
that the 1972 fraction of diesel fuel used in transportation sector can
increase by 70 percent before the optimum yield is reached. [95] Another
study has indicated it is possible to achieve much greater increases in
diesel fuel, as a proportional of total automotive fuel, with maximum
savings in process energy at the refinery, relative to today's practice, of
2 percent occurring at about a diesel fuel to gasoline ratio for transpor-
tation of 1:1. For syncrudes, the optimum mix for minimum refinery
energy losses is expected to be about 1:2, diesel fuel : gasoline. [96]
There do not, therefore, appear to be major constraints of expanding the
diesel fuel demand and maintaining the relative price advantage, though
there appears to be some disagreement as to what the optimum proportions of
diesel and gasoline would ultimately be.
The availability issue concerns the distribution of outlets for
diesel fuel which now exist, and the impact that the more limited availa-
bility of diesel fuel might have on the initial market appeal of a diesel
engine car. Especially in urban and suburban areas, diesel fuel outlets
are much more limited in number than gasoline stations. This is obviously
not an overwhelming impediment to diesel car sales, Mercedes and Peugeot
diesel vehicles are saleable in limited numbers. But these vehicle buyers
may be a very special part of the market -- they are buying a high priced,
low performance, high efficiency vehicle. Of course, if diesels are intro-
duced in significant numbers, the number of diesel outlets will increase.
But at time of introduction, this may be a discouraging factor; and the
diesel engine car cannot use gasoline in the introduction period as could
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stratified charge, gas turbine and Stirling cars.
6.4 Government Involvement in Diesel R & D
In Section 3.1, we identified four objectives which Federal
R & D programs might address: (1) advancing the state-of-the-art, (ii) sup-
porting procurement; (iii) developing data for policy regulation and public
information, (iv) providing "leverage" on private efforts. In this section,
we will examine whether any of these types of Federally supported R & D
activity are appropriate for the diesel, and if they are, what specific
problems should be addressed. By appropriate, we mean that suitable govern-
ment funded programs would contribute significantly to removing the un-
certainty now surrounding passenger car diesel engine final development
and introduction decisions.
Two of the above four objectives can be eliminated immediately. The
government should obviously support diesel engine R & D related to special
government procurement needs. The U.S. Army is already supporting diesel
engine development for a number of its specialized vehicle applications
(in the heavy-duty diesel field). Furthermore, given that light-duty diesels
are already in mass production in Europe, and that one domestic automobile
manufacturer, GM, and one foreign manufacturer, VW, already have extensive
diesel engine development programs, it is hard to see any government program
having significant additional leverage. We will now address the two remaining
objectives for Federal R & D.
6.4.1 Advancing Diesel Engine Technology
Suppose the government mounted a substantial program with the goal of
developing and demonstrating an automobile diesel engine of suitable size
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for intermediate and larger size U.S. cars. Would the attributes of diesel
as an alternative engine be likely to improve significantly? Would the
automobile industry's information base with which to evaluate either the
Final Development or Introduction Decisions be enhanced? We have concluded
that the answer to both these questions is no, for the reasons we will now
summarize.
We have explained that diesel engine technology available for intro-
duction within the next five years is already highly developed; it can be
characterized as a "mature" technology. It has gone through many product
improvement phases -- for example, Daimler Benz had progressed through thir-
teen different model designations and a total production of more than 1.37
million diesel vehicles prior to the introduction of its new five cylinder
300D engine. Because of the diesel's lower specific power and higher initial
cost than the ICE, strong pressures to achieve improvements in these two
areas have always existed. Further, passenger car diesel engine development
efforts are continuing, both in the European and U.S. automobile industries
at a level far in excess of any program the U.S. government might fund. We
conclude, therefore, that a Federal program with the goal of improving the
attributes of automobile diesels for introduction within a five-year time
scale is not likely to have a significant impact.
A somewhat better case can be made for Federal support of activities
in the Initial Development Stage related to advanced diesel engine
concepts. Current R & D activities on ceramic materials for reciprocating
engines, on comprex-type superchargers, and low-compression ignition-assisted
engine concepts are modest. A careful evaluation of the impact of the more
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promising of these advanced concepts, on the diesel's attractiveness relative
to the ICE, should first be carried out. While these are highly speculative
areas, the costs of stimulating greater activity are not that substantial.
6.4.2 Public Policy and the Diesel's Emissions
We have described how current uncertainty as to whether diesel passenger
cars will be able to meet future light-duty vehicle emission standards is
inhibiting diesel engine development efforts, and especially the resolution of
the Introduction Decision. It is most important to add that while a part of
this uncertainty lies in precisely what the emissions characteristics of
diesel vehicles would be, the greater part lies in what the applicable future
emissions standards will be. We can divide the problem into two parts: the
applicable NO emission standard; and emission standards for current unregu-
x
lated emissions. We will argue that Federal research in these areas could
contribute substantially to removing much of this current uncertainty that
exists regarding diesel emissions. Indeed, the government has an obligation
to act in this area and ought, with a high degree of urgency, to generate the
necessary information to help resolve these policy issues.
The NO standard issue is paramount. It is almost unbelievable that,
in the five years that have elapsed since the 0.4 g/mile was written into
law in the 1970 Clean Air Amendments, the Federal government has not spon-
sored substantial programs with the goal of developing the necessary informa-
tion which either gives this standard -- 0.4 g/mile -- a respectable
scientific basis or supports an alternative. The original basis for this
number [97] has been shown to be inadequate. Several independent studies
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have carefully documented the need for a rational review (e.g., [75 ,
98]. The implications of substantial errors in this number (as in the
HC emission standard also) for the ICE are enormous. With automotive air
pollution damages at the uncontrolled vehicle level assessed as having a
total annual cost in the U.S. of $2-10 billion [75], inadequate control
could result in continuing damages on the order of $1 billion per year.
Excessive control could result in fuel economy losses for the ICE of order
10 percent or more (Figure 4.1), which could translate into $2-3 billion
per year additional fuel costs on a nationwide scale. For the diesel (if
it in fact proves to be an attractive alternative to the ICE), an un-
necessarily low NO emission standard could have the following impacts.
x
It may either force substantial degradation in vehicle fuel economy (the
diesel like the ICE suffers from a trade-off between efficiency and NO emis-
x
sions if the fuel injection timing is retarded from its optimum position to
achieve additional NO control); may limit diesel engine usage to small
x
vehicles (because diesel NO emissions increase with increasing engine size)
x
where the fuel savings per vehicle are less; or may prevent the introduction
of the diesel altogether in the passenger car market. Each of these results
would represent fuel conservation actions foregone, of sizeable impact (see
Table 6.1 and Figure 6.1).
The type of research programs required to make progress in this area
are substantial in scope and difficulty. The areas in need of much better
resolution are the following. The magnitude and the uncertainties in
aggregate vehicle emission characteristics, and in the relative contributions
from mobile and stationary sources are not adequately'characterized; the
influence of meteorology and atmospheric chemistry on ambient air quality
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are not at all well understood. The relative importance of HC reductions
and/or N x reductions needs extensive investigation. The regional nature
of the problem with the Los Angeles Basin as the worst case -- and a special
case -- must somehow be incorporated into policy-making in a more rational
way. Finally, the basis for the ambient oxidant and NO2 air quality stand-
ards are subject to question.
It has been argued that substantial progress in resolving these
uncertainties may not be achievable. Since the magnitude of efforts devoted
to these areas to date has been relatively modest, we doubt that to be the
case. Unquestionably, considerable residual uncertainty will remain but
the identification of where that uncertainty lies, an understanding of the
magnitude of that uncertainty, and above all an acknowledgment that uncer-
tainty exists would be a substantial improvement over the current situation
where a standard without any adequate scientific basis is regarded in
Congress and in parts of the government as if it had such a basis.
It seems astounding to have to say that the Federal government should
spend a few millions of dollars to help resolve uncertainties in NO standard
x
definition where errors (either way) may cost billions. But until programs
with this goal are completed, and the information generated in such programs
used to develop a more rationally based schedule of NOx emission standards,
uncertainty as to what future light-duty vehicle standards will be, will
continue to inhibit automotive engine development, and especially diesel
engine development and introduction.
The characterization of diesel passenger car emissions for all pollu-
tants which might be of concern, and the study of the potential impact diesel
use on a wide scale might have on urban air quality, because of its different
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emissions from the ICE, are also appropriate and important areas for govern-
ment funded research. The controversy associated with sulfate emissions
from catalyst-equipped ICE vehicles -- discovered after commitments to
large-scale production of catalysts had been made -- is a continuing remin-
der of a situation to be avoided by prudent planning of research activities.
A series of programs to quantify more precisely the levels of emissions
1from diesel vehicles of different sizes should be undertaken. These emis-
sions should include both regulated pollutants (HC, CO, NOX), and other
pollutants which may be of concern (particulates, S02, sulfate, NO2, alde-
hydes). Odor is a problem where definition and characterization are important.
Once vehicle emission levels are better defined, impact studies should
be carried out to determine if regulation would be necessary in the event
diesels were used on a wide scale, and the approximate reductions in emissions
required to hold the potential impact to tolerable levels should be assessed.
Should such studies show that substantial reductions might be re-
quired, then government funding to stimulate the development of suitable
emission control technology might be appropriate.
6.5 The Diesel Engine: Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter we have examined the status of diesel engine techno-
logy as a potential alternative to the ICE in U.S. manufactured passenger
cars. Both the technology which would be available by 1980, and more advanced
concepts were considered. The attractiveness of the diesel relative to the
Several sizes of vehicles are now available for testing, either by
the government or the automobile industry. These range from subcompact (the
VW Rabbit), through compact (Peugeot, Daimler-Benz), intermediate (Chrysler
has been testing a Valiant with a six cylinder Nissan diesel) to full size
(Oldsmobile V-8 350 CID diesel).
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ICE was determined through an approximate assessment of benefits expected
in total vehicle operating costs. The major areas of uncertainty which
currently inhibit diesel engine development and/or introduction were then
identified as market appeal and inability to meet future emission standards.
The degree to which Federal R & D programs could decrease the importance of
these uncertainties was examined.
The attributes of the diesel engine can be characterized relative
to those of the ICE as follows. The diesel engine has lower specific power
than the ICE, i.e., a lower power per unit displacement. The engine weight
for equal displacement is higher than the ICE due to heavier construction,
and heavier duty auxiliaries. Thus, if engine displacement is held roughly
equal to an ICE, the diesel vehicle is slightly heavier, and has signifi-
cantly poorer performance. For equal vehicle performance to an equivalent-
size ICE vehicle, the diesel engine displacement must be larger and the
diesel vehicle is substantially heavier. Across this performance spectrum,
there is fuel economy advantage for the diesel, but the advantage decreases
significantly as the diesel vehicle's performance approaches that of the
equivalent-size ICE vehicle. The diesel offers potential advantages in lower
fuel price and maintenance costs. The initial diesel engine cost is always
higher than an equivalent ICE; the increase being greatest at the equal
vehicle performance end of the spectrum described above.
This diesel engine technology which could be introduced within a
five-year time scale is well characterized and highly developed. It is the
product of many years of light-duty diesel engine development. Given the
choice of relative acceleration level for the diesel, it is our conclusion
that the diesel vehicle attributes can be estimated with reasonable certainty
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with relatively modest effort, and a suitable diesel engine could be
developed with a development program comparable in scale to that required
to bring a new ICE into production.
An approximate evaluation of benefits to be gained through reduced total
vehicle operating costs if dieselsare substituted for ICE's indicates that
gains of the order of several tenths of a cent per mile are realizable at
the roughly equal-engine-displacement end of the relative performance range.
At equal vehicle acceleration, gains are uncertain and are not likely to be
realized without substantial fuel price and maintenance cost savings. Thus,
the diesel engine is most attractive as a substantially lower power alterna-
tive to the ICE, i.e., at a substantially lower than average vehicle per-
formance level.
The nature of the industry's technology development and production
process also constrains the size of the diesel likely to be introduced as
an alternative to the ICE. To hold investment in the diesel vehicle pro-
duction line to a minimum at time of introduction, the diesel is likely to
be installed into an existing vehicle body with only modest body design
changes being made to accommodate the new engine. And it is likely to
share many common parts and production machinery with the ICE from which it
was developed. Thus, the roughly equivalent displacement diesel, with
its modest vehicle body impact, holds the production costs at a minimum also.
One major uncertainty regarding the attractiveness of the diesel to the
manufacturer is, therefore, the market appeal of a significantly lower than
average performance vehicle, with a higher initial cost, which over the
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vehicle's lifetime is likely to be offset by fuel and maintenance cost
savings. The key questions here are customer evaluation of this trade-
off and the potential size of the market for this type of vehicle.
The other major uncertainty is diesel engine emissions. Diesel vehicle
NO emissions increase as vehicle size increases. The most effective con-
x 
trol -- retarded injection -- brings with it a fuel economy penalty. Current
uncertainty as to the fate of the 0.4 g/mile 1978 light-duty vehicle NOx
x
standard and the value and scheduling of its presumed replacement now inhibit
passenger car diesel engine Development and Introduction Decisions. It is
generally acknowledged that the diesel is most unlikely to approach this
level of NO control. In addition to uncertainties in meeting NO standards,
x x
the diesels emissions of particulates, S 2, sulfates, aldehydes and NO2 are,
or may be, higher than ICE vehicle emissions, and may be subject to regula-
tion if widescale use of diesels appeared imminent or occurred. There is
real industry concern at the risk involved in investing in the production
of a new engine technology which may well not be able to meet future emission
standards.
The greatest areas of uncertainty we have identified are the market
appeal of the diesel with its different attributes to the ICE, and the diesel
vehicle's ability to meet future emission standards. The uncertainty as to
the attributes of the ICE with which the diesel would compete compounds the
difficulties in the diesel engine evaluation. In contrast, we judge the
values of the diesel engine attributes, once the design performance level
is selected, to be relatively certain, and not especially difficult or costly
to confirm in a development process similar in scope and scale to that
required to introduce a new ICE.
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Thus, we argue there is almost nothing t be gained from a Federally
funded diesel engine development program. GM and several European manu-
facturers are already involved in such programs at a level of development
and program scale well in excess of what any Federal program might achieve.
Current interest in the diesel is not constrained by difficulties in the
development of the technology,ad advanced diesel technology offers the
promise (to date) of only modest further improvements. But, we also argue
that the Federal government has a critical role to play in reducing the
uncertainties associated with the diesel's emissions. First, the light-
duty NO standard must be put on a sounder scientific base through substan-
x
tial Federally funded programs which better define the relationship between
vehicle NOx emissions and ambient air quality. The costs of such programsx
are modest (of order millions of dollars) in contrast to the social costs
of too much or too little control of vehicle NOx emissions on a national
scale (of order a billion dollars per year). It is astounding that five
years after this NO standard was promulgated that efforts in this direction
x
have not been initiated. Finally, the diesel's emissions of currently un-
regulated air pollutants must be characterized, and the potential impact on
urban air pollution of widespread diesel use assessed. A repeat of the
sulfate-catalyst controversy where additional air pollution hazards were
detected after large-scale commitments tothe production and use of catalysts
had been made must be avoided.
The residual uncertainties which remain -- the market appeal of the
diesel, and the values of future ICE attributes -- belong within the U.S.
automobile industry, since Federal R & D on the diesel can have no impact
on these areas.
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7. THE ELECTRIC VEHICLE
7.1 Introduction
Electric automobiles were a significant factor in the infant automotive
industry of 1900, and it is conceivable that they will be important again by
the year 2000. As with the alternative heat engines, the prospect is contin-
gent upon the cost of liquid fuels and on the success of R & D efforts, in
this case with the critical R & D focused on the batteries for energy storage
rather than on the motor.
However, in the case of the electric car, the analytical difficulties
described in Chapter 3 take an extreme form. Indeed, at this time and very
probably for at least a few years in the future, support for the electric car
option might best be thought of in terms of insurance against a hopefully
avoidable set of difficulties, rather than (as in the case of alternative
heat engines) as an investment with a well defined payoff as a function of
assumptions about fuel costs, fuel economy, and engine costs.
What makes this investment/insurance distinction significant is not that
the R & D program in support of electric cars is technically much more risky
than in the case of radical heat engine alternatives such as the Stirling
engine described in Chapter 5. That may be true, but certainly is not ob-
viously true. Rather, the problem is that even if the R & D effort is tech-
nically successful, in terms of the crucial criterion of Chapter 3 (life-cycle
cost), there may nevertheless be no significant market for electric cars.
For an electric car, with technology that can be reasonably anticipated with-
in this century, will not be simply a car with an electric motor rather than
a conventional engine under its hood. It will be a car which is different
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from a conventional car in ways which limit what the driver can use it for;
in particular, it will be limited in practical operating range.
Consequently, a fundamental point stressed in Chapter 3 does not apply
to the electric car. It is not true that even a slight improvement over the
economics of a gasoline engine could produce a large social benefit, given
the large number of vehicle miles driven each year. For a saving of a few
tenths of a /mile -- amounting to a few tens of dollars per year for the
typical driver -- is not likely to be very interesting if it must be obtained
at the "non-pecuniary" but very real cost of even occasional inconvenience
due to the range limitation of the vehicle. Even savings of the order of a
penny or two per mile may be insufficient to "sell" electric cars unless the
R & D efforts are so successful as to make the range limitation of the ve-
hicle a minor inconvenience to the driver.
On the other hand, there is an essential sense in which the electric ve-
hicle option is potentially more important to the nation than the alternative
heat engines. For in the event of severe constraints on the availability of
liquid fuels by the end of the century, the electric car, which uses no liquid
fuel at all, could have enormous social value.1 The range of electric cars
is likely to be significantly restricted by technology for at least the bal-
ance of this century. But this may come to seem rather unimportant should
it turn out that the range of conventional cars must be limited by shortages
of fuel. Given dwindling supplies of domestic petroleum, uncertainty about
lIf electric cars in large numbers were to be marketed within the next
few years, the statement that they use no liquid fuel would be misleading;
a significant fraction of the electricity they use would be provided by oil-
fired generating plants. But by the end of the century, this is unlikely to
be true, particularly in the event of severe liquid fuel constraints.
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overseas supplies, and quite possibly practical limitations on synthetic fuel
production, this is a prospect which -- while hopefully avoidable -- is hard-
ly to be prudently ignored. It is as insurance against this prospect that the
electric car option has peculiar importance.
The assessment of government support of the electric vehicle (EV) option
we want to reach in this portion of the study will depend upon:
1. The social value of EV's.
2. The acceptability of EV's to users.
3. The prospect that increased government R & D on EV's
will significantly speed up the evolution of EV technology.
By "social value" we mean what economists call the "external benefits" of EV
use: the benefits that accrue to society as a whole;1 "acceptability to
users", in contrast, turns on the value of an electric vehicle to an individ-
ual user-- particularly the value of the EV compared to the value of an
equal cost conventional car.
All three of the issues interact with each other. The social value of
EV's can be realized only if such vehicles actually take over a significant
portion of the automotive mileage, which in turn depends on the prospect
that significant numbers of users find the electric vehicle an acceptable
substitute for the conventional alternative. However, the reverse is also
true. If it were judged important to the country to encourage the use of
electric vehicles, then there would be a case for government policies (sub-
sidies, regulations, etc.) which might stimulate use of electric vehicles
even though (under free market conditions) EV's would be unattractive to users.
1Note that this contrasts with the definition of social benefits as used
in Chapter 5, which included both private benefits and external benefits.
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So the question of how good the EV has to be depends on how strongly govern-
ment policy intervenes in the market, which in turn depends on how highly a
shift to EV's is socially valued. Finally, judgements about whether the pay-
offs from Federal support for R & D justify the costs depends on both issue
(1) (even if the probability of success is low, if the value of success is
very high, one may wish to gamble), and on issue (2) (the probability of
success will depend on how much progress over the existing state-of-the-art
is required to make a significant improvement in the EV's acceptability to
consumers). In the final analysis, all three questions have to be considered
simultaneously. But is convenient to treat the questions separately until
the final stage of the analysis.
We will start (Section 7.2) with a summary of the technical situation.
We then address (Section 7.3) the question of the social value of an EV op-
tion. We then address (Section 7.4) the issue of user acceptability, at-
tempting in particular to clarify the relationship between user acceptability
and the driving range of the EV. (In part this depends on clearly disting-
uishing among various possible markets for electric vehicles; even more it
depends on probing the relationship between driving ranges and the perceived
needs of various classes of potential EV users). We next review (Section 7.5)
the R & D situation bearing on electric vehicles, with particular attention
given to the problems in high performance batteries. Finally, then, we are
able (Section 7.6) to provide some conclusions on the role of Federal policy
in support of EV R & D. These conclusions are likely to seem disappointing
to advocates of a strong effort on EV's: for it proves to be easier to des-
cribe efforts which are likely to be futile, or even counter-productive, than
to define areas where expanded Federal efforts are clearly important. On the
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other hand, even the rather modest near term efforts that seem warranted add
up to a program which is substantial compared to the current Federal rate of
investment, and which could lead to much stronger Federal programs in this
area before the end of the current decade.
7.2 Status of the Technology and Current R & D Programs
As is now widely understood, the fundamental technical problem facing
the electric car is the limited energy storage capacity of batteries as com-
pared to liquid fuels. As a consequence EV's, at least with current tech-
nology, are much heavier and more expensive than comparable conventional ve-
hicles, and are severely limited in range. The following background points
on the technology and economic prospects of electric cars develop this cen-
tral issue.1
7.2.1 Technology and Economics
The energy storage per unit of storage system weight (specific energy)
of any battery depends on the power output for which the battery is opti-
mized. This means that an EV design problem is encountered which is fun-
damentally different from that faced in a conventional vehicle: the energy
content of gasoline is independent of the power demanded of the engine. It
is a minor design problem to arrange to pump fuel to the engine at the rate
desired. That is not the case for a battery. The more rapidly one wishes
to draw out the energy -- i.e. the higher the power rquired -- the less the
total energy which can be withdrawn. It is as if, in a conventional car, an
increase in engine power were permitted only if the size of the fuel tank
1Two useful systems studies and reviews of EV technology which we will
not reference in the text are [ 99 & 100 ].
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were reduced.
The problem of the power/energy trade-off has two implications impor-
tant for the analysis which follows. First, the specific energy of a prac-
tical car battery (that is, a battery designed to handle power demands that
must be faced in hill-climbing and acceleration) will be designed low com-
pared to that of a battery using the same technology, but designed for a use
under a uniform, low-power, duty cycle. Second, even after the battery has
been optimized (i.e. designed and manufactured) for automotive use, the ef-
fective energy on a particular charge can vary widely, depending on how se-
vere the demands for power turn out to be on a particular day's use. Fac-
tors which increase the power required -- hills, headwinds, etc. -- reduce
the range not only by increasing the energy consumed per mile, but by ef-
fectively reducing the total energy which can be drawn from the battery, due
to the power/energy trade-off.
Both points will be developed further in later sections of this chapter.
An immediate consequence, though, is that one must treat paper design studies
of EV's with special caution, since there are numerous subtle interactions
(such as the power/energy trade-off highlighted above) that can make a ve-
hicle which seems quite practical on paper quite impractical in practice.
Nevertheless, it is useful to have some rough quantitative feeling for
the basic technical and economic prospects. A practical battery must provide
the car with performance reasonably comparable to that of a low-powered con-
ventional car, if only to avoid safety hazards. Table 7.1 gives some repre-
sentative values for estimated maximum ractical values for several widely
discussed candidates for electric vehicle propulsion as compared to gasoline.
The first column gives energy stored per pound; the second column then adjusts
the base number to take account of the efficiency advantages of an electric
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Table 7.1
COMPARISON OF ENERGY STORAGE IN BATTERIES AND GASOLINE TANKS
Specific Energy
(watt-hours/pound)
Gasoline (includes tank, etc.)
Base Adjusted Comment
1,130 140 Current state-of-the-
art
Lead/acid battery
Nickel/zinc battery
20 15
50 35
Probably achievable
with near-term R & D
Lithium/sulfur battery (design goal) 140 100 Long-term goal for
technology now under
R & D
Note: Column 1 from[101]. Energy efficiency of conventional cars varies
from 10-15% depending on driving conditions. A factor of 12.5% is
used in the adjustment. EV efficiency is much higher, mainly because
thermodynamic inefficiencies are absorbed at the generating plant,
not in the vehicle; partly because no energy is used during idling.
A factor of 0.7 is used here.
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motor over a heat engine. It is the second which provides a reasonable com-
parison. However, even after this necessary adjustment is made, gasoline
retains an advantage over the best projected battery performance. And a
gas tank can be refilled in a few minutes; a battery recharge takes several
hours.
The lead/acid battery is the familiar technology now used for starter
batteries in conventional cars and for propulsion in specialized vehicles
such as golf carts. The nickel/zinc battery is representative of technology
which is roughly in the position of the Stirling technology discussed in Chap-
ter 5: that is, likely performance is reasonably well defined, and R & D is
focused on improving the economics of the technology. In contrast, the
lithium/sulphur battery is representative of a number of advanced battery
developments, for which achievable performance in practical applications
remains quite uncertain. Initial vehicle applications of the advanced tech-
nologies is unlikely before the mid-1980's; and attainment of the long-run goals
cited in Table 7.1 (if indeed they prove practical) lies even further in the
future.
We can see that except for advanced batteries, the limited potential
energy storage directly implies that a vehicle with range at all comparable
to the "tank-full" range of a conventional car will be heavy, and the bat-
teries massive and hence expensive.
In Table 7.2 estimates, adapted from the most recent detailed EV study,
are given, based on (perhaps optimistic) estimates of future battery perfor-
mance and costs obtained from battery developers. By making still more op-
timistic assumptions about such things as achievable cycle life, required
vehicle range, and so on, it is possible to develop more optimistic numbers
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Table 7.2
ESTIMATED COSTS FOR ELECTRIC VEHICLES
Power Source
Gasoline
Lead-acid battery
Nickel-zinc battery
Lithium-sulphur battery
Cost1
(¢/mile)
13-15
18-25
20
14-15 
Comment
Today's technology
Nominal range, 54 miles
Nominal range, 144 miles
Nominal range, 145 miles
lBased on electricity at 3.6¢/kwh and gasoline at 50¢-$1/gallon (in-
cluding tax). The numbers are in 1973 dollars [103, Chart 10].
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for the near-term (lead/acid and nickel/zinc) technologies. But we believe
the above estimates in Table 7.2 for EV's are most unlikely, in practice, to
turn out to be unrealistically high. The contrary is more likely. It must
be stressed that the numbers for the conventional car are "real" numbers,
based on demonstrated technology, while the numbers for the electrics depend
on estimated costs of cars which do not yet exist, and in particular on es-
timates of the costs and performance of batteries which have not yet emerged
from the laboratory. The numbers are particularly soft for the high temper-
ature batteries, which are furthest from practical application.
In terms of such crude and perhaps (but not necessarily) overoptimistic
paper estimates, and neglecting the problem of range, the advanced batteries
look potentially interesting in term of economic competitiveness with conven-
tional cars. And in terms of insurance against the possibility of severe
liquid fuel constraints by the end of the century, investment in advanced
battery technology looks very promising. On the other hand, these same num-
bers present a discouraging picture of the prospects for electric cars based
on either lead/acid or nickel/zinc technology. Even before taking account of
the effect of range limitations on the value of the vehicle, such cars look
expensive compared to comparable conventional cars even at fuel costs sub-
stantially higher than today. And unless all of the various advanced bat-
tery programs fail badly, such cars would be markedly inferior to newer tech-
nology electric cars in the event of severe fuel constraints towards the end
of the century.
Finally, we emphasize that the economic estimates of Table 7.2 refer to
private passenger cars. The economic prospects of lead/acid or nickel/zinc
powered vehicles are considerably more favorable, though, if one considers
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specialized applications such as urban buses, delivery vans, and the like.
This point is developed in Section 7.4.
7.2.2 Current Vehicles and Programs
In the light of this discussion, the most important point to note about
existing R & D programs on batteries is that work on the high temperature
batteries has been pursued for some years, primarily motivated by the impor-
tance to the electric power industry of developing reasonably cheap ways to
store electricity for load-leveling. Consequently, the most important as-
pect of EV technology has been receiving support as a by-product of interest
in improved batteries for other purposes. The crucial policy question is
whether there is justification for expanding these efforts on advanced bat-
teries; or for promoting efforts on nearer-term technology (notably, lead/
acid and nickel/zinc) as insurance against the risk of severe liquid fuel
shortages despite the unappealing economics suggested by the estimates of
Table 7.2.
A candid report on electric passenger cars currently on the market, from
a source unlikely to be suspected of any bias against EV's is provided by
[103]. A wider survey of current vehicles is provided by [104].
7.3 Arguments For and Against EV's (Social Value)
Would an option to replace a substantial fraction of conventional ve-
hicles with electric vehicles be socially valuable (leaving aside for now
the benefits and costs to individual users, except insofar as they affect
the practicality of marketing EV's, probably a sine qua non for obtaining
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any social benefits)? A widely held view today, as reflected for example
in Congressional support for EV demonstrations, is that such an option would
be very valuable; but a contrary case can be made. We briefly review pros
and cons of this question.
The fundamental element of the prospective social value of EV's is the
prospect of reducing the national requirements for liquid fuels. Roughly
75% of all automobile mileage is accumulated on trips of less than 50 miles.
More than half o all trips, although barely more than 10% of all mileage,
are less than 5 miles. [73 ] Thus a large fraction of mileage is for travel
which might plausibly be managed with a range-limited electric vehicle, and
most of this short distance travel is within the urban areas in which most
Americans live. A reasonable "ballpark" estimate of the travel which might
be handled by electric vehicles would be to assume that EV's are substituted
for second cars in urban households owning more than one car. Currently,
something like 20% of all cars fall into this category. (About 30% of all
cars are today owned by households with two or more cars, not all of which
are in urban areas.) And barring continuing economic stagnation, that frac-
tion will certainly increase. So, in principle, quite a substantial fraction
of mileage could be handled by electric cars. But the conservation of liquid
fuel is not the only gain that might come with an EV option. One may also
consider possible gains in terms of reduced automotive emissions; the value
of laying the basis for eventual much wider use of EV's (not only for urban
travel); and improving the economics of an increasingly electric economy by
providing a market for off-peak power. (The latter point depends on the as-
sumption that an increasing fraction of electricity will be generated by nu-
clear power, where the high ratio of capital to operating costs in the total
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cost of electricity makes it important to be able to run the plants close to
24 hours a day.)
To reach some judgement on the social value of these various potential
payoffs from an EV development effort, it is necessary to consider at least
the following offsetting arguments:
1. A variety of fuel options (e.g., syncrude, shale oil, etc.,) have
been proposed that, for a long time at least, may be preferable to electric
cars. One must assume very high cost for these substitutes for imported
petroleum (certainly well above $20/barrel-equivalent) and/or make very
optimistic assumptions about the economies of EV's (i.e. approaching the
long-run advanced battery goals of Table 7.2), to allow electric cars to
provide transportation at a total cost per mile competitive with convention-
al cars. Yet unless electric cars are cheaper than conventional cars, why
should consumers (and voters) be willing to use an electric car limited to
the range of its batteries rather than a conventional car which for all prac-
tical purposes has unlimited range (considering the ease of refilling a gas
tank compared to the time-consuming process of recharging a battery).1 Ex-
cept under extremely optimistic assumptions about EV's (or very pessimistic
assumptions about the cost of synthetic fuel) the user could not expect to
save more than a penny or two per mile. One can also not expect EV's, with
their range limitations, to be driven more than 10,000 miles per year. Is
it reasonable to expect that consumers ould find saving a penny or two per
mile (at most, $100-200 per year) adequate compensation for the inconvenience
lWhat about the possibility of quickly exchanging batteries? This ap-
pears to be a forlorn prospect for private cars. It is plausible, though,
for commercial operations of a fleet of vehicles from a central base, where
both the physical and bookkeeping operations for handling these heavy and
expensive devices could be efficiently managed.
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of a range-limited car?
2. Given current legislation on emissions, auto emissions will become
a minor factor in urban air pollution. (This is the fundamental conclusion
of the recent and widely cited EPA study of this matter.[101]) Replacing
conventional urban second cars by EV's cannot make much of a difference.
3. The notion that EV's will fulfill a load-leveling role for the elec-
tric power industry is far from compelling, even if one ignores both the sub-
stantial grounds for skepticism that significant numbers of EV's can be sold
and current uncertainties about nuclear power. Part of the problem is po-
licing such an arrangement, since people are unlikely to wait until after mid-
night to plug in their vehicles for recharge. But this part of the problem
could be dealt with by suitable, and probably not very expensive, gadgetry.
A more important part of the problem is that, given the improvements in bat-
tery technology that would make EV's economically competitive, utilities
could build their own load-leveling facilities. The batteries for the direct
utility application (per kwh of storage) would certainly be cheaper than for
EV use, though of course more expensive (to the utilities) than off-peak
storage obtained as the by-product of EV usage. On net, considering all the
factors, one may doubt that the presence or absence of EV's is likely to have
any noticeable effect on the cost of electricity.
Our judgement is that this formidable list of objections, and it is sim-
ply unrealistic to ignore such objections, does not provide sufficient grounds
to dismiss EV hopes as an illusion. They do, however, provide strong grounds
for wanting to see any EV program carefully thought through and justified.
Each of the objections has an answer, but always an answer that is only par-
tial, not dismissive. Briefly,
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1. On paper, substitutes for imported petroleum can be obtained at
costs that would make the wide implementation of even a quite successful
EV R & D program doubtful. But in fact, all of these options involve major
economic, environmental, and political uncertainties. It is particularly
doubtful that a large enough synthetic fuels industry will evolve before the
end of the century so that one would not also value quite highly a comple-
mentary effort on EV's.
2. We cannot now forsee just how trade-offs between fuel economy and
emissions control for ICE-powered vehicles will develop. EV's may well have
a useful role to play in clean air strategy, particularly since their use is
inherently concentrated in densely urbanized areas where the most severe
air quality problems arise. Since the cost of auto air pollution controls
is in the neighborhood of $5 billion per year currently [ 1, one should
not dismiss the possibility that significant savings might be available if
EV's were available as a component of a "two-car strategy".
3. EV's will probably not have an effect on electricity costs notice-
able to the individual consumer; but since every household and firm is a
user, even a minute effect can add up to many millions per year nationally.
How does one appraise the net situation? The fact is that any quanti-
tative estimate is bound to be highly arbitrary; and in fact more useful pri-
marily as an exercise for reaching a better understanding of the issues rather
than for making specific decisions. Too much depends on political and tech-
nical developments in an uncertain future. Ultimately one reaches a cautious
but affirmative judgement by a simpler and more intuitive process. Are there
sets of circumstances in which we might plausibly seriously regret having
made a substantial R & D effort to develop an EV option? It is hard to ima-
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gine what they might be. The amounts of money are simply extremely small
compared to the aggregate amounts -- currently exceeding $100 billion per
year -- spent on automotive transportation, reflecting the national importance
of the system. Even a small probability of contingencies in which an EV
option would be important will make "insurance" against such contingencies
look prudent. And even total failure will have a trivial effect on our na-
tional performance in the transportation sector.
In contrast, it is easy to imagine circumstances in which the U.S. would
seriously regret not having done what could reasonably be done to develop
an EV option. One may merely note that interest in developing a "syncrude"
industry continues despite rapid escalation of the estimated cost of syn-
crude. (Typical estimates are running in the neighborhood of $20 per bar-
rel compared to $6-10 only two years ago.) Since few of these plants would
be in operation before 1990, we are talking of a commitment to an expensive
source of energy, with the commitment (given the capital investments required)
running well into the 21st century. So long as this kind of commitment to
syncrude is judged interesting, it is hard to imagine wishing to ignore an
option which has at least the potential to be economically competitive, which
may be environmentally and politically superior, and which, in any case,
would complement rather than conflict with a syncrude program.
Thus the case for interest in an EV option does not turn on any partic-
ular calculation of its value, which for practical purposes may be made as
high or as low as the analyst cares to make it. It is simply a matter of
noting that it is not hard at all to construct alternative futures in which
one would regret ignoring this option, but very hard to construct alternatives
in which one would seriously regret having sought it.
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Thus, it is even harder to make a calculation of EV payoffs than for
the alternatives (such as those discussed earlier in this report) which
involve less radical changes from the automotive technology we know today.
This is scarcely surprising. It is always easier to specify the costs and
benefits of small perturbations in a complex system than to forsee the costs
and benefits of a radical change. But because EV's have the prospect of
radically changing the system in a way which may prove to be critical --
namely disengaging an important, and ultimately perhaps even large, share
of the automotive system from supplies of liquid fuel -- the potential pay-
off may be very important indeed. It is in this sense that we suggested at
the outset that support for the EV option might best be regarded as prudent
insurance, which is not likely to be regretted even should it turn out that
it is not needed.
7.4 User Acceptability
Suppose then that we adopt the view that an EV option is, in principle,
attractive, in the fundamental sense that if we look across the range of al-
ternative futures, we find a number of contexts in which such an option looks
valuable, and none in which we are likely to seriously regret having devel-
oped the option. We have only a rather empty conclusion. For the critical
policy question regarding the EV's concerns the appropriate level of support
(and balance between): a) near-term R & D and demonstration efforts to pro-
mote the development of an EV industry with technology that is currently a-
vailable, or likely to become available within this decade, and b) support
for R & D efforts on advanced batteries, looking towards applications in the
late 1980's and beyond.
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Other things equal, there is much to be said for moving expeditiously
on encouraging the evolution of an EV industry. For although (in the light
of the discussion of the previous section) the major payoffs from the EV
option are likely to lie several decades off, the transition to substantial
EV usage late in the century, if that proves practical and desirable, will
be eased if a healthy and growing EV industry has developed in the interim,
providing experience with the technology and at least the beginnings of the
extensive infrastructure that would be required.
On the other hand, it is almost certain to be futile and self-defeating
to attempt to promote the use of electric vehicles that are from the view-
point of users (and voters), markedly inferior to conventional vehicles re-
quiring either subsidies so massive or restrictions on the use of convention-
al vehicles so stringent that it is unrealistic to suppose that the program
could (or should) command public support.
In this context, it becomes critical to consider, in particular, the
relation between the acceptability of EV's and the practical range of the
vehicle. For the acceptability of EV's will obviously depend not only on
their cost, but on the extent to which they are in fact capable of replacing
a conventional vehicle.
7.4.1 Range Versus Value
A convenient way to address the issue of user acceptability is in terms
of a diagram such as Figure 7.1, in which the value of an EV (say, the ra-
tio of the price it could command in the market to the price of a convention-
al car of comparable performance and size) would be plotted as a function of
electric vehicle range. Even in the absence of data which would permit a
287
Figure 7.1
VALUE VS. RANGE FOR ELECTRIC VEHICLES
A 
RANGE
J
-J
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precise quantitative treatment, the figure provides us with a way of thinking
about the problems of user acceptability.
The first thing to notice is that a value vs, range plot must, in fact,
have the "s-shaped" form of the two illustrative curves in the figure. Ob-
viously if the range is zero, the vehicle is of no value, and increasing
the range from zero to some very low number will not greatly increase the
value. Eventually, though, as range increases the vehicle becomes capable
of handling typical trips the user has occasion to take. We reach a segment
of the curve where value starts to increase rapidly with range. The probabil-
ity that the owner will be unable to make (or worse, be unable to complete)
a trip declines as range increases; accordingly the value of the vehicle
increases. Eventually, the range becomes great enough so that it is only
on rare occasions that the range limitation of the vehicle creates any con-
cern for the user. We reach a "shoulder of the curve" beyond which the gain
in value for successive increments in range becomes relatively small. If
we assume -- and this is a sufficient approximation for our purpose -- that
the user is indifferent between an electric and a conventional vehicle ex-
cept for the issue of range, then the value of the EV will asymptotically
approach the value of an equivalent conventional vehicle as range becomes
very long.
For some distance beyond the shoulder of the curve, the EV is what we
will call "almost competitive". It is not likely to be perceived by buyers
as terribly inferior to a conventional car. It can serve ordinary needs
quite satisfactorily. But it is still sometimes inconvenient. If (unsub-
sidized) costs of an EV were similar to those of a conventional car, one
could imagine significant use of EV's given subsidies or regulations that
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consumers (i.e. voters) do not regard as extravagant. Similarly, one can
imagine significant numbers of buyers preferring such a car if gasoline
shortages like those of the winter of 1973 become almost yearly experiences.
But one can still hardly imagine a mass market for such a car if convention-
al alternatives are available at comparable prices, and if gasoline is al-
most always available.
We show the value of the car increasing only slowly beyond the shoulder
of the curve. For although it is becoming less and less often that the owner
finds the car can not take him where he wants to go, the effect of increased
range will be modest. Changing the range of the vehicle from a few to 50
miles makes an enormous difference in the value of the car; increasing the
range from 100 to 150 miles may make only a modest difference. There are
still likely to be trips he would like to take (or even trips he merely
wants the option to take) which are beyond the range of the car.
But although we can only expect value to increase slowly once the ve-
hicle is capable of handling the great majority of trips, at some point
further improvements in range will become sufficiently unimportant that our
typical user finds the range limitation a minor factor in his choice between
a conventional and an electric car. It is reasonable to suppose that this
reduction of range limitation to a secondary aspect of the car's value will
occur sooner if the car is a second car in an urban household, where another
car is available for occasional long trips, than if the car is the one the
household wants to use on weekends and vacations.
However, it does not similarly follow that the shoulder of the curve
will be reached significantly sooner for a second car than for an only car.
What data is available indicates little difference between the annual mileage
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accumulated per car in single car and multi-car households. Except for oc-
casional long trips outside the city, both the single car and multi-car house-
hold may turn out to have quite similar (urban) usage patterns and hence
similar reactions to range limitations until EV's achieve sufficient range to
comfortably handle the great majority of urban travel.
We would like to obtain some quantitative sense of what the range of an
EV probably must be for the car to become "almost competitive". And we
would like to reach some judgement as to when the range limitation, at least
for a second car, might plausibly become a minor matter for many users, so
that even occasional concern about fuel shortages, or such advantages of the
electric as quiet operation and low maintenance, begin to seem as important
to buyers as the fact that on rare occasions its range limitation is an in-
convenience. In the former case, politically plausible subsidies or regu-
lations may be sufficient to promote significant EV usage. In the latter
case, EV's could be expected'to achieve a significant market even if subsi-
dies or other incentives were absent.
As a first approximation, we could assume merely that the value of the
EV is proportional to the probability that it is adequate for a randomly
selected trip. The range/value plot will be an s-shaped cumulative distri-
bution curve (the dotted curve A in Figure 7.1). However, if in fact the
EV is only interesting if it can satisfactorily replace a conventional vehi-
cle the user would otherwise buy, then it will be only when the EV can han-
dle most trips that we will begin to see a rapid increase of value as range
increases. The steep part of the curve will be flattened somewhat, and the
shoulder of the curve will be pushed out beyond where it would be under the
simpler assumption (see Curve B in Figure 7.1).
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An immediate application of this distinction is to the EV enthusiast
who owns an electric car today. For him, there is no conventional substitute
for the EV: an electric car is what he wants. His curve is Curve A. He
may be very pleased with a car with a range at the point marked X. This in
no way implies that the more typical user, whose preferences are given by
Curve B, will find the EV even remotely competitive. This user will only
find the EV attractive if someone else makes up the large difference in value
between the vehicle with range X and the value of a vehicle that he feels
really begins to meet his needs.
Similarly, suppose that at some future date households were permitted
to own no more than one conventional car, or that severe gas rationing ef-
fectively makes it difficult to operate more than one conventional car; a
second car must be electric or nothing. Under these conditions, Curve A is
probably applicable: a car that can handle a large majority of trips may
command almost as high a price as a conventional car. But in the absence
of such severe restrictions, an electric second car which is adequate on 9
days out of 10 is a car that is inconvenient to own 2 or 3 days a month. A
good used conventional car is likely to be preferable to such a car, and if
so the buyer will not be willing to pay more for the electric than for the
used conventional car.
We will see it is principally this distinction between the case in
which the choice is an EV or nothing versus the case in which an EV must
face competition from a conventional car that illustrates why-we cannot reach
the unqualified judgement that barring radical improvements in batteries,
electric cars clearly can never find a market. If we are sufficiently pes-.
simistic about the availability of liquid fuels late in the century, then
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cars that would be marketable only to some minute fraction of buyers today
may look quite reasonable to a wide class of buyers.
At the same time, though, one must note that for the forseeable future,
at least, severe restrictions on the availability of conventional vehicles
are most implausible. For even given much more pressure for politically un-
popular restraints on fuel use than is apparent today, it is hard to imagine
that policies which effectively force the purchase of EV's (or nothing) would
seem preferable to policies to sharply cut fuel consumption by severe taxes
on car size and enforcing limits on speeds and performance. At least for
the forseeable future, a modicum of realism suggests that we must consider
the range/value tradeoff for EV's in the context of conventional cars -- in
particular of small, modest performance cars, such as EV's will be -- as an
available alternative to prospective EV users.
In that context, how far must the range of an electric car be before
the owner begins to consider its range limitation relatively unimportant?
(Perhaps a more useful way of putting this question is, how long does the
range have to be before buyers are willing to revise their expectations of
how the car could be used?) The first issue one must face, it turns out,
concerns how the notion of "range" is to be defined. For the "range" of an
EV can easily vary by a factor of 3 using various commonly used technical
definitions of range; and none of the commonly used definitions of range
correspond to what a potential user is likely to think of as its range. A
private buyer is likely to suppose that if the vehicle's range is given as
50 miles, then he will be able to use the vehicle with confidence on any day
when he is confident he will travel no more than 50 miles. But if the buyer
assumes that a vehicle which has been certified to have a 50-mile range over
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the standard SAE metropolitan driving cycle1 meets this criterion, then he
is likely to be severely disappointed.
The basis of the problem is simple enough, although the solution is
not so simple. For conventional cars, nominal driving cycles have been de-
veloped which are representative of typical conditions. The most widely
used is the EPA's Federal Driving Cycle. Vehicle performance over this cycle
provides an estimate of average fuel consumption and average emissions under
typical urban driving conditions. These results will be highly non-represen-
tative of performance under unfavorable conditions, such as during a traffic
jam. But the cycle is nevertheless very useful for its intended purpose,
since one is ordinarily interested in average performance, not performance
on any particular trip.
But fuel economy on a particular trip would be very important if con-
ventional cars were restricted to very small fuel tanks which could not be
readily refilled. The driver would have to worry about how far the car
would go under the particular conditions that might be encountered. It
would be small comfort to a driver who ran out of gasoline 5 miles from
home on a 30-mile trip to know that the car, when new and tested under a
standard set of conditions, ran for 50 miles. But this is almost exactly
the problem that arises in specifying a nominal range for an electric vehi-
cle. The standard cycle is calibrated to require approximately the same
energy as the more complicated -- and more demanding in terms of speed and
acceleration -- EPA driving cycle. A properly calibrated standard driving
cycle is useful for estimating average energy consumption and for comparing
one EV with another. But it may easily be drastically misleading as a mea-
lSociety of Automotive Engineers Electric Vehicle Test Procedure.[105]
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sure of the practical range of the vehicle. Since this quite fundamental
point is generally neglected, we will explore it in some detail in the fol-
lowing subsection.
7.4.2 Defining "Range"
What we would like to be able to specify would be the scales along the
vertical and horizontal axes of Figure 7.1, and we would like to do so for
various classes of users (private cars, urban delivery vehicles, buses, etc.).
Data to do so do not exist: one can hardly give reliable estimates of con-
sumer response to a product (a mass-market EV) which does not yet exist.
Nevertheless, one can make some crude but useful approximations.
Reproduced below (Table 7.3) is one of the few sets of reasonably well
documented data on actual (rather than calculated) EV performance. The vehi-
cle here (the ESB Sundancer) was a test bed (i.e. not designed to production
comfort, safety or economy standards) built to exhibit the maximum perfor-
mance obtainable with lead/acid batteries as of 1971. [106] The lead/acid
batteries ere experimental units with considerably higher performance than
those commercially available today (1975). The numbers, therefore, were and
remain optimistic as an indicator of what might be obtained in a production
car with current mass-producible lead/acid batteries, though perhaps conser-
vative as an indicator of what might be obtained with lead/acid batteries 3
to 10 years from now. The reader will note that the reported ranges vary by
a factor of 3, depending on how the measurement was made. Some insight into
the causes of this large variation are given by Figure 7.2.
The figure shows the force (energy per unit distance travelled) required
at the wheels (vertical axis, in logarithmic units) as a function of the speed.
Two things to particularly note are the increase in force required to maintain
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Table 7.3
SUNDANCER RANGE FOR VARIOUS TESTS1 ,2
Test Range (miles)
30 mph steady speed 140-150
60 mph steady speed 60-65
SAE residential driving cycle 75-80
SAE metropolitan driving cycle 50-55
1 Source: [106].
2Experimental battery.
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a steady speed as the speed increases, and the much greater requirements of
acceleration or hill climbing. The first is largely due to the increased
aerodynamic resistance as speed increases, and leads to an increase in total
force greater, although not very much greater, than the proportionate in-
crease in speed. (Here a tripling of speed from 20 to 60 mph leads to some-
thing less than a four-fold increase in required force; a doubling of speed
from 30 mph to 60 mph leads to somewhat more than a doubling of required
force.)
If we now look back at the Sundancer performance data (Table 7.3) we
see that, as should be expected, the steady-speed range at 30 mph is more
than double that at 60 mph. The drop in range shown in Table 7.3 is some-
what greater than the drop in force shown in Figure 7.2. This is because,
as noted in Section 7.2, the faster energy is drawn from a battery, the
lower will be the total amount of energy the battery can deliver. Consequent-
ly, increasing the power required -- the product of the force and the velo-
city -- cuts the total energy available. This effect is not too important
for changes in velocity: you have to read the chart carefully to see there
is a discrepancy. But when we consider the effects of acceleration -- or,
equivalently, hill climbing, which also requires energy to overcome gravi-
tational inertia -- the tradeoff of power for total energy becomes very im-
portant.
Looking at Figure 7.2, one can note that the power required for accel-
erations ordinarily encountered in urban driving -- keeping up with the nor-
mal flow of traffic requires accelerations of about 3 mph/sec. -- is much
higher than the power required for steady-speed driving, even at highway
speeds. Consequently (in addition to the greater energy dissipated in
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braking for stops) the battery is forced to perform at points along its dis-
charge curve where severe tradeoffs are encountered between power and total
energy. The sharpness of this effect will depend on how far within its max-
imum capabilities the battery is operating. The strong effect of a rather
modest incremental acceleration imposed on the Sundancer warns us that an
EV equipped with lead/acid batteries, barring really striking advances in
that technology, will be vulnerable indeed to degradations of nominal range
in the event of unanticipated demands for power. On the other hand, it is
conceivable that advanced batteries may provide sufficient power densities
so that the pronounced total energy penalties at high power apparent in the
Sundancer data can be ameliorated (though not eliminated). But whether this
favorable development will come about remains to be seen.1
The significance of this power/energy tradeoff can be illustrated by
superimposing the SAE metropolitan driving cycle over the SAE residential
cycle. Sundancer was able to achieve only 2/3 of the residential cycle
range on the metropolitan cycle. Yet the difference in power required over
this 150-second cycle (repeated many times in a single range test) is im-
portant only in the 12.5-second interval between- points A and B. (The ener-
gy required between points B and C is not very much larger for the metro-
politan cycle, since about half the time the vehicle is drawing no power as
it allows the speed to drop.) Further the accelerations involved are modest:
only 1.2 mph/sec.
lMost published power/energy diagrams inadvertently, but misleadingly,
show little or no negative slope in the curves for advanced batteries. This
reflected the limited knowledge available until recently on performance of
advanced batteries. Now that measurements are becoming available on the per-
formance of experimental cells, it is clear that the effects are significant.
How significant the effects will be cannot be known with confidence until
later in the development programs.
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Consequently, we can expect that EV ranges may diverge sharply from
their values for average conditions, being especially sensitive to variations
in the acceleration profile of a particular trip (number of stop signs or
lights encountered, hills, smooth flowing or congested traffic, etc.) Even
on familiar trips (to and from work, for example) these factors will vary
from day to day. Much more severe problems will arise if the vehicle is not
restricted to trips where the driver can be assumed to know fairly accurate-
ly just what distances and conditions will be involved.
Indeed, we encounter two sources of difficulty in extrapolating from
the generally used nominal ranges of electric vehicles (defining nominal
range as range estimated on the basis of the SAE J227 driving cycle): First,
the cycle itself does not represent actual driving conditions: in particu-
lar the accelerations required are less than those which are ordinarily en-
countered. One would expect, consequently, that actual average EV ranges
would fall short of the nominal range. However, the GRC study [101] reports
that a comparison of calculated range over the EV cycle compared to the EPA
urban cycle (the latter derived from actual driving experience in Los Angeles)
shows little discrepancy. We find this puzzling, but we cannot flatly as-
sert an error has been made.
However, on the second point, there is no ambiguity. Results obtained
under the SAE J227 range test represent, at best, average performance, typ-
ically reported for performance with a new battery. By the very definition
of "average", this nominal range must be greater than the range a driver can
feel confident of obtaining.
To these difficulties in interpreting EV ranges must be added a consid-
erable number of others. As already noted, battery performance degrades with
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use. Normal practice today with lead/acid traction batteries is to regard
the battery as worn out when it has dropped to 60% of its original perfor-
mance. If this procedure is followed, then an EV with 50 miles nominal
range will have only 30 miles nominal range when close to battery replace-
ment time. Cold weather increases road load; as do winds, underinflated
tires, wet roads and various other factors. Without choosing extreme con-
ditions, these factors can accumulate to an increase in road load of a fac-
tor of 2. Driving in snow would be a severe problem.
Another kind of problem occurs if the battery itself is allowed to
become cold, as every driver knows from cold weather problems with starter
batteries. The cold weather effect noted before is primarily due to the
effect on tire friction. Under normal conditions, the cold weather effect
directly on the battery may be minor, since the internal temperature of a
large traction battery would not fall rapidly. But if for any reason, a
lead/acid car were left parked on the street overnight on a severe winter
night, the range might be short indeed on the following day.
Driver performance will, of course, affect ranges considerably, given
the sensitivity noted to acceleration. A driver who seeks to conserve en-
ergy by accelerating slowly from stops, coasting to stops, and keeping speed
down (especially on hills) will obtain substantially longer range than a
more typical driver. Unfortunately, such practices might also make this
energy-conserving driver a considerable annoyance to others, and indeed a
safety hazard. Such problems may arise whether the driver is trying to con-
serve energy or not, since performance degrades (on a given day) as the bat-
tery is depleted. This effect is not important under the SAE J227 cycle,
since the acceleration demanded by the cycle never exceeds 2.14 mph/sec.
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But in actual use, it is important to be aware that a vehicle designed to be
able to meet reasonable minimum performance requirements on a fully charged
battery (say 3 mph/sec. acceleration from 0 to 30 mph) in fact will not be
capable of doing so over a substantial fraction of its nominal range, so
long as the SAE J227 cycle remains the basis for range tests.
A final point worth noting is that the SAE J227 cycle (as may be seen in
Figure 7.2 of the text) includes a 20 second stop before each 130-second cycle
of driving. In the EPA cycle from which the electric vehicle cycle is de-
rived an equivalent amount of standing time is included, since otherwise fuel
consumption and emissions during engine idling is erroneously neglected. For
an electric car, the effect of including standing periods in the cycle is the
opposite of the effect with a conventional car. During standing periods, no
energy is consumed; rather the battery has a chance to regenerate some energy.
It is proper to include this effect in obtaining average range numbers; but
of course in actual driving, the total amount and distribution of standing
time will vary widely, and there will be occasions on which it is essentially
absent.
Obviously it would be useful to make at least a modest effort to gather
data which would permit a more quantitative treatment of the problem of de-
fining practical range of electric vehicles than is possible here. A sig-
nificant amount of data has been accumulated through British experience with
electric milk delivery vans and Japanese experiments with a small electric
commuter car. We were not able to obtain this data in time for the present
study, but presumably it is available. A systematic collection of data in
this country could be undertaken at modest cost in connection with the USPS
experiments with electric postal delivery vans. Finally, an analysis of the
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raw data on which the EPA cycle -- and hence, indirectly, the electric vehi-
cle cycle -- was based would provide insight into the distribution of driving
conditions which are represented by the standard cycles, and into the extent
to which the EPA cycle provides an appropriate basis for EV range calculations.
One could then could then compute a distribution of estimated range for a
given EV, which would be far more useful than the single number which can be
obtained now.
To sum up, then, we can note that:
1. The steady-speed (on a flat road, no wind) range of an electric ve-
hicle, to a first approximation, can be taken as inversely proportional to
the speed. The approximation increasingly overestimates range as speeds rise.
2. A well-designed standardized driving cycle can give a good approx-
imation of average range in actual driving, and further is quite appropriate
(and, in fact, necessary) as a basis for comparing alternative electric ve-
hicles. But it seems likely to us that the SAE J227 cycle overestimates av-
erage range.
3. In any event, the standardized test will be a poor indicator of ac-
tual ranges obtained on a given day (since precipitation, winds, and temper-
ature all have substantial effects on energy requirements) on a given trip
(depending on how often hills, stop lights, merging or passing situations are
encountered) with a particular driver (fast or slow) in a particular car
(old batteries or new).
In summary, the nominal EV ranges commonly quoted are gravely mislead-
ing as an indicator of "guaranteed range" which a user of the vehicle can be
confident of obtaining on a particular day's travel. Indeed, we doubt that
a vehicle with a 50-mile nominal range can, in fact, be guaranteed to deliver
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10 miles, since it is easy to specify combination of not extreme conditions
under which the car will obtain an actual range only 20% of nominal.
For example, suppose that the battery has been depleted to 70% of its
as-new capacity; nominal 50 mile range is now cut to a nominal 35-mile range.
Suppose further that the day is moderately cold (30° F), tires are slightly
underinflated and there are wet roads creating bad driving conditions and a
moderate headwind of 15mph. From tests in [106] the car would have a range
of about 17 miles under these conditions, provided that all other conditions
were equivalent ot those of the SAE J227 cycle. However, during roughly the
last third of this trip, while the vehicle keeps up with the SAE J227 cycle,
it would not accelerate at the 3 mph/sec. ordinarily encountered in leaving
a stop light, much less the 4 mph/sec. typical of merging onto a freeway.
So if the driver is nervous or uncomfortable in a vehicle that cannot keep up
with the normal flow of traffic, he will find himself unhappy after about 12
miles. Finally, unless the driver is taking a trip he regularly takes, and
for which he has noted the mileage, he is hardly likely to be confident that
what he supposed is about a 10-mile trip will not turn out to be 12 or even
more miles.
Of course, importance of these factors vary from driver to driver. An
owner could replace the battery sooner than its nominal life, but only at a
substantial incremental expense. Some owners would regard the risk of having
to creep home under unfavorable conditions as of almost no concern (so long
as they could get home); others will be very uncomfortable at the thought of
this prospect. Obviously the problems will be far less severe in parts of
the country which have few hills and a mild, dry climate. But even in the
1Batteries are typically replaced when depleted to 60% of original per-
formance.
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most favorable context, it is clear that a 50-mile nominal range cannot be
taken as a 50-mile practical range; and in unfavorable situations, our illus-
trative 20% of nominal may in fact be an entirely realistic estimate of the
practical range of the vehicle as perceived by the driver. On the other
hand, for a specialized vehicle (not a mass market passenger car) with a
well-defined and favorable duty cycle under conditions which vary little
from day to day, the nominal range on the SAE cycle may understate its prac-
tical capabilities.
In the face of these difficulties, then, can we say anything useful
about the likely shape of the range/value curves illustrated in Figure 7.1?
In fact, a number of useful inferences can be drawn.
7.4.3 Discussion of Range-Value Plots
We have tried to show why the problem of defining the range of an elec-
tric vehicle is a subtle one. But within the present effort we could not
carry out the kind of detailed data-gathering and analysis (previously dis-
cussed) that would quantitatively define EV range in a more relevant way than
the widely used nominal ranges based on the SAE test procedure.
Further, the discussion so far has concerned the variability of range
primarily as a function of the variability of the conditions encountered in
driving a car. That is, we have considered mainly the physical aspects of
EV range. Equally important, though, are the psychological aspects. There
are people who begin to be concerned about the possibility of running out of
gas as soon as their fuel gauge falls below the half-full mark; there are
others who rarely bother to re-fuel until the guage is on empty, feeling
quite secure in the knowledge that there is a gallon or so in reserve even
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when the gauge (first) reaches the empty mark. Analogously, the practical
range of a given EV will depend on the perception of the user, not simply on
the physical properties of the car. However, for the purposes of the present
discussion, we may take the practical range of an EV as half the nominal
range based on the SAE range test.
The initial role of a mass-market electric passenger car is commonly,
and reasonably, taken to be that of a second car for urban use. In that role,
it is often assumed that a range of about 50 miles would be satisfactory.
[101,107] The argument runs as follows: a typical car is driven about 10,000
miles per year, or an average of under 30 miles per day. A family which
owned both an EV with 50-mile range and a conventional car with unlimited
range would be clearly inconvenienced only on occasions when both cars were
needed for more than 50 miles travel. If one makes some simplifying assump-
tions about the skimpy available data (assuming independence, log-normal dis-
tributions of trip length, etc.), one finds that a 50-mile range would be ad-
equate for an urban second car on nore than 95% of days. The recent Commit-
tee Report for the Electric Vehicle Research, Development and Demonstration
Act of 1975 puts that number at 98%. [108].
The assumptions on which 50-mile adequate range must be based (in addi-
tion to the statistical assumptions noted above) include 1.) that the house-
hold knows at the start of the day how far each driver -- or at least the
driver of the EV -- will travel; 2.) that the household perceives no sub-
stantial inconvenience in trading off cars among its members; and, perhaps
more important, 3.) that high theoretical availability is an accurate mea-
sure. For it seems very possible that only when the vehicle has a reserve
energy storage capacity considerably beyond what the owner ordinarily needs
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that he can feel reasonably secure about such things as forgetting to plug
in the car at night, or a blown fuse during recharge, or a teenager trying
to drive the car faster (and harder) than he should.
Overall, in terms of a range-value curve, it seems reasonable to consi-
der the 50-mile range as reaching the shoulder of the curve for the typical
driver; but it is not reasonable to assume that because one has defined an
adequate urban car as a car with 50-mile range, that owners will therefore
put out of mind the fact that if they choose to own such a car they must ac-
cept the reality that the car will not always be able to take them where they
want to go, even if they have another car for long trips. With a 50-mile
range, there will be days when there are extra errands to run, or an unexpec-
ted trip to make, or particularly severe driving conditions, when the car is
inadequate.
Again in terms of a range/value curve, we want to consider the likely
range at which the range limitation of the vehicle becomes a minor factor, so
that we may expect that substantial numbers of typical users might find an
equal-cost electric car a completely satisfactory or even preferable substi-
tute for a conventional car (considering such likely advantages of advanced
electric cars as low maintenance, extremely quiet operation, exceptionally
smooth acceleration). Essentially, what we wish to estimate is a range that
is sufficiently long so that a driver need not be conscious of any range lim-
itation in normal usage, and (even better) long enough so that it is possible
to use the vehicle on occasional out-of-town trips.
A nominal range of 200 miles may be more than enough to meet this cri-
terion. The range is now long enough -- very possibly, though not assuredly,
longer than necessary -- so that even considering the manifold problems
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discussed earlier, we can reasonably assume that the inconvenience of the
range limitation for routine travel is reduced to the level of the problems
comparable to the possibility that a conventional car may have mechanical
difficulties. Further, the range is long enough so that some out-of-town
travel can be managed. The potential owner need not think of himself as
choosing a vehicle which forecloses the possibility of such travel.
To what extent this would prove to be the case depends substantially on
the kind of supporting infrastructure that might develop in the event sub-
stantial numbers of such vehicles came into use. The practical range for
out-of-town travel of a 200-mile nominal range vehicle may not be much more
than 100 miles. This is partly because the improved range at a steady high-
way speed shown in Table 7.3 overstates the actual prospects, since actual
highway driving involves a good deal of acceleration and grade-climbing, cre-
ating periods of very high power demand since power is the product of the
force required times the speed at which the vehicle is travelling. And the
concerns that the possibility of running low on power creates, like the prob-
lems of mechanical failure in a conventional car, are more worrisome in out-
of-town travel. Hence the owner's judgement of what he considers practical
range will be more severe than for travel which is never very far from home.
On the other hand, should a substantial number of such vehicles be in use,
one could expect specialized services to evolve which ease the problem of
the long-distance EV driver: we could expect to see facilities for obtaining
at least a partial recharge during breaks in the trip, and we could expect
to see arrangements for rental of generator-trailers which could supplement
the energy available from the car's own batteries.1
1Such trailers are currently used in Britain to extend the range of
electric milk delivery vans on long runs.
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In short, then, we reach the rough and tentative estimates that an elec-
tric passenger car capable of substantial market penetration would probably
require a nominal range of 100 to 200 miles (practical range of 50 to 100
miles), with the lower number estimating the capability of a vehicle which
would be a reasonably satisfactory substitute for a conventional car in urban
use, and the higher number representing a vehicle that might be judged to be
quite competitive with a conventional car for many buyers if both were avail-
able at comparable cost.
We stress again that over the long run any such numbers are contingent
on what one assumes about public policy and the availability of gasoline or
other liquid fuels. If one were to assume severe rationing of gasoline, elec-
tric cars of very low performance indeed might find a market, as would great-
ly increased use of busses, motorcycles, etc. If, as is perhaps equally
likely, gasoline prices (in constant dollars) remain about the same as they
are today over the next 20 years, with no severe rationing or frequent short-
ages, and absent substantial subsidies for EV's, then it is hard indeed to see
a significant private car market for a 100-mile range vehicle. A useful way
to think of the 100-mile nominal range is as a reasonable estimate of the
minimal nominal range at which it is likely to be politically feasible to
stimulate a substantial shift to electric vehicles, should that be judged
appropriate public policy: the EV is not yet quite competitive with a con-
ventional car; but the inconvenience imposed on the user (i.e. on voters) is
nevertheless not very severe. It is really only with vehicles significantly
beyond this hypothesized 100-mile "shoulder of the curve" that it is plaus-
ible to envision a significant impact of electric cars in the absence of
rather strong pressures imposed by government policy.
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7.4.4 Implications for Marketable Vehicles
We have seen that a car with a nominal range of 50 miles is by no means
adequate if our criterion is a 50-mile practical range. For the practical
range could hardly be taken as more than 25 miles, which is less even than
the average day's travel. In parts of the country with severe winters or
hilly terrain; the guaranteed range would be substantially less. Since with
current technology (i.e., lead/acid batteries) an electric car with perfor-
mance approaching that of a conventional subcompact could hardly be provided
with a nominal range of significantly more than 50 miles, we must judge that
such cars would be very inconvenient for a typical user. In terms of a range/
value curve, their value, for a typical user, would be modest compared to a
conventional car, since a good used conventional car is very likely to be
preferred to an electric car of such limited range.
It does not seem to help matters to consider the low-mileage driver as
a particularly promising EV market. About 25% of cars are driven under about
6,000 miles per year, or an average of only 16 miles per day [73]. At least
in favorable parts of the country (mild climate, flat terrain) this presum-
ably falls within the practical range of lead/acid cars. However, under these
specially favorable conditions, two problems arise. First, for some substan-
tial fraction of low-mileage users, low average mileage carries no implication
that the vehicle is used only for short range travel. For example consider
the owner who belongs to a car pool or lives close to work, and uses the car
primarily on weekends. His average mileage per day ver the year is low, but
his average mileage on the days when he actually accumulates most of the mile-
age on the car is not low. Second, even if the average mileage per day is
not a misleading indicator, an economic problem arises. This is partly be-
311
cause battery life tends to be partly a function of the number of charge/dis-
charge cycles (not simply a function of the total mileage) and partly because
unless the car is heavily used, the owner cannot obtain the economic advan-
tages associated with the long operating life and low maintenance of electri-
cal equipment.
We encounter a fundamental dilemma: unless the car is driven as much as
a typical conventional car, its cost per mile will be substantially higher
than that indicated by calculations which assume the canonical 10,000 miles
per year. On the other hand, if it is driven 10,000 miles or so per year
(and perhaps even if it is not) then the kinds of ranges that seem plausible
for lead/acid cars will make range limitation a recurring inconvenience to
the driver. Either way there is a gross mismatch between the costs of the
vehicle and its value compared to that of a conventional alternative.
This does not mean that no electric cars will be marketed within the
next few years. In a rich country of 200 million people, there is some mar-
ket for electric cars which can be built today, as there is some market for
$50,000 luxury cars and for antique Model T's. But the prospect of a nation-
ally significant market for such cars is negligible.
It is physically possible to build an electric car today with performance
considerably exceeding lead/acid performance, possibly reaching an "almost
competitive" range. Various batteries, such as silver-zinc and nickel-cadmium,
are commercially available which would allow EV performance to be roughly
doubled compared to lead-acid cars. But the costs would be extravagant. The
cost of the silver/zinc battery powering the GM Electrovair experimental ve-
hicle was reported as $15,000 (1964 dollars). Even though a major fraction
of the cost could be reclaimed through salvage, the sheer carrying costs of
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the investment required and the problem of physical security for the material
present irremediable difficulties. Nickel/cadmium batteries are 3 to 6 times
as expensive per watt hour as lead/acid.
This does not quite settle the issue of near-term prospects of EV's; for
one can make a case for subsidizing electric vehicles. The argument for sub-
sidies turns partly on the grounds that the social value of conserving fuel
exceeds the price charged to individual drivers. Hence EV users could very
reasonably be subsidized at least to the extent of the difference between
the market price of fuel and the "shadow price" (somehow chosen) reflecting
the full social value of the fuel saved. An additional increment (again,
somehow chosen) could be allowed for the social benefits that are estimated
to go with reduced vehicle emissions.
A second line of argument for subsidies concerns the social value of
stimulating an electric vehicle industry. If we believe that it may be im-
portant to the nation to have the option to move expeditiously to widespread
use of electric cars late in this century (when incentives for fuel conser-
vation may be far more intense than today, and when superior battery tech-
nology may be available), then it would appear advantageous to stimulate the
evolution of an electric vehicle industry. For the more gradual the transi-
tion to substantial EV usage, the more manageable will be the transition,
involving (as it would) major changes in a vastly important component of our
social system, affecting the interests and (perhaps as important) the habits
of almost every part of society. Further, a growing EV industry would stim-
ulate a broad advance in technology and know-how applicable to electric ve-
hicles, no element of which is comparable in importance to improving battery
technology, but which (in sum) adds up to an important element of the ulti-
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mate feasability of wide EV usage.
We cannot address these matters in detail within the present discussion.
But by considering the prospects of current and near-term technologies, one
can get some sense of the plausibility of effectively stimulating the indus-
try with subsidies that could be reasonably justified. We believe this is
sufficient to reach some clear judgements about the kind of program to stim-
ulate EV usage which would be most attractive, if such an effort is undertaken.
In this context of near-term prospects, we want to consider the possi-
bility of improvements in nickel/zinc technology, which has attracted a good
deal of interest in the past year or so. [109,110 ] This technology could
provide (assuming current R & D efforts are successful) an electric car with
nominal range in the 100 to 200 mile category we have designated as "almost
competitive". From the estimates of Table 7.1 we can see that their cost
would be comparable to lead/acid cars, but their range would be more attrac-
tive. (The Table 7.1 nickel/zinc entry is based on GRC's estimate of the
cost of a vehicle with 150-mile nominal range.) Thus, in contrast to current
(and generally forecast) lead/acid technology, the vehicle could plausibly
be "almost competitive"; while in contrast to silver/zinc or nickel/cadmium
1technology the costs may not be absolutely forbidding.
The way we will proceed will be to develop a necessarily crude but we
1Since the nominal range of the nickel/zinc car on which the Table 7.2
number is based was about 150 miles, one might consider the cost per mile
number conservative, since the batteries are large enough to provide substan-
tially more than the minimum nominal range we judged reasonable. However,
whether this proves the case depends on the power/energy tradeoffs for the
nickel/zinc batteries. On the sketchy information presently available from
informal discussions with developers, it seems quite possible that a nickel/
zinc vehicle with adequate power may necessarily have something of the order
of 150-mile nominal range on the rather benign SAE cycle.
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believe reasonable notion of how much battery technology must improve to
provide a car in our "almost competitive" range, assuming what seems a con-
servative (high) estimate of the price of conventional fuel. The latter may
be interpreted either as an actual price in the event of a further large in-
crease in the cost of crude oil (or substitutes); or as a shadow price for
fuel, with the difference between the actual price and the socially-valued
shadow price used to subsidize electric vehicles.
Of course a vehicle at the lower end of our "almost competitive" range
(i.e. 100-mile nominal range) would still require subsidies (even in the e-
vent of high fuel prices) for substantial market penetration to make up for
the difference in the value to the user between this car and an unlimited
range conventional car. Consequently, the analysis leaves what we should
judge to be a generous margin for subsidies (or increments to fuel-related
subsidies) intended to take account of the social value of reduced emissions
and stimulation of the industry.
We also consider the prospects of EV's in commercial fleet applications
(rather than in the role of private cars) and, briefly, the possibility of
hybrid vehicles.
Against this background, we then reach the essential questions of the
present study: the problems and prospects of Federally-supported R & D on
EV technology.
7.4.5 Technology Improvement for an "Almost Competitive" Car
Suppose that gasoline prices (or equivalent prices for some substitute
fuel for heat engines) should reach $1.20 per gallon.1 This corresponds to
10r, equivalently, assume that the social value (shadow price) of gas is
treated as $1.20, with the EV subsidized to the extent of the difference be-
tween price at the pump and $1.20.
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a price of crude oil of around $30/barrel, or triple current prices. Numer-
ous other possibilities (syncrude, methanol from wastes, shale oil, even me-
thane from wood) become very plausible options at such extreme prices.
It is clear that no substantial market for electric passenger cars exists
with current technology, even with gas prices in the range of $1.20 per gal-
lon. There is no need to frame a theoretical argument to make this point.
One need only look at the situation in Europe and Japan, where (due to high
taxes on fuel) gasoline prices have approximated such levels for some years,
and where driving distances are shorter than in the U.S., and where (never-
theless) no market for electric passenger cars has developed. One would like
to have some feel for how much improvement over current technology is re-
quired in order to make a significant impact of electric cars plausible; we
have examined that issue in terms of capability (in particular, the range)
which is likely to be required. We now consider the cost side of the picture.
It is clearly possible to produce small conventional cars that will de-
liver 30 miles to the gallon in urban driving: indeed cars approximating this
fuel economy are already on the market, and further improvements are univer-
sally anticipated1 (see Chapter 4). Thus the cost per mile of fuel for cars
comparable to forseeable electric passenger cars is unlikely to exceed 4 cents
per mile so long as the price of crude oil or substitute equivalents does not
exceed $30/barrel. Electric vehicles today invariably cost (purchase cost)
substantially more (exclusive of the battery) than comparable conventional ve-
hicles. However, assuming that through economics of mass production and tech-
nological advances, and taking account of the low maintenance and long life
1The Honda Civic obtained 29 mpg on the EPA city/suburban cycle; 40 mpg
on the highway cycle.
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of electric motors, these lifetime costs per mile became comparable.1 Assume
the electricity usage is 0.5 kwh/mile (taking into account charging and sub-
sequent losses) and that, optimistically, off-peak power is available at
2¢/kwh. Hence electricity cost is about l/mile, and therefore 3/mile is
available for battery depreciation if the electric vehicle is to be equal in
cost to the conventional vehicle.
How high would this cost be for an "almost competitive" car with current
technology? There are serious problems in estimating this number even for
current technology, since no lead/acid car currently on the market even ap-
proaches our "almost competitive" requirements. (Consumer Reports has re-
cently provided an appraisal of currently available EV's [103]; some reasons
for the difficulty of estimating costs of batteries are given in Section
7.5.1 below.) GRC's estimate of "worst performance" for a future lead/acid
battery might be taken as a reasonable estimate of today's state-of-the-art.
If so, the cost comes to about 10/mile [101, Task Report 9, Table 2.3], but
this is based on 1967 information. We are not aware of any claims for major
advances since that time, so that an estimate for current (1975) technology
of 6/mile seems optimistic. This is still a factor of 2 higher than needed
to make a lead/acid car equivalent in cost to a conventional car.
Consequently, in addition to the factor of 2 improvement of performance
beyond the best current batteries (increasing nominal range from 50 miles to
1One must distinguish here between the electric passenger car, and the
electric commercial vehicle. Total cost per mile comparability is clearly
more than feasible with commercial vehicles, where their intensive use makes
maintenance a more important component of cost than for a private car, and
where vehicles are used long enough to take full advantage of the long use-
ful life of an electric motor. The assumption of the text is reasonable,
though not conservative, for a private passenger car. The assumption of the
text on the cost of off-peak electricity is decidedly optimistic.
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our shoulder of the curve" estimate of 100 miles), an improvement in costs
by at least a factor of 2 is also required. In terms of a measure of over-
all performance per dollar we therefore require something of a factor of 4
improvement over current battery technology to build electric passenger cars
that begin to be plausibly significant in terms of petroleum conservation.
This is the number to have in mind in considering potential payoffs from ef-
forts to develop a potentially viable electric car option. Beyond this min-
imum required step in battery technology, one would like to see at least a
significant potential for the technology pursued to eventually reach a fur-
ther factor of 2 improvement in performance in order to reach vehicles which
might plausibly be able to compete with conventional cars in the absence of
the kind of palpable crisis that would create (or make politically plausible)
the severe constraints on fuel availability that would be required to make
substantial market penetration possible for our hypothesized "shoulder of
the curve", 100-mile nominal range, vehicle.
7.4.6 Fleet Operations
Note that this discussion has been concerned solely with the electric
passenger car. For the reasons such as those reviewed, the passenger car
is the most difficult role for the electric vehicle. Selected fleet opera-
tions of electric vehicles are substantially less demanding. They are likely
to be important in the evolution of an electric vehicle industry, even though
fleet operations alone are not likely to add up to a nationally significant
impact on fuel conservation.
It will be useful to review some of the reasons why fleet operations
are far more advantageous for electric vehicles.
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1. Maximum required daily ranges for a number of applications are rea-
sonably short and highly predictable. (The current U.S. Postal Service ex-
periment with electric mail delivery trucks will require only 11 miles per
day on an average route. [111] The day-to-day variation in range on a given
delivery route is essentially zero.)
2. The fleet manager can assign vehicles (or batteries to vehicles) to
make the best use of his inventory. The problem of loss of battery perfor-
mance with age is a minor one in an operation where it merely requires assign-
ing vehicles with older batteries to less demanding routes, rather than con-
tinual adjustment of the driver to lower performance as the battery ages.
3. Battery exchange, maintenance, and recharging are all simplified
when vehicles are routinely returned to a central base.
4. Vehicle failure is not a significant problem for the driver. Not
only are such failures less likely than for a passenger car, given the pre-
dictability of routes and the central maintenance and charging facility, but
the consequences of a failure are entirely different for a fleet operation
and a private driver. For the former, battery exhaustion on 1% of trips
would be a minor cost in the overall operation, and handled by routine pro-
cedure. For a private driver a 1% failure rate would be intolerable: few
people indeed would tolerate a vechicle which had to be towed home 3 days a
year (especially a vehicle which has (at best) minimal cost advantages over
a conventional vehicle and which is burdened with the performance disadvantage
of limited range).
5. For typical fleet operations, the total usage per vehicle generally
exceeds that of a private passenger car. This advantage bears significantly
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on the relative cost of electric as compared to conventional vehicles in at
least two ways:
a.) Other things equal, a battery designed to provide modest
performance over a long duty cycle (such as an urban delivery ve-
hicle) will produce markedly better overall output (measured, say
in ton-miles/$) than a vehicle which must deliver its output in a
brief period (a passenger car which is likely to be in actual use
less than 2 hours a day).
b.) A significant prospective advantage of electric vehicles
is low maintenance costs and long life relative to a conventional
vehicle. The more intensively the vehicle is used, the more sig-
nificant this advantage becomes.
6. The vehicle can be tailored to meet the particular requirement of
the fleet. (The U.S. Postal Service electric vans would be almost useless
in any other operations other than delivering mail. But since their only
mission is delivering mail, they can be optimized for precisely that special-
ized role. Similarly, regenerative breaking -- recapturing a portion of the
energy used to accelerate the vehicle -- is only marginally interesting for
a passenger car. But an urban bus, which dissipates a large fraction of its
total energy in braking, might profitably incorporate this feature.)
7. Finally, it is in specialized fleet applications that relatively
small numbers of electric vehicles are most likely to yield relatively sig-
nificant environmental gains. Spread widely a small EV fleet will be incon-
sequential. But concentrated in particular areas, such as urban centers,
the environmental effects may be important. Indeed, such environmental ad-
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vantages have played a significant role in the existing limited commercial
market for electric vehicles: an important asset of electric golf carts is
that they are quieter than gasoline equivalents; similar considerations have
helped the promotion of electric power for lift trucks and in-plant person-
nel carriers. EV's for use in urban centers with dense traffic will have
the greatest efficiency advantage as compared to conventional cars, since
no energy is used idling.
In sum then, there are many reasons to suppose that successful early
applications of EV technology will come in the field of specialized fleet
operations, not in the field of private passenger cars.
One possibly important qualification to this discussion is required.
We have considered only "pure" electric vehicles. Numerous possible hybrid
vehicles have been explored in paper studies, (and occasionally, though to
date not very successfully, in test vehicles). Hybrids generally, though
not always, involve electric cars as one of the components. A hybrid EV may
have sufficient power from the non-electric component of the drive to allow
the vehicle to get home even in the event of battery depletion. Such on
board "insurance" is likely to be very important to the driver of a passenger
car, even if it is very rarely needed; for the burden of worrying about whe-
ther the car will be adequate is probably more important in limiting the ac-
ceptability of short-range vehicles than the perhaps rare occasions in which
serious difficulties actually arise.
Thus, in principle, a hybrid approach to the electric passenger car has
the prospect of producing a competitive vehicle with considerably more modest
improvement in battery technology than appear to be necessary for a pure
electric vehicle. The question is whether the economics of such an approach
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could be made plausible. Further, a hybrid approach is probably only in-
teresting if the development is one that provides growth potential to evolve
into a pure electric vehicle. And, finally, many of the arguments just given
for expecting early EV applications to be most feasible in connection with
commercial fleets, not private cars, apply as well to hybrids.
On net, there are strong grounds for skepticism about hybrid passenger
cars. But the issues have not been explored in this study, and warrant fur-
ther study.
7.5 R & D Issues
7.5.1 Some Pitfalls in Discussing Battery Technology
A source of difficulty in making judgements on battery R & D prospects
is that the problem of defining the capabilities of a battery is as beset
with pitfalls as the problem of defining the practical range of an EV (to
which so much space was devoted in the previous section). It is useful to
list some of the major design considerations in a battery:
1. Power density (determining the weight of a battery ade-
quate to provide required performance).
2. Energy density (determining the weight of a battery ade-
quate to provide given range under some standardized set of
conditions.
3. Manufacturing cost (considering both inherent cost of
materials, and suitability of the design to mass production).
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4. Cycle life (i.e. the number of charge/discharge cycles
before the battery must be replaced).
The often severe tradeoffs among these design features (we have already
stressed the power/energy density tradeoffs) are easily lost sight of in dis-
cussions of battery improvements. For example the performance of current
lead/acid batteries is well below 20% of theoretical maximum performance.
Consequently, it is not surprising to find there is no severe problem in
building an experimental battery which markedly outperforms existing commer-
cial batteries. Where severe problems tend to be encountered is in obtaining
the markedly improved performance without substantially offsetting disadvan-
tages in areas such as manufacturing costs or cycle life.
Other areas where misunderstandings can easily arise include the following: 
1. Discharge time. (We noted in the previous section that a battery
designed to be discharged over a fairly long duty cycle -- say the 6 hours of
a postal van, or the 8 hours of a lift truck -- will give better performance
than a car battery which must be designed to discharge in an hour or two.)
2. Degradation during a single cycle. (Again, as noted earlier, bat-
tery performance in terms of maximum power output degrades not only over the
life of the battery, but within each cycle as the battery is discharged. The
battery size required to maintain some minimum performance level throughout
a nominal "deep discharge" will be quite sensitive to the extent of this de-
gradation.)
3. Degradation across cycles. (The "cycle life" mentioned earlier is
generally taken to be the life of the battery until performance has fallen
to 60% of the original level. A battery which maintains a fairly constant
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performance level almost to the end of its useful life, with severe degra-
dation setting in only at that point, would obviously be superior to a bat-
tery which degrades rapidly at the beginning of its life, so that the new
battery performance is drastically misleading as an indicator of typical
performance.
4. Depth of discharge and cycle life. (The most favorable situation
is likely to be that the effect on battery life of a given day's use is
simply proportional to the fraction of a nominal deep discharge cycle which
is expended. More typical, though, is that shallow discharges cause a more
than proportional aging of the battery: that is, typically 10 days of use
at 10% of nominal capacity wears the battery considerably more than 1 day of
maximum use. Different batteries may vary sharply in this regard.)
The point of this brief review is to emphasize the extent to which any
simple specification of battery R & D goals may be drastically misleading as
an indicator of long-run performance and cost of a vehicle powered by the
nominal battery. Further, many additional matters arise beyond those already
mentioned: such as insulation and packaging for advanced batteries using
molten electrolytes or electrodes, temperature controls generally, ease of
integration of the battery into the vehicle when safety and maintenance con-
siderations are considered, and so on.
An important inference which follows from this discussion is that one
must be pessimistic about advanced technologies which appear to have only
marginal prospects of meeting more than minimal performance goals. For even
if explicit R & D goals are met, one must expect performance of production
batteries to fall significantly short of performance calculated from experi-
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mental devices once all of the tradeoffs that have to be faced in an actual
operating vehicle have been dealt with.
7.5.2 Near-Term Battery Prospects
The problems just discussed create particular skepticism about the pros-
pects for pure electric vehicles powered by lead/acid batteries to ever reach
the "shoulder of the curve" performance and cost requirements suggested in the
previous section, even though such performance is certainly theoretically
within reach of the technology. Lead/acid batteries reflect a "mature" tech-
nology with a large and competitive existing commercial market. For many
years there has been an incentive to private developers (here and abroad) to
find ways to make batteries more cheaply, with higher performance, and longer
cycle lives. It would be quite surprising if the kind of radical improvement
in this technology that would be required for a reasonably acceptable passen-
ger car were now to emerge. It is also worth noting that until fairly re-
cent years, lead/acid batteries were critical in the performance of military
submarines, because until the advent of atomic power, underwater performance
was severely limited by battery technology. Thus the current state of lead/
acid technology includes the results of a period of some decades -- approxi-
mately 1915-1955 -- during which promising improvements in the technology would
have been strong competitors for naval R & D support in a number of leading
technical nations, notably Germany, Japan, and later the Soviet Union.
To a lesser degree, the preceding point also applies to nickel/zinc bat-
teries. However, one can be somewhat less pessimistic about the prospects
here. Both Gould and General Motors have recently asserted that major improve-
ments in the economics of these batteries are in sight. [109,110] Little
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use has been made of this technology in the past, since the cost of nickel
electrodes and the limited durability of zinc electrodes have combined to
make the combination economically unattractive. (For some years performance
has been sufficient to plausibly reach our "shoulder of the curve" require-
ments.) It is fair to report that there is a good deal of skepticism in
other quarters of the industry about prospects here. These largely stem
from the fact that a good deal of work has been done on nickel and zinc sys-
tems: nickel/cadmium and silver/zinc batteries have both enjoyed considerable
support for highly specialized (generally military) applications, where their
high materials costs have been acceptable. There is skepticism that a num-
ber of the major problems with the nickel/cadmium and silver/zinc batteries
can be overcome to allow production of economically viable nickel/zinc bat-
teries. It will probably be another two years before we have clear evidence
of how well these R & D efforts are succeeding. No immediate issue of govern-
ment-supported R & D appears to rise in this area, since the private devel-
opers assert they are adequately funded and are not requesting government
support.
(This points to a more general problem with near-term technology, es-
pecially technology which is useful for a wider class of applications than
EV's. If private firms are enthusiastic about the progress they are making,
they tend to be reluctant to accept government funding: they do not want to
compromise their patent position. It is when the venture looks too risky
for private investment that managers permit their laboratories to seek publ-
lic funding. This does not necessarily mean that the government is being
asked to support work that i not worth supporting. As stressed in Chapter
3, the social value of the technology may exceed the return which a private
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developer can capture, and an investment which offers inadequate prospects
to attract private financing may remain quite attractive as a social invest-
ment. But the situations in which public investment are most warranted even
though private investment finds the venture inadequately promising tend not
to be those in which near-term commercial applications are clearly available
if the program is successful, aside from the inherently risky possibility of
EV applications.)
Several cautionary points may be noted regarding nickel/zinc technology.
From the sketchy data that has been released, it appears that there may be
severe power/energy tradeoffs at high power levels for these batteries. (Ap-
parently, the developers themselves remain quite uncertain about the perfor-
mance tradeoffs that might be involved in commercial versions of the battery.)
And costs (per storage capacity) are unlikely to be lower than those of cur-
rent lead/acid batteries. Although a marginally satisfactory ("shoulder of
the curve") passenger car in'terms of performance may evolve from this tech-
nology (possibly a hybrid), barring severe constraints on fuel availability,
a significant market for such cars would still require heavy subsidies.
Some numbers will give some feeling for the subsidies likely to be re-
quired. Assume both that gasoline prices rise to $1.20 per gallon and what
appears to be an optimistic 5/mile cost for batteries derived by GRC from
developers' estimates [101, Task Report 9, p.13]. For comparable cars (aside
from EV range limitation) Table 7.1 indicates that about 3/mile subsidy is
still needed to equalize total cost per mile for the two cars. An addition-
al l¢/mile is a conservative estimate of the additional subsidy needed to
offset the fact that the car is only "almost competitive" with a convention-
al car, not fully competitive. The car has a still-significant range problem.
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This comes to $400 per year for a car driven the typical average of 10,000
miles per year. (As noted earlier, assuming the car will be marketed to low-
mileage users does not necessarily improve the economics.) Note that this is
not a one-time subsidy at the time of purchase, but $400 every year over the
estimated 12-year life of the car.
Even this may be far too little, not only because it is based on clearly
optimistic assumptions, but because, on those assumptions, a new battery
costing about $3000 is needed for the car every four years. (The new car
cost of the nickel/zinc EV is divided almost equally between the cost of the
battery and the cost of the rest of the car.) Would many people, even given
the subsidy, spend $3000 to refurbish a 5-10 year-old car?
Consequently, even granting the various grounds for subsidizing EV's
noted in an earlier section, the prospect for an interesting role for nickel/
zinc private cars appears very dim, particularly where incentives for stimu-
lating the development of the industry could be provided in the far more
plausible context (for reasons reviewed in Section 7.4) of commercial vehi-
cles for specialized use.
Note that the enthusiasm of the privateiy-funded developers does not re-
quire that there be a significant application to electric passenger cars.
Essentially what they hope to achieve is a battery which costs no more than
current lead/acid batteries (for given capacity) but which weighs half as
much. These investments could produce a handsome return even if there is
no application as the prime energy source for passenger cars, or even to the
more tractable (but limited, and as yet ill-defined) application of special-
ized fleet operations.
Summarizing the discussion so far, we may conclude:
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Current Systems - Current lead/acid technology is inadequate to power
a reasonable substitute for a conventional car, even assuming we are consider-
ing only a second car for urban use, and largely neglecting cost. So far as
we can see, the belief often encountered to the contrary depends crucially
on the understandable, but quite unwarranted, assumption that the nominal
range of these vehicles is in fact a reasonable approximation of their prac-
tical range. A demonstration of this technology is almost certain to produce
disillusionment rather than enthusiasm for electric cars.
A more reasonable urban car can be built using nickel/cadmium batteries,
and an "almost competitive" urban car can be built using silver/zinc batter-
ies. But the costs per mile would be so high (a factor of 2 or more greater
than a comparable conventional vehicle) that the demonstration is scarcely
likely to make the electric vehicle credible to the public. (For the silver/
zinc vehicle, there would also be a non-crucial problem of protecting the
cars from theft.) More plausible applications of current technology, even in
a subsidized demonstration program, lie in the area of specialized fleet
operations.
Near-Term Systems - The two possibilities which have been widely dis-
cussed are a greatly improved lead/acid battery and a more economical nickel/
zinc battery. At least two major firms (Gould and GM) have announced that
they are well along on nickel/zinc development programs. If the nickel/zinc
technology proves to be successful, these batteries will be markedly superior
to current lead/acid technology at comparable prices, but nickel/zinc cars
still require large subsidies of the order of several hundred dollars per year
(for the life of the car) to achieve any significant place in the private
car market at gas prices of $1.20 per gallon. They may prove to be competi-
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tive (or competitive with relatively modest subsidies) in some fleet appli-
cations, even at current gas prices, and they may contribute to the viability
of hybrid technologies. One must be markedly more pessimistic about the
dramatic improvements occasionally claimed in prospect for lead/acid batter-
ies, and particularly concerned that claimed potential advances in power or
energy density may not be achievable without degradation of other aspects of
battery performance or cost. While radical improvements in this mature tech-
nology are not impossible, they would be surprising.
7.5.3 Advanced Batteries Prospects
To reach capabilities which have at least the potential for a significant
national impact on petroleum conservation, (without obviously requiring either
massive subsidies or an intense fuel shortage) we must look to radically
different kinds of technology, of which the most widely discussed for electric
vehicle applications are fuel cells, the zinc slurry battery, the zinc chlor-
ide battery, and several types of high temperature batteries.
1. Fuel Cells - We have little to add to the many available discussions
of fuel cell technology, other than to note that our inquiries in the U.S. and
among developers in Europe have indicated a general mood of pessimism, and
a consequent tendency to focus funding elsewhere. The basic problems remain
those that have been faced for many years: fuel cells which use reasonably
inexpensive fuel (e.g. hydrogen) require expensive catalysts, such as non-
trivial amounts of platinum; fuel cells which avoid the use of expensive
catalysts, require expensive fuel, such as hydrazine. The prevailing pessi-
mism stems from the lack of promising research approaches to dealing with one
or the other of these problems. So the situation remains that fuel cells are
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potentially interesting, but for the forseeable future are likely to remain
economically unfeasible.
An important but secondary problem is that fuel cells (barring another
kind of breakthrough) are quite severely limited in power density, hence
requiring an unreasonably large volume and weight of cells to provide suf-
ficient power for automotive applications. The reason this problem is sec-
ondary is that, given a breakthrough on the basic economics of fuel cells,
they would become an attractive component of a hybrid using batteries, fly-
wheels, or some other stored energy source for peak power requirements. In
particular, a fuel cell/battery hybrid -- since both power systems would be
electric -- would be relatively easy to build.
2. Zinc Slurry Battery - This is a form of zinc/air battery (or so-called
because oxygen taken from the air is a component of the reactions involved)
in which finely divided zinc powder is suspended in a liquid forming a slurry
which is pumped through the battery. Power densities appear to be limited,
but somewhat better (at acceptable energy density levels) than fuel cells.
There has been a good deal of interest in this kind of battery as applicable
to a modest-performance urban car. Depending on the performance actually a-
chieved, a successful development along these lines might reach our "shoulder
of the curve" performance; or it might (like the fuel cell) be an attractive
component of a hybrid.
At the moment serious work on this concept is largely abroad, principally
by Sony in Japan and in several French laboratories. In the U.S., at least,
there is considerable pessimism about the prospects, largely because of the
disappointing results of efforts, funded by utilities here, to develop zinc/
air batteries for load leveling.
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The great advantage of the zinc slurry approach is that the battery is
recharged by changing the slurry, an operation (hopefully) not much more
time-consuming than refilling the tank of the conventional car. However,
the logistics are more complicated than with conventional fuel (the old slur-
ry must be drained and reprocessed), and the range between refills will be
very short compared to a conventional vehicle, which can easily be provided
with a fuel tank giving 250 miles of range between visits to the service
station, compared to 50 miles or so for the zinc slurry battery.
But, assuming refilling stations are widely available, the problems of
practical range stressed in our previous discussion are enormously erased.
For on occasions where actual range turns out to be well short of nominal
range, the driver faces only a stop at a service station, rather than creeping
home on inadequate power or requiring a tow. Should this technology actually
become available, there would be an obvious role for the government (should
it be deemed in the public interest to encourage adoption of the technology)
in subsidizing the early stages of developing the refilling station network
required. Until the technology becomes available, the question remains moot.
3. Zinc Chloride Battery - The key to this system is maintaining the
required chlorine in a frozen compound, which requires that the temperature be
kept below 8 C (15° F). Hence the system is mechanically rather complicated,
requiring a refrigerator and auxilliary pumps. The technology has the poten-
tial, though, (unlike any discussed so far) of providing a combination of
power density and energy density clearly beyond our "shoulder of the curve".
The work is supported by a consortium of Occidental Petroleum and Gulf+Western
with significant participation by Gould. It is clear that Gould, at least,
has become disillusioned with progress to date. Aside from the complexity
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of the system, and the obvious need for careful measures to deal with the
possibility of a breakdown of the refrigeration system (which would initiate
the release of chlorine gas), the system faces a complex fundamental problem
which to date does not seem to have been resolved: no satisfactory method
of recharging the battery has been demonstrated. Until this is accomplished,
the system remains completely impractical for its intended automotive appli-
cation. (This points up one of the difficulties with "demonstrations" in
which what is being demonstrated has not been clearly defined in a useful and
promising way. A zinc/chloride powered vehicle was impressively demonstrated
as long ago as 1971; but the demonstration was rather meaningless in the ab-
sence of any practical way to recharge the battery.)
4. High-Temperature Batteries - Many previously unexplored combinations
of materials with high electrochemical potential have been considered in re-
cent years in work which accepts the difficulties of working with ordinarily
solid materials in a molten state. The attraction is the possibility of
order-of-magnitude improvements over lead/acid performance: any number of
these combinations have the potential of providing a car battery which pro-
vides competitive performance to a conventional car together with nominal
range (possibly approaching or exceeding 200 miles) which is clearly beyond
our "shoulder of the curve" and at a cost that might be competitive with a
conventional car even at current gas prices. The prospective economies come
partly from the use of inherently cheap materials, such as sulphur; partly
because the performance is so good that a relatively small mass of material
is required. If the developers' goals are-achieved, these vehicles could
conceivably save a cent or more per mile over conventional cars (total oper-
ating costs), aside from whatever social value is attributed to relieving de-
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pendence on petroleum. But the complexity of the technologies leaves both
the achievability of the performance goals in a practical design, and the de-
tails of the economics, very uncertain.
The fundamental technical problems facing all high-temperature battery
programs concern materials: chemical reactions are characteristically ac-
celerated at high temperatures. This (in part) is the source of the high
potential performance of these batteries. But it introduces severe problems
of corrosion as well as other modes of deterioration of the battery materials.
Beyond this, there are critical design problems to handle the insulation re-
quirements of these batteries; to assure that the battery is not severely
damaged should the materials be allowed to solidify, as must be at least oc-
casionally anticipated in automotive applications; to assure reasonable safe-
ty standards in the event of a crash; and so on.
Work to date on the high-temperature batteries has been stimulated pri-
marily by the potential market for load leveling batteries for the utility
industry. This is an inherently easier technical problem than the automotive
application. The batteries would be stationary; they would have highly pre-
dictable duty cycles; modest power densities are quite adequate; the safety
and maintenance problems inherent in an automotive application are greatly
eased; and so on.
We may conclude with a few comments on the two leading candidates for a
high temperature battery, lithium/sulphur (in which the leading role has been
played by ERDA's Argonne National Laboratory) and sodium/sulphur (developed
at Ford). It is first worth noting that the Argonne and Ford batteries in-
volve very different technologies: in the Argonne (lithium/sulphur) battery,
and variants being pursued elsewhere, including GM, the electrolyte is molten;
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the electrodes themselves may not be (a point we will return to). In the Ford
battery, the electrodes are molten, and the key to the technology is a porous
ceramic (beta alumina) solid electrolyte, which separates the molten elec-
trodes but allows the migration of electrons across the interface.
The particular development which is the current focus of interest at
Argonne uses solid electrodes, which considerably compromised the ultimate
potential of the battery. This represents an important redirection of the
program several years ago in the face of technical difficulties. Thus, at
the moment, the potential of the Ford battery is superior, and it is perhaps
not surprising to find that more laboratories are following the Ford lead
than that of Argonne, some using beta alumina, others experimenting with al-
ternative solid electrolytes. An important, but not necessarily conflicting,
exception is GM, which has a substantial effort on the Argonne type of bat-
tery, but focused on the more difficult molten sulphur version (under the
direction of the former leader of the Argonne program).
The Argonne program is, of course, fully funded by the U.S. Government.
The Ford program is primarily funded by the U.S. Government, currently through
NSF support, with ERDA support planned in future years. An important effort
in Britain on sodium/sulphur batteries is government-funded. Numerous smaller
efforts are underway around the world, with some mix of public and private
funding.
In sum, then, a considerable number of potentially "reasonably competi-
tive" batteries are in principle feasible; substantial efforts are underway
on two basically different types of high-temperature, high-performance, bat-
teries, with numerous more modest efforts here and abroad exploring variants
or alternatives to these efforts; all face difficult technical problems and
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it is likely to be several years before confident estimates could be made of
when (or if) these efforts will produce the kind of battery that would make
a significant market for electric cars plausible. Finally, as with all the
advanced battery technologies, early automotive applications are likely to
come in highly specialized roles, not in vehicles suitable for the passenger
car market. The battery discussion just concluded is based primarily on our
interviews with research workers in the field. General reviews, several
years old but not significantly out of date, may be found in [112,113,114].
7.5.4 Non-Battery R & D
The discussion so far has been concerned solely with battery develop-
ment. But the cost and performance of electric vehicles will be affected by
many other aspects of vehicle design and equipment. We provide a brief dis-
cussion. It is useful to distinguish among several categories of possible
other-than-battery R & D:
1. Developments unique to the EV, as' contrasted to developments common
to many automotive applications. The key items of the former category are
electric motors and their associated controls. Key examples of the latter are
low-friction tires and body designs which minimize aerodynamic drag.
2. Development which can be effectively pursued independently of total
vehicle design as compared to those which cannot. For example, work on low-
friction tires would be independent of overall vehicle desgin, but work on
body design to minimize drag would interact with requirements imposed on the
vehicle: both those which apply to vehicles generally (for example, safety
regulations requiring side mirrors), and those associated with the volume,
shape, and weight requirements for a particular battery, especially as they
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interact with safety and maintenance constituents.
3. Advanced development and production engineering as contrasted with
research and exploratory development. For example, refinement of an existing
motor design to optimize it for EV application, vs. development of a novel
type of electric motor uniquely suited to the EV application.
4. Rapidly evolving technologies as versus mature technologies. For
example, advances in controllers for EV probably would rely heavily on ad-
vanced solid state electronic technology, a rapidly evolving field. A new
motor, though, would primarily involve adapting a mature technology to op-
timize a motor for the EV application.
All of these distinctions tie into the issue of whether R & D should ap-
propriately be focused on long-lead-time efforts or short-lead-time efforts.
If it were realistic to believe the acceptable mass-market EV's could be
ready for production within 5 years, then a substantial effort on short-lead-
time efforts would be justified. One might decide to fund a program to de-
velop an advanced controller using today's solid state technology, for exam-
ple. On the other hand, if it is unrealistic to believe that anacceptable
mass market EV could be produced in less than ten years, then an effort of
that kind might well be a waste of money: solid state technology continues
to evolve so rapidly that a device based on current technology is quite like-
ly to be obsolete by the time the occasion for its use arises.
Similar considerations arise on the other issues. Particularly impor-
tant is the contrast between engineering development and production engineer-
ing as versus more basic R & D. It is, by far, the former which requires
the heavier investment for such things as detailed design, pilot plants, and
elaborate test facilities. A few million dollars a year may be quite signif-
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icant funding for advanced R & D; it will be a drop in the bucket compared
to the investments that would have to be made in the late stage of the R & D
process.
Having in mind these points, a few comments seem in order:
1. The summary of battery issues presented here reflects our impression
,that there is a strong concensus of opinion in that portion of the technical
community in the best position to make such judgements. Naturally, variations
on individual points abound, and perhaps even more naturally, one finds that
individuals associated with particular technological :efforts tend to be rela-
tively optimistic about their own work and relatively more pessimistic about
work that is competitive with their own. Nevertheless, there seems to be a
broad and well-founded consensus that a mass market vehicle employing advanced
batteries could hardly be produced in less than 10 years .(i.e. by 1985) no
matter how urgently the technology is pushed and how generously it is funded.
Thus important impacts from current R & D on advanced batteries, if they are
to come, should realistically be judged to lie beyond 1985, and more probably
not before the 1990's.
2. There is much less consensus on the question of whether advanced bat-
teries are in fact required to make a significant role for EV's possible.
For example, currently proposed legislation [108] would finance a rather large
scale (several thousand vehicles) demonstration of the commercial feasibili-
ty of current and near-future state-of-the-art EV's, including passenger cars,
over the next 5 years. The Committee Report notes that "a significant limi-
tation of today's electric vehicles is their range, which is typically about
50 miles . . . However, even this short range is adequate for all (approxi-
mately 98 percent) of the daily travel of the 'second' car". [ ] The
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premise of the bill is that an acceptable urban second car is within reach
in terms of performance and reasonably within reach in terms of economics,
especially if use is subsidized to take account of the social value of the
vehicles and of economies of scale once mass production has begun. There
are currently something like 20,000,000 cars in this country which might be
considered urban second cars. Hence, provided the premises of the legislation
are correct, the demonstration could lead directly to a substantial mass mar-
ket for electric cars in the early 1980's.
Judgements on the appropriate role for Federal R & D will differ radi-
cally, depending on whether one accepts the premises just outlined. If so,
then it seems appropriate, and indeed necessary, to spend a major share of
Federal R & D support on work that will pay off over the next several years,
allowing for its incorporation in the vehicles that will be built and demon-
strated within a relatively few years. It would be very important to make
whatever improvements can be made over the existing vehicles t enhance the
success of the demonstration, and to lay the ground for the large scale com-
mercialization expected to follow the demonstration.
On the other hand, if the premises underlying the demonstration are
deemed unrealistic, then equally clearly whatever portion of the $160 million
proposed demonstration program is allocated to R & D is likely to be very
inefficiently allocated to near-term improvements of a technology which will
remain gravely inadequate. The work is likely to make very little contribu-
tion to more advanced vehicles which might be available in later years (post-
1985 and perhaps more realistically, post-1990).
On the alternative premise (that a mass-marketable electric car requires
radical advances in battery technology), such R & D as is funded on work other
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than advanced batteries should be focused on developments which require long-
lead-times, in areas where technology is not. moving so fast that work begun
now is likely to be obsolete before advanced batteries are available, and
where the broader pressure to improve fuel economy by weight reduction and
streamlining (hence reducing power and energy requirements) will not as a by-
product provide the R & D needed for the EV application.
In sum then, appropriate allocation of R & D work other than batteries
will vary sharply depending on what view one takes of the prospects of near
term EV's. Our own views have been indicated in the discussion which is
summarized in the section below.
7.6 The Electric Vehicle: Summary and Conclusions
1) Over the long run (25 years or more) electric vehicles are an
important, though not assuredly viable, prospect: and it is
important to note that this conclusion does not depend on
current policy with regard to new sources of liquid fuels,
such as shale oil or synthetic oil. For the costs, political
feasibility, and realistic scale of such supplies are necessarily
very uncertain. To the extent that electric vehicles succeed
in penetrating the vehicle market, this is likely to be a
welcome complement to a new fuels program. And, of great
importance, creation of an EV option provides an insurance
policy in the event that pessimistic appraisals of liquid fuel
availability prove justified.
2) Although a substantial market for electric cars is not assured
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even assuming success on development of radically improved
batteries, the prospect is sufficiently attractive that a
good case can be made for Federal encouragement of an electric
vehicle industry (with the important qualifications listed in
the subsequent point). Such encouragement would serve two
important functions:
a. Unlike other alternatives (such as the Stirling or
gas turbine engines), electric vehicles require
broad changes in the infrastructure of the transpor-
tation system. Although the prospect of complete
conversion to electric propulsion lies in the remote
future any substantial usage of electric vehicles
implies important changes in supporting infrastructure
ranging from numerous regulatory details to provision
of wiring suitable for recharging in housing and public
facilities. The problem is not that there are a few
big things that are needed but rather a myriad of
small things. An initially small but growing electric
vehicle industry will encourage these adaptations, and
ease the conditions for a substantial scale transition
when the technology arrives.
b. Although, as has been noted many times, the crucial
problem for electric vehicles is the evolution of
radically improved batteries, numerous other details
of electric vehicle systems would benefit from tech-
nical advances. Public encouragement of the develop-
ment of an electric vehicle industry may well be a more
efficient way to stimulate such across-the-board ad-
vances than public investment in component R & D, at least
until battery development is farther along than it is
today.
3) But the least promising area for government efforts to stimulate
an electric vehicle industry is in the field of private passenger
cars. As we have tried to show in some detail, private cars
with current or near-term battery technology are unlikely to
be competitive with conventional cars unless massively subsidized.
The frequently noted favorable comparisons between the nominal
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range of current technology electric cars and typical urban
driving are quite drastically misleading. The desired growing
industry suggested in the previous point seems least likely
to evolve in the forseeable future if the effort is focused
on passenger cars. Rather, fruitful efforts along these
lines almost certainly must be focused on specialized fleet
applications of electric vehicles: and indeed the number of
promising opportunities for reasonably economic applications
of EV technology is likely to be very limited in the immediate
future. What is needed most clearly is a serious planning
effort, not an immediate action program. Just where might
early applications come? What kinds of specific programs
look promising?
4) With regard to battery R & D, the most important point is that
only advanced batteries appear to have plausible potential
to achieve significant market penetration in the passenger
car field, and of course it is only in the event of significant
penetration of the passenger car markets that EV's can make
an important contribution to fuel conservation. But two
independent (basically different technologies) advanced battery
efforts are currently supported by the Federal Government. A
third substantial effort (an adaptation of one of the American
technologies) is underway in Britain, and what currently appear
to be somewhat less promising efforts are underway in Japan
and France. Progress on each of these efforts has been slow,
but so far as we have been able to determine, not importantly
342
limited by funding limitations. Thus it is not clear that an
immediate increase in funding for battery research would sig-
nificantly improve the prospects for a viable technology.
(Clearly, much more money will be needed once an advanced
battery is ready for engineering and production development.)
However, since the amounts of money are small compared to the
prospective gains and compared to other energy-related efforts,
a reasonable case can be made for providing funding for one or
more additional substantial efforts, selected as the most
promising from among the many currently small-scale efforts
in private industry. This applied R & D work should be accom-
panied by well-supported fundamental research.
With regard to near-term battery R & D (notably improved
lead/acid and nickel/zinc batteries), which would have to power
the early applications of EV technology suggested above, it
appears doubtful that Federal support has an important role
to play, for there are sufficiently large non-automotive markets
for these batteries to encourage substantial private investment.
The incentive for private investment would, of course, be enhanced
if public encouragement for early applications was assured.
5) An important point of detail which is worth noting here is that
the view that a viable electric passenger car must necessarily
be one capable of recharge with the convenience of refilling a
gas tank seems unwarranted. Obviously, the prospects for electric
cars would be greatly enhanced were some approximation of "instant
recharge" feasible. No realistic prospects on this line are
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evident. But the importance of "instant recharge" diminishes as
the range of the vehicle increases, and as (consequently) the
likelihood diminishes that a recharge will be needed other than
at times very convenient to the user (notably, while parked
overnight).
6) In sum, then, we believe that the electric vehicle is an important
prospect for the long run and an important insurance policy
hedging against liquid fuel shortages and/or very high fuel
cost; consequently, we believe that it is well worthwhile to
generously support R & D on batteries and fundamental research
that promises to be applicable to electric cars. We believe
that it would be appropriate to undertake a planning and policy
analysis effort looking towards government-encouraged applications
of electric vehicles within a few years, with a focus on special-
ized fleet applications rather than passenger cars. But we
also believe it is important to be realistic about the time-scales
and problems involved, and that (even more than with other
technologies reviewed in this study) an attempt to produce
dramatic short run results is likely to be disillusioning and
wasteful.
344
(Intentionally Blank)
345
REFERENCES
1. J. B. Heywood, H. D. Jacoby and L. H. Linden, "The Role for
Federal R & D on Alternative Automotive Power Systems,"
M.I.T. Energy Laboratory Report No. MIT-EL-74-013, Cambridge,
Mass., November, 1974.
2. "Energy Policy and Conservation Act," Conference Report to
Accompany S.622, U.S. House of Representatives Report No. 94-700,
Washington, D.C., December 9, 1975.
3. "The Automobile and Air Pollution: A Program for Progress,"
Report of the Panel on Electrically Powered Vehicles to the
Commerce Technical Advisory Board, U.S. Department of Commerce,
Washington, D.C., October, 1967.
4. "Electric Vehicles and Other Alternatives to the Internal
Combustion Engine," Joint Hearings before the Committee on
Commerce and the Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution of
the Committee on Public Works, U.S. Senate, March 14-17 and
April 10, 1967.
5. "An Evaluation of Alternative Power Sources for Low-Emissions
Automobiles," Report of the Panel on Alternate Power Sources
to Committee on Motor Vehicle Emissions, National Academy of
Sciences, Washington, D.C., April, 1973.
6. "Final Report, Current Status of Advanced Alternative Automotive
Power Systems and Fuels, Vol. II - Alternative Automotive Engines,"
Aerospace Corp. Report No. ATR-74 (7325)-2 Vol. II, Report No.
EPA-460/3-74-013b, Environmental Protection Agency, Ann Arbor,
Michigan, July, 1974.
7. T. F. Kirkwood and A. D. Lee, "A Generalized Model for Comparing
Automobile Design Approaches to Improved Fuel Economy," Report
R-1562-NSF, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif., January, 1975.
8. "Should We Have a New Engine? An Automobile Power System
Evaluation," (Two Volumes) Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California
Institute of Technology, Pasadena, Calif., August, 1975.
9; "Electric Vehicle Research, Development, and Demonstration Act
of 1975", Report to Accompany H.R.880, U.S. House of Representatives
Report No. 94-439, Washington, D.C., July 31, 1975.
346
10. "1973/4 Automobile Facts and Figures," Motor Vehicle Manufacturers
Association, Detroit, Michigan.
11. "The Fifty Largest Industrial Corporatiozs," Fortune, May, 1975.
12. L. J. White, The Automobile Industry Since 1945 (Harvard University
Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1971).
13. "Decision of the Administrator of tne Environmental Protection
Agency Regarding Suspension of the 1975 Auto Emission Standards,"
Part 3, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution
of the Committee on Public Works, U.S. Senate, May, 1973, Serial
No. 93-H9.
14. J. W. Ford, testimony reprinted in "The Industrial Reorganization
Act," Hearings before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly
of the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, Part 4, "Ground
Transportation Industries," April, 1974.
15. G. . Leeth, "Energy Conversion Devices for Ground Transportation,"
Fourth Intersociety Energy Conversion Engineering Conference,
Septemper, 1969.
16. W. J. Abernathy and K. Wayne, "Limits to the Learning Curve,"
Harvard Business Review, September-October, 1974.
17. R. U. Ayres and S. Noble, "Economic Impact of Mass Production of
Alternative Low Emissions Automotive Power Systems," U.S. Department
of Transportation Report No. DOT-OS-20003 (Amended), March 6, 1973.
18. R. Gilpin, "Technology, Economic Growth and International Competi-
tiveness," A Report Prepared for the Use of the Subcommittee on
Economic Growth of the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress
of the United States, Joint Committee Print, July 9, 1975.
19. S. E. Boyle, "A Reorganization of the U.S. Automobile Industry,"
Printed for the Use of the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
February, 1974.
20. R. Nader, Unsafe at Any Speed (Bantam Books, New York, 1965).
21. J. C. Esposito, Vanishing Air (Grossman Publishers, New York, 1970).
22. E. Rothschild, Paradise Lost, The Decline of the Auto-Industrial
Age (Vintage Books, New York, 1973).
347
23. F. M. Serer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance
(Rand McNally and Co., Chicago, 1970).
24. "19T5 Almanac Issue," Automotive News, April 23, 1975.
25. S. Wlidhorn, et al., "How to Save Gasoline: Public Policy
Alternatives for the Automobile," Report No. R-1560-NSF, Rand
Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif., October, 1974.
26. "Estimated Factory Installations of Passenger Car Optional
Equipment," Automotive Industries, March 15, 1961.
27. J. K. Galbraith, The Affluent Society (Houghton-Mifflin, Boston,
1958).
28. C. G. Burke, "A Car That May Reshape the Industry's Future,"
Fortune, July, 1972.
29. F. E. Lueck, et al., "Why Disc Brakes," SAE Paper 650172.
30. W. M. Beevers and A. V. Hogan, "Ford's Second Generation Disc
Brake," SAE Paper 680018. 
31.. P. Ware, "The Difficulties of a Car Designer," Appendix E to The
Car Makers, by Graham Turner (Eyre and Spottiswoode, London, 1963).
32. P. L. Mullins, "Capital Budgetting for Research and Development,"
Management Services, May, 1969.
33. J. Jewkes, et al., The Sources of Invention (MacMillan and Co.,
Ltd., London, 1958).
34. O. K Kelley, "Automatic and Hydraulic.Transmissions," SAE
Transactions, April, 1952.
35. L. H. Linden, "The Disc Brake: A 'Quick' Study of a Technological
Innovation in the Automobile Industry," unpublished draft, June,
1975.
36. D. E. Lapedes, et al., "Gas Turbine Engine Production ImDlementation
Study," Aerospace Corp., Rept. No. ATR-73(7323)-l, U.S. Department
of Transportation Report No. DOT-TSC-OST-73-26, July, 1973.
37. "NASA Proposes Aircraft Fuel R & D Effort," Aeronautics and
Astronautics, November, 1975.
348
38. A. J. GroSecker, et al., "The Effects of Stratospheric Pollution
by Aircraft," U.S. Department of Transportation, Washington,
D.C., 1974.
39. "A National Plan for Energy Research, Development and Demonstration;
Creating Energy Choices for the Future," (Two Volumes), U.S. Energy
Research and Development Administration Report No. ERDA-48, June,
1975.
40. G. Eads, "U.S. Government Support for Civilian Technology: Economic
Theory Versus Political Practice," Research Pclicy, 1974.
41. J. H. Holloman, et al., Energy Research and Development, A Report
to the Eergy Policy Project of the Ford Foundation, (Ballinger
Publishing Co., Cambridge, Mlass., 1975).
42. M. L. Monaghan, et al., "A Study of the Diesel as a Light-Duty
Power Plant," U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Report No.
EPA-460/3-74-011, Ann Arbor, Mich., July, 1974.
43. J. R. Moore, and N. R. Baker, "Computational Analysis of Scoring
Models for R & D Project Selection," Management Sciences,
December, 1969.
44. W. E. Souder, "A Scoring Methodology for Assessing the Suitability
of Management Science Models,' Nlanaoement Sciences, June, 1972.
45. T. E. Clarke, "Decision-Making in Technologically Based Organizations:
A Literature Survey of Present Practice,"IEEE Transactions, Engineering
Management, February, 1974.
46. R. E. Gee, "A Survey of Current Project Selection Practices," Research
Management, September, 1971.
47, J. M. Allen, "A Survey into the R & D Evaluation and Control Pro-
cedures Currently Used in Industry,"Journal of Industrial Economics,
July, 1970.
48. C. Ressen, "The Use of Sophisticated Analytical Methods for
Decision-Making in the Aerospace Industry,"MSU Business Topics,
Autumn, 1971.
49. N. R. Baker and W. H. Pound, "R & D Project Selection: Where We
Stand," IEEE Transactions, Engineering Management, December, 1964.
50. R. M. Hogarth, "Cognitive Process and the Assessment of Subjective
Probability Distributions," Journal of the American Statistical
Association, June, 1975.
349
51. C. LaPoirte, "Factors Affecting Vehicle Fuel Economy," SAE Paper
730791.
52. T. C. Austin, et al., "Passenger Car Fuel Economy Trends Through
1976,' SAE Paper 750957.
53. D. A. Hurter, et al., "A Study of Technological Improvements in
Automobile Fuel Consumption," U.S. Department of Transportation
Report No. DOT-TSC-OST-74-40, December, 1974.
54. J. B. Heywood, and R. J. Tabaczynski, "A Review of the Effect of
Engine Control Variables on SI Engine Fuel Economy and Emissions,"
paper presented at Department of Transportation Automobile Engine
Control. orkshop, July 8-9, 1975, to be published in Workshop
Proceedings.
55. E. N. Cantwell et al., "The Effect of Emission Standards and Gas-
oline Quality on Fuel Consumption," SAE Paper 750671.
56. "Report by the Committee on Motor Vehicle Emissions," National
Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C., November, 1974.
57. N. D. Postma, et al., "The Stirling Engine for Passenger Car
Application," SAE Paper 730648.
58. G. Walker, "The Stirling Engine,"Scientific American, August, 1973.
59. G. Walker, Stirling-Cycle Machines (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1973).
60. R. J. Meijer, testimony reprinted in "Automotive Research and
Development and Fuel Economy," Hearings before the Committee on
Commerce, U.S. Senate, Serial No. 93-41, May, June, 1973.
61. H. C. J. Van Beukering and H. Fokker, "Present State-of-the-Art of
the Philips Stirling Engine," SAE Paper 730646.
62. R. J. Meijer, "The Philips Stirling Engine," de Ingenieur, 1969.
63. J. H. Leines and W. R. Wade, "Stirling Engine Progress Report:
Smoke, Odor, Noise and Exhaust Emissions," SAE Paper 80081.
64. W. Agnew, testimony reprinted in "Automotive Research and
Development and Fuel Economy," Hearings before the Committee on
Commerce, U.S. Senate, Serial No. 93-41, May, June, 1973.
350
65. "Stirling Engine Program," printed presentation by Ford Motor o.
to Er.rgy Research and Development Administration's Advanced
Autcmotive Power Systems Contractors' Coordination Meeting, May 8,
1975.
66. "Stiling Engine Program," printed presentation by Ford Motor Co.
to nergy Research and Development Administration's Advanced
Auromntive Power Systems Contractors' Coordination Meeting, November
18, 1975.
67. "1975 Gas Mileage Guide for New Car Buyers," Environmental
Protection Agency, Washington, D.C.
68. "1975 as Mileage Guide for New Car Buyers in California, ;
Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, D.C.
69. "Emission Control of Engine Systems," Consultant Report to the
Committee on Motor Vehicle Emissions, National Academy of Sciences,
Washington, D.C., September, 1974.
70. B. Sternlicht, "Which Automotive Engines in the Future?"
Mechanical Engineering, November, 1974.
71. R W. Richardson, "Automotive Engines for the 1980's, Eaton's
Worldwide Analysis of Future Automotive Power Plants," Eaton
Corp., 1973.
72, D. N. Dewees, Economics and Public Policy, The Automobile Pollution
Case (M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1974).
73. "Annual Miles of Automobile Travel," Report No. 2 of the "National
Personal Transportation Study," Federal Highway Administration,
U.S. Department of Transportation, Washington, D.C., April, 1972.
74, J. C. Fisher and R. H. Pry, "A Simple Substitution Model of
Technological Change," Technological Forecasting and Social
Change, 1971.
75, "The Costs and Benefits of Automobile Emission Control," Vol. 4
of Air Quality and Automobile Emission Control, A Report by the
Coordinating Committee on Air Quality Studies to the National
Academy of Sciences and National Academy of Engineering, U.S.
Senate Committee on Public Works, Serial No. 93-24, September, 1974.
351
76. "Cost of Operating An Automobile," U.S. Department of Trans-
portation, Washington, D.C., April, 1972.
77. Monthly Energy Review, Federal Energy Administration, Washington,
D.C., February, 1975.
78. G.J. Heubner, as quoted in "The Industrial Reorganization Act,"
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of
the'Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, Part 4, "Ground
Transportation Industries," April, 1974.
79. "Energy Conservation Working Paper," Hearings before the
Committee on Commerce, U.S. Senate, November and December, 1974,
Serial No. 93-128.
80. E. Hicks and R. Herendeen, "Total Energy Demand for Automobiles,"
SAE Paper 730065.
81. P. Huntley, private communication (1975).
82. "1973 Motor Truck Facts," Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Associ-
ation, Detroit, Michigan.
83. R. Senter, "Why Peugeot Entered Diesel in U.S. Market,"
Ward's Auto World, August, 1974.
84. G.L. Witzenburg, "Mercedes Coup: 5-Cylinder Diesel for More
Power," Ward's Auto World, January, 1975.
85. H.W. Barnes-Moss and W.M. Scott, "The Light Duty Diesel Engine
for Private Transportation," SAE Paper 750331.
86. J.N. Braddock and R.L. Bradow, "Emissions Patterns of Diesel-
Powered Passenger Cars," SAE Paper 750682.
87. N.A. Henein, "The Diesel as an Alternative Automobile Engine,"
SAE Paper 750931.
88. R. Fendell, "Driving Volkswagen's Diesel Rabbit," Automotive
News. January 26, 1976.
89. J.B. Heywood and L.H. Linden, "Report on Trip to Europe,
January 1976; A Survey of European Alternative Automotive Power
Systems R & D," unpublished working paper, M.I.T., Cambridge,
Mass.
90. K.J. Springer and R.C. Stahman "Emissions and Economy of Four
Diesel Cars," SAE Paper 750332.
352
91. "Control of Air Pollution from New Motor Vehicles and New
Motor Vehicle Engines, Advanced Notice f Proposed Rulemaking"
Federal Register, February 10, 1970, p. 2791.
92. M.L. Monaghan and J.J. McFadden, "A Light Duty Diesel for
America?" SAE Paper 750330.
93. D.E. Larkinson and B.R. Jewsbury, "A Diesel for Light Duty
Applications," SAE Paper 750333.
94. "GM Ties Light Diesel's Production to Easing of Emission Standards,"
Wall Street Journal, September 22, 1975.
95. W.T. Tierney, et al., "Energy Conservation Optimization of the
Vehicle-Fuel-Refinery System, SAE Paper 750673.
96. "Effects of Changing the Proportions of Automotive Distillate
and Gasoline Produced by Petroleum Refining," prepared by Exxon
Research and Engineering Co. for the Environmental Protection
Agency, Report No. EPA-460/3-74-018, Ann Arbor, Michigan.
97. D.S. Barth, et al., "Federal Motor Vehicle Emission Goals for
CO, HC and NOx, Based on Desired Air Quality Levels," reprinted
in Air Pollution - 1970, Part 5, U.S. Senate Committee in
Public Works, 1970.
98. F.P. Grad, et al., The Automobile and The Regulation of Its
Impact on the Environment (University of Oklahoma Press, Norman,
Oklahoma, 1975).
99. "Prospects for Electric Vehicles; A Study of Low-Pollution Vehi-
cles - Electric," prepared by Arthur D. Little, Inc.,for the
National Air Pollution Control Administration, Department of
H.E.W., NAPCA Rept. No. APTD 69-52, October, 1969.
100. L.R. Foote, et al., "Electric Vehicle Systems Study," Ford
Motor Company Technical Report SR-132, Dearborn, Mich., October,
1973.
101. W.F. Hamilton, et al., "Impact of Future Use of Electric Cars in
the Los Angeles Region," U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Report No. EPA-460/3-74-020, Ann Arbor, Michigan.
102. "Impact of Electric Car Use in St. Louis. Philadelphia and Los
Angeles," printed presentation by General Research Corp. to
Energy Research and Development Administration's Advanced Auto-
motive Power Systems Contractors' Coordination Meeting, May 8,
1975.
353
103. "Two Electric Cars," Consumer Reports, October, 1975.
104. "Special Report: Electric Vehicle Revival," Special issue of
Machine Design, October 17, 1974.
105. "Electric Vehicle Test Procedure -- SAE J227, SAE
Recommended Practice" (Report of Electric Vehicle Technical
Committee, approved March, 1971), in SAE Handbook (published
annually by Society of Automotive Engineers, Warrendale, Pa.).
106. R.S. McKee, et al., "Sundancer: A Test Bed Electric Vehicle,"
SAE Paper 720188.
107. S.J. Kalish, "The Potential Market for On-the-Road Electric
Vehicles," prepared for and available from the Electric Vehicle
Council (New York), May 1971.
108. "Electric Vehicle Research, Development, and Demonstration Act
of 1975," Report to Accompany H.R. 8800, U.S. House of Representa-
tives Report No. 94-439, Washington, D.C., July 1975.
109. E. David, testimony reprinted in Hearings before the Committee
on Science and Technology on the Electric Vehicle Research,
Development, and Demonstration Act of 1975, U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives, Washington, D.C., June, 1975.
110. E.J. Cairns and J. McBreen, "Advanced Batteries: Candidates
for Vehicle Propulsion," General Motors Research Laboratories
Report No. GMR-1971, Warren, Michigan, May 5, 1975.
111. J. Braughton, testimony reprinted in Hearings before the Committee
on Science and Technology on the Electric Vehicle Research,
Development, and Demonstration Act of 1975, U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives, Washington, D.C., June, 1975.
112. E.H. Heitbrink, et al., "Batteries for Vehicle Propulsion,"
in Electrochemical Aspects of Cleaner Environments, J.O. Nockris,
ed. (Plenum Press, 1971).
113. D.V. Ragone, "Review of Battery Systems for Electric Highway
Vehicles," SAE Paper 680453.
114. J.H.B. George, "Electrochemical Power Sources for Electric Highway
Vehicles," Arthur D. Little Report No. C-74692, Cambridge, Mass.,
June, 1972.
354
(Intentionally Blank)
355
APPENDIX A. HISTORY AND STATUS OF SIRL1NG ENGINE TECHNOLOGY
In Section 5.2 we gave a brief descL;ption of the key features of the
Stirling engine, an organizational historv of the important past and present
Stirling R & D programs and a summary of the system's potential attributes
in the next decade. In this appendix e supplement Section 5.2 by describ-
ing the past and present technological content of the R & D programs
(Section A.1) and then discussing the key features and components individ-
ually and their present status (Section A.2).
Some of the material presented in Chapter 5 will be repeated here
when necessary for maintaining the continuity of the exposition. Much of
the historical material presented here is taken from personal interviews at
the organizations involved.
A.1 Technological Review of R & D Efforts
A.l.l Philips and Ford
As discussed in Chapter 5, work on the Stirling engine by N.V. Philips
Gloeilampenfabrieken has been underway more-or-less continuously since 1938,
at the Philips Research Laboratories in Eindhoven, the Netherlands. The
initial program was designed to provide a quiet source of electric power
generation for use at remote sites, a need eliminated by the advent of the
transistor.
Research was continued, however, and numerous engine configurations
were examined in the post-World War II period. A major breakthrough was
made in 1953 with the invention of the rhombic drive. This is an ingenious
gear and rod system for coordinating the movements of two pistons in a
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single cylinder engine, and resulting in a otary power output at a crank-
shaft. Before this time Stirling systems required extremely complex rocker
arm assemblies so that the two pistons would be coordinated. Figure A.1
shows a cross-section of a Philips engin:e of the 1960's. Each piston is
"single-acting;"t the "power piston" principally serves to draw power from
the heated working gas, while the "displacer piston" principally serves to
move the gas between the heater and cooler. Each cylinder is practically
an independent engine; because the rhombic drive provides for almost perfect
balancing large single-cylinder engines are possible. The major disadvan-
tages of the rhombic drive are that it is very bulky and heavy, the drive
mechanism takes up about as much space and weight as the sealed working gas
system itself. During the period 1953 to 1965 Philips focussed on basic
engineering studies and component development for the single-acting rhombic
drive system. A key event during this period was the development in 1960
of the roll-sock seal, a fully lubricated rolling diaphragm, to meet the
requirement for a gas-tight external seal between the piston rod and the
cylinder base. As automotive air pollution began to be perceived as a
serious problem in the United States, Philips began to seriously consider
the Stirling as a potential competitor with the diesel in the heavy duty
prime mover field. A 4-cylinder engine was installed in a bus as a demon-
stration of the low noise, vibration and emissions, and competitive effi-
ciency of the system.
However, with active consideration of the prime mover application,
interest was renewed in alternative configurations to the bulky single-
action rhombic drive system; alternatives which would achieve a system
power density (ratio of power output to total system weight or volume)
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competitive with the diesel. In 1968 an engine with double-acting pistons
and a swashplate drive was designed and (subsequently) built. It was
similar to that shown in Figure 5.1 in the main text. In this configuration
there is only one piston per cylinder; a number of cylinders are cyclically
interconnected and the working gas altearnates between the upper half of one
cylinder and the lower half of an adjacent one with the heater, cooler and
one or more regenerators in between. The swashplate drive consists of a
circular plate obliquely connected to a shaft, the piston rods from the
pistons are connected to the edge of the plate by sliders, so that the
reciprocating rod motion is converted to a circular motion of the plate and
thus the output shaft. The double-action swashplate system represents a
substantial improvement in overall specific power over the single-action
rhombic drive system. A key development which helped to renew its attrac-
tiveness had been the development (unrelated to the Stirling program) of
Teflon; from which internal piston seals which required no lubrication could
be made. This double-action swashplate engine was the direct forerunner of
the present Ford prototype.
A number of Philips' important developments should be mentioned here.
First, all working gases other than hydrogen were eliminated from practical
consideration. The theoretical advantages of hydrogen had long been known;
Philips' advances in seal technology allowed the highly diffusive gas to be
contained in working systems; although direct diffusion through the metal
itself remained a problem. The power control system developed by Philips
is based on changing the mean pressure of the working gas by pumping it
between the engine proper and a high pressure storage reservoir. Philips
also developed extremely efficient regenerators. Finally, along with the
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continuing experimentation discussed above, Philips developed an extensive
set of componenent analyses from which they have created a sophisticated
computerized capability for engine synthesis.
In summary, Philips has carried the Stirling engine from its status as
a museum piece in 1938 to the point where laboratory prototypes demoLIscrated
the size, weight and performance features expected of modern automotive
power-plants. On the order of a dozen different engines, some in many
copies, were built, on which a large number of components were tested and
refined. The total number of engine hours accumulated has not been released,
but probably approaches 100,000.
The technology used in the Ford-Philips program is essentially that
which has been distilled out of Philips' long efforts and is now available
as most appropriate for this particular application. The horizontal, four
cylinder double-action configuration with the swashplate drive is similar
to an engine previously built at Philips. The power control system utiliz-
ing mean pressure variation and a bypass for rapid response, the roll-sock
seals, and most other crucial features were originally developed on the
single-action rhombic drive systems. The only important new features are
the use of exhaust gas recirculation in the burner for NO reduction, and
x
a new proprietary coating recently developed by Philips to greatly decrease
the diffusion of hydrogen through the metal walls. Ford arranged with
United Stirling for the mounting of a small test engine in a Pinto in the
summer of 1974 for a very preliminary set of passenger car tests.
The Ford engine program presently consumes the bulk of Philips'
Stirling effort. However, Philips has also been examining a number of
potentially major advances in Stirling cycle technology. First, Philips is
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working to both decrease the cost of the heater head and raise engine effi-
ciency by use of ceramics in place of the present superalloys. However,
Philips is also looking for ways, short of complete replacement of ail
possible high-temperature components with ceramics, to accomplish ts. For
example, they are looking at the possibility of cooling the outer suriace of
the cylinder dome with water, and lining the cylinder inside with a ceramic.
For several years, Philips has been examining the use of a heat store with
the heat pipe. A third area which Philips has begun to look at is the use
of a variable-angle swashplate for power control. Changing the swashplate
angle changes both the swept volume and dead volume, providing an amplified
power control. While this would require a complicated mechanical control
of a load-bearing component, it would eliminate the need for a torque
converter or other transmission components external to the engine. Combined
with a heat-store, heat-pipe system, the variable swashplate would provide
the capability of a high power (but low efficiency) transient operating
point (present systems are limited in power by the combustion air blower
output).
A.1.2 United Stirling
As discussed in the main text, United Stirling was founded in 1968,
and initially hoped to develop as rapidly as possible an engine based on the
technology then most prominent at Philips, i.e., single-acting power and
displacer pistons, rhombic drive, roll-sock seals, etc., and to market it
for uses where the advantages of high efficiency, clean exhaust, and low
noise and vibration would outweigh the relatively high initial cost. It had
been hoped that the submarine, city bus, and underground mining equipment
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might provide such applications. The 200 hi, engine which resulted in 19,.
turned out to be too heavy and expensive even for these markets, although
it did have low noise, vibration and emissions, and a thermal efficiceay
somewhere between that of an ICE and a diesel.
With this experience, the company then decided to orient its develop-
ment work more specifically toward the prime mover field, where the
increasingly stringent emissions and noise controls would tend (they hoped)
to increase the attractiveness of the Stirling relative to the diesel. The
second major design effort then was a double-action engine in the V-4
configuration with cross-head pistons and a standard crankshaft, producing
40-60 hp, shown in Figure A.2. The idea was to stay as close as possible
to conventional prime-mover technology in order to minimize development and
production costs and to take advantage of the higher specific power of the
double-action system. The first prototype of this engine was produced in
late 1971; six were built in all. At the present time, United Stirling is
focusing its efforts on a 100 hp, double-action V-4 engine, which will be
designed and built in a 200 hp, V-8 configuration as well. One such V-4
model has been running in a test cell since late 1974. This latest model
differs from Philips' most widely used technology in several important areas:
its use of sliding seals as compared to the roll-sock, its conventional V"
configuration and crankshaft as compared to Philips' in-line single-cylinder
geometries and rhombic drive, its use of double acting pistons as compared
to single-acting power displacer pistons and its variation of dead-volume as
compared to mean pressure for power control.
This 200 hp engine is now in what United Stirling has designated its
"Stage Zero", and achieves a thermal efficiency about halfway between that
Figure A.2
CUTAWAY DRAWING OF UNITED
STIRLING DOUBLE-ACTION V-4
STIRL1NG ENGINE
(Courtesy of United
Stirling (Sweden))
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of the present ICE and diesel. The engine .at "Stage One" is planned to
have a thermal efficiency closer to that of the diesel using improved
versions of present technology, and it is hcred that this can be demonstrated
in a prototype within a couple of years. This engine would (they hope)
compete with the diesel where special requirements such as noise or
emissions control would make the Stirling more attractive in spite of its
higher initial and operating costs. The company sees the Stirling fully
compeatitive with the diesel only in their 'Stage Two" when, using ceramics
rather than high temperature steel for the critical hot components, the
Stirling engine would attain a thermal efficiency equal to the diesel's,
and a considerably lower first cost. This will not be obtained even in the
laboratory for four to five years; a ceramic component development effort
is just now getting underway. A separate effort on the use of heat pipes
with the engine to both reduce cost and improve efficiency by permitting
much higher heat transfer fluxes to the heater head is underway.
While United Stirling's efforts are focused on specific engine config-
urations which it hopes to improve and eventually market, the company has
made a strong commitment to fundamental engineering studies of almost every
component of the engine. Thus, in parallel with the specific development
efforts discussed above, an impressive engineering and development capability
has been developed. For example, studies of heat transfer coefficients
across banks of closely spaced tubes, and flow visualization studies using
water, are underway in support of header head development. Simulator rigs
for other key components have been constructed as well.
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A.1.3 M.A.N. - MWM
The M.A.N.-MWM group has always had a long-range view of the Stirling
engine's potential. They have therefore ulot sought to build a prototype
for a specific application, in contrast to the efforts on Philips' Torino
engine and United Stirling's V-8. In i6) they designed and built a single
cylinder 30 hp single-acting rhombic drive engine and a similar 4-cylinder
version to gain design experience and to serve as test beds. They have
designed and are now building a 4-cylinder in-line double-action crankshaft-
drive engine. Their principal efforts, however have been put into develop-
ing the low cost, reliable component technology which would be applicable
over a wide power range, preferably in a modular format. The group's most
noteworthy accomplishment to date has been the development of a heater which
can be precision cast at minimal addition to the materials cost. They have
designed it to be as light as possible, and their testing has proven it
reliable. It consists of a finned tube, a plain tube, and a connecting
U-shaped tube, all of which can be brazed to the cylinder and regenerator
housing. They claim to have achieved a cost reduction of 90% relative to
the conventional Philips heater, due to a smaller high temperature metal
requirement and the elimination of a special machining requirement.
Optimization and testing of the unit continues.
Rather than the rotating ceramic regenerator which United Stirling and
Philips are using in their latest designs, the M.A.N.-MM group has devel-
oped an accordian-like recuperator, with hot and cool gases in alternate
folds of metal. It replaces a number of welding operations with folds and
thus is cheaper to manufacture than previous Stirling recuperators. It has
the advantages of being easily replaced as a unit if it becomes blocked.
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and of minimizing leakage between exhaust gses and incoming air. Both
this recuoerator and the previously diszcussed heater head can be combined
directly into larger units with minimal 'tdidign. The group's latest
design uses a conventional crankshaft drive, rather than a swashplate,
which would have required a separate development effort, or the rhombic,
which is bulkier. It is an in-line configuration in contrast to United
Stirling's V".
Because of the two firms' interest in other applications as well as
the automotive the Group has a different perspective on the requirements
for the Stirling engine control system. For example, little output modula-
tion is needed for the duty cycle of an electric power generator. Another
present application of heavy duty diesels is in ship propulsion, where there
is no need for rapid output changes, but the engine must maintain its
efficiency for long part-load operations; the Philips mean pressure control
system is adequate for this. The Group has not been able to achieve the
part-load efficiencies claimed by United Stirling for their dead volume
control system. The Group is working on a new type of control system which
they claim will provide rapid response without the substantial loss during
the transient which characterizes Philips' use of working gas bypass, but
they will not discuss it in detail. It involves a working gas bypass
carefully controlled as a function of phase angle. The Group has tested
both roll-sock and sliding seals. Both have held up well under laboratory
conditions; but they are concerned as to how they will perform in a working
environment.
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A.2 Technological Status of The Stirling Engine and Its Key Components
In Section 5.2 and the preceding p.ages of this Appendix we have defined
the crucial features of the Stirling cycle powerplant and described the past
and present development efforts aimed at bringing it to the end of the
Initial Development Stage. In this secLiLII an attempt will be made to
summarize and characterize the status of engine, its key components and
features. As discussed in the previous section, numerous Stirling engines
have been operated on test stands and a number have been demonstrated in
vehicles of various sorts. Thus, for each important component there is at
least one concept from which an operable engine can be made. In fact, there
are several alternatives in most cases., and also there are varying
degrees of development experience behind the alternatives and there are one
or two "front-runners," which presently appear to have the greatest
probability of utilization should the Stirling engine be commercialized at
an early date, and there are advanced concepts which offer theoretical
advantages, but lag behind the front-runners in development status. The
distinction is a crucial one; the key attributes of a Stirling-powered
passenger car depend on what set of alternatives is chosen; this in turn
implies the extent of further development required and thus the likely
introduction date. First, gross system design choices will be discussed.
Second, the key individual components will be addressed. Table A.1
summarizes the discussion.
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Table .1
DEVELOPMENT STATUS OF KEY STIRLING ENGINE FEATURES AND COMPONENTS
Feature/Component Concept
(* = FGS)
Prime
Organization
Configuration and
drive system
Single-action
rhombic drive
Philips No longer considered
viable - too heavy
*D-A, Parallel
cylinders,
swashplate
drive
*D-A, "'tV" or
in-line
cylinders,
conventional
crankshaft
Philips-Ford
United
Stirling,
M.A.N. -MWM
Working gas *Hydrogen All Key for power density;
sealing problems
Heat Source *Burner All Well developed
Heat store
Heat pipe
Philips,
United
Stirling
Philips,
United
Stirling
Limited range problem
Advanced concept
Heater head *Metallic All Expensive
Philips,
United
Stirling
Advanced concept
Power Control *Mean pressure
with bypass
Philips-Ford,
M.A.N.-MWM
Inefficient during
transients
*Dead Volume United
Stirling
Expensive,
complicated
Variable-angle
swashplate
Philips Advanced concept
Comment
Ceramic
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Table A.1 (Cont'd)
Feature/Component Concept
(* = FGS)
Prime
Crganization
External seals *Roll-sock
*Sliding
Preheater *Rotating
ceramic core
*Metallic
recuperator
Phi Lips-Ford,
M.A.N.-MWM
United
Stirling,
M.A.N.-MWM
Philips-Ford,
United
Stirling
M.A.N.-NUN
Durability unclear,
catastrophic failure,
hermatic seal
Difficult to make
frictionless and
tight
Chemical attack
a problem
Expensive
Regenerator *Stacked metal
screens
All Expensive
*Metallic All
Comment
Cooler Expensive
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A.2.1 Gross Design Features
The crucial distinction among modern Stirling engine configurations is
between the single-action and double-action systems. The single-action
system with rhombic drive (shown previously in Figure A-1) was the system
on which Philips did most of the crucial evelopment work of the 1950's and
1960's, and which was originally utilized by the United Stirling and M.A.N.-
MWM groups. The latter two groups and the Ford-Philips team have all now
turned to double-action configurations whose superior system power density
are more competitive with those of modern prime movers. The Ford engine
uses four horizontal parallel cylinders, whose axes lie on-and are equally
spaced around a cylinder, and uses a swashplate drive. The latest United
Stirling and M.A.N.-MWM designs use conventional "V" or in-line configu-
rations with crankshafts. It seems clear at this point that the double-
action system dominates over the single-action system wherever volume is
limited. While there is much less experience with swashplate drive as
compared to a crankshaft, there do not appear to be any major difficulties
which might prevent its utilization. Thus, while these are several com-
peting configuration-drive systems, several appear to be adequate for the
passenger car engine. The only major innovation being considered in this
area is the variable-angle swashplate, discussed below with power control
systems.
There is little doubt that any commercially successful Stirling system
will use hydrogen as its working gas. The next best choice, helium, could
be used at a sacrifice of power density of about one-third.[2] Air is far
worse. The most important problem with using hydrogen is the difficulty
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in containing it under the high pressures required for Stirling engine
operation. This is addressed below under the discussion of seals. The
other problem associated with the use of ydrogen is its flammability. The
actual amount of hydrogen in a Stirling engine is so small (less than 20 gm)
that "there would be more noise than visible effect" [3,p.113] in an explo-
sion. In any case, it would diffuse very rapidly, should it leak, and it
must be compared relative to gasoline vapor which is highly explosive. How-
ever, the issue is a sensitive one and remains open. Ford has funded a study
at the Stanford Research Institute to reduce the present uncertainty.
A closed cycle heat engine such as the Stirling engine can be operated
from any source of heat at the requisite temperature. The most prominently
discussed alternative to a burner is the use of a heat store, whose heat
would be transferred to the heater head of the engine either by a heat pipe
or some more conventional system.[4,5] A heat store is an insulated
container filled with some material capable of storing energy in the form
of heat, as a latent heat of fusion, sensible heat or both. Heat stores
can be rechanged; most likely electrical resistance heating would be used
- the gross features of the system thus becoming similar to an electric
vehicle running off energy stored in a battery. Taking into consider-
ation the efficiency of a Stirling engine with a peak cycle temperature at
the minimum temperature of a lithium-fluoride heat store, a specific
mechanical energy storage of about 200 wh per kg of LiF has been cited [5];
incorporating the necessary insulation and other ancillary features would
reduce this substantially, probably to the point where the key performance
issues discussed with respe-t to the electric vehicle elsewhere in this
report become directly relevant.[3, p.198] It does not appear that a
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vehicle operated by a Stirling engine powered from a heat store could
compete for a substantial fraction of the American passenger car market; in
any case such a system would have to be considered an advanced concept in
terms of its development status.
A heat pipe is a device which can trnsmit large quantities of heat
with a very small temperature drop and deliver the heat to a very small
area; i.e. it can deliver a very high heat flux. Independent of the
original source of the heat (burner, heat store, etc.), the high delivered
heat flux would permit a relatively small heater head, possibly resulting
in a substantial cost savings. Philips and United Stirling are conducting
small development efforts to take advantages of this opportunity; it must,
however, be considered as an advanced concept in an early state of devel-
opment.
A.2.2 Key Components
A.2.2.1 Heater Head
At the present time this appears to be the most costly, and thus
possibly a limiting, feature of the system. It must contain the working
gas at pressures of over 200 atmospheres while being maintained continuously
at temperatures above 1400°F. These cycle parameters, crucial to the high
efficiency of the powerplant, can presently be attained only with the use
of expensive "superalloys," special steels utilizingenickel and chromium,
because of tremendous stresses (thermal and non-thermal) which must be
sustained at high temperature. Up to ten lbs each of nickel and chromium
may be required in the heater head steels. The heater head serves as the
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heat transfer 1Surface through which heaL is transferred from the flowing
combustion products on the outside to the flowing working gas on the inside.
The high surface area required is presently ttained by the use of many
small tubes, a configuration extremely ifficult to readily mass produce.
A heater head from a mid-1960's Philips engine is shown in Figure A.3.
While satisfactory heater heads have been made at substantial cost for the
experimental engines used to date, it is clear that this component will be
a major focus of future cost reduction efforts. One approach is obviously
to attempt to design a head which can be separated into castable components
requiring a minimum number of attachments to each other and to the engine;
this approach has been pursued with some success by the M.A.N.-LMWM group
and will obviously be a key effort in Phase II of the Ford-Philips program.
While it is far from clear at this time whether these programs can succeed,
the metallic heater head must be considered the most likely candidate for
incorporation into any Stirling system commercialized within the next
10-15 years.
An advanced concept which is the subject of considerable interest in
the Stirling engine community is to make the heater head from a ceramic
material. Carefully fabricated small pieces of ceramic have demonstrated
the ability to attain the required local properties of enduring stress
resistance at high temperature. A heater head ideally made from such
materials could actually accommodate cycle parameters which would theoreti-
cally add 5-10 percentage points to the metal-based engine's thermal
efficiency. Because the basic materials from which such ceramics are
likely to be formed (silicon, nitrogen, carbon, etc.) are very low in cost,
it is theoretically possible that a ceramic heater head could be manufactured
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commercially uccessful Stirling engine program, there are a number of
options which, if diligently pursued, may yield a successful device,
A.2.2.2 Power Control System
Powel control is inherently more difficult for external combustion
systems because the removal of the combustion process from the working
fluid makes the fuel and air flows unsuitable as primary control variables;
either some sort of variable system geometry or direct control of the
amount of working gas in the system is required. Philips' favored concept
has been the latter: a reservoir of working gas is maintained at high
pressure; power is increased by letting gas pass from the reservoir into the
engine proper; to reduce power the gas must be pumped back into the reser-
voir. This is known as "mean pressure" control. Power increases are very
rapid; power decreases with this system require an unacceptable length of
time to.pump the fluid out. In order to meet passenger care requirements,
therefore, a simple bypass system is used momentarily to bleed gas from the
high pressure section of the engine to the low. This is rapid but directly
decreases engine efficiency during its use. The extent to which this is
important depends on the duty cycle of the engine. The passenger car
application requires a substantial degree of transient operation: the
bypass therefore does cause some reduction in vehicle fuel economy.
1The fuel and air flows must of course vary with power output; this
does not appear to be difficult. The Ford-Philips prototype utilizes a
temperature sensor on the heater head; fuel and air flows are controlled
to keep the heater head temperature constant and coordinated together to
meet burner combustion requirements.
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The Unite6 Stirling group is using a control system based in changing
the inert, or "dead," volume of the working gas system. An increase in
dead volumce mea.s that, for a given mean pressure, the pressure decrease
due to a given volumetric expansion is lower, as is the work output. This
form of power control is thus "pressure amplitude" control as compared to
Philips' "means pressure" control. United Stirling claims adequate
responsiveness for the system without any significant efficiency losses.
The M.A.N.-MWA group is working on control system which apparently involves
mean pressure control with a bypass carefully controlled as a function of
crank angle; it is proprietary but they claim good response and high
efficiency.
Each of these control concepts is expensive due to complicated
valving, piping, chambers, pumps, etc. However: the control system
problem seems to be amenable both to new and continued efforts on these
concepts, for simplification and consequent cost reduction without a
significant sacrifice in efficiency.
An advanced power control and drive system concept now being
examined by Philips is the variable-angle swashplate drive. Varying the
angle at which the swashplate is connected to the driveshaft changes the
swept volume, and effectively changes the dead volume, providing for power
output changes without the increase in total working gas volume associated
with the explicit use of dead volume. A rudimentary variable-angle
swashplate drive system has been tested at Philips, but this must be
considered an advanced concept, lagging well behind the more practical
control and drive systems discussed above.
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A.2.2.3 Working Gas Seals
High pressure hydrogen is notoriously difficult to contain in ay
system. In the Stirling Engine the most critical point of leakage is where
the piston rod slides against the cylinder base. Philips has developed,
and is using in the Ford program, the roll-sock seal. This is a rubDer
diaphragm attached to both the rod andbase, sealed with oil on the outer
side and providing a hermetic seal. A major open issue is the durability of the
roll-sock seal under vehicle operating conditions; it has held up success-
fully under laboratory conditions and in the Stirling cycle refrigerators sold
by Philips. United Stirling is using a much simpler sliding seal arrange-
ment, which they feel can be engineered to contain the gas to the point
where a minimal level of make-up will be required.
The high pressure hydrogen also has the ability to diffuse right
through the metal walls of cylinder, heater, etc. Philips claims that this
problem has been virtually eliminated by the development of a new coating.
Again, however, serious testing remains. Even without the new coating,
and even with the use of sliding seals, it appears that the total amount of
hydrogen make-up can probably be held to a point where recharge would occur
within maintenance periods typically expected of passenger cars. In
summary, then, solutions to the problem of containing the high pressure
hydrogen seem to be relatively well in hand, at least at the laboratory
engine stage. Again, of course, much practical development remains to be
accomplished - for example mucheffort is presently being expended on devel-
oping the optimal material for the roll-sock.
378
A.2.2.4 Other Components
The heater head, power control ad seals are presently the
individual components receiving the most development effort. The other key
components are at,or are likely to shortly be at,the stage where they can
be confidently installed in a prototype engine which has completed its
Initial Development Stage, i.e. they will demonstrate the necessary per-
formance. These components are the burner, radiator, preheater, regen-
erator, and cooler.
Stirling engine burners have been shown to sustain combustion with
good combustion efficiency and, in simulations of the EPA regulatory
driving cycle (the "FDC"),meet the statutory (original 1976) emissions
standards for intermediate-size cars when running on gasoline. There is
little doubt that they can be designed to achieve high combustion effi-
ciencies in heavier, cheaper, fuels although the emissions issue under
those conditions is less clear, both in terms of the regulated pollutants
and particulates (and possibly sulfur oxides and odor as well).
The radiator for the Stirling engine needs to be considerably larger
than on an ICE-powered vehicle, making it more costly and difficult to
package. Neither presently appears to be a major problem; in any case
Philips claims to have made a significant advance in radiator design,
although the cost aspects of their system are unclear.
* Preheaters of two types are presently being used in laboratory engines:
stationary "recuperators," where the incoming air flows on one side of a
set of passages and the hot exhaust gases on the other, and rotary systems,
where the incoming air flows through one side of a rotating disc (probably
a ceramic) and the exhaust gases on the other. The Ford-Philips and
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United Stirling teams are leaning toward the rotary ceramic system. it s
very similar in concept to the preheater used by Ford on automotive gals
turbines except that it does not have sealing problems which are as
difficult. Automotive gas turbine preheater ceramic discs have had
difficulties standing up to the attack of impurities in air and in ile
combustion products from the fuel; most of these problems seem to have been
resolved. The M.A.N.-MWM Group feels they have developed a potentially
satisfactory recuperator. In both cases adequate performance is highly
likely but cost remains an open issue.
The Stirling engine regenerator, as developed at Philips, consists
of a volume of fine steel mesh; it is remarkably efficient; again cost is
open.
The cooler on the Stirling engine, where heat is rejected from the
engine proper to the cooling water, needs, like the heater head, a system
of fine tubes which must contain the high pressure hydrogen while conduct-
ing large amounts of heat. The crucial difference is that it does all this
at much lower temperatures and therefore, superalloys (or ceramics) are not
required; a difficult manufacturing problem remains, however.
Finally, it should be noted that Ford considers it likely that a two-
speed accessory drive will have to be developed for use in the engine.
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